Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP v. Hershey

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-1512

SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS LLP,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

and

ACADIA INVESTMENTS L.C.,

Party-in-Interest,

v.

LOREN W. HERSHEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-2147

SCHNADER HARRISON SEGAL & LEWIS LLP,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

and

ACADIA INVESTMENTS L.C.,

Party-in-Interest,

v.

LOREN W. HERSHEY,

Defendant – Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga,
District Judge. (1:12-cv-00928-AJT-IDD)

Submitted: June 2, 2014 Decided: June 20, 2014

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Loren W. Hershey, Appellant Pro Se. Jonathan Michael Stern,
SCHNADER, HARRISON, SEGAL & LEWIS, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Schnader, Harrison, Segal, & Lewis, LLP filed a

complaint against Loren W. Hershey, a former client of the law

firm, for breach of contract for failure to pay legal fees for

services rendered to Hershey. Hershey counterclaimed, alleging

claims for (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) fraudulent

inducement to enter into the contract; (3) tortious interference

with contract; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress;

(5) conspiracy to injure business interests and trade secrets;

and (6) attempted conspiracy. The district court entered

summary judgment in favor of Schnader on its claim for breach of

contract and on all of Hershey’s counterclaims. The court

subsequently denied Hershey’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) motion,

and granted Schnader’s motions for sanctions against Hershey

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Hershey now appeals.

On appeal, Hershey challenges the district court’s

orders granting summary judgment and denying reconsideration.

We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary

judgment. Providence Square Assocs., L.L.C. v. G.D.F., Inc.,

211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment should be

granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]here is no

issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

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nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.

If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly

probative, summary judgment” is proper. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986) (citations omitted).

In addition, we review a district court’s order

denying a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 2000). Under

Rule 60(b)(2), a district court may relieve a party from a final

judgment due to newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable

diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a

new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b).

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the

relevant legal authorities and conclude that the district court

did not err in granting summary judgment for Schnader and

denying Hershey’s motion for reconsideration.

On appeal, Hershey also challenges the district

court’s order granting Schnader’s motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

“We review the decision to award sanctions for abuse of

discretion.” Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City

Vision, Inc., 650 F.3d 423, 443 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation

omitted). However, Hershey has failed in his appellate brief to

develop an argument challenging the court’s order. We therefore

conclude that Hershey has forfeited appellate review of that

order. See Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 653 n.7

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(4th Cir. 2006) (finding conclusory single sentence in brief

“insufficient to raise on appeal any merits-based challenge to

the district court’s ruling”).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders.

We also deny Hershey’s motion to place the appeal in abeyance.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

this court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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