UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
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ESTATE OF ESTHER KLIEMAN, et al., )
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Plaintiffs, )
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v. ) Civil Action No. 04-1173 (PLF)
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PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY, et al., )
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Defendants. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case involves an alleged terrorist attack that took place in March of 2002 in
the State of Israel or in territories administered or controlled by the State of Israel. See Estate of
Klieman v. Palestinian Auth., 467 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110 (D.D.C. 2006). In 2006, this Court held
that it could exercise general personal jurisdiction over defendants Palestinian Authority (“PA”)
and Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”). Id. at 113; see also Memorandum Op. and
Order, Dkt. No. 85 (April 24, 2008) (denying defendants’ first motion for reconsideration). The
defendants have moved for reconsideration of the Court’s jurisdictional decisions in light of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). See
Defendants’ Second Mot. for Reconsideration, Dkt. No. 233 (Feb. 5, 2014). Plaintiffs oppose
the motion.
In their papers, the parties focus on three issues: (1) whether the defendants have
sufficient contacts with the United States such that the defendants are essentially “at home” in
the United States, and therefore are subject to the general jurisdiction of U.S. courts; (2) whether
the defendants have waived personal jurisdiction; and (3) whether specific personal jurisdiction
may be exercised. After reviewing the parties’ briefs and various legal authorities, the Court
believes that additional briefing on the third issue – plaintiffs’ theory of specific personal
jurisdiction – would be helpful to the Court.
Specifically, the Court requires clarification on plaintiffs’ theory that this lawsuit
“is related to or ‘arises out of’” defendants’ contacts with the United States, as required to
exercise specific jurisdiction consistent with constitutional due process. See Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 204 (1977)). In their supplemental brief, plaintiffs should explain whether they
contend either (i) that defendants’ contacts with the United States “gave rise to the episode-in-
suit,” see Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011), or
(ii) that the March 2002 attack was “purposefully directed” at residents of the United States. See
Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). If plaintiffs are asserting an alternative theory of specific
jurisdiction, plaintiffs should further explain how such theory suffices under the applicable case
law.
In addition, plaintiffs should specify what pertinent facts they expect to find if
jurisdictional discovery is permitted.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that on or before July 11, 2014, plaintiffs shall file a supplemental
brief of no more than ten pages addressing these issues; it is
FURTHER ORDERED that on or before July 18, 2014, defendants shall file a
memorandum of no more than ten pages responding to plaintiffs’ supplemental brief; and it is
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FURTHER ORDERED that counsel for the parties shall appear before the Court
for oral argument on the defendants’ motion on July 24, 2014, at 10 a.m. in Courtroom 29A.
SO ORDERED.
/s/________________________
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
DATE: June 27, 2014 United States District Judge
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