NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 13-4320
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WILLIAM BELL,
Appellant
v.
PLEASANTVILLE HOUSING AUTHORITY
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-09-cv-04614)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 2, 2014
Before: HARDIMAN, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 11, 2014)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
William Bell appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint as a
sanction. We will affirm.
William Bell filed suit against the Pleasantville Housing Authority (“PHA”)
alleging that it wrongfully evicted him. The District Court dismissed his complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but we vacated and remanded after concluding that
Bell’s complaint raised a federal question—i.e., a due process claim based on his eviction
in alleged violation of the regulations of the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”). See Bell v. Pleasantville Hous. Auth., 443 F. App’x 731,
735 (3d Cir. 2011).
On remand, Bell repeatedly failed to appear for his deposition even though the
District Court appointed counsel to represent him for that purpose. He also refused to
respond to the PHA’s discovery requests and to appear for various court-ordered
conferences. The Magistrate Judge finally convened a show cause hearing, at which Bell
also failed to appear. The Magistrate Judge continued the hearing and, when Bell finally
appeared, gave Bell one last chance to appear for his deposition. When Bell again failed
to do so, the PHA filed a third motion to dismiss Bell’s complaint as a sanction under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). Bell did not oppose the motion (or the PHA’s prior
motions), and the Magistrate Judge recommended granting it. Bell also did not object to
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, and the District Court adopted it and dismissed
his complaint. The District Court later granted the PHA’s request to withdraw its
counterclaim, and Bell appeals from that final order.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
dismissal of a complaint as a sanction for abuse of discretion. See Poulis v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). In this case, the District Court
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properly recognized that dismissal is a drastic sanction to be imposed as a last resort, but
it carefully balanced the factors set forth in Poulis and concluded that dismissal was
warranted in light of Bell’s repeated failures to appear for his deposition and to respond
to PHA’s discovery requests. Bell does not challenge the District Court’s application of
the Poulis factors, and the District Court acted well within its discretion in dismissing his
complaint for the reasons the Magistrate Judge adequately explained.
Bell’s sole argument on appeal is that the Fair Housing Act and HUD’s policies
and regulations confer on him a “privilege to refuse to answer discovery and appear for
deposition.” (Appellant’s Br. at 1.) He contends in that regard that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure do not govern this action. Bell did not raise that argument below, and
there is no support for it. The Fair Housing Act authorizes aggrieved persons to
commence a “civil action” in, inter alia, “an appropriate United States district court[.]”
42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “govern the procedure
in all civil actions . . . in the United States district courts[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Those
rules, including the discovery obligations they impose, are thus fully applicable in this
civil action. Bell’s unsupported assertion to the contrary is frivolous and serves only to
further demonstrate the willfulness of his refusal to comply with his obligations.
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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