UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4280
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER JAMIE DAVIS,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:12-cr-00267-RBH-1)
Argued: May 15, 2014 Decided: June 30, 2014
Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: James P. Rogers, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Frank Daley,
Jr., OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, Alfred W. Bethea,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Jamie Davis appeals from his conviction,
pursuant to a conditional guilty plea, of using a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Davis contends that the
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We
affirm.
On November 15, 2011, Officer Marvin Cox stopped a car for
speeding. He approached the vehicle, saw a substance that
appeared to be marijuana on the driver’s lap, and detected the
odor of marijuana emanating from the car. Davis was the front
seat passenger in the vehicle. The patrol car dashboard camera
showed that while Officer Cox talked to the driver near the
front of the patrol car, the front passenger side door opened
and closed.
Officer Cox called for backup and Officer Tabitha Smith
arrived at the scene. Officer Cox then had Davis exit the
vehicle and checked him for weapons. Officer Cox subsequently
searched the vehicle and located a bottle of vodka and two cups
containing vodka. One cup also “contain[ed] a small marijuana
roach.” J.A. 37. Both Davis and the driver admitted to drinking
alcohol in the vehicle; Cox arrested each of them for having an
open container of alcohol. Cox then transported Davis and the
driver to the county jail. Officer Smith remained with the
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vehicle, awaiting the tow truck to impound the vehicle. No one
else approached the vehicle during this time.
As the vehicle was being loaded onto the tow truck, Officer
Smith observed a bag embroidered with the name “Davis” under the
vehicle on the passenger side. Officer Smith notified Officer
Cox of her discovery and Officer Cox returned to the scene.
Officer Cox searched the bag and discovered, among other items,
narcotics, two handguns, and a wallet containing Davis’
identification.
On March 27, 2012, the grand jury indicted Davis for
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); felon in possession, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) and 924(e); and
using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to and in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). On September 27, 2012, Davis filed a
motion to suppress the evidence seized from the bag. On October
16, 2012, the district court held a hearing on the suppression
motion. Officers Cox and Smith testified about the traffic stop
and the subsequent searches; the tow truck driver described the
discovery of the bag in the course of his preparations to tow
the car.
On November 14, 2012, the district court denied the motion.
While the government had asserted several bases on which the
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district court could have done so, the court concluded solely
that Davis had abandoned the bag by attempting to secrete it
beneath the car during the traffic stop, and Davis therefore had
no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in its
contents.
Thereafter, Davis conditionally pled guilty to Indictment
Count 3, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, pursuant to a plea agreement in which he
preserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression
motion. The district court sentenced Davis to 240 months’
imprisonment, with five years’ supervised release. Davis timely
filed this appeal.
We review the factual findings underlying a district
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error and its
legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d
705, 709 (4th Cir. 2012). When the district court denies a
motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government. Id. We may affirm on any ground
supported by the record, regardless of the ground on which the
district court relied. Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470,
474 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Moore, 709 F.3d
287, 293 (4th Cir. 2013)).
“The police may search an automobile and the containers
within it where they have probable cause to believe contraband
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or evidence is contained.” California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,
580 (1991); see also United States v. Carter, 300 F.3d 415, 421-
22 (4th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). The officers in this case
undeniably had probable cause to search the car for narcotics on
the basis of the odor of marijuana detected by Officer Cox when
he first approached the car. See Carter, 300 F.3d at 422; United
States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193, 198 (4th Cir. 2010). This
authority to search extended to any containers within the
vehicle, including those possessed or owned by passengers in the
car. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999).
Although Davis’ bag was discovered outside the car after he
had been removed from the scene, the district court specifically
found that Davis had placed the bag beneath the car during the
traffic stop. Undisputed evidence in the record fully supports
the district court’s determination: (1) the bag was found
beneath the passenger side of the car; (2) the dashboard video
camera revealed that the passenger door opened and closed while
Officer Cox was speaking with the driver during the stop; and
(3) Davis’ name is embroidered on the bag and his identification
was found in the bag. In light of the above, we have no
hesitation in concluding, as the government argued below, that
the fact that the bag was moved before it was discovered did not
vitiate Officer Cox’s authority to seize the bag and search it
attendant to the lawful search of the vehicle. Specifically, at
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the time of the stop, the probable cause to search the car
extended to the bag. See Acevedo, supra, and Houghton, supra.
Accordingly, the search of the bag was a reasonable search under
the Fourth Amendment.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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