FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 1, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
GEORGE L. MOTHERSHED,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 14-6044
(D.C. No. 5:13-CV-00435-C)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. (W.D. Okla.)
Oklahoma Bar Association; STEVEN W.
TAYLOR, Honorable Chief Justice in his
official and individual capacity; TOM
COLBERT, Honorable Vice–Chief Justice
in his official and individual capacity;
JAMES E. EDMONDSON, Honorable
Justice in his official and individual
capacity; JAMES R. WINCHESTER,
Honorable Justice in his official and
individual capacity; YVONNE KAUGER,
Honorable Justice in her official and
individual capacity; DOUGLAS L.
COMBS, Honorable Justice in his official
and individual capacity; JOSEPH M.
WATT, Honorable Justice in his official
and individual capacity; JOHN F. REIF,
Honorable Justice in his official and
individual capacity,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Before HARTZ, McKAY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
In this pro se appeal, as in other litigation he has pursued in this court and
elsewhere, Plaintiff George Mothershed (a former Oklahoma attorney) raises claims
regarding his 2003 disbarment by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. In his previous appeals
to this court, we affirmed the dismissal of his claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. See Mothershed v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 463 F. App’x 777 (10th Cir.
2012); Mothershed v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n, 390 F. App’x 779 (10th Cir. 2010).
Plaintiff contends his complaint in the instant litigation should nonetheless have been
permitted to proceed because he is now raising claims that fall outside the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine: general constitutional challenges to the validity of the state’s rules and
procedures for regulating the practice of law, rather than specific challenges to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s judgment in his disbarment proceeding. Among other things,
Plaintiff argues the Oklahoma Supreme Court may not constitutionally regulate the
practice of law based on the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of
legislative functions, and the “common law” as enacted in 1275 by the “English
Parliamentary enactment of First Statute of Westminster, 3 Edw. 1, ch. 29 (1275).”
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(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 48; see also id. (“After enactment of the First Statute of
Westminster under the common law the sole authority and power to establish professional
standards for the practice of law originates from a legislative or statutory grant of police
power.”).)
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers
complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). “In other words, an element of the claim
must be that the state court wrongfully entered its judgment” in order for Rooker-
Feldman to apply. Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2012).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar a plaintiff from raising the same legal issues
in federal court that have previously been decided in a state court, so long as the alleged
constitutional wrong is based on an independent act of the defendant, and not a decision
by the state court. Id. at 1283-85. However, where “claims are based on the alleged
invalidity of the state court order, Rooker-Feldman bars them.” Segler v. Ross Mgmt.
Grp., Inc., 485 F. App’x 980, 981 (10th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff’s claim in this case is, at heart, a claim that he was wronged by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision to disbar him, allegedly in violation of the
constitutional limits on that court’s authority and jurisdiction. His claim is “based on the
alleged invalidity of the state court order,” not some independent wrongful act, and it is
therefore barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. Moreover, even if we were to hold
that Plaintiff’s challenge to the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s disbarment authority falls
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outside the scope of Rooker-Feldman, we would not find Plaintiff entitled to relief on the
merits of this claim.
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the case. For substantially the same
reasons stated by the district court, we also AFFIRM the district court’s imposition of
pre-filing restrictions. In the future, Plaintiff will be subject to the pre-filing restrictions
detailed in the district court’s order.
All pending motions are DENIED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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