People v. Branch

Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Branch, 2014 IL App (1st) 120932

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption EARNEST BRANCH, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Third Division
Docket No. 1-12-0932

Filed January 15, 2014
Rehearing denied January 27, 2014

Held The eyewitness testimony of police officers that defendant made eight
(Note: This syllabus transactions that involved going to a vacant lot to retrieve an item and
constitutes no part of the then returning to a street to deliver the item to an individual in
opinion of the court but exchange for cash and then, after delivering the cash to another man
has been prepared by the following the transactions, defendant was arrested and found to be in
Reporter of Decisions possession of several capsules of heroin, was sufficient to sustain his
for the convenience of conviction for the unlawful possession of a controlled substance with
the reader.) intent to deliver, notwithstanding his contention that the State failed to
prove he intended to deliver heroin, especially when he did not
possess a large amount of drugs or cash or any weapons or
distribution-related equipment, since a trier of fact reasonably could
infer that defendant was engaging in heroin sales and that he intended
to deliver the drugs in his possession.

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 10-CR-15831; the
Review Hon. William Hooks, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
 Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier and Christofer R. Bendik, both of State Appellate
Appeal Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.

Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Noah Montague,
Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Neville and Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 A jury convicted defendant Earnest Branch of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver under section 401(c)(1) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS
570/401(c)(1) (West 2010)). He was sentenced to six years in prison. On appeal, Branch
contends that the State failed to prove that he intended to deliver the narcotics found in his
possession. We affirm. The evidence sufficiently supports Branch’s conviction for possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.

¶2 Background
¶3 Branch was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance with intent
to deliver in that he “unlawfully and knowingly possessed with intent to deliver *** 1 gram or
more but less than 15 grams of a substance containing a certain controlled substance, to wit:
heroin.”
¶4 At trial, Chicago police officer Kathleen McCann testified that at about 12:30 p.m. on
August 11, 2010, she and five other officers were working undercover surveillance near the
intersection of Augusta Boulevard and Long Avenue. As she was stopped in traffic heading
westbound, she saw Branch walking eastbound on the south side of the street. McCann
observed Branch cut into the backyard of a vacant residence, reach down and remove an item
and then walk back toward the corner of Augusta and Long Avenue. She pulled her car over
and observed Branch make a suspected hand-to-hand narcotics transaction with an
unidentified individual, exchanging the item for an unknown amount of money. She observed
Branch engage in “at least eight” transactions. McCann then radioed Officer Myron
Kuykendall and Officer Reginald Dukes, who were working as enforcement officers.
¶5 Officer Edward Daniels, who was also working as a surveillance officer, testified that he
was parked 10 to 15 feet from Branch when he observed Branch engage in 8 suspected
narcotics transactions over a period of 45 minutes. He was not able to see the amount of money
that was being exchanged during each transaction or the item that was being tendered. Branch
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 began walking southbound after the transactions, and Daniels, through his rear-view mirror,
saw Branch give an unknown amount of cash to a man on a bicycle before going westbound
down an alley.
¶6 Officer Kuykendall testified that he and Officer Dukes received radio communication
regarding Branch’s suspected narcotics transactions and drove westbound into the alley
between Augusta Boulevard and Iowa Street. Kuykendall exited the car and told Branch and
the man on the bicycle to stop. Branch looked in Kuykendall’s direction and dropped an object
from his hand. Kuykendall recovered the item and arrested him. The man on the bicycle fled
and was never captured. Kuykendall recovered a clear plastic bag containing 11 capsules of
suspected heroin and $18 in cash.
¶7 Forensic chemist Elaine Harris tested 7 of the 11 capsules, and they weighed 1.1 grams and
tested positive for heroin. She estimated all 11 capsules weighed 1.7 grams.
On appeal, Branch contends that the State failed to prove the element of intent to deliver
beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶8 Analysis
¶9 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his or her
conviction, the relevant question on review is whether, after considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8
(2011). The trier of fact determines the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to their
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. People v. Howery,
178 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1997). A conviction only will be overturned where the evidence is so
improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant’s
guilt. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d at 8.
¶ 10 To prove defendant guilty of the offense of possession of a controlled substance with intent
to deliver, the State must prove the defendant (1) had knowledge of the presence of the
narcotics; (2) had possession or control of the narcotics; and (3) intended to deliver the
narcotics. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 407 (1995); 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2010).
The trier of fact may rely on reasonable inferences to determine knowledge and possession.
People v. Smith, 191 Ill. 2d 408, 413 (2000). The element of “intent to deliver” is usually
proved by circumstantial evidence because knowledge and possession of drugs are rarely
subject to direct proof. People v. Cruz, 129 Ill. App. 3d 278, 286 (1984) (Possession “is an
inherently surreptitious affair, and common sense must illuminate the dark.”). Several factors
have been considered by Illinois courts as probative of intent, including the manner in which
the drugs are packaged; the possession of weapons; and the possession of large amounts of
cash. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408.
¶ 11 Here, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Branch intended to deliver the heroin
that police found in his possession. The State presented eyewitness testimony from Officer
McCann that Branch went to a vacant lot and secured an item from the back of a house and
delivered the item in exchange for cash. Officer Daniels could not identify the items that were

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 tendered or the amount of cash Branch received; however, he witnessed Branch give a man
cash after the transactions and Officer Kuykendall subsequently found Branch in possession of
11 individually packaged capsules of heroin. A trier of fact could reasonably infer that the
eight transactions that officers saw Branch engage in were heroin sales.
¶ 12 Branch contends that the absence of factors probative of intent to deliver articulated in
Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408 (i.e., possession of amounts of narcotics inconsistent with personal
use, evidence as to the drug purity, weapons, large amounts of cash, distribution-related
equipment) indicates that Branch did not intend to deliver the heroin found in his possession.
We disagree.
¶ 13 In Robinson, the police arrested the defendant based on suspected drug activity in a house
and the State presented no eyewitness testimony that the defendant had been observed
engaging in alleged drug transactions. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 405-07. Accordingly, the
Robinson court examined other circumstantial factors indicating intent to deliver. Unlike in
Robinson, the State presented eyewitness testimony from Officers McCann and Daniels that
over a period of 45 minutes, 8 times, Branch was approached by individuals with whom he had
a short conversation, before engaging in a transactions with cash. Branch multiple times went
to get something from close to the ground on the side of a nearby vacant house and then
returned to the corner. The officers saw him engage in eight suspected heroin transactions and
hand over the proceeds of the transactions to a man on a bicycle before being found in
possession of heroin. Given these circumstances, the absence of Robinson factors is not
dispositive. See, e.g., People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 327 (2005) (evidence sufficient where
defendant accepted money from two individuals and handed them unknown items in
exchange); People v. Bell, 343 Ill. App. 3d 110, 121 (2003) (evidence sufficient where
defendant accepted money from several individuals and handed them small items). A
reasonable trier of fact could have found the element of intent to deliver based on the State’s
evidence.
¶ 14 Alternatively, Branch argues that the drugs found in his possession on arrest were separate
from the drugs that he was selling and were intended for personal use. He attempts to
distinguish Bush by reasoning that the defendant in that case was found to have intent to
deliver because she “resumed her post behind the fence at the conclusion of both transactions.”
See Bush, 214 Ill. 2d at 328-39. Conversely, Branch argues he had handed his proceeds to the
man on the bicycle and was done for the day. We reject this argument. The jury could have
reasonably found that the drugs Branch possessed on arrest were not a separate supply and that
he intended to deliver the remaining capsules of heroin. Viewing all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, as we must, coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn from the
evidence, we cannot say that no rational trier of fact could have found that Branch intended to
deliver the drugs in his possession.
¶ 15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 16 Affirmed.

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