FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 16 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TAMARA PETROSYAN, No. 11-70158
Petitioner, Agency No. A097-857-809
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 8, 2014**
Pasadena, California
Before: SILVERMAN, TALLMAN, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Tamara Petrosyan, a citizen and native of Armenia, petitions for review of a
final order of removal from the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or “the
Board”). The BIA affirmed an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
relief”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for
review.
Petrosyan contends that substantial evidence does not support the IJ’s
adverse credibility finding—a credibility determination upheld by the BIA after it
performed its own review of the evidence and the law. See Joseph v. Holder, 600
F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that where the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision
and also provides its own review of the evidence and the law, “we review both the
IJ and the BIA’s decision”). We must uphold an adverse credibility finding so
long as it is supported by substantial evidence. Soto-Olarte v. Holder, 555 F.3d
1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2009). Because Petrosyan filed her application for relief
before May 11, 2005, the effective date of the REAL ID Act, pre-REAL ID Act
standards govern our review. Joseph, 600 F.3d at 1240 n.3.
Petrosyan contends that the inconsistencies in her application were minor
and insufficient to support an adverse credibility determination. Petrosyan is
correct that “‘[m]inor inconsistencies . . . that do not relate to the basis of an
applicant’s alleged fear of persecution, [or] go to the heart of the asylum claim’ do
not generally support an adverse credibility finding.” Singh v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d
1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d
655, 660 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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But the inconsistencies relied upon by the BIA were not minor. Petrosyan
initially testified that before she moved to Moscow she left in her apartment in
Yerevan a court summons criminally charging her for attempting to encourage her
minor neighbors to adopt her gay lifestyle. But on cross-examination, she stated
that she “didn’t leave it there, [but] destroyed it because [she] was afraid” that it
would be found. When confronted with the inconsistency, she said she destroyed
it, but then backtracked and stated “but as far as what I did with the document, I
could not recall.” Singh, 439 F.3d at 1108 (“A single supported ground for an
adverse credibility finding” may be sufficient).
This inconsistency was also “accompanied by other indications of
dishonesty” that support the adverse credibility determination. Kaur v. Gonzales,
418 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis omitted). Her explanation that she
destroyed medical records relating to her rape to keep others from learning about it
is inconsistent with her filing of a public, written complaint about the incident.
Moreover, both the Board and the IJ also correctly noted that Petrosyan failed to
provide accessible corroborating evidence, such as medical records, police and
court reports, and immigration documents submitted in Russia. Sidhu v. I.N.S., 220
F.3d 1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the IJ has reason to question the
applicant’s credibility, and the applicant fails to produce non-duplicative, material,
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easily available corroborating evidence and provides no credible explanation for
such failure, an adverse credibility finding will withstand appellate review.”).
Because the evidence in the record does not compel the conclusion that
Petrosyan is credible, we uphold the BIA and the IJ’s adverse credibility
determination. Kaur, 418 F.3d at 1064. Petrosyan is therefore ineligible for
asylum and withholding of removal. See Kin v. Holder, 595 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th
Cir. 2010). Similarly, Petrosyan is not entitled to CAT relief because her CAT
claims were based on the same unbelievable statements used to support her
applications for asylum and withholding of removal and no other evidence in the
record supports a claim of torture. Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1157
(9th Cir. 2003).
PETITION DENIED.
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