UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4862
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
IGOR BORODIN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:12-cr-00258-FDW-1)
Submitted: June 19, 2014 Decided: June 23, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher C. Fialko, RUDOLF WIDENHOUSE & FIALKO, Charlotte,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant
United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Igor Borodin pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to trafficking in motor vehicle airbags bearing
counterfeit trademarks owned by automobile manufacturers, and
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320(a) (West
2000 & Supp. 2014) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (Count One), and
transporting hazardous materials, and aiding and abetting, in
violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46312 (2006) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count
Two). The district court sentenced Borodin within the advisory
Guidelines range to eighty-four months’ imprisonment on Count
One and a concurrent sixty-month term on Count Two. Borodin
timely appealed.
Counsel has filed a brief, pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether
Borodin’s sentence was unreasonable in light of his history and
characteristics and because his sentence was greater than the
sentences imposed on defendants in other jurisdictions convicted
of trafficking in counterfeit trademarked airbags. Borodin
filed a pro se supplemental brief reiterating these contentions
and asserting that the Government breached the plea agreement.
Finding no error, we affirm.
We review the district court’s sentence, “whether
inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines
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range [for reasonableness,] . . . under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41
(2007). This standard of review involves two steps; under the
first, we examine the sentence for significant procedural
errors, and under the second, we review the substance of the
sentence. United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir.
2007) (analyzing Gall, 552 U.S. at 50-51). Significant
procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)
[(2012)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence — including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
If there are no significant procedural errors, we then
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id.
If the sentence is within or below the properly calculated
Guidelines range, this court applies a presumption on appeal
that the sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v.
Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). Such a presumption is
rebutted only if the defendant shows “that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
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2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have reviewed the
record and conclude that Borodin’s within-Guidelines sentence is
both procedurally and substantively reasonable. We further
conclude that the Government did not breach the plea agreement.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Borodin, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Borodin requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Borodin. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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