UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4585
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BOBBY CLARENCE BYRD, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00364-FDW-1)
Submitted: May 22, 2014 Decided: May 28, 2014
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Henderson Hill, Executive Director, Joshua B. Carpenter, FEDERAL
DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States
Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Bobby Clarence Byrd, Jr., pleaded guilty to knowingly
transporting child pornography, and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1), 2 (2012); and possessing
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)
(2012), and received a total sentence of 204 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Byrd raises two claims: that the
district court erred in failing to address two of his arguments
in favor of a more lenient sentence, and that the sentence is
substantively unreasonable. Finding no merit in either
contention, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 46, 51 (2007). The Supreme Court has held that a sentencing
judge must provide sufficient explanation to demonstrate that it
has “considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis
for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita
v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Failing to do so
renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable. United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009).
Byrd asserts that the district court procedurally
erred by failing to address all of his nonfrivolous reasons for
imposing a lower sentence. Our review discloses no such error.
The court stated that it had considered each of the arguments
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set forth in Byrd’s sentencing memorandum. The court addressed
the offense characteristics which, according to Byrd, overstated
the seriousness of his offense, concluding that two of the
enhancements were antiquated and should be stricken and that the
remaining enhancements should apply. The court thus granted a
downward variance to a range of 188 to 235 months, and
determined that a sentence of 204 months was appropriate.
Explicitly referencing the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) and noting the extremely serious nature of the
offense, the court also provided a detailed rationale for its
sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
not commit the procedural sentencing error asserted by Byrd.
Byrd also fails to rebut the presumption that his
below-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable. See
United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012)
(explaining that this court applies a presumption on appeal that
a sentence within or below a properly calculated Guidelines
range is substantively reasonable); United States v. Montes-
Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
defendant may rebut presumption by showing “that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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