UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4867
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID RICH, a/k/a Oakie,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District
Judge. (1:08-cr-00438-WDQ-1)
Submitted: June 30, 2014 Decided: July 2, 2014
Before MOTZ, KING, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Daniel H. Ginsburg, THE LAW OFFICE OF DANIEL GINSBURG, LLC,
Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Michael C. Hanlon, Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Rich appeals the 360-month sentence imposed at
his resentencing hearing on drug, firearms, and related
offenses. On appeal, Rich asserts that his sentence is
unreasonable and is in contravention of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
For the following reasons, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “the
familiar abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We first review for “significant
procedural error,” which includes, as relevant here, “failing to
adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 51. To
adequately explain the sentence, “the district court must make
an individualized assessment” by “apply[ing] the relevant [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors to the specific circumstances
of the case before it.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325,
328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The
sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the
appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments
and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal
decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
356 (2007); see Carter, 564 F.3d at 330. The district court,
however, need not explicitly reference § 3553(a) or discuss
every factor on the record, particularly when the sentence is
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within the advisory Guidelines range. United States v. Johnson,
445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006).
After reviewing the sentencing transcript, we conclude
that the district court adequately explained its reasons for
imposing the chosen sentence. In response to counsel’s argument
for a sentence below the Guidelines range, the district court
took note of the need for deterrence and Rich’s extensive and
violent criminal history, but found that those factors
outweighed his post-sentencing rehabilitation and the asserted
reduced risk of recidivism at the time of his release. The
court’s implicit assignment of greater weight to the nature and
circumstances of Rich’s offense and the need for the sentence to
promote the other § 3553(a) factors articulated by the court did
not amount to an abuse of discretion. United States v. Rivera-
Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that it was
within district court’s discretion to accord more weight to host
of aggravating factors in defendant’s case and decide that
sentence imposed would serve § 3553 factors on whole).
Rich also argues that the district court failed to
address his argument that a variant sentence was necessary due
to the disparity of his sentence compared to that of his co-
conspirator. We have recognized that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) is
aimed primarily at eliminating national sentencing inequity, not
differences between co-defendants. United States v. Withers,
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100 F.3d 1142, 1149 (4th Cir. 1996); see also United States v.
Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 623-24 (6th Cir. 2007) (collecting
cases). Further, a district court has “extremely broad
discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the
§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679
(4th Cir. 2011). Here, the district court — although not
directly addressing Rich’s argument that he should receive a
lesser sentence than his co-conspirator based on his role in the
offense — indicated that the quantity of drugs for which Rich
was responsible, the violence in Rich’s offenses, and Rich’s
extensive criminal history supported the chosen sentence.
Rich repeats his claims in support of his argument
that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Substantive
reasonableness is determined by considering the totality of the
circumstances, and, if the sentence is within the properly-
calculated Guidelines range, we apply a presumption of
reasonableness. United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288, 295
(4th Cir. 2012). Our review convinces us that Rich’s arguments
on appeal do not rebut that presumption.
Finally, we reject Rich’s argument that his statutory
sentence for Count One is improper because it was based on a
prior conviction to which he did not admit and that was not
proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This issue is
foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
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228-35 (1998). Although Rich suggests that the case is losing
its sustainability, Alleyne did not overrule Almendarez-Torres.
See United States v. McDowell, 745 F.3d 115, 124 (4th Cir. 2014)
(“Almendarez-Torres remains good law . . . .”), petition for
cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __ (June 16, 2014) (No. 13-10640); see
United States v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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