2014 IL App (5th) 130151WC
Opinion filed June 9, 2014
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
JACK CARTER, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit,
) Randolph County, Illinois.
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 5-13-0151WC
) Circuit No. 11-MR-25
)
THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION ) Honorable
COMMISSION et al. (Old Ben Coal Co./ ) Richard A. Brown,
Horizon Natural Resources, Appellee). ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Hoffman, Hudson, Harris, and Stewart concurred in the judgment and opinion.
______________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 The claimant, Jack Carter, filed a claim against Old Ben Coal Co./Horizon Natural
Resources (the employer) under the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (the Act) (820 ILCS
310/1 et seq. (West 2008)) alleging coal workers' pneumoconiosis and claiming a last exposure
date of September 24, 2004. Medical evidence presented at the hearing indicated that the
claimant was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) caused in part by
exposure to coal dust but was not diagnosed with coal workers' pneumoconiosis. The arbitrator
found that the claimant's claim was time-barred because it was not filed within the three-year
statute of limitations applicable to claims alleging occupational diseases other than coal workers'
pneumoconiosis. See 820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008).
¶2 The claimant appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Illinois Workers' Compensation
Commission (the Commission), arguing that the arbitrator erred by applying the Act's three-year
statute of limitations to the claimant's claim rather than the five-year statute of limitations
governing claims for disability caused by "coal miners pneumoconiosis." The Commission
unanimously affirmed the arbitrator's decision.
¶3 The claimant then sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court
of Randolph County, which confirmed the Commission's ruling. The claimant filed a motion to
reconsider the court's ruling in which he argued for the first time that the "statutory scheme
devised by the Illinois legislature" (i.e., the legislature's enactment of a five-year statute of
limitations for "coal miners pneumoconiosis" and a three-year statute of limitations for other
pulmonary conditions like COPD) "violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Illinois
Constitution." The circuit court denied the claimant's motion to reconsider. This appeal
followed.
¶4 FACTS
¶5 For more than 22 years, the claimant worked for the employer as a coal miner. Although
he spent one year working above ground, 90% percent of his career with the employer was spent
underground. During his employment, the claimant was exposed to coal dust both underground
and above ground. During the dustiest conditions he encountered underground, the claimant
could only see 10 to 15 feet in front of him. In lighter dust he could see approximately 30 to 40
feet.
-2-
¶6 The employer's mine closed on September 24, 2004. That was the claimant's last day at
the mine and his last exposure to coal dust. Before his last day, the claimant told two foremen
that he was having breathing problems. He said that he was experiencing "congestion." He did
not mention that he thought he had black lung or coal workers' pneumoconiosis.
¶7 On September 3, 2008, the claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim with the
Commission seeking benefits under the Act for heart, lung, and breathing problems (including
pneumoconiosis) caused by exposure to coal dust, rock dust, fumes, and vapor during the course
of his employment. On December 15, 2008, the claimant filed a claim under the federal Black
Lung Benefits Act (30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2006)).
¶8 The claimant's union recommended that the claimant be evaluated by Dr. William
Houser, who is board certified in internal medicine and pulmonary disease. On February 16,
2009, Dr. Houser examined the claimant in connection with the claimant's federal claim for black
lung benefits. The claimant told Dr. Houser that he had smoked 1½ packs of cigarettes per day
from age 16 through age 30. Dr. Houser noted that the claimant rode his bicycle up to 10 miles
per day, 3 times per week in the summertime. An x-ray of the claimant's chest was interpreted as
negative for coal workers' pneumoconiosis by Dr. Daniel Whitehead, a B-reader. The claimant's
arterial blood gas testing levels were normal. However, a spirometry revealed mild obstruction
in the claimant's airways, primarily in his small airways.
¶9 Dr. Houser diagnosed mild COPD and arterial sclerotic heart disease with an "age
indeterminate anteroseptal myocardial infarct."1 Dr. Houser opined that the claimant's COPD
1
A "myocardial infarction," commonly known as a heart attack, is a heart problem where part of
the heart muscle dies and scars due to poor blood supply. When the patient suffers an
"anteroseptal" infarction, the tissue damage is centered around the anteroseptal wall, the area
-3-
was secondary to the inhalation of coal and rock dust during his work as a coal miner and his
smoking history. Dr. Houser opined that the claimant's arterial sclerotic heart disease was
secondary to the claimant's cigarette smoking and possibly also to hereditary factors. Dr. Houser
did not diagnose coal workers' pneumoconiosis.
¶ 10 On March 23, 2009, the United States Department of Labor (the DOL) issued a Schedule
for Submission of Additional Evidence (the SSAE) in connection with the claimant's federal
claim for black lung benefits. The SSAE indicated that: (1) the claimant did not have
pneumoconiosis caused by exposure to coal mine dust; and (2) the claimant did not have a totally
disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment caused in part by pneumoconiosis. On June 23,
2009, the DOL issued a "Proposed Decision and Order" denying benefits and finding that "the
evidence does not show that the [claimant] has pneumoconiosis (black lung disease)."
¶ 11 In the instant case, the claimant introduced into evidence the expert report of Dr.
Lawrence Mayer, a physician who holds a Ph.D. in epidemiology. Dr. Mayer opined that the
claimant's claim should be governed by the Act's five-year statute of limitations for claims
involving coal workers' pneumoconiosis, rather than the three-year statute of limitations for other
claims brought under the Act. Dr. Mayer acknowledged that coal workers' pneumoconiosis and
COPD affected different parts of the lungs. Specifically, he noted that pneumoconiosis involved
scarring (fibrosis) on the lung tissue, whereas COPD involved damage to the broncho trachea
tree. However, Dr. Mayer stated that, like coal workers' pneumoconiosis, COPD could be
caused by long-term exposure to coal dust. He also noted that both conditions can significantly
impair lung function and can result in death. Dr. Mayer concluded that there was "no evidence
to support the suggestion that [coal workers' pneumoconiosis is] a more destructive disease than
between the left and right ventricles.
-4-
COPD." Based on these conclusions (which were drawn from Dr. Mayer's review of the relevant
medical literature), Dr. Mayer opined that "from a medical and scientific viewpoint, no
distinction should be made legally between a disease process that directly attacks the lung tissue
[pneumoconiosis] *** and one that attacks that part of the lung that permits airflow in and out of
the lung [COPD]." In other words, Dr. Mayer opined that no distinction should be drawn
between coal workers' pneumoconiosis and COPD for purposes of applying a statute of
limitations. He suggested that the distinction between the two conditions reflected in the Act's
statute of limitations "has to be the product of thinking that COPD can never exist in a coal
miner unless [there] is evidence that he or she has [pneumoconiosis]," a belief which, according
to Dr. Mayer, has been proven false.
¶ 12 The arbitrator denied the claimant's claim as untimely. The arbitrator noted that the
statute of limitations for claims filed under the Act (820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008)) requires an
employee to file his claim within three years of the last date of exposure or within two years of
the last payment of compensation. The arbitrator observed that "the sole exceptions to [this]
statutory requirement are for claims of coal workers' pneumoconiosis and radiological exposure,
which allow for filing periods of five years and twenty-five years, respectively." The arbitrator
found that there was no evidence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis or radiological exposure in
this case, and no evidence that the claimant received any compensation from the employer after
September 24, 2004 (the claimant's last date of exposure to coal dust). Accordingly, because the
claimant filed his claim more than three years after his last date of exposure, the arbitrator found
that the claim was time-barred under section 6(c) of the Act and found all remaining issues moot.
¶ 13 The claimant appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Commission, arguing that the
arbitrator erred by applying the Act's three-year statute of limitations to his claim rather than the
-5-
five-year statute of limitations governing claims for disability caused by "coal miners
pneumoconiosis." Citing Dr. Mayer's opinion, the claimant maintained that "the medical
literature establishes that COPD caused by exposure to coal dust is a form of *** coal workers'
pneumoconiosis" and that his claim should therefore be governed by the five-year statute of
limitations. The Commission rejected this argument. The Commission "view[ed] itself as bound
by the specific language of Section 6(c)" which "contains no specific reference to COPD and
does not define coal workers' pneumoconiosis so as to include COPD." Based upon Dr. Houser's
diagnosis and opinions, the Commission found that the claimant's "occupational disease claim
for COPD is governed by the three-year statute of limitations and was thus not timely filed."
The Commission denied the claimant's claim on that basis and found all remaining issues moot.
¶ 14 The claimant then sought judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court
of Randolph County, which confirmed the Commission's ruling. The circuit court found that
there was "insufficient evidence" for the court to find that "the [COPD] which the claimant
suffers can be considered coal miner's pneumoconiosis." The claimant subsequently filed a
motion to reconsider the court's ruling in which he argued for the first time that the "statutory
scheme devised by the Illinois legislature" (i.e., the legislature's enactment of a five-year statute
of limitations for "coal miners pneumoconiosis" and a three-year statute of limitations for other
pulmonary conditions like COPD) "violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Illinois
Constitution." The circuit court held that the evidence to support the claimant's equal protection
claim was "insufficient" and denied the claimant's motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.
-6-
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 1. The Governing Limitations Period
¶ 17 The claimant argues that the Commission erred in applying the Act's three-year statute of
limitations to his claim, rather than the Act's five-year limitations period governing claims for
disability caused by "coal miners pneumoconiosis." The claimant contends that the phrase "coal
miners pneumoconiosis" in section 6(c) of the Act should be interpreted to include COPD caused
by exposure to coal dust. This argument turns on an issue of statutory construction, a question of
law which we review de novo. Gruszeczka v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2013 IL
114212, ¶ 12; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 324 Ill. App. 3d 961, 965 (2001).2
¶ 18 The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of
the legislature. Gruszeczka, 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 12. The language used in the statute is normally
the best indicator of what the legislature intended. Id. Each undefined word in the statute must
2
Although the employer concedes that the "interpretation of the statute of limitations found at
820 ILCS 310/6(c)" is subject to de novo review, it argues that we should apply a "clearly
erroneous" standard of review to the Commission's "ultimate conclusion [as] to the facts in this
case." In support of this argument, the employer cites Dodaro v. Illinois Workers' Compensation
Comm'n, 403 Ill. App. 3d 538, 544-45 (2010). Dodaro involved a two-step analysis which
required us to apply two standards of review: first, we reviewed the Commission's interpretation
of the meaning of a statutory exclusion de novo; second, we reviewed the Commission's
application of the statutory exclusion to the facts presented in that case under a more deferential
"clearly erroneous" standard. Dodaro is inapposite. Unlike the situation presented in Dodaro,
the facts essential to our analysis in this case are undisputed, and the case turns on a pure issue of
statutory construction. Thus, our review is de novo. Dodaro, 403 Ill. App. 3d at 544-45.
-7-
be given its ordinary and popularly understood meaning. Id.; see also Texaco-Cities Service
Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270 (1998). Words and phrases must not be viewed in
isolation but must be considered in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. Gruszeczka,
2013 IL 114212, ¶ 12; Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320 (2003). If
the meaning of an enactment is unclear from the statutory language itself, the court may look
beyond the language employed and consider the purpose behind the law and the evils the law
was designed to remedy as well as other sources such as legislative history. Gruszeczka, 2013 IL
114212, ¶ 12. However, where the statutory language is clear, it will be given effect without
resort to other aids for construction. Id.; see also Hollywood Casino-Aurora, Inc. v. Illinois
Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2012 IL App (2d) 110426WC, ¶ 16.
¶ 19 Section 6(c) of the Act provides, in relevant part:
"In any case, other than injury or death caused by exposure to radiological
materials or equipment or asbestos, unless application for compensation is
filed with the Commission within 3 years after the date of the disablement,
where no compensation has been paid, or within 2 years after the date of
the last payment of compensation, where any has been paid, whichever
shall be later, the right to file such application shall be barred."
820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008).
In 1973, the legislature amended section 6(c) by prescribing a five-year limitations period "in
cases of disability caused by coal miners pneumoconiosis."3 As noted, the claimant argues that
3
Specifically, section 6(c) now provides that claims for disability caused by coal miners'
pneumoconiosis shall be barred unless such claims are filed with the Commission "within 5
years after the employee was last exposed where no compensation has been paid, or within 5
-8-
the phrase "coal miners pneumoconiosis" in section 6(c) should be interpreted to include COPD
caused by exposure to coal dust.
¶ 20 We disagree. By its plain terms, the five-year limitations period prescribed by section
6(c) applies only to claims for disability caused by "coal miners pneumoconiosis." It does not
reference COPD. Nor does it apply to all disabilities or respiratory conditions caused by
exposure to coal dust. To the contrary, it applies only to claims for disability caused by one
specific medical condition, "coal miners pneumoconiosis." Had the legislature intended to
include claims for COPD within the five-year limitations period prescribed in section 6(c), it
could have explicitly referenced COPD in that provision. Alternatively, it could have drafted the
provision broadly to include all disabilities or respiratory conditions caused by "exposure to coal
dust," as it did for other types of occupational disease claims.4 It did neither. Instead, the
legislature decided to apply the five-year limitations period only to claims for disability caused
by "coal miners pneumoconiosis." Accordingly, by its plain language, section 6(c)'s five-year
limitations period does not apply to disabilities caused by any other conditions, not even to other
respiratory diseases that can be caused in part by exposure to coal dust, like COPD.5 It is
years after the last payment of compensation where any has been paid." Id. In this case, the
claimant's last exposure was on September 24, 2004, and the employer paid no compensation
after that date.
4
For example, the legislature prescribed a 25-year limitations period "[i]n cases of disability
caused by exposure to radiological materials or equipment or asbestos." 820 ILCS 310/6(c)
(West 2008).
5
The claimant explicitly agreed with this conclusion in his motion for reconsideration before the
circuit court. There, the claimant stated that "the legislature promulgated a statute of limitations
-9-
undisputed that the claimant in this case was diagnosed with COPD but was not diagnosed with
coal workers' pneumoconiosis. Thus, the Commission did not err in finding that section 6(c)'s
five-year statute of limitations did not apply to his claim.
¶ 21 The claimant argues that, because "coal miners pneumoconiosis" is not defined in the
Act, we should apply the "ordinary and popularly understood meaning" of that term, which,
according to the claimant, includes COPD. The claimant asserts that the medical community
recognizes that COPD caused by exposure to coal dust is a "form of" coal workers'
pneumoconiosis. In support of this assertion, the claimant cites Dr. Mayer's opinion. However,
contrary to the claimant's argument, Dr. Mayer did not opine that COPD was a type of coal
workers' pneumoconiosis. To the contrary, he expressly acknowledged that they were different
conditions. For example, Dr. Mayer noted that coal workers' pneumoconiosis is a "restrictive
pulmonary impairment" of the lung tissue, whereas COPD is an "obstructive impairment" of the
broncho trachea tree. Thus, Dr. Mayer acknowledged that the two conditions involve a different
disease process and affect "different part[s] of the lung." Moreover, Dr. Mayer stated that the
"strict medical definition of Coal Worker's Pneumoconiosis requires a finding of fibrosis
(scaring) [sic] on the miner's lung tissue," and that this scarring "can frequently be seen on a
chest x-ray." By contrast, Dr. Mayer noted that obstructive impairments like COPD are more
that provides that a coal miner who has sustained damage to his lungs by means of coal dust
exposure in the form of fibrosis (scaring [sic]) has five years to bring his or her claim," but "[a]
miner who has sustained damage in the form of emphysema or other form of [COPD] has only
three years to file his or her claim." As Dr. Mayer noted, coal workers' pneumoconiosis involves
fibrosis (or scarring) of the lung tissue caused by exposure to coal dust.
- 10 -
readily diagnosed by pulmonary function testing and that a "chest x-ray is not a good diagnostic
tool for detecting emphysema" (one of the two types of COPD). The only similarities between
COPD and coal workers' pneumoconiosis noted by Dr. Mayer are that both conditions can arise
from exposure to coal dust and both can result in major pulmonary impairment and death.
¶ 22 Further, one of the stated purposes of Dr. Mayer's report was to demonstrate that
exposure to coal dust "can and does cause[ ] [COPD] independent of any radiologic or other
evidence of the existence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis." (Emphasis added.) Thus, Dr.
Mayer's entire report is premised on the assumption that COPD is a different condition than coal
workers' pneumoconiosis. Dr. Mayer's report reinforces this assumption by providing a detailed
history of the current medical and epidemiological consensus that exposure to coal dust can
cause COPD even in the absence of coal workers' pneumoconiosis. Accordingly, although Dr.
Mayer opined that there was no scientific or medical reason to apply a different limitations
period to claims by coal miners alleging COPD (as opposed to coal workers' pneumoconiosis),
he never stated or implied that COPD was the same as coal workers' pneumoconiosis or that the
former was a type of the latter. To the contrary, his report unequivocally provides that they are
two separate conditions.6
6
Moreover, although we have never addressed the precise question presented in this case, our
appellate court has treated COPD and coal workers' pneumoconiosis as separate conditions (i.e.,
we have assumed without deciding that they were different diseases) based on the medical
evidence provided in several cases. See, e.g., Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Illinois
Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 386 Ill. App. 3d 779 (2008); Shelton v. Industrial Comm'n, 267
Ill. App. 3d 211 (1994).
- 11 -
¶ 23 The claimant points to two other legal provisions in support of his argument that "coal
miners pneumoconiosis" includes COPD. First, he relies upon section 1(d) of the Act (820 ILCS
310/1(d) (West 2008)). That section provides, in relevant part, that "[i]f a deceased miner was
employed for 10 years or more in one or more coal mines and died from a respirable disease
there shall, effective July 1, 1973, be a rebuttable presumption that his or her death was due to
pneumoconiosis." 820 ILCS 310/1(d) (West 2008). Contrary to the claimant's argument, this
provision does not suggest that COPD is equivalent to (or a type of) coal workers'
pneumoconiosis. It merely suggests that: (1) pneumoconiosis is one of multiple types of
respirable diseases that can be caused by exposure to coal dust; (2) if a miner who worked in a
coal mine for 10 years or more dies from a respirable disease before he is diagnosed with
pneumoconiosis, there will be a presumption that his death was caused by pneumoconiosis; and
(3) that presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the miner died from some other type of
respirable disease, such as COPD.
¶ 24 The presumption cited by the claimant does not apply in this case, because the claimant is
still alive. But even if there was a rebuttable presumption of pneumoconiosis in this case, the
presumption was rebutted by Dr. Houser, the claimant's own IME physician, who opined that the
claimant did not have pneumoconiosis.
¶ 25 The claimant also relies upon certain regulations promulgated by the DOL pursuant to the
federal Black Lung Benefits Act (Black Lung Act) (30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2006)). For
purposes of the Black Lung Act, these regulations define "pneumoconiosis" as "a chronic dust
disease of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising
out of coal mine employment." 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a) (2009). This definition includes both
medical (or "clinical") pneumoconiosis and statutory (or "legal") pneumoconiosis. "Clinical
- 12 -
pneumoconiosis" consists of "those diseases recognized by the medical community as
pneumoconioses, i.e., the conditions characterized by permanent deposition of substantial
amounts of particulate matter in the lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that
deposition caused by dust exposure in coal mine employment." 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(1)
(2009). "Legal pneumoconiosis" is defined as "any chronic lung disease or impairment and its
sequelae arising out of coal mine employment," including "any chronic restrictive or obstructive
pulmonary disease arising out of coal mine employment." 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2) (2009).
The regulation defines the phrase "arising out of coal mine employment" as including any
chronic pulmonary disease or respiratory or pulmonary impairment "significantly related to, or
substantially aggravated by, dust exposure in coal mine employment." 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(b)
(2009).
¶ 26 The claimant correctly notes that these federal regulations define "legal pneumoconiosis"
as including COPD caused by exposure to coal dust. However, this fact does not support the
claimant's argument in this case because the Act does not define "pneumoconiosis" in a similar
manner. Nor does it adopt or reference the federal regulations. As noted above, section 6(c) of
the Act leaves the term "coal miners pneumoconiosis" undefined, and nothing in the Act
suggests that the legislature intended that term to include COPD. In fact, the legislature's failure
to include more expansive language supports the opposite inference, i.e., that the term includes
only diagnosed cases of pneumoconiosis, not COPD.7
7
Moreover, it should be noted that, applying the more expansive definitions of pneumoconiosis
contained in the federal regulations, the DOL found that the claimant did not have either medical
or legal pneumoconiosis.
- 13 -
¶ 27 In sum, by its plain terms, the Act's five-year statute of limitations applies exclusively to
"coal miners pneumoconiosis," not to COPD. 820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2008). It is undisputed
that the claimant was diagnosed with COPD but was not diagnosed with coal workers'
pneumoconiosis. The claimant does not argue that section 6(c) is ambiguous. Thus, the
claimant's claim for disability caused by COPD could be subject to the five-year limitations
period only if "pneumoconiosis" is commonly understood as including COPD. However, Dr.
Mayer's opinion does not support this conclusion. In fact, Dr. Mayer's expert report establishes
the contrary proposition, i.e., that COPD and pneumoconiosis are separate conditions.
¶ 28 Relying upon Dr. Mayer's opinion, the claimant argues that there is no medical or
scientific reason for treating COPD and pneumoconiosis differently for purposes of the statute of
limitations. However, this is an argument best addressed to the legislature. We must apply the
Act's unambiguous statute of limitations as written, and we may not amend the statute under the
guise of interpretation. Hines v. Department of Public Aid, 221 Ill. 2d 222, 230 (2006) ("Where,
as here, the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must enforce it as written"
and "may not annex new provisions or substitute different ones, or read into the statute
exceptions, limitations, or conditions which the legislature did not express."); In re Mary Ann P.,
202 Ill. 2d 393, 409 (2002) (ruling that, where the legislature had not "seen fit to amend" a
statute in the fashion advocated by the respondent, the supreme court would not "inject [that]
provision into the statute" "under the guise of statutory construction"); see also Plasters v.
Industrial Comm'n, 246 Ill. App. 3d 1, 8 (1993).
¶ 29 2. Equal Protection
¶ 30 The claimant argues that interpreting the five-year limitations period under section 6(c) as
applying to claims for coal workers' pneumoconiosis but not to claims for COPD caused by
- 14 -
exposure to coal dust violates the equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution because it
treats similar classes of claimants differently without a rational basis. The claimant urges us to
construe the statute in a manner that avoids this "constitutional infirmity" by applying the five-
year limitations period to his claim.
¶ 31 We disagree. As an initial matter, the claimant presented an equal protection argument
for the first time in a motion for reconsideration before the circuit court. Thus, the claimant
forfeited the argument by not raising it before the Commission. See, e.g., Carpetland U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 397 (2002) (finding
constitutional argument waived where it was raised before the circuit court but not before the
administrative agency).8 Although administrative agencies "lack[ ] the authority to invalidate a
statute on constitutional grounds or to question its validity" (id.), it is " '[n]onetheless ***
advisable to assert a constitutional challenge on the record before the administrative tribunal,
because administrative review is confined to the proof offered before the agency' " (id. (quoting
McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d at 278-79)). Such a practice avoids piecemeal litigation and allows opposing
8
Moreover, the equal protection argument the claimant raised in the circuit court is different
from the equal protection argument he raises on appeal. Before the circuit court, the claimant
argued that "statutory scheme devised by the Illinois legislature" in section 6(c) violated the
equal protection clause. On appeal, he argues that the Commission's and the circuit court's
interpretation of that statutory scheme to exclude his claim from the Act's five-year limitations
period violates the equal protection clause, and he disavows any argument that the statute itself is
unconstitutional. Accordingly, the claimant arguably forfeited the argument he makes on appeal
by not raising it before either the Commission or the circuit court.
- 15 -
parties to present evidence and to build a record in opposition to a constitutional challenge.
Carpetland U.S.A., 201 Ill. 2d at 397; McGaw, 182 Ill. 2d at 279.
¶ 32 We recognize that the rule that issues or defenses not raised before an administrative
agency will be deemed waived and will not be considered for the first time on administrative
review is "an admonition to the parties, not a limitation on the court's jurisdiction," and that "the
waiver rule may be relaxed in order to maintain a uniform body of precedent or *** where the
interests of justice so require." Daniels v. Industrial Comm'n, 201 Ill. 2d 160, 172 (2002).
However, this is not such a case. If we are to consider whether it would be unconstitutional to
limit the Act's five-year limitations period to claims for coal workers' pneumoconiosis (as the
Commission did in this case), the employer and the Commission should first be given the
opportunity to build a record in response to the constitutional challenge. See Carpetland U.S.A.,
201 Ill. 2d at 397.9
9
The employer also argues that the claimant violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 19 by failing
to serve an appropriate notice of his constitutional claim on the Attorney General or the
Commission's attorney. Ill. S. Ct. R. 19(a) (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). We disagree. Supreme Court
Rule 19 requires that such notice be provided when the State or the political subdivision, agency,
or officer affected by the constitutional challenge "is not already a party" to the action. Id. The
purpose of this notice requirement is "to afford the State *** [or] agency *** the opportunity ***
to intervene in the cause or proceeding for the purpose of defending the law or regulation
challenged." Ill. S. Ct. R. 19(c) (eff. Sept. 1, 2006). Here, the Commission is a named party to
the action and has received the claimant's briefs before the circuit and appellate courts. Thus,
Rule 19 does not require the claimant to provide additional notice to the Commission's attorney.
Moreover, on appeal, the claimant is challenging the constitutionality of the Commission's and
- 16 -
¶ 33 In any event, if we were to address the claimant's constitutional argument, we would
reject it. The equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2)
requires the government to "treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." Byrd v.
Hamer, 408 Ill. App. 3d 467, 490 (2011). It does not preclude the State from enacting legislation
that draws distinctions between different categories of people, but it does "prohibit the
government from according different treatment to persons who have been placed by a statute into
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation."
Jacobson v. Department of Public Aid, 171 Ill. 2d 314, 322 (1996). In reviewing a claim that a
statute violates equal protection, the court applies different levels of scrutiny depending on the
nature of the statutory classification involved. Id. at 322-23. Classifications based on race,
national origin, sex, or illegitimacy, and classifications affecting fundamental rights receive
heightened scrutiny. Id. at 323. In all other cases, the court employs only a "rational basis
review." Id. As the claimant correctly notes, rational basis review applies in this case.
¶ 34 Whether a rational basis exists for a classification presents a question of law, which we
consider de novo. Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 417 (1994). Under the rational basis test,
a court's review of a legislative classification is "limited and generally deferential." Jacobson,
171 Ill. 2d at 323. The court simply inquires whether the method or means employed in the
the circuit court's interpretation of section 6(c) of the Act (which he deems erroneous), not the
constitutionality of the statute itself. Thus, the claimant does not need to provide notice of this
argument to the Attorney General. The claimant arguably should have provided notice to the
Attorney General when he challenged the constitutionality of section 6(c) of the Act before the
circuit court. However, he has abandoned that challenge on appeal, so such notice is no longer
required.
- 17 -
statute to achieve the stated goal or purpose of the legislation is rationally related to that goal. Id.
at 323-24; see also Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 74 (1990). The
legislation "carries a strong presumption of constitutionality," and "if any set of facts can
reasonably be conceived to justify the classification, it must be upheld." Jacobson, 171 Ill. 2d at
324.
¶ 35 Interpreting section 6(c)'s five-year statute of limitations as applying only to claims
involving coal workers' pneumoconiosis (and not to claims involving COPD caused by exposure
to coal dust), does not violate the equal protection clause because this interpretation of the statute
does not treat "similarly situated" individuals differently. All coal miners diagnosed with coal
workers' pneumoconiosis have five years to file their claims, and all coal miners diagnosed with
COPD (but not pneumoconiosis) have three years to file their claims. As noted above, coal
workers' pneumoconiosis and COPD are different conditions which involve different disease
processes that affect different parts of the lung and that are diagnosed through different
procedures. Thus, miners suffering from pneumoconiosis are not "similarly situated" to miners
suffering from COPD, even where the COPD is caused by exposure to coal dust. Because these
miners are not similarly situated, the government may treat them differently without running
afoul of the equal protection clause.
¶ 36 CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Randolph
County, which confirmed the Commission's ruling.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
- 18 -
2014 IL App (5th) 130151WC
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION DIVISION
JACK CARTER, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit,
) Randolph County, Illinois.
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 5-13-0151WC
) Circuit No. 11-MR-25
)
THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION ) Honorable
COMMISSION et al. (Old Ben Coal Co./ ) Richard A. Brown,
Horizon Natural Resources, Appellee). ) Judge, Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Opinion Filed: June 9, 2014
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Justices: Honorable William E. Holdridge, P.J.
Honorable Thomas E. Hoffman, J.,
Honorable Donald C. Hudson, J.,
Honorable Thomas M. Harris, Jr., J., and
Honorable Bruce D. Stewart, J.
Concur
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Darrell Dunham, Darrell Dunham & Associates, 308 West Walnut Street,
for Carbondale, IL 62903
Appellant
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Attorney Cheryl L. Intravaia, Feirich/Mager/Green/Ryan, 2001 West Main Street,
for P.O. Box 1570, Carbondale, IL 62903-1570
Appellee
_____________________________________________________________________________________