UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4661
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIE JAMES STEELE, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:12-cr-00184-RJC-DSC-1)
Submitted: May 22, 2014 Decided: May 28, 2014
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ross Hall Richardson, Acting Executive Director, Joshua B.
Carpenter, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC.,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Willie James Steele, Jr., appeals from his jury
conviction and twenty-four-month sentence on two counts of
deprivation of civil liberties while acting under color of law,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012). Steele’s counsel filed
a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
questioning whether Steele’s sentence is procedurally and
substantively reasonable, and whether it was error for the
district court to impose certain supervised release conditions.
Steele has not filed a pro se supplemental brief despite
receiving notice of his right to do so, and the Government has
declined to file a responsive brief. Finding no error, we
affirm.
We review a sentence imposed by the district court
under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); United States v. Lynn,
592 F.3d 572, 578 (4th Cir. 2010) (abuse of discretion standard
of review applicable when defendant properly preserves a claim
of sentencing error in district court “[b]y drawing arguments
from [18 U.S.C.] § 3553 [(2012)] for a sentence different than
the one ultimately imposed”). In conducting this review, we
must first examine the sentence for significant procedural
error, including “failing to calculate (or improperly
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calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting
a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence[.]” Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. In reviewing the district court’s application of the
Guidelines, we review findings of fact for clear error and
questions of law de novo. United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d
330, 334 (4th Cir. 2009).
We have considered Steele’s arguments regarding his
Guidelines range calculation and find them to be meritless. In
any event, the district court thoroughly explained its rationale
for the chosen sentence and expressly indicated that it would
have imposed a higher sentence if it had statutory authority to
do so. Accordingly, even if the district court would have
decided the Guidelines issues in Steele’s favor, Steele’s
sentence would have been the same. See United States v.
Savillon-Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123-24 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming
sentence where the record was clear the district court would
have imposed the same sentence “even if it had decided the
guidelines issue the other way,” and it was evident that “the
sentence would be reasonable even if the guidelines issue had
been decided in the defendant’s favor”). We also defer to the
district court’s decision to impose a twelve-month sentence on
each count, and to order that the sentences run consecutively.
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See Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (2012)
(“Judges have long been understood to have discretion to select
whether the sentences they impose will run concurrently or
consecutively with respect to other sentences that they
impose[.]”); Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (recognizing that even when
reviewing a sentence outside the Guidelines range, an appellate
court “must give due deference to the district court’s decision
that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the” sentence
imposed).
We discern no error in the supervised release
conditions imposed by the district court. In this regard,
district courts are afforded broad latitude in imposing
supervised release conditions, which we review for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Worley, 685 F.3d 404, 407 (4th
Cir. 2012). Although a particular condition of supervised
release need not be connected to the underlying offense, id.,
the sentencing court must provide an explanation for the
conditions it imposes. United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182,
186 (4th Cir. 2009).
Steele challenges the special conditions requiring
psychosexual evaluation and that he take all medications
prescribed as a result of the evaluation. It is apparent from
the record that in imposing the special conditions of supervised
release, the district court considered Steele’s history and
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characteristics, which included the circumstances underlying his
crimes and his behavior and disregard for the law while
unmedicated. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of
discretion in the district court’s imposition of the special
conditions of supervised release. In any event, Steele may
challenge his supervised release conditions if and when they are
enforced. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c).
We have reviewed the record in accordance with our
obligations under Anders and find no reversible error.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform Steele, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Steele requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
counsel may then move this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Steele. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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