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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-13515
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-00280-RBD-MCR
IRA C. JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LYNN HILL,
Assistant Warden,
L. CREWS,
Warden, Secretary, Grievance Coordinator,
SGT. HALE,
PENDLETON,
Lieutenant,
WARDEN,
Defendants-Appellees,
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, etc., et al.
Defendants.
Case: 12-13515 Date Filed: 06/16/2014 Page: 2 of 5
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(June 16, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ira C. Jackson, a Florida prisoner, appeals pro se the dismissal without
prejudice of his second amended complaint that officials at the Putnam
Correctional Institution violated his civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jackson
complained that the officials disposed of his personal property, in violation of his
right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and he suffered “undue
emotional and physical stress” when officers retaliated against him by disciplining
him for filing grievances, in violation of the First Amendment. The district court
sua sponte dismissed Jackson’s complaint as frivolous. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The district court ruled that Jackson’s complaint about his
property was “not cognizable [because he had] an adequate means of redressing
that violation . . . under state law” and that his claim about retaliation was barred
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act because he sought compensatory and
punitive damages for mental and emotional injuries, not physical injuries, see 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e). We affirm the dismissal of Jackson’s claim about the disposal
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of his property. We also affirm in part the dismissal of Jackson’s complaint for
compensatory and punitive damages, but vacate and remand for the district court to
consider whether Jackson can recover nominal damages for his claim of retaliation.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed as frivolous
Jackson’s claim about the destruction of his property. Jackson alleged that
officials denied him access to personal property shipped to Putnam; refused to mail
the property to another location; and later denied having Jackson’s property.
Jackson cannot claim that he has been deprived of due process when he has
available an adequate postdeprivation remedy under state law. See Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981). Under Florida law, Jackson can sue the officers
for the conversion of his personal property. See Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317,
1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing E.J. Strickland Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric. &
Consumer Servs. of Fla., 515 So. 2d 1331, 1335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
The district court also did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed
Jackson’s claim for damages for emotional and physical stress allegedly caused by
the officials’ retaliation. Jackson alleged that he suffered “anxiety [and] fear of
physical harm” because the officials “restrained and confined [him] in solitary
confinement . . . [and] expos[ed] [him] to an undue psychological screening and
evaluation,” but Jackson was barred from recovering damages for mental or
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emotional injuries. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528,
531–32 (11th Cir. 2002). Jackson also alleged that the officials’ retaliation caused
him “sleepless nights” and that he “exhibit[ed] a hunger strike,” but he did not
allege that his health was affected or that he suffered in any way that would qualify
as a physical injury under section 1997e(e). See Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]o avoid dismissal
under § 1997e(e), a prisoner’s claims for emotional or mental injury must be
accompanied by allegations of physical injuries that are greater than de minimis.”).
The district court erroneously failed to consider whether Jackson was
entitled to nominal damages for his claim about being disciplined in retaliation for
filing grievances. Based on the liberal construction given pro se pleadings, see
Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), the district
court should have considered whether Jackson could recover nominal damages
despite his failure to request that relief, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). Nominal
damages are not precluded by the Act, Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1266 (11th
Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds, Sossamon v. Texas, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S.
Ct. 1651, 1657–60 (2011), and “are appropriate if a plaintiff establishes a violation
of a fundamental constitutional right, even if he cannot prove [an] actual injury
sufficient to entitle him to compensatory damages,” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157,
1162 (11th Cir. 2003). Jackson alleged that officials disciplined him for filing
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grievances by “search[ing] [his] person and locker,” placing him in solitary
confinement, and subjecting him to unnecessary psychological testing. These
allegations state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, see
Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467, 1468 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing U.S. Const.
amend. I), for which Jackson could recover nominal damages, see Pelphrey v.
Cobb Cnty., Ga., 547 F.3d 1263, 1282 (11th Cir. 2008). We remand for the district
court to consider whether Jackson may be entitled to nominal damages for his
complaint of retaliation. See Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1162–63.
We AFFIRM in part the dismissal of Jackson’s complaint and VACATE
and REMAND in part for the district court to consider whether Jackson can
recover nominal damages for his claim that he was disciplined in retaliation for
filing grievances.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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