UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4865
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PIERRE LACOSTA WARREN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District
Judge. (7:12-cr-00042-SGW-10)
Submitted: May 23, 2014 Decided: June 6, 2014
Before GREGORY and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Daniel K. Dorsey, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Ronald
Andrew Bassford, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pierre Lacosta Warren appeals the district court’s
judgment sentencing him to sixty months in prison after pleading
guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to
distribute 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846 (2012), and conspiracy to commit
money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i),
(h) (2012). Warren’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there
are no meritorious grounds for appeal but raising the issues of
whether the district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in
accepting Warren’s guilty plea and whether it plainly erred in
sentencing Warren. Warren was notified of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. We affirm.
“A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important
rights, and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently, ‘with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences.’” Bradshaw v. Stumpf,
545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). In federal cases, Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure “governs the duty of the trial judge
before accepting a guilty plea.” Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238, 243 n.5 (1969). It “require[s] a district court, before
accepting a guilty plea, to ‘personally inform the defendant of,
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and ensure that he understands, the nature of the charges
against him and the consequences of his guilty plea.’” United
States v. Hairston, 522 F.3d 336, 340 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
United States v. Damon, 191 F.3d 561, 564 (4th Cir. 1999)).
We “accord deference to the trial court’s decision as
to how best to conduct the mandated colloquy.” United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1307 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting
this “Court has repeatedly refused to script the Rule 11
colloquy, relying rather on the experience and wisdom of the
district judges below”). A guilty plea may be knowingly and
intelligently made based on information received before the plea
hearing. See DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 116; see also Bradshaw, 545
U.S. at 183 (trial court may rely on counsel’s assurance that
defendant was properly informed of elements of the crime).
“A federal court of appeals normally will not correct
a legal error made in criminal trial court proceedings unless
the defendant first brought the error to the trial court’s
attention.” Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1124
(2013) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731
(1993)). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) creates an
exception to the normal rule, providing “[a] plain error that
affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was
not brought to the court’s attention.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
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Because Warren’s Rule 11 claim is raised for the first
time on appeal, we review for plain error. See United States v.
Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 71 (2002); United States v. Martinez, 277
F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). It is thus Warren’s burden to
show (1) error; (2) that was plain; (3) affecting his
substantial rights; and (4) that this Court should exercise its
discretion to notice the error. See Martinez, 277 F.3d at 529,
532. To show that his substantial rights were affected, he
“must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he
would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez
Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004). We have reviewed the record,
and we conclude that Warren fails to make this showing.
We review a criminal sentence for reasonableness using
an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. McManus, 734
F.3d 315, 317 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). First, we consider whether the district
court committed any significant procedural error, such as
improperly calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider
the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012), or
failing to adequately explain the sentence. United States v.
Allmendinger, 706 F.3d 330, 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 2747 (2013). If the sentence is procedurally reasonable, we
then consider its substantive reasonableness, taking into
account the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at
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51. We presume that a sentence within or below a properly
calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United
States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012).
In sentencing, the district court must first correctly
calculate the defendant’s sentencing range under the Sentencing
Guidelines. Allmendinger, 706 F.3d at 340. The court is next
required to give the parties an opportunity to argue for what
they believe is an appropriate sentence, and the court must
consider those arguments in light of the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). Id. When rendering a sentence, the
court must make and place on the record an individualized
assessment based on the particular facts of the case. United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). In
explaining the sentence, the “sentencing judge should set forth
enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his
own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 356 (2007). While a court must consider the statutory
factors and explain its sentence, it need not explicitly
reference § 3553(a) or discuss every factor on the record.
United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that Warren’s
sentence is reasonable. The district court properly calculated
his Guidelines range and reasonably determined that a sentence
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below the range was appropriate based on the § 3553(a) factors.
The court sentenced Warren below the sentence that he requested,
and the court neither erred nor abused its discretion.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform his or her client, in
writing, of his or her right to petition the Supreme Court of
the United States for further review. If the client requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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