FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 10, 2014
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTOPHER CARR,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. Nos. 14-1033 & 14-1034
(D.C. Nos. 1:13-CV-01950-LTB &
MIKE MILLER, Warden; THE 1:13-CV-01951-LTB)
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE (D. Colo.)
STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before GORSUCH, MURPHY, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
After Christopher Carr found himself convicted of various state charges
stemming from acts of forgery and theft, he sought relief on direct appeal and in
state habeas proceedings. When those avenues proved fruitless he turned to
federal court, filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court denied
relief and it is this result Mr. Carr now seeks to appeal.
To obtain the right to appeal Mr. Carr must first win a certificate of
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
appealability. To accomplish that he must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). That, however, he has
not done. As the district court explained, the bulk of Mr. Carr’s claims are
clearly barred by the statute of limitations. Petitions for relief under § 2254 must
be made within one year from, as pertinent here, “the date on which the judgment
[of conviction] became final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). As the district court
noted, the latest of Mr. Carr’s convictions became final on April 8, 2002. Mr.
Carr filed his federal habeas petition on July 22, 2013, more than ten years after
his conviction became final. To be sure, the statutory limitations period is tolled
during the pendency of state post-conviction proceedings. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(2). But Mr. Carr filed his first state habeas proceeding on November
17, 2003, well after the one-year limitations period expired. Mr. Carr’s
submission to this court identifies no fault in the district court’s analysis on any
of these scores. Neither does it present any argument as to why the limitations
period should be equitably tolled.
Separate from his complaints about the processes leading to his state
convictions, Mr. Carr also claims that the state courts took too long to decide his
state habeas petition — longer than Colorado rules permit. And this, Mr. Carr
contends, violated his federal due process rights. But there is no federal due
process right to state collateral review. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,
557 (1987). And this court and others have long declined to find federal due
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process violations arising from delays in such optional state collateral
proceedings. See, e.g., Body v. Watkins, 51 F. App’x 807, 809-11 (10th Cir.
2002); Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414, 415-16 (3d Cir. 2000); Jackson v.
Duckworth, 112 F.3d 878, 879-80 (7th Cir. 1997); Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d
1200, 1206 (7th Cir. 1996). Neither in his submission to this court does Mr. Carr
identify any persuasive reason to question the wisdom of these decisions.
The application for a COA and the request for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis are denied. This matter is dismissed. Mr. Carr is reminded of his
obligation to pay the filing fee in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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