UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4591
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARNELL TYRECE HAYES, a/k/a Donnell Hayes,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:13-cr-00018-D-1)
Submitted: May 29, 2014 Decided: June 2, 2014
Before SHEDD, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lewis A. Thompson, III, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC,
Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker,
United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Joshua L.
Rogers, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Darnell Tyrece Hayes pled guilty to distribution of
heroin and was sentenced as a career offender to 210-months’
imprisonment. He appeals, challenging the determination that he
qualified as a career offender, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual (“USSG”) § 4B1.1 (2012). We affirm.
To be classified as a career offender under USSG
§ 4B1.1, a defendant must have been at least eighteen years old
at the time he committed the offense of conviction, the offense
of conviction must be “a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense,” and the defendant must have two prior felony
convictions “of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense.” USSG § 4B1.1(a). Hayes concedes that he
had one qualifying predicate offense. At issue in this appeal
is whether Hayes’ prior convictions for either burning personal
property, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-66, or speeding to
elude arrest, in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat § 20-141-5, qualify
as a second predicate offense.
Hayes argues that his North Carolina conviction for
burning personal property does not qualify as a crime of
violence because the statute does not require the use of
physical force. However, the Sentencing Guidelines define
“crime of violence” to include the crime of arson, and this
court has previously held that “the modern, generic crime of
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arson involves the burning of real or personal property.”
United States v. Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 174 (4th Cir. 2010)
(citing cases). Because the burning of personal property
qualifies as arson, this offense is categorically a crime of
violence. Thus, Hayes had two prior convictions for crimes of
violence and was properly sentenced as a career offender.
Having determined that Hayes has two prior qualifying
conviction, we need not address Hayes’ challenges to the
district court’s determination that his speeding to elude arrest
constituted a crime of violence and to the district court’s
alternate ruling that it would have imposed 210 months as a
variant sentence if Hayes were not a career offender.
Hayes also contends that the sentence imposed was
unreasonable. We have reviewed the sentence and conclude that
it was properly calculated and that the sentence imposed was
reasonable. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007);
United States v. Llamas, 599 F.3d 381, 387 (4th Cir. 2010). The
district court appropriately considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) factors in light of Hayes’s individual characteristics
and history, and adequately explained the sentence. We conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
the 210-month sentence. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 41; United
States v. Allen, 491 F.3d 178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (applying
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appellate presumption of reasonableness to within-Guidelines
sentence).
Accordingly, we affirm Hayes’ sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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