NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUL 3 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
A. WAHEED CHAUDRY, No. 12-55019
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00508-JAH-NLS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL,
Fourth Appellate District Division One; et
al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John A. Houston, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 25, 2014**
Before: HAWKINS, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
A. Waheed Chaudry appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from state court appellate
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument and grants defendants’ motions, filed on April 1 and 9,
2014, to submit this case on the briefs. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
proceedings involving him and his homeowners association. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Sadoski v. Mosley, 435 F.3d 1076,
1077 n.1 (9th Cir. 2006). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record,
Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Chaudry’s claim for damages against
defendant Haller in her individual capacity because Haller is entitled to judicial
immunity. See Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999)
(explaining that “[a] judge is not deprived of immunity because he takes actions
which are in error . . . or are in excess of his authority[,]” and setting forth the two
exceptions to judicial immunity). Contrary to Chaudry’s contention, Chaudry
failed to allege facts sufficient to show that Haller acted in clear absence of all
jurisdiction. See O’Neil v. City of Lake Oswego, 642 F.2d 367, 369-70 (9th Cir.
1981) (discussing the distinction between acts taken “in clear absence of all
jurisdiction” and those taken merely “in excess of jurisdiction”).
To the extent that Chaudry sued Haller for damages in her official capacity,
the district court properly dismissed Chaudry’s claim because Haller is entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th
Cir. 2007) (state officials sued for damages in their official capacities are entitled
to Eleventh Amendment immunity).
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Dismissal of Chaudry’s claims against defendant Whispering Ridge
Homeowners Association was proper because federal courts are required to abstain
from interfering with pending state court proceedings. See Gilbertson v. Albright,
381 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2004) (listing the requirements for Younger abstention
and explaining that the doctrine applies to actions for equitable relief); see also
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1987) (states have an important
interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of their courts).
Because we affirm dismissal on immunity and Younger grounds, we do not
address Chaudry’s contentions concerning the district court’s application of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine to his complaint.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chaudry’s motion
for leave to file his proposed first amended complaint. See Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t
of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 2013) (setting forth standard
of review and explaining that leave to amend may be denied if amendment would
be futile).
We reject as unsupported by the record Chaudry’s contention that the district
court’s recusal and reassignment decisions denied him any fundamental rights.
Defendant Whispering Ridge Homeowners Association’s opposed motion to
strike, filed on June 21, 2013, is granted.
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All other pending motions are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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