UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4688
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CALVIN LEVAR DIXON, a/k/a Booga, a/k/a Calvin Dion,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:10-cr-00277-PMD-4)
Submitted: June 11, 2014 Decided: June 24, 2014
Before DIAZ and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bradley M. Kirkland, BRADLEY M. KIRKLAND, LLC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell, Assistant United States
Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Calvin Levar Dixon pleaded guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine,
500 grams or more of cocaine, 1000 grams or more of heroin, a
quantity of marijuana, as well as maintaining a place for
distribution, three counts of possession with intent to
distribute heroin, one count of possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, and one count of unlawful possession
of a firearm by a convicted felon. He received a 264-month
sentence of imprisonment. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), finding no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Dixon’s
guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and whether the district
court imposed a reasonable sentence. Dixon filed a pro se
supplemental brief raising ineffective assistance of counsel
related to the guilty plea hearing. The Government declined to
file a brief or raise the appeal waiver. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Prior to accepting a plea, a trial court must conduct
a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and
determines that the defendant comprehends, the nature of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum
penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the rights
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he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir.
1991). Additionally, the district court must ensure that the
defendant’s plea was supported by an independent factual basis,
was voluntary, and did not result from force or threats. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2)-(3); DeFusco, 949 F.2d at 119-20. Because
Dixon did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea or otherwise
preserve any allegation of Rule 11 error, this court reviews his
plea colloquy for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277
F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002); see Henderson v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013) (discussing plain error standard).
Our review of the record indicates that the district court
substantially complied with Rule 11 in accepting Dixon’s plea.
Accordingly, we conclude that Dixon’s plea was knowing and
voluntary and was supported by an adequate factual basis, and,
consequently, that the plea was final and binding. See United
States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 46 (2007). The court first reviews for significant
procedural error, and if the sentence is free from such error,
it then considers substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51.
Procedural error includes improperly calculating the Sentencing
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines range as mandatory,
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failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, and
failing to explain adequately the selected sentence. Id. The
district court must make an “individualized assessment” by
applying the relevant § 3553(a) factors to the case’s specific
circumstances. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009). The individualized assessment need not be elaborate
or lengthy, but it must be adequate to allow meaningful
appellate review. Id. at 330. Substantive reasonableness is
determined by considering the totality of the circumstances, and
if the sentence is within the properly-calculated Guidelines
range, we apply a presumption of reasonableness. United
States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2012).
In imposing Dixon’s sentence, the district court
correctly calculated the Guidelines range, did not abuse its
discretion in granting a variance for a 1:1 ratio of powder to
crack cocaine, and specifically considered the advisory nature
of the Guidelines, the § 3553(a) factors, and Dixon’s individual
circumstances. Accordingly, we conclude that Dixon’s 264-month
sentence is both procedurally and substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the
record, including Dixon’s pro se claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel, and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Dixon’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Dixon, in writing, of the right to
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petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Dixon requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Dixon. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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