FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 09 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
JANE DOE, pro se, No. 11-15583
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-05596-SI
Northern District of California,
v. San Francisco
CITY OF SAN MATEO; SAN MATEO
POLICE DEPARTMENT; SHANDON ORDER
MURPHY; JOSEPH YANSUKA;
COUNTY OF SAN MATEO; SAN
MATEO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE;
PERUCCI, Sergeant; SUZANNE BLICK,
Deputy,
Defendants - Appellees.
Before: TROTT, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
The Memorandum Disposition filed January 28, 2014, is withdrawn. It may
not be cited as precedent by or to this court or any district court of the Ninth
Circuit.
The Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc are otherwise
DENIED, no further petitions for rehearing will be accepted.
FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 09 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JANE DOE, pro se, No. 11-15583
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:07-cv-05596-SI
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF SAN MATEO; SAN MATEO
POLICE DEPARTMENT; SHANDON
MURPHY; JOSEPH YANSUKA;
COUNTY OF SAN MATEO; SAN
MATEO COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE;
PERUCCI, Sergeant; SUZANNE BLICK,
Deputy,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Susan Illston, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 3, 2013
San Francisco, California
Before: TROTT, THOMAS, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over this timely appeal
from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, and we
affirm, albeit on a different ground.1 Craig v. M&O Agencies, Inc., 496 F.3d 1047,
1053 (9th Cir. 2007). Because the facts are well known to the parties and were
fully aired during oral argument, we repeat them only as necessary to explain our
decision.
The events that precipitated this lawsuit began with a sexual encounter
between Doe and her ex-boyfriend at his home, following which he called the
police, who arrested her. She sued the ex-boyfriend in state court for sexual
battery, but she voluntarily dropped that case after the trial commenced. She
subsequently sued in federal court under § 1983, alleging that the police had
violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by illegally strip searching
her following her arrest and by denying her medical care following her alleged
rape.
A thorough examination of this record demonstrates beyond doubt that even
viewed in every respect in the light most favorable to her, Doe plainly has not
1
We reject any suggestion in the district court’s order that the crime of rape
without more does not create a “serious medical need.” We do believe, as did the
district court, that appropriately attending to and treating a woman who is a rape
victim “is the right thing to do.”
2
marshaled evidence sufficient to permit a jury reasonably to render a verdict in her
favor nor create a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to withstand a motion
for summary judgment. See In re Oracle Corp. Sec. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th
Cir. 2010). Doe’s only evidence is internally inconsistent and contradictory, when
not entirely self-serving. For example, Doe claims for the first time in opposition
to summary judgment that she sought medical treatment two days after her alleged
attack. This claim, about which she refused to divulge any specific information,
contradicted her deposition testimony that she never saw a doctor or went to a
hospital after the event.
Under these circumstances, the defendants are entitled to summary
judgment. Thus, we affirm.2
AFFIRMED
2
On these facts and circumstances, Doe’s First Amendment Petition Clause
Claim with respect to her “informal request for assistance” has no merit.
3