FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 2, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
ENRIQUE GARCIA-MENDOZA,
Petitioner,
v. No. 13-9531
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
United States Attorney General,
Respondent.
-------------------------------------
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
Amicus Curiae.
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DECISION OF
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Submitted on the briefs:*
Sandra Saltrese-Miller, Saltrese, Faville & DeSeguin, LLC, Denver, Colorado, Ingrid
J. DeFranco, Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco, Brighton, Colorado, and Ben
Winograd, Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, LLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Petitioner.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Douglas E. Ginsburg,
Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, and Julie S. Saltman, Trial
Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Office of Immigration
Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Maris J. Liss, Farmington Hills, Michigan, Aaron C. Hall, Aurora, Colorado, and
Mark R. Barr, Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus brief on behalf of American
Immigration Lawyers Association.
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, PORFILIO and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
BRISCOE, Chief Judge.
Enrique Garcia-Mendoza petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (BIA) decision upholding the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of his request
for cancellation of removal. The agency determined that he was ineligible for such
relief because he could not establish that he “ha[d] been a person of good moral
character,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B), due to his confinement in a penal institution
for more than 180 days, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7). We have jurisdiction pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.
I. Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. He was admitted in January 1996
as a temporary visitor for six months, but he remained in the United States beyond
that time without authorization.
In 2010, he was arrested and charged with driving under the influence and
leaving the scene of an accident. He could not afford bond and remained confined
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during his pretrial criminal proceedings for a total of 104 days. He then entered a
guilty plea and was sentenced to a term of 270 days with credit for time served. He
was released in 2011, after he had been confined for a total of 197 days (104 served
before his conviction and credited towards his term of imprisonment and 93 served
after his conviction).
After he was released, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) took him
into custody and initiated removal proceedings. Petitioner conceded that he was
removable for remaining in the United States beyond his authorized period of stay
and applied for cancellation of removal. The IJ denied his request because petitioner
had been confined for more than 180 days for his 2010 conviction and therefore he
could not establish the requisite good moral character.
While petitioner’s appeal of that decision was pending with the BIA, he filed a
motion with the state trial court seeking to amend his sentence. In the motion, he
alleged that his counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his
sentence before he entered his guilty plea. He asked the court to resentence him to
166 days with no credit for time served, because this sentence “would satisfy the
court’s desire and the District Attorney’s request to have Mr. Garcia-Mendoza
actually serve a total of 270 days (a 9 month sentence), but the mittimus would be
such that he would be able to avail himself to a defense before the United States
Department of Justice.” Admin. R. at 318 (emphasis in original). The state court
granted the motion and issued a modified mittimus nunc pro tunc to the original
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sentencing date. We note the state trial court did not issue any substantive order
addressing the allegations petitioner asserted in his motion regarding his counsel’s
advisements.
Petitioner then filed a motion for remand with the BIA based on the new
evidence that his sentence was modified to 166 days. The BIA granted the motion
and remanded to the IJ for further proceedings. On remand, the IJ again denied
cancellation of removal, noting that the nunc pro tunc order modifying the sentence
did not change the fact that petitioner had already been confined for more than
180 days as a result of his conviction. The BIA upheld the IJ’s decision. Petitioner
now seeks review of the BIA’s decision.
II. Analysis
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, nonpermanent residents, like
petitioner, who apply for cancellation of removal must demonstrate that they have
been persons of “good moral character” during the ten years immediately preceding
the date of their application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). An applicant cannot
establish “good moral character” if he has “been confined, as a result of conviction,
to a penal institution for an aggregate period of one hundred and eighty days or
more.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7).
The issue presented for review is whether the BIA correctly determined that
petitioner is statutorily barred under § 1101(f)(7) from establishing good moral
character and is therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal under § 1229b(b)(1).
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Petitioner contends the BIA erred by failing to give full faith and credit to the state
court’s nunc pro tunc sentence modification. Petitioner also asserts that the BIA
erred in counting his period of pretrial confinement in determining that he had been
confined for 180 days or more as a result of his conviction.
We review legal questions de novo. Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 974
(10th Cir. 2011). When reviewing the BIA’s interpretation of immigration statutes,
we follow the two-step test from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). Tapia Garcia v. I.N.S., 237 F.3d 1216,
1220 (10th Cir. 2001). At the first step, we consider whether Congress has spoken to
the question at issue. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. “If the intent of Congress is clear,
that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43. If the statute is
ambiguous, we move to the second step to decide “whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843.
A.
The BIA concluded that the state court’s nunc pro tunc sentence modification
had no impact on calculating the 180-day period of confinement for the
good-moral-character provision in § 1101(f)(7) because petitioner “had actually
already served a period of confinement in excess of 180 days as a result of a lawful
conviction, prior to the Colorado sentencing judge’s amendment of his sentence.”
Admin. R. at 5. In support of its conclusion, the BIA noted that the state court order
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“did not vacate the actual conviction, or find that the conviction was unlawfully
obtained or the sentence imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States
or the State of Colorado.” Id. The BIA further found that “in light of the clear
express language of section [1101(f)(7)], Congress intended to apply the actual
period of confinement served by an alien pursuant to a then existing lawful sentence
. . . rather than any nunc pro tunc modification of that sentence, in determining
whether an alien meets the aggregate period of 180 days.” Admin. R. at 5.
We agree with the BIA that the statutory language is clear on this issue, and
therefore we need not proceed to the second Chevron step. See Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 842-43. In § 1101(f)(7), Congress intended to bar aliens from establishing good
moral character when an alien was “confined, as a result of [a] conviction,” for
180 days or more. This language focuses on the actual period of confinement, and
does not reference the ordered term of imprisonment. The inquiry under § 1101(f)(7)
is fact-based, dependent on the actual period of confinement, and not dependent on
the formal language of the court’s sentencing order.
Section 1101(f)(7)’s use of the word “confined” distinguishes it from the cases
petitioner relies on to support his position. Those cases involved the question of
whether certain convictions for theft offenses qualified as aggravated felonies under
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) after the state court issued a nunc pro tunc order reducing
the aliens’ sentences. See In re Cota-Vargas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 849, 851 (BIA 2005);
In re Song, 23 I. & N. Dec. 173, 173-74 (BIA 2001). Section 1101(a)(43)(G) defines
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aggravated felony to include a theft offense “for which the term of imprisonment [is]
at least one year.” Id. Because § 1101(a)(43)(G) looks to the ordered term of
imprisonment, as opposed to the actual period of confinement served, the nunc pro
tunc orders in those cases, which reduced the sentences for the relevant theft offenses
to less than one year, caused the aliens’ convictions to no longer fall within the
statutory definition of an aggravated felony. See Cota-Vargas, 23 I. & N. Dec.
at 852; Song, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 174.
Not surprisingly, in any statutory analysis we start with the language of the
statute and if the key terms at issue vary, so will our analysis. That is the case here.
The analysis therefore is different when applying a statute such as 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(G) because there is no consideration of whether or for how long the
alien was actually confined as a result of the sentence. For the purposes of that
statute, the focus is solely on whether “the term of imprisonment” that has been
ordered is for “at least one year.” See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B)
(defining “term of imprisonment” “to include the period of incarceration ordered by
a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that
imprisonment” (emphasis added)); Cota-Vargas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 852 (following
§ 1101(a)(48)(B)’s directive to consider only the ordered term of imprisonment in
determining that nunc pro tunc sentence modification caused petitioner’s theft
offense to no longer qualify as an aggravated felony).
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When considering § 1101(f)(7), however, it is the actual period of confinement
served that is determinative, not the ordered term of imprisonment. See id. (barring
applicant from establishing “good moral character” if he has “been confined, as a
result of conviction, to a penal institution for an aggregate period of one hundred and
eighty days or more”). As a result, the BIA’s treatment of the nunc pro tunc order
here did not run afoul of the full faith and credit clause because giving the order
effect does not alter the fact that petitioner actually spent more than 180 days in jail
as a result of his lawful conviction.1
B.
The BIA next considered petitioner’s argument that he does not fall within the
purview of § 1101(f)(7) because his period of pretrial confinement does not
constitute confinement as a result of a conviction. In rejecting this argument, the
BIA relied on its earlier decision in In re Valdovinos, 18 I. & N. Dec. 343, 344-45
(BIA 1982), explaining that “the Board has found that the period of confinement
prior to conviction should be included in computing the period of time for purposes
of section [1101(f)(7)].” Admin. R. at 6.
The BIA also noted that, although the Tenth Circuit had not addressed the
issue, the Ninth Circuit had “‘concluded that pre-trial detention that is later credited
1
We note that petitioner’s reliance on In re Matter of H-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 249,
250 (BIA 1956), is also misplaced because unlike in that case, petitioner has not been
granted a pardon for his crime, nor has his conviction been expunged or vacated by
the state court.
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as time served as part of the sentence imposed counts as confinement as a result of a
conviction within the meaning of [8 U.S.C.] § 1101(f)(7).’” Admin. R. at 6 (quoting
Arreguin-Moreno v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2008)). The BIA
further cited to the Second Circuit’s decision in Spina v. Department of Homeland
Security, 470 F.3d 116, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2006), in which that court acknowledged the
uniform practice of crediting the time spent by a defendant in pretrial detention as
against the term of imprisonment imposed by the court upon conviction. As the
Spina court explained, “[t]his unanimity is strong evidence of a common
understanding that, after judgment, any credited pre-conviction detention effectively
becomes time served on the imposed term of imprisonment.” 470 F.3d at 127-28.
Petitioner contends that the statutory text is unambiguous and that no
deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation. We disagree. We conclude that the
phrase “as a result of conviction” is ambiguous, and we defer to the BIA’s reasonable
interpretation of the statute, which “relies on prior BIA precedent addressing the
same question,” Efagene v. Holder, 642 F.3d 918, 920 (10th Cir. 2011).
The statute’s language “as a result of conviction,” is ambiguous because it is
subject to more than one interpretation. Petitioner interprets the statute to mean that
the period of confinement can only count towards the 180 days if it is served after the
judgment of conviction is entered. But the statute does not say, “confined, after a
conviction.” The BIA interprets “confined, as a result of conviction” to include an
alien’s pretrial confinement that is credited towards a later term of imprisonment
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because it is “considered time served as a result of [an alien’s] subsequent
conviction.” Valdovinos, 18 I. & N. Dec. at 344.
The BIA’s interpretation is consistent with the uniform practice of crediting
time served in pretrial confinement towards the ultimate sentence imposed after the
conviction2; the time served in pretrial confinement thereby becomes part of the time
served “as a result of conviction.” Conversely, if the alien is not ultimately
convicted, then the pretrial period of confinement would not count towards the
180-day period because it would not have occurred “as a result of conviction.”
Because the BIA’s interpretation of the statute is reasonable, we defer to it.
See Tapia Garcia, 237 F.3d at 1220.
III. Conclusion
The BIA concluded that petitioner could not establish the requisite good moral
character for cancellation of removal because he “had actually already served a
lawful period of confinement in excess of 180 days as a result of a conviction,” and
the sentencing court’s entry of a nunc pro tunc order at petitioner’s request
shortening the ordered sentence did not impact the calculation of petitioner’s 180-day
2
See Spina, 470 F.3d at 127 (“[W]e note that the federal government, fifty
states, and the District of Columbia provide by statute, rule, or court decision that
time spent by a defendant in pre-conviction detention is to be treated as a day-for-day
credit or reduction of the term of imprisonment imposed upon conviction.”); see also
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-405 (providing that pretrial confinement must be credited
towards the sentence imposed after conviction); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-502
(providing that a person sentenced for a misdemeanor is entitled to the same time
credits as a person sentenced for a felony).
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confinement period. Admin. R. at 7. Because we see no reversible error in the BIA’s
decision, we deny the petition for review. We grant petitioner’s motion for leave to
proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees, however waiver of prepayment
does not relieve petitioner from liability for all filing and docketing fees, which he is
obligated to pay.
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Garcia-Mendoza v. Holder
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2014-06-02
Citations: 753 F.3d 1165
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion