FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUN 16 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VASILE DOREL FILIP, No. 10-71664
Petitioner, Agency No. A098-925-046
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 9, 2014**
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, GRABER, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Vasile Dorel Filip petitions for review of a decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals ("BIA") denying his application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
("CAT"). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the
petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioner was not
credible. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). The BIA
provided specific, cogent reasons for its adverse credibility finding, including: (1)
Petitioner did not include in his application allegations that he was assaulted in
front of the chief of police; (2) Petitioner provided inconsistent dates for his
allegations that someone sabotaged the brakes on his car; (3) he omitted other
important details from his application, including death threats, and failed to
provide a plausible explanation for the omissions; and (4) when asked to clarify
inconsistencies and omissions, he provided unpersuasive explanations. Those
inconsistencies are permissible considerations in reaching an adverse credibility
finding. See Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
omission of crucial facts in an application constitutes substantial evidence to
support an adverse credibility finding). Similarly, inconsistencies, "accompanied
by other indications of dishonesty—such as a pattern of clear and pervasive
inconsistency or contradiction"—constitute substantial evidence in support of an
adverse credibility determination. Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir.
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2005). Nothing in the record compels a contrary conclusion. See Morgan v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating standard).
2. Even assuming credibility, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
alternative finding that Petitioner failed to establish that a protected ground was
"one central reason" for past or future persecution. Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555
F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2009). Petitioner’s general allegations that his persecutors,
that is, his former in-laws, were aware of his ethnicity as a Roma are insufficient to
satisfy the "one central reason" standard, where the record showed that the dispute
was primarily a familial squabble. See id. at 742 (holding that reference to a
victim’s ethnicity during an attack with multiple motivations was insufficient to
satisfy the "one central reason" standard).
3. Failure to satisfy the lesser standard of proof required to establish
eligibility for asylum necessarily results in failure to satisfy the “clear probability”
standard for withholding of removal. Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
4. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s finding that Petitioner was
ineligible for CAT relief. Petitioner failed to present any evidence that would
compel the conclusion “that he would most likely be tortured by or with the
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acquiescence of a government official or other person acting in an official
capacity” upon removal. Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1095 (9th Cir. 2010).
PETITION DENIED.
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