UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4972
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARRELL COPELAND,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:05-cr-00701-GRA-1)
Submitted: June 4, 2014 Decided: June 18, 2014
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Darrell Copeland appeals the district court’s judgment
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to fourteen
months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning
whether the sentence imposed is plainly unreasonable. We
affirm.
Copeland admitted the four charged violations of
supervised release, so the district court’s decision to revoke
his release is not in question. Because Copeland did not object
to the district court’s explanation of sentencing at the
revocation hearing, our review of the sentence is for plain
error. United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir.
2013). To establish plain error, Copeland must show that the
district court clearly erred and the error affected his
substantial rights. Id. If he meets this burden, we will
recognize the error only if it seriously affects the fairness,
integrity or reputation of the judiciary. Id.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the applicable statutory
range and not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In deciding whether a
sentence is plainly unreasonable, “we first decide whether the
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sentence is unreasonable . . . follow[ing] generally the
procedural and substantive considerations that we employ in our
review of original sentences.” Id. at 438. But we “take[] a
more deferential appellate posture concerning issues of fact and
the exercise of discretion than reasonableness review for
guidelines sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652,
656 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if
the district court properly calculates the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual Chapter Seven advisory policy statement range
and explains the sentence adequately, after considering the
policy statements and applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012); Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439.
A revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the
district court states a proper basis for the sentence imposed,
up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if
we find a sentence unreasonable must we decide if it is plainly
so. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657.
The record establishes that the district court
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors applicable to
sentencing upon revocation of supervised release and provided an
adequate explanation of its sentencing determination, and thus
the revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable. The court
also considered Copeland’s individual circumstances in imposing
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a revocation sentence that exceeded neither the policy statement
range nor the statutory maximum. Thus, the revocation sentence
is substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Copeland, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Copeland requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Copeland.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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