Shasta Staley v. Martin Gruenberg

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1875

SHASTA D. STALEY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

MARTIN GRUENBERG, Acting Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:12-cv-00530-GBL-JFA)

Submitted: May 30, 2014 Decided: June 6, 2014

Before WILKINSON, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gerald L. Gilliard, LAW OFFICE OF GERALD L. GILLIARD, ESQ., LLC,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting United
States Attorney, Dennis C. Barghaan, Jr., Assistant United
States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

The President of the United States, through an

Executive Order, directed the Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation (“FDIC” or “Defendant”) to decide promptly whether

to convert certain interns to permanent status. After the FDIC

decided not to convert Shasta Staley to permanent status, Staley

filed a complaint alleging that the FDIC retaliated against her

for engaging in protected activities, in violation of Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (2012); and the Rehabilitation

Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2012). Staley alleged that she

engaged in the following protected activities: (1) requesting a

reasonable accommodation; (2) filing a grievance after her

request was denied; and (3) filing an informal and formal

complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”). The district court granted summary judgment to

Defendant on this claim, and Staley appeals. Finding no

reversible error, we affirm.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in

2
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 1 Halpern v.

Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 460 (4th Cir.

2012). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). Summary judgment will be granted unless “a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” on the

evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not

suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of

[the nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power

Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Because Staley presented no direct evidence of

retaliation, we analyze her claim under the familiar burden-

shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209,

212 (4th Cir. 2004) (Title VII); Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. &

1
Because the district court struck Staley’s memorandum in
opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and Staley
does not challenge that order on appeal, we confine our review
to Staley’s complaint and the evidence presented in the exhibits
accompanying Defendant’s memorandum in support of summary
judgment. See Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416
(4th Cir. 1993) (providing that facts presented in summary
judgment motion are “uncontroverted” if opposing party fails to
respond).

3
Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1995) (ADA &

Rehabilitation Act). “Importantly, although intermediate

evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under this framework,

[Staley retains] the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of

fact,” Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 336 (4th Cir.

2011) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), that

her engagement in the protected activities was a “but for” cause

of her non-conversion to permanent status. Univ. of Tex. Sw.

Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013); see Feist v.

La., Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d 450,

454 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying “but for” test to retaliation

claim under ADA).

The primary issue on appeal is whether Staley has

demonstrated that Defendant’s proffered reasons for her non-

conversion to permanent status were pretextual. 2 A plaintiff can

prove pretext by showing that the defendant’s “explanation is

2
Staley also suggests that the incidents identified in the
Letter of Warning and Letter of Admonishment are not legitimate,
non-retaliatory reasons for her non-conversion to permanent
status because they relate to her disability. However, “[t]he
law is well settled that the ADA is not violated when an
employer discharges an individual based on an employee’s
misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to a disability.”
Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 429 (4th Cir.
2009); see also Calhoun v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 576 F.3d 201,
214 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that insubordinate behavior is
sufficient to discharge the employer’s burden to produce a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for an adverse employment
action).

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unworthy of credence or by offering other forms of

circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of . . .

[retaliation].” Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 336 (4th Cir.

2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] plaintiff’s

prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that

the employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the

trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully

discriminated.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530

U.S. 133, 148 (2000).

We conclude that Staley has failed to establish that

Defendant’s legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for not

converting her to permanent status were pretext for retaliation

— either for requesting a reasonable accommodation, filing a

grievance after that request was denied, or filing an informal

and formal complaint with the EEOC. To the contrary, the record

reveals that Staley was not converted to permanent status

because she disregarded FDIC policy, was disrespectful to

supervisors, and demonstrated poor judgment. Although Staley’s

non-conversion occurred shortly after she filed the formal EEOC

complaint, this temporal proximity alone is not sufficient to

establish that her engagement in protected activity was a “but

for” cause of her non-conversion. See Hernandez v. Yellow

Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 660 (5th Cir.) (holding that

“‘[b]ut for’ causation . . . cannot be established by temporal

5
proximity alone”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 136 (2012). Nor is

there any evidence that Staley’s supervisors were conspiring to

prevent her non-conversion by creating a paper trail of “trumped

up” disciplinary charges. In any event, it is not for this

court to decide whether the decision by Staley’s supervisors was

wise. See DeJarnette v. Corning, Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th

Cir. 1998) (observing that “this [c]ourt does not sit as a kind

of super-personnel department weighing the prudence of

employment decisions made by firms charged with employment

discrimination” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, we affirm the entry of summary judgment

in favor of Defendant on Staley’s retaliation claim. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED