United States v. Ehizele Seignious

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4621

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

EHIZELE AYDO SEIGNIOUS, a/k/a Mike Smith,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Senior District
Judge. (1:10-cr-00580-BEL-3)

Argued: May 15, 2014 Decided: July 1, 2014

Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge Hamilton wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Thacker joined.

ARGUED: Arthur Samuel Cheslock, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellant. Tamera Lynn Fine, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge:

We ordered briefing on several issues pertaining to the

district court’s order that criminal defendant Ehizele Seignious

(Seignious) pay $1,213,347 in restitution, pursuant to the

Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A.

For reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s order of

restitution.

We also affirm Seignious’ convictions and sentence in the

face of the brief filed by Seignious’ appellate counsel,

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the pro

se supplemental brief filed by Seignious, and our court’s

obligation under Anders to “conduct ‘a full examination of all

the proceeding[s] to decide whether the case is wholly

frivolous,’” Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (quoting

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744) (alteration in original).

I.

A.

On April 12, 2012, Seignious pled guilty, without benefit

of a plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to commit bank

fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, one count of access device fraud, id.

§ 1029(a)(4), one count of bank fraud, id. § 1344, and one count

of aggravated identity theft, id. § 1028A. The charges stem

from a massive and organized scheme to use stolen credit card

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information to create counterfeit credit cards and to use such

cards to make retail purchases of gift cards and high-end

merchandise to be sold or returned for cash. The scheme spanned

nearly four years——from December 2007 through at least August

2010.

Following Seignious’ guilty plea, but prior to his final

sentencing hearing, the district court conducted five

evidentiary hearings over the course of two months to address,

inter alia, the parties’ dispute regarding the applicable loss

figure under United States Sentencing Guidelines (the Guidelines

or USSG) § 2B1.1(b)(1). During these hearings, the government

offered the testimony of numerous cooperating witnesses who were

involved in the scheme, the testimony of an investigative agent

with the Secret Service who worked extensively on the case, and,

through such agent, a summary exhibit of physical and

documentary evidence regarding actual and intended losses caused

by the bank fraud conspiracy.

Sherice Jones (Jones), one of the initial four

coconspirators in the case, testified that Seignious introduced

her to the other two primary coconspirators——brothers Moadian

Bratton-Bey (Moadian) and Boaz Bratton-Bey (Boaz). 1

1
For ease of reference, we refer to Seignious, Jones,
Moadian, and Boaz collectively as “the Initial Coconspirators.”

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 During its infancy, the conspiracy involved recruiting

employees at legitimate businesses such as restaurants and

hotels to use skimmer devices to record customers’ credit card

numbers and then deliver those numbers to the Initial

Coconspirators. Eventually, the conspiracy grew to include the

purchasing of large volumes of credit card numbers from foreign

countries, including China and Russia, over the Internet.

Credit card numbers in hand, the Initial Coconspirators

manufactured fraudulent credit cards using specialized printers

and other equipment purchased by Seignious, Moadian, and Boaz.

The Initial Coconspirators also counterfeited photo

identification cards to accompany the fraudulent credit cards.

The Initial Coconspirators would then use the newly minted

credit and identification cards to purchase high-value

merchandise in various retail stores. To convert their

purchases to cash, they would return the merchandise for refunds

or sell the merchandise to third parties.

Jones also explained that the conspiracy involved

purchasing individuals’ identifying information from a local

business which specialized in assisting customers with passport

applications. Jones and Seignious would use such information to

purchase or rent cars and property and to open new credit card

accounts. Jones noted that Seignious used another person’s

identifying information to rent an apartment where the

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conspiracy based its operations and where Seignious personally

produced counterfeit credit cards.

As the conspiracy grew, the Initial Coconspirators

recruited numerous other individuals known as “strikers” to

handle the necessary interaction with retailers. This division

of labor produced a tiered hierarchy of crews, comprised of five

to six individuals each, who were managed and supplied with

fraudulent credit cards by the Initial Coconspirators. In

total, Jones estimated that over fifty individuals were

recruited to assist in the conspiracy which eventually expanded

to other states up and down the eastern seaboard of the United

States.

Regarding the conspiracy’s profitability, Jones testified

that, once fully operational, the conspiracy involved three to

five crews each making $5,000 to $10,000 in fraudulent purchases

per day. Jones estimated that the scheme netted millions of

dollars in merchandise through the use of over 1000 counterfeit

credit cards. Jones explained that, on average, each card the

conspiracy produced that proved operational would be used to

make three to four purchases of $1,500 to $2,000 each.

Shelia Allen, a striker in the conspiracy, testified that

she alone purchased roughly $8,000 worth of televisions per week

from January to April 2009. Another striker in the conspiracy,

Mandy Myers (Myers), estimated that she alone used counterfeit

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credit cards to purchase around $400,000 to $500,000 worth of

merchandise during her fifteen-month involvement in the

conspiracy.

Jermaine Dansbury (Dansbury), a mid-level manager who the

government refers to as a wrangler, estimated that some weeks

his crew purchased between $5,000 and $20,000 worth of

merchandise.

Secret Service Special Agent Scott Windish (Agent Windish),

one of the lead investigative agents in the case, testified last

on behalf of the government. Of relevance on appeal, through

his testimony, Special Agent Windish laid the foundation for

admission of Government Exhibit 1A. Government Exhibit 1A

consists of a thirty-six page, color-coded document, in a

twelve-column spreadsheet format. Government Exhibit 1A lists

1827 credit card numbers with each credit card number and its

corresponding information coded in black (1,460), red (49) or

blue (318). 2

Per Special Agent Windish’s testimony, black coding

represents credit card numbers found on computers used by the

conspiracy or found on computer printouts belonging to the

conspiracy. The conspiracy purchased the credit card numbers

2
The government introduced an earlier version of this
exhibit as Government Exhibit 1. Because Government Exhibit 1A
is the final version, we do not consider the content of Exhibit
1.

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coded in black in bulk amounts from persons in foreign countries

via Internet transactions known as “credit card dump[s].” (J.A.

720). With respect to 211 of the 1,460 credit card numbers

coded in black, Exhibit 1A lists actual losses totaling

approximately $606,000. Although Exhibit 1A does not

specifically list the date upon which each loss occurred,

Special Agent Windish testified that he and the other agents who

prepared Exhibit 1A included losses with respect to a fraudulent

transaction only if the fraud occurred during the duration of

the conspiracy. In fact, he specifically testified that “[i]f

we found a transaction that occurred before or after this scheme

was going on, it was not included in the spreadsheet.” (J.A.

738). Under cross-examination, he conceded, however, that, with

respect to the credit card numbers coded in black, the

possibility existed that the corresponding loss listed could

have been caused by a non-member of the conspiracy who illegally

purchased and used the same number during the duration of the

conspiracy.

Per Special Agent Windish, red coding represents credit

card numbers with the attributes of credit card numbers coded in

black, plus the existence of evidence verifying usage by the

conspiracy, for example, a receipt in a vehicle in which

merchandise purchased with the counterfeit credit card was

recovered or video surveillance of a member of the conspiracy

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using such card. Exhibit 1A contains 49 credit card numbers and

corresponding information coded in red with actual losses

totally approximately $84,000.

Special Agent Windish explained that blue coding represents

credit card numbers and their respective related information for

which the investigation uncovered evidence verifying usage by

the conspiracy, but did not find such numbers on computers used

by the conspiracy or on computer printouts belonging to the

conspiracy. Exhibit 1A contains 318 credit card numbers and

corresponding information coded in blue with actual losses

totaling approximately $523,000.

Special Agent Windish further testified that he and other

case agents compiled Exhibit 1A as a master spreadsheet of the

evidence gathered over the course of the criminal investigation

of the conspiracy which evidence was put on “initial

spreadsheets [that] were created as arrests were occurring, as

warrants were occurring, before we were preparing evidence and

discovery, as we were getting evidence from banks or from stores

and receipts.” (J.A. 731). He also described the various

methods he and the other agents used to weed out incomplete or

unreliable information and to avoid double-counting.

On July 20, 2012, the district court sentenced Seignious to

120 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.

Pursuant to the MVRA, id. § 3663A, the district court ordered

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Seignious to pay $1,213,347 in restitution at the rate of $25

per month; payments to begin when Seignious starts serving his

term of supervised release. The $1,213,347 amount is the

identical amount of restitution sought by the government, which

amount the government asserted below it had established in

actual losses caused by the conspiracy through the testimony of

Special Agent Windish, as aided by Government Exhibit 1A.

Notably, the district court determined the restitution

amount without making findings on the record regarding the

actual losses the scheme caused specific victims. Accordingly,

instead of identifying individual victims and their losses, the

district court’s judgment simply directed that restitution be

paid to the Clerk of Court.

Seignious noted this timely appeal on August 7, 2012.

Roughly one week later, the government submitted a document for

filing which specifies the total actual losses suffered by each

of the banks and retailers listed as victims in Government

Exhibit 1A. Such document, which the government refers to as

the Restitution Worksheet, also specifies the victims’ names and

respective addresses. On August 15, 2012, the district court

entered the Restitution Worksheet as a sealed document on its

docket.

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 B.

Seignious’ appellate counsel (Appellate Counsel) filed an

Anders brief, certifying that there are no meritorious issues

for appeal, but questioning whether the district court

adequately complied with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11

when accepting Seignious’ guilty plea and whether the district

court properly sentenced Seignious. For his part, Seignious

filed a pro se supplemental brief, in which he contests the

district court’s application of several sentencing enhancements.

The government did not file a response to either brief.

Based upon our court’s obligation under Anders to

independently review the record, we ordered Appellate Counsel

and the government to submit briefs addressing: (1) whether the

government and the district court sufficiently complied with

§ 3664(a)-(d); (2) if so, whether the restitution order is

adequately supported by the evidence, and whether the district

court sufficiently explained its reasoning when imposing

restitution; and (3) if so, whether the district court erred in

failing to specifically identify in the judgment the victims

eligible to receive restitution and their respective losses.

Our order also directed that, to the extent not already in the

record on appeal, the government provide a copy of each version

of the spreadsheet it had submitted to the district court to

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support its arguments regarding losses attributable to

Seignious’ offenses.

In response to our order, Appellate Counsel filed an

opening brief addressing the identified issues and the

government filed a response brief. Although Appellate Counsel

did not file a reply brief, we allowed Seignious to file a pro

se supplemental reply brief. Having reviewed the entire record

in accordance with Anders, we set the case for oral argument and

directed counsel to focus on the restitutionary issues we had

ordered briefed.

II.

We first take up the issue of whether the government and

the district court sufficiently complied with § 3664(a)-(d), the

statutory section setting forth the procedures for issuance and

enforcement of an order of restitution under the MVRA. Id.

§ 3663A(d).

A.

As a threshold matter, we address our standard of review

with respect to this issue. Because Seignious never brought to

the district court’s attention any deficiency in the

government’s and/or the district court’s compliance with such

procedures, we are constrained to review for plain error. Fed.

R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial

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rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the

court’s attention.”). See also Puckett v. United States, 556

U.S. 129, 134 (2009) (“If a litigant believes that an error has

occurred (to his detriment) during a federal judicial

proceeding, he must object in order to preserve the issue. . . .

If an error is not properly preserved, appellate-court authority

to remedy the error (by reversing the judgment, for example, or

ordering a new trial) is strictly circumscribed.”).

Plain error review has four prongs. The first prong

requires the existence of legal error “that has not been

intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively

waived, by the appellant.” Id. at 135. The second prong

requires that the legal error at issue “be clear or obvious,

rather than subject to reasonable dispute.” Id. The third

prong requires that the clear or obvious legal error at issue

“have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the

ordinary case means [the defendant] must demonstrate that it

‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’” Id.

(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).

“Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied,

the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the error——

discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error

seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation

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of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted) (alteration in original).

B.

The MVRA provides that, “[n]otwithstanding any other

provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an

offense [against property under Title 18, including any offense

committed by fraud or deceit], the court shall order, in

addition to . . . any other penalty authorized by law, that the

defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense . . . .”

Id. § 3663A(a)(1). See also id. § 3663A(c)(1) (“This section

shall apply in all sentencing proceedings for convictions of

. . . any offense——(A) that is—— . . . (ii) an offense against

property under this title . . . , including any offense

committed by fraud or deceit . . . .”). Notably, “under the

MVRA, each member of a conspiracy that in turn causes property

loss to a victim is responsible for the loss caused by the

offense,” not merely for the losses caused by a particular

conspirator’s overt acts. United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d

328, 341 (4th Cir. 2003). The MVRA further provides that “[a]n

order of restitution under [the MVRA] shall be issued and

enforced in accordance with section 3664.” Id. § 3663A(d).

Section 3664(a), for its part, directs the district court

to order preparation of a presentence report that will include

“information sufficient for the court to exercise its discretion

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in fashioning a restitution order” including “to the extent

practicable, a complete accounting of the losses to each victim

. . . and information relating to the economic circumstances of

each defendant.” Id. § 3664(a). Section 3664(b) directs the

district court to disclose such information to the parties.

Section 3664(c) specifies that “this chapter [(Miscellaneous

Sentencing Provisions)], chapter 227 [(Sentences)], and Rule

32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure [(Sentence)]

shall be the only rules applicable to proceedings under this

section.” Id. § 3664(c).

In addition, under § 3664(d), “to the extent practicable,”

the government must provide information concerning restitution

to the probation officer sixty days in advance of the scheduled

sentencing date, id. § 3664(d)(1); the probation officer, in

turn, must, to the extent practicable, provide notice to and

collect information from victims, id. § 3664(d)(2), and the

defendant must provide the probation officer with information

concerning his background, financial resources and ability to

pay restitution, id. § 3664(d)(3). Under § 3664(d)(4), the

district court can require other information, including

documentation or testimony. “If the victim’s losses are not

ascertainable by the date that is 10 days prior to sentencing,”

the district court can set another date for disclosure of this

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information, up to ninety days after sentencing. Id.

§ 3664(d)(5).

C.

Our thorough review of the record regarding the procedural

history leading to the district court’s order of restitution

reveals that restitution was imposed without the various

procedural requirements of § 3664(a)-(d) being observed. Such

circumstance, however, entitles Seignious to no appellate

relief. This is so because, assuming arguendo that the

imposition of restitution in this case without the various

procedural requirements of § 3664(a)-(d) being observed

constitutes clear or obvious legal error, Seignious has failed

to carry his burden on appeal of demonstrating that such error

affected his substantial rights, i.e., that such error

“‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’”

Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).

The record leaves no doubt that the district court would

have imposed the same amount of restitution on Seignious

regardless of whether every requirement of § 3664(a)-(d) had

been meticulously met in his case. When the district court

imposed restitution at Seignious’ final sentencing hearing, on

July 20, 2012, it stated as follows: “I impose restitution in

the amount stated by government counsel, which is $1,213,347.”

(J.A. 889). The district court’s reference to “the amount

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stated by government counsel,” refers to the following colloquy

between government counsel Assistant United States Attorney

Tamera Fine and the district court earlier during the same

hearing:

[MS. FINE:] And, finally, Your Honor, United
States has established that there are actual losses in
the amount of $1,213,347 in this case. We would ask
that a restitution order in that full amount be
entered, joint and several with other defendants in
this case.

THE COURT: If you could say that amount again,
please?

MS. FINE: Certainly. The amount that was
testified to by Special Agent Windish from his
spreadsheet . . . is $1,213,347. Thank you, Your
Honor.

THE COURT: Good. Thank you, Miss Fine.

(J.A. 866).

The spreadsheet to which government counsel refers in this

quoted passage from the transcript of Seignious’ sentencing

hearing is Government Exhibit 1A. To reiterate, the government

introduced Exhibit 1A through the testimony of Special Agent

Windish during the last of five hearings held over the course of

two months for the purpose of taking evidence on Guidelines’

issues in dispute for sentencing, including the applicable loss

figure under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1). This Guidelines’ section

provides for increasing amounts of levels to be added to a

defendant’s base offense level under the Guidelines based upon

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the greater of actual loss (i.e., “the reasonably foreseeable

pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense”), USSG

§ 2B1.1(b)(1), comment.(n.3(A)(i)), or intended loss (i.e., “the

pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense

. . .”), id. § 2B1.1(b)(1), comment.(n.3(A)(ii)).

Seignious had the opportunity to cross examine Special

Agent Windish about how he arrived at the figure of $1,213,347

in actual losses caused by the conspiracy and about the creation

of Exhibit 1A. In fact, Seignious availed himself of these

opportunities and presented argument to the district court that,

with respect to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1), “the amount of [actual

fraud] loss that the government has sufficiently proven

attributable to this conspiracy is $251,496.” (J.A. 518). The

district court rejected this argument and found, for purposes of

USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1), the loss figure to be between $2.5 and $7

million, which range the district court characterized as “a more

than conservative loss figure . . . .” (J.A. 1020). Notably,

in support of the district court’s characterization of this loss

figure as conservative, the district court stated in its

sentencing memorandum that “the cooperator testimony established

by a preponderance [of the evidence] that the actual losses

attributable to the conspiracy exceeded $7 million.” Id. In

this regard, the district court summarized the testimony of the

following three cooperating witnesses———Jones, Myers, and

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Dansbury. Seignious had the opportunity to cross examine each

of these witnesses as well.

In sum, all of the evidence upon which the district court

relied in determining the appropriate amount of restitution to

impose upon Seignious under the MVRA was before the district

court in the context of resolving the parties’ dispute regarding

the appropriate loss amount to be used in applying USSG

§ 2B1.1(b)(1). Seignious had fair opportunity to challenge such

evidence. Under these circumstances, we are not surprised that

he cannot show prejudice resulting from restitution being

imposed upon him without, in large part, the various procedural

requirements of § 3664(a)-(d) being observed. Accordingly,

Seignious fails the third prong of plain error review on this

issue.

III.

We now turn to consider whether the restitution order is

adequately supported by the evidence. At no point below did

Seignious object to the amount of restitution imposed upon him

or dispute the amount of restitution proposed by the government.

Accordingly, as Seignious concedes, we are constrained to review

this issue for plain error. Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). See also

Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134.

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 Under plain error review, we must first consider whether

the district court committed legal error. Puckett, 556 U.S. at

135. In the present context, this means that we must first

consider whether the district court’s factual finding that,

based upon the preponderance of the evidence, the bank fraud

conspiracy caused $1,213,347 in actual losses is clearly

erroneous. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (district court to resolve any

dispute as to proper amount of restitution by preponderance of

the evidence); United States v. Wilkinson, 590 F.3d 259, 271

(4th Cir. 2010) (district court’s actual loss finding under MVRA

is reviewed under clearly erroneous standard). In answering

this question, we remain mindful of the Supreme Court’s oft-

quoted delineation of when a district court’s finding is clearly

erroneous: “[W]hen although there is evidence to support it,

the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395

(1948). Some thirty-seven years later, the Court explained that

“[t]his standard plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to

reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is

convinced that it would have decided the case differently.”

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). Rather, as

the Court cautioned, “[i]f the district court’s account of the

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its

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entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though

convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it

would have weighed the evidence differently.” Id. at 573–74.

Here, we conclude that the district court’s account of the

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its

entirety. Accordingly, we uphold the district court’s finding

of fact that the bank fraud conspiracy caused $1,213,347 in

actual losses as not clearly erroneous.

The parties are on the same page that Seignious is only

responsible to pay restitution under the MVRA for the actual

losses suffered by the victims of his offenses, including the

conspiracy offense. As for Appellate Counsel, in the

Supplemental Opening Brief we ordered him to file, Appellate

Counsel takes the position that “the evidence was sufficient to

support the [$1,213,347] order of restitution.” (Supplemental

Opening Br. of Appellate Counsel at 22). The government takes

the same position.

In his pro se supplemental response to the government’s

Supplemental Brief, Seignious takes the position that the

evidence in the record does not support actual losses of

$1,213,347. According to Seignious, at most, the record

supports restitution in the amount of $176,336.36. He complains

in large part that the testimony of his coconspirators regarding

the profitability of their fraud scheme is too vague to be

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relied upon by the district court in calculating restitution.

He also repeatedly makes the point that Agent Windish admitted

the possibility that actual losses attributed on Exhibit 1A to

the credit card numbers coded in black (accounting for

approximately half of the $1,213,347 figure) could have been

caused by other criminals who were not part of the conspiracy at

issue in the present case.

Although the district court could have done a better job of

making a record below with respect to restitution, after

reviewing the record as a whole, we are not convinced that a

mistake has been committed with respect to the district court’s

finding that the conspiracy caused $1,213,347 in actual losses.

First, not even counting any of the credit card numbers coded in

black, Government Exhibit 1A, as supported by the testimony of

Special Agent Windish, supports approximately half of the total

actual loss figure right off the bat. These are credit card

numbers for which the government obtained evidence directly

implicating the conspiracy in the actual loss listed on

Government Exhibit 1A.

Now for the credit card numbers coded in black. We readily

acknowledge the possibility, as Special Agent Windish

acknowledged during his testimony, that other criminals could

have separately obtained the same credit card numbers as the

bank fraud conspiracy at hand and caused the losses listed on

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Exhibit 1A during the exact same time period the conspiracy at

hand operated. The problem for Seignious, however, is that the

conclusion that the bank fraud conspiracy at hand caused the

actual losses occurring during the life of such conspiracy with

respect to the credit card numbers indisputably illegally

obtained by and found within the care, custody, and control of

such conspiracy is plausible in light of the record viewed in

its entirety.

Added on top of the testimony of Special Agent Windish and

Government Exhibit 1A is the testimony of Seignious’ numerous

coconspirators. The district court expressly credited and

accepted all of the following testimony of Seignious’

codefendants Jones, Myers, and Dansbury, as summarized by the

district court in its August 10, 2012 order addressing various

Guidelines issues, including the amount of loss under USSG

§ 2B1.1(b)(1):

Sherice Jones testified . . . that between 3 and 5
crews of between 3 and 5 strikers each “went out every
day” to make fraudulent purchases. She explained
that, depending on the type of merchandise, each crew
could purchase anywhere from $5,000 to $10,000 in
merchandise per day. The merchandise was then either
sold or returned, for cash, to the store where it had
been purchased. Jones also testified that over the
course of the conspiracy, she estimated that the
scheme brought in “millions of dollars” worth of
merchandise by using “thousands” of fake credit cards.
Mandy Myers, a striker, testified that she personally
made between $400,000 and $500,000 in fraudulent
purchases over the course of her 15-month involvement
in the scheme. Jermaine Dansbury, a wrangler,

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 testified that he took crews of 2 to 5 strikers out 4
to 7 times per week, and that his crews could “bring
in” between $5,000 to $20,000 per week on average.
Dansbury explained that the total amounts were
inconsistent based on a variety of factors, but that
his crews could sometimes purchase thousands of
dollars’ worth of merchandise in just a few hours.

(J.A. 1019-20). The district court also held that the evidence

amply demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1)

“there were at least 50 strikers involved in the scheme, though

less than a third were actually indicted,” (J.A. 1017); (2)

during the life of the conspiracy from December 2007 through

August 2010 “the illegal conduct was consistent and persistent,”

id.; and (3) with respect to the scope of the conspiracy,

“hundreds of individuals were being victimized and . . . the

losses totaled in the millions of dollars,” (J.A. 1019).

Although we need not solely rely on Jones’ testimony in

support of the district court’s actual loss finding, Jones’

testimony goes a long way to support such a finding and is not

too vague to be probative on issues of actual loss as alleged by

Seignious. Based upon the most conservative figure in Jones’

testimony regarding the fraudulent purchasing modus operandi of

a single crew working for the conspiracy during its time of

operation (i.e., $5,000 per day), a single crew working for the

conspiracy for just one year fraudulently purchased $1,825,000

in merchandise. This amount is $611,653 more than the amount of

restitution the district court ordered Seignious to pay under

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the MVRA. Given that “[t]he settled law of this circuit

recognizes that the testimony of a defendant’s accomplices,

standing alone and uncorroborated, can provide an adequate basis

for conviction,” United States v. Burns, 990 F.2d 1426, 1439

(4th Cir. 1993), there is no basis for us to conclude that the

district court’s actual loss figure of $1,213,347 is clearly

erroneous.

Finally, assuming arguendo the district court’s actual loss

finding is clearly erroneous, thus satisfying the first prong of

plain error review, we cannot say that such error is clear or

obvious. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. Therefore, Seignious fails

the second prong of plain error review as well, making going

further in our plain error analysis a fruitless exercise. In

sum, Seignious is entitled to no relief with respect to his

appellate challenge to the district court’s factual finding

underlying its order of restitution regarding the actual losses

caused by the conspiracy.

IV.

We next consider whether the district court sufficiently

explained its reasoning when imposing restitution. At no point

did Seignious object to the adequacy of the district court’s

explanation of its reasoning when imposing such restitution.

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Accordingly, as Seignious concedes, we review for plain error.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). See also Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134.

Assuming arguendo that Seignious has established the first

two prongs of the four prong test for obtaining appellate relief

under plain error review, Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 734, the

analysis stops because Seignious cannot establish the third

prong—i.e., Seignious cannot establish that the district court’s

failure to sufficiently explain its reasoning with respect to

imposing restitution upon him under the MVRA affected his

substantial rights. The overarching point is that there is no

reason to believe that the amount of restitution the district

court ordered Seignious to pay under the MVRA would have been

any different had the district court expressly explained its

reasoning in imposing such restitution.

V.

The last issue for which we ordered briefing is whether the

district court erred in failing to specifically identify in its

July 25, 2012 judgment the victims eligible to receive

restitution and their respective losses. Because Seignious

filed no objection in this regard, we review for plain error.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). See also Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134.

Under plain error review, we hold Seignious is entitled to

no relief. Jumping straight to the third prong of the test for

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plain error review (i.e., the prejudice prong), Seignious has

failed to establish that the filing of the Restitution Worksheet

approximately one week after the filing of his criminal judgment

affected his substantial rights. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135.

Accordingly, there is no basis to grant Seignious any appellate

relief on this issue.

VI.

We have examined the issues raised by Seignious in his pro

se briefing and his Appellate Counsel’s Anders brief. We

conclude that all such issues lack merit. Furthermore, in

accordance with our obligations under Anders, 386 U.S. at 744,

we have reviewed the entire record in this case and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm Seignious’ convictions

and sentence in toto, as well as the district court’s order of

restitution.

AFFIRMED

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