MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2014 ME 88
Docket: Ken-13-436
Argued: May 14, 2014
Decided: July 1, 2014
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, SILVER, MEAD, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.
GLEN C. HARRINGTON III
v.
STATE OF MAINE
JABAR, J.
[¶1] Glen C. Harrington III appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior
Court (Kennebec County, Anderson, J.) summarily dismissing his petition for
post-conviction relief. See 15 M.R.S. § 2131(1) (2013); M.R. App. P. 19(a).
Harrington argues that the court erred in determining that a decision by the
Department of Corrections to limit the availability of transition-plan programs and
related good-time credits was a “calculation[]” of good-time credits excluded from
the scope of post-conviction review pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2121(2) (2013). We
affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] In August 2012, Harrington pleaded guilty to one count of eluding an
officer (Class C), 29-A M.R.S. § 2414(3) (2013), admitted to violating the
conditions of his probation, 17-A M.R.S. § 1206(5) (2013), and was sentenced to
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forty-eight months’ imprisonment. After his sentencing, the Department sent
Harrington a letter informing him that he was eligible to receive up to seven days
per month of good-time credits for good conduct and participation in certain
programs. Additionally, the Department informed him that in the last year of his
sentence, he would be eligible to receive an additional two days per month for
participation in transition-plan programs pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1253(10)(B)
(2013). See also 1A C.M.R. 03 201 010-51 § 27.3(VI)(B)(1)(b) (Aug. 21, 2006).
Because Harrington believes that he would be eligible to receive the additional two
days of good time for the entire duration of his sentence, he filed a petition for
post-conviction review seeking the two additional days associated with
transition-plan programs.
[¶3] Although 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121(2) and 2123-A (2013) provide that
“calculations of good time . . . credits” are not reviewable in post-conviction
proceedings, Harrington argued that his post-conviction petition did not challenge
a “calculation[]” of the credits, but instead challenged the Department’s policy of
making the credit available to only those inmates with one year or less remaining
in their sentences. The post-conviction court disagreed with Harrington’s
characterization and summarily dismissed his petition. See 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121(2),
2123-A; M.R. Crim. P. 70(b) (Tower 2013).
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[¶4] Harrington timely appealed. See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(A). We granted
his petition for a certificate of probable cause to address the merits of his appeal on
the sole issue of “[w]hether the court erred in concluding that [the] decision of the
Department of Corrections . . . is a ‘calculation’ of good time credits excluded
from the scope of post-conviction review pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2121(2).”
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] Harrington argues that the court erred in interpreting the Department’s
policy as a “calculation[]” of good-time credits, excluded from the scope of
post-conviction review pursuant to 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121(2) and 2123-A. “Statutory
interpretation is a matter of law, and we review the trial court’s decision de novo.”
State v. Harris, 1999 ME 80, ¶ 3, 730 A.2d 1249 (quotation marks omitted). In
interpreting statutory language, our primary purpose is to “giv[e] effect to the
intent of the Legislature.” Joyce v. State, 2008 ME 108, ¶ 7, 951 A.2d 69. “We
seek to discern from the plain language [of the statute] the real purpose of the
legislation, avoiding results that are absurd, inconsistent, unreasonable, or
illogical.” State v. Fournier, 617 A.2d 998, 999 (Me. 1992). If the statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, we construe the statute in accordance with its
plain meaning “in the context of the whole statutory scheme.” State v. Stevens,
2007 ME 5, ¶ 5, 912 A.2d 1229 (quotation marks omitted). Only if the statute is
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reasonably susceptible to different interpretations will we look beyond the
statutory language to the legislative history. Id.
[¶6] The post-conviction statute provides that an inmate “who satisfies the
prerequisites of [15 M.R.S. § 2124 (2013)] may . . . [challenge a] post-sentencing
proceeding [that] is unlawful.” 15 M.R.S. § 2125 (2013). In relevant part, section
2121(2) defines a “post-sentencing proceeding” as “a court proceeding or
administrative action occurring during the course of and pursuant to the operation
of a sentence that affects whether there is incarceration or its length.” The
definition also specifically provides a list of administrative proceedings that do not
fall within the definition of post-sentencing proceedings, including “calculations of
good time and meritorious good time credits pursuant to Title 17-A, section 1253,
subsections 3, 3-B, 4, 5 and 7 or similar deductions under Title 17-A, section 1253,
subsections 8, 9 and 10.” (Emphasis added.) Harrington makes two arguments in
assigning error to the court’s interpretation of the term “calculation[]” in the
post-conviction statute.
A. Plain Meaning
[¶7] First, Harrington argues that the plain meaning of the term
“calculation[]” encompasses the act of computing the number of days for which an
inmate is eligible but not the broader act of determining whether an inmate is
eligible for a program at all. Harrington’s argument is not persuasive.
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[¶8] To limit the meaning of the term “calculation[]” so as to exclude the
administrative action at issue here, as Harrington urges, would result in the
post-conviction court directly reviewing the discretionary acts of the Department
without affording the Department the opportunity to first review the inmate’s
grievance. See 15 M.R.S. § 2123-A (stating that review of administrative
proceedings that are not “post-sentencing proceedings” is exclusively provided by
the Maine Administrative Procedure Act); 1A C.M.R. 03 201 010-53–57 § 29.1
(2012) (providing a process for review of prisoners’ grievances). The
Department’s decision whether inmates are eligible for certain programs involves a
similar level of discretion as a decision whether an inmate’s performance in a
program should warrant good-time credits, which is entitled to deference by a
reviewing court.1 See FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
2007 ME 97, ¶ 11, 926 A.2d 1197 (“[W]hen a dispute involves an agency’s
interpretation of a statute it administers, the agency’s interpretation, although not
conclusive, is entitled to great deference and will be upheld unless the statute
plainly compels a contrary result.” (quotation marks omitted)). Because the statute
specifically provides that the Department’s calculations of good-time credits are
reviewable exclusively through the Maine Administrative Procedure Act, see
1
Although Harrington has not directly presented the issue in this appeal, in Roderick v. State, we
concluded that the Department’s policy of limiting transition-plan programs and the associated two-day
good-time credit to only those inmates with less than one year remaining in their sentences comports with
17-A M.R.S. § 1253(10)(B) (2013). 2013 ME 34, ¶¶ 12-18, 79 A.3d 368.
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15 M.R.S. §§ 2121(2), 2123-A, we conclude that the statute supports the
post-conviction court’s interpretation and reject Harrington’s argument that the
court erred in interpreting the statute’s plain meaning.
B. Statutory Context
[¶9] Second, Harrington argues that the court erred in interpreting the
statute as a whole. Harrington contends that because the Legislature mandated that
post-conviction proceedings are to be the “comprehensive” and “exclusive”
method of review of post-sentencing proceedings, it must also have intended that
the exceptions to post-sentencing proceedings, including “calculations” of
good-time credits, would be construed narrowly. See 15 M.R.S. § 2122 (2013).
However, Harrington’s interpretation of section 2122 leads to a result that is
inconsistent with the post-conviction statute as a whole. See Fournier, 617 A.2d at
999.
[¶10] Pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2123-A, review of administrative
proceedings “that are not included in the definition of ‘post-sentencing proceeding’
in section 2121, subsection 2 is exclusively provided by [the Maine Administrative
Procedure Act].” (Emphasis added.) In describing both post-conviction
proceedings and administrative proceedings as “exclusive,” the Legislature did not
intend one to be read more broadly than the other. Rather, the Legislature intended
to create two entirely separate methods of review, dependent on whether an
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inmate’s grievance involved a “post-sentencing proceeding,” or whether it
involved a separate administrative action listed in section 2121(2). See 15 M.R.S.
§§ 2122, 2123-A.
[¶11] Further, to the extent that the term “calculation[]” is ambiguous, the
legislative history of section 2121(2) supports construing “calculation[]” to
encompass the Department’s decision at issue. In 2012, the Legislature enacted
the relevant amendments to the post-conviction statute, adding a list of
administrative actions that are excluded from post-conviction review and are
reviewable only through the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. See P.L. 2011,
ch. 601, §§ 3, 6 (effective Aug. 30, 2012) (codified at 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121(2),
2123-A). In its summary accompanying the legislative changes, the Legislature
explained that “[c]urrent administrative remedies provide for an adequate hearing
process . . . for remedial relief for errors in calculations of good time . . .
deductions, making access to post-conviction review relief unnecessary and
duplicative.” L.D. 1861, Summary (125th Legis. 2011). Harrington does not
argue that he is unable to challenge the Department’s decision through review of
the agency’s action pursuant to the Maine Administrative Procedure Act. See
generally 5 M.R.S. § 11001 (2013).
[¶12] In contrast, post-conviction review is available for determinations of
the credit pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1253(2) (2013) for time served in custody
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before or during an inmate’s trial or sentencing. In drawing the distinction
between “calculations” of good-time credits for which post-conviction review is
unavailable and the sentence reductions “relative to time detained” in section
1253(2), the Legislature considered whether the decision to reduce an inmate’s
sentence involved the discretion of the Department of Corrections. “Calculations”
of good-time credits involve the Department’s discretion in either determining
whether an inmate’s participation in a specific program has merited good-time
credit or, as is the case here, whether and when to offer a program. See L.D. 1861,
Summary (125th Legis. 2011). Conversely, the Legislature noted that sentence
reductions pursuant to section 1253(2) are based “upon a statement from either the
transporter of the prisoner or the attorney for the State,” regarding how much time
the inmate has served before sentencing and do not involve the Department’s
discretion. L.D. 1861, Summary (125th Legis. 2011). Inmates challenging the
calculations of the State’s attorney or the transporter cannot petition for review of
the Department’s final agency action pursuant to the Maine Administrative
Procedure Act. As a result, the nondiscretionary reduction “relative to time
detained” does not require deference by the court, and constitutes a post-sentencing
proceeding pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2121(2).
[¶13] Because nothing precludes Harrington from seeking administrative
relief and review of the Department’s action pursuant to the Maine Administrative
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Procedure Act, see 5 M.R.S. § 11001, and because the statute supports the court’s
interpretation, we conclude that the court did not err in construing the
Department’s decision as a “calculation[]” of good-time credits and dismissing
Harrington’s petition.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
James T. Lawley, Esq., Lipman & Katz, P.A., Augusta, for appellant
Glen C. Harrington
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Fernand LaRochelle, Dep. Dist.
Atty., Augusta, for appellee State of Maine
At oral argument:
James T. Lawley, Esq., for appellant Glen C. Harrington
Diane E. Sleek, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of Attorney General, Augusta, for
appellee State of Maine
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CR-2013-623
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY