Case: 14-10211 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-10211
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket Nos. 4:11-cv-00055-RH-GRJ
4:09-cr-00025-RH-GRJ-1
TONY EDWARD DENSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(June 17, 2014)
Case: 14-10211 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 2 of 8
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tony Denson, a pro se federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of
his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The
district court granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the issue of whether
Denson’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to object
to treating Denson’s Florida conviction for possession of a short-barreled shotgun,
in violation of Florida Statute § 790.221(1), as a “crime of violence” for career
offender guidelines calculations under U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2.1 After
review, we affirm the district court’s denial of Denson’s § 2255 motion.
I. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE CLAIMS
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Denson has the
burden to show that: (1) his counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) he
suffered prejudice as a result of the deficient performance. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). “In a 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 proceeding, we review a district court’s legal conclusions de novo and
factual findings for clear error.” Devine v. United States, 520 F.3d 1286, 1287
(11th Cir. 2008). Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance is a mixed
1
Denson also argues the underlying substantive issue that the sentencing court wrongly
applied U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1’s career offender enhancement. Because this issue is outside the scope
of the COA, we do not address it. See Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250 (11th
1998).
2
Case: 14-10211 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 3 of 8
question of law and fact that we review de novo. Id. Here, the district court
correctly denied Denson’s ineffective assistance claim because he did not establish
either deficient performance or prejudice. We explain why.
II. CAREER OFFENDER GUIDELINES
Denson’s ineffective assistance claim hinges on his counsel’s failure to
object to the district court’s designating him a career offender under U.S.S.G.
§§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. Under § 4B1.1, a defendant qualifies as a career offender if
he “has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). A “crime of violence” means
an offense punishable by one year in prison that either “has as an element the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” or
“is a burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk for physical injury
to another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a).
The commentary to § 4B1.2 explicitly states that “unlawfully possessing a
firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a),” such as a “sawed-off shotgun” is a
crime of violence. Id. § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1. Because this guidelines commentary is
authoritative and binding, possession of such a firearm qualifies as a “crime of
violence” without resort to the “categorical approach” traditionally used to
determine whether an offense falls within the residual clause of U.S.S.G.
3
Case: 14-10211 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 4 of 8
§ 4B1.2(a)(2). United States v. Hall, 714 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013)
(concluding that possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, in violation of
26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), qualifies as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(a)(2) based on the binding guidelines commentary).
At the time of Denson’s predicate offense, Florida’s definition of “short-
barreled shotgun” was virtually identical to the federal definition of “sawed-off
shotgun” in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), referenced in the guidelines commentary.
Compare 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(1)-(2), with Fla. Stat. Ann. § 790.001(10) (1992). In
other words, a “short-barreled shotgun” under the Florida law was, for the
purposes of § 4B1.2, a “firearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a),” and, according
to the binding commentary, unlawful possession of such a firearm qualifies as a
crime of violence.
III. PERFORMANCE
As to deficient performance, Denson is unable to show that his “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” See Strickland,
466 U.S at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. This is so because an objection to
classifying Denson’s Florida short-barreled shotgun offense as a crime of violence
would have run counter to the express and authoritative language of the guidelines
commentary and thus would have been meritless. Failing to make a meritless
objection does not constitute deficient performance. See Freeman v. Att’y Gen.,
4
Case: 14-10211 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 5 of 8
536 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A lawyer cannot be deficient for failing to
raise a meritless claim . . . .” (citation omitted)).
IV. BEGAY V. UNITED STATES
In an effort to show his counsel’s performance nevertheless was objectively
unreasonable, Denson points to Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S. Ct.
1581 (2008), and to this Court’s application of Begay in United States v. McGill,
618 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2010). Begay was decided about a year before Denson
was sentenced. In Begay, the Supreme Court concluded that a New Mexico
driving under the influence offense was not a “violent felony” under the residual
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
553 U.S. at 141-42, 128 S. Ct. at 1584. The ACCA’s residual clause defines the
phrase “violent felony” using language virtually identical to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2’s
residual clause defining a “crime of violence.” Compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Begay explained that an offense
that “involves conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another” is
a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s residual clause only if it is “roughly similar,
in kind as well as in degree of risk posed” to the ACCA’s enumerated crimes,
burglary of a dwelling, arson, extortion, or unlawful use of explosives. Id. at 143,
128 S. Ct. at 1585.
5
Case: 14-10211 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 6 of 8
McGill was decided almost a year after Denson’s sentencing and involved
whether the same Florida offense at issue here—possession of a short-barreled
shotgun—was a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s residual clause. See McGill,
618 F.3d at 1274. In McGill, this Court applied Begay and determined that, while
possession of a short-barreled shotgun presented a serious risk of physical injury to
another, the risk was “not ‘similar in kind’ to ‘use of explosives,’ its closest
enumerated analog” in the ACCA. Id. at 1277. Thus, Florida’s short-barreled
shotgun offense is not a “violent felony” under the ACCA. Id. at 1279.
Denson maintains these cases show that his Florida short-barreled shotgun
offense should not have been deemed a “crime of violence,” and, had his counsel
made a Begay-like objection, the sentencing court would not have designated
Denson a career offender under the guidelines.
Denson’s argument is foreclosed by our recent precedent in United States v.
Hall. Like Denson, the defendant in Hall relied upon Begay and McGill to argue
that “the analysis for the term ‘crime of violence’ is exactly the same because the
two definitions are virtually identical” and, therefore, possession of a short-
barreled shotgun cannot be a crime of violence under the career-offender guideline.
Hall 714 F.3d at 1273. This Court rejected that argument based on United States v.
Stinson, in which the Supreme Court “made clear that ‘commentary in the
Sentencing Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is
6
Case: 14-10211 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 7 of 8
authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is
inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.’” Id. at 1272
(quoting Stinson, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993)) (brackets
omitted). In Hall, this Court concluded that because “Stinson controls,” and the
guidelines commentary designating the possession of a short-barreled shotgun as a
crime of violence is authoritative and binding, the usual “categorical approach”
used in Begay and McGill to determine if an offense falls within the residual
clause does not apply. Id. at 1274. We further determined that the commentary
did not fall within “Stinson’s stringent exception requirements, as the commentary
provision violates neither the Constitution nor any other federal statute, and it is
not inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, the guideline text itself.”
Id.
Although Denson attempts to distinguish Hall on its facts, Hall’s legal
conclusion—as to the binding effect of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2’s commentary—controls
the outcome of Denson’s ineffective assistance claim. We also reject Denson’s
argument that Hall was undermined to the point of abrogation by Descamps v.
United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). Contrary to Denson’s
contention, Hall did not employ the modified categorical approach addressed in
Descamps, and this panel remains bound by Hall. In any event, to the extent
Denson contends that Hall is wrongly decided, reasonably effective representation
7
Case: 14-10211 Date Filed: 06/17/2014 Page: 8 of 8
does not include a requirement that trial counsel make arguments or objections
based on predictions as to how the law may develop. See Marquard v. Sec’y for
Dep’t of Corrs., 429 F.3d 1278, 1313 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that counsel’s
performance was not ineffective for failing to contemplate a future Supreme Court
decision).
V. PREJUDICE
Denson also failed to show prejudice under Strickland. To prove prejudice,
“[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. Because Florida’s
offense of possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a “crime of violence” under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2’s binding commentary, Denson has not shown that any objection
by defense counsel to Denson’s career offender status would have been likely to
change the outcome of his sentencing.
For these reasons, the district court properly denied Denson’s § 2255 claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
AFFIRMED.
8