Case: 13-60529 Document: 00512645572 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/29/2014
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
No. 13-60529
Fifth Circuit
FILED
Summary Calendar May 29, 2014
Lyle W. Cayce
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
RANSEL KEITH PRYOR,
Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 2:12-CR-19-1
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Ransel Keith Pryor appeals his guilty plea conviction and 188-month
sentence for possessing with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of
cocaine hydrochloride. In his plea agreement, Pryor waived the right to appeal
his conviction and sentence on any ground whatsoever.
Although it moves for dismissal on the basis that the appeal is barred by
the appeal waiver, the Government disputes Pryor’s contention that the
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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No. 13-60529
district court abused its discretion by not allowing Pryor to withdraw his guilty
plea. We agree with the Government that this claim, assuming it survived the
appeal waiver, is unavailing. Because the district court accepted his plea at
rearraignment, Pryor had no absolute right to withdraw it. See FED. R. CRIM.
P. 11(d)(1); compare United States v. Arami, 536 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2008).
However, a district court may permit withdrawal before sentencing if the
defendant presents a “fair and just reason.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d)(2)(B). When
deciding whether the defendant has met this standard, we consider whether
(a) the defendant asserted his innocence, (b) withdrawal would cause the
Government to suffer prejudice, (c) the defendant delayed in filing the motion,
(d) withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the court, (e) close
assistance of counsel was available, (f) the original plea was knowing and
voluntary, and (g) withdrawal would waste judicial resources. United States
v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1984).
Pryor does not address the last of the Carr factors, that is, whether
allowing him to withdraw his plea would have wasted judicial resources. With
regard to each of the other six factors, each of Pryor’s assertions is conclusory,
and not one of those assertions is supported by a record citation as required.
See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Arguments must be briefed adequately. United
States v. Charles, 469 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 2006). Conclusory arguments are
deemed inadequately briefed and abandoned. United States v. Cothran, 302
F.3d 279, 286 n.7 (5th Cir. 2002). A counseled brief is not entitled to liberal
construction. Beasley v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1986). Moreover,
the record belies the contention that Pryor had not been advised of the possible
severity of the sentence and that his plea was therefore involuntary and
unknowing because his consent to it was vitiated by error. See United States
v. Cantu, 185 F.3d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1999).
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No. 13-60529
Additionally, Pryor’s challenge to the sentence is barred by the plea and
the appeal waiver contained in the plea agreement. See United States v.
Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 729 (5th Cir. 2002). Pryor does not suggest that the
waiver is invalid for reasons pertaining to it alone rather than to the plea as a
whole. See United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1992).
Pryor’s waiver of the right to challenge the sentence was without exception.
The Government’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the appeal is
DISMISSED.
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