FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 02 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ANTHONY L. ROBINSON, No. 10-17186
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:02-cv-01538-NJV
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANTHONY A. LAMARQUE, Warden; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Nandor J. Vadas, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 22, 2014**
San Francisco, California
Before: D.W. NELSON, LEAVY, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c). The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for
decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
California state prisoner Anthony L. Robinson appeals from the district
court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging excessive force and
violation of his right to freely exercise his House of Yahweh Yadhaim (“HOYY”)
faith. We review de novo, EEOC v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961
(9th Cir. 2009) (denial of a Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law);
Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (summary judgment); and for an
abuse of discretion, Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Swift Transp.
Co., Inc., 632 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2011) (review of injunctive relief order);
Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 2007) (denial of a motion
for a new trial). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I
Robinson argued to the jury that his participation in the Jewish kosher meal
program would be sufficient to satisfy his sincerely held religious beliefs, and he
prevailed on this claim. Robinson now objects to the scope and content of the
injunctive relief. The district court did not abuse its discretion in entering a
permanent injunction granting Robinson the prospective relief of participation in
the Jewish kosher meal program because the injunction was the least intrusive
means to correct the specific harm alleged. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo
Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1297 (9th Cir. 1992).
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II
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s First
Amendment claims to be appointed an inmate minister for HOYY, for a name
change, for special showering and housing assignments, and for permission to wear
corn rolls, dread locks, and a full beard. Robinson failed to raise a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether the prison’s denial of his requests was reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests in security, denied him all religious
expression, could be maintained while accommodating his request without a severe
burden on prison resources, or could be substituted with ready alternatives. See
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987).
III
The district court properly dismissed as Heck-barred Robinson’s excessive
force claims stemming from the January 5, 2000 incident because success on
Robinson’s claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his state conviction
for misdemeanor battery by a prisoner on a peace officer. See Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994) (section 1983 action that necessarily implies the
invalidity of plaintiff’s conviction must be dismissed unless the conviction has
been invalidated).
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IV
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Robinson’s due
process claim because Robinson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether he was improperly denied procedural protections during his disciplinary
hearing. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 564-70 (1974) (describing
minimum procedural due process protections in prison disciplinary proceedings).
V
Contrary to Robinson’s contentions, the district court properly denied his
motion for a judgment as a matter of law and his motion for a new trial because
substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. See Johnson v. Paradise Valley
Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Substantial evidence is
evidence adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to
draw a contrary conclusion from the same evidence.”).
Robinson’s remaining contentions are without merit.
AFFIRMED.
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