FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 12 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-50430
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 3:11-cr-02916-GT-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MAURICIO CASTILLO-CANSINO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Gordon Thompson, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 3, 2014**
Pasadena, California
Before: GOULD and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ENGLAND, Chief District
Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Morrison C. England, Jr., Chief District Judge for the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, sitting by designation.
1. The district court did not plainly err by delaying Mauricio Castillo-
Cansino’s revocation sentencing. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1
“‘primarily’ governs . . . post-revocation sentencing[s].” United States v. Whitlock,
639 F.3d 935, 940 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Leonard, 483 F.3d
635, 638-39 (9th Cir. 2006)). Rule 32.1(b)(2) requires “the court [to] hold the
revocation hearing within a reasonable time.” Here, any violation of Rule 32.1’s
timeliness requirement was not “clear” or “obvious” under current law. See United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993). Given our holding in Whitlock, even if
United States v. Carper, 24 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1994), suggests application of Rule
32, application of Rule 32.1’s reasonableness standard would not constitute plain
error.
2. The district court did not plainly err by failing to provide the government
an opportunity to speak at the revocation sentencing. Because Castillo-Cansino
cites no authority requiring that the district court provide the government an
opportunity to speak, any error could not be “clear under current law,” Olano, 507
U.S. at 734. Castillo-Cansino cites Carper, but Carper addresses a defendant’s
right to allocute, not the government’s right to speak. See 24 F.3d at 1158.
3. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence that
fell within the Guideline range. The district court’s decision was not substantively
2
unreasonable, because, in addition to the imposition of punishment for the crime
underlying the revocation, “a court may properly sanction the violator for failing to
abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision.” United States v. Miqbel,
444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
3