FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY 29 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ZDRAVKO KOTZEV, No. 12-16167
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-00907-FJM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES L. RYAN, in his individual
and official capacities as Director of the
Arizona Department of Corrections; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Frederick J. Martone, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 13, 2014**
Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.
Former Arizona state prisoner Zdravko Kotzev appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging
constitutional violations in connection with his incarceration and community
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
supervision. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo
summary judgment and the district court’s dismissal under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 2009). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Kotzev’s claim for forcible spousal
separation against defendants Ryan and Butcher because Kotzev failed to allege
facts sufficient to link defendants to any constitutional violation. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must
allege facts that “allow [ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged”).
The district court properly dismissed Kotzev’s intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim because Ryan and Butcher are immune under Arizona
law. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 31-201.01(F) (“Any and all causes of action which may
arise out of tort caused by the director, prison officers or employees of the
department, within the scope of their legal duty, shall run only against the state.”).
The district court properly dismissed Kotvez’s § 1983 claims for damages
against Ryan acting in his official capacity because Ryan is entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir.
2007) (Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 damages claims against state officials in
their official capacity).
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The district court properly granted summary judgment on Kotvez’s claims
against Ryan for injunctive and declaratory relief because those claims were moot.
See Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1063-65 (9th Cir. 2012) (injunctive and
declaratory relief became moot upon inmate’s release from custody because he was
no longer subject to the conditions or policies he challenged).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kotvez’s motion to
amend his complaint and the motion to extend deadlines in the scheduling order
because Kotvez failed to show good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (requiring
“good cause” to modify a scheduling order); Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,
Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1992) (setting forth standard of review and
explaining that the “good cause” standard of Rule 16 controls after a scheduling
order is established, and that the inquiry turns primarily on the party’s diligence).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Kotvez’s motion
for recusal. See United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010)
(setting forth standard of review and stating that judicial rulings alone rarely
constitute a valid basis for a recusal motion).
Kotvez’s contentions concerning the denial of his motion for default are
unpersuasive and unsupported by the record.
AFFIRMED.
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