UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4910
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEMETRIUS HILL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:12-cr-00288-WO-1)
Submitted: June 19, 2014 Decided: June 23, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jonathan Leonard, LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN LEONARD, Winston-Salem,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Terry Michael Meinecke,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Demetrius Hill pled guilty pursuant to a written plea
agreement to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2012). The
district court sentenced Hill as an armed career criminal,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012), to 192 months in prison.
On appeal, counsel for Hill filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the
district court erred in sentencing Hill as an armed career
criminal, because two of the predicate offenses should not have
been counted separately and none of the predicate felonies were
charged in the indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hill has not filed a pro se supplemental brief, despite notice
of his right to do so. We affirm.
At sentencing, Hill objected to his designation as an
armed career criminal based on the fact that he was convicted of
two of the predicate offenses, felony delivery of cocaine, on
the same day. However, the crimes for which he was convicted
were “committed on occasions different from one another,”
arising out of “separate and distinct criminal episode[s],” such
that the district court properly overruled the objection. 18
U.S.C. § 924(e); United States v. Davis, 689 F.3d 349, 358–59
(4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d
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332, 335 (4th Cir. 1995)). We therefore conclude that the
district court did not err in counting Hill’s prior felonies as
separate offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act.
Counsel also posits that Hill’s constitutional rights
were violated because the predicate offenses supporting his
armed career criminal designation were not charged in the
indictment or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This
argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States
v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 284 n.4 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that
an indictment need not reference or list the prior convictions
used to enhance a sentence); United States v. Cheek, 415 F.3d
349, 352–54 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that prior convictions used
as the basis for an armed career criminal sentence need not be
charged in the indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt);
see also Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 n.1
(2013) (recognizing the narrow exception for fact of a prior
conviction). Accordingly, the district court did not err in
sentencing Hill as an armed career criminal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Hill, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Hill requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
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believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Hill. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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