FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION JUL 21 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 13-30098
Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 1:12-cr-00155-BLW-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
JESUS GUADALUPE SANCHEZ, AKA
Che, AKA Jose Salazar,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 9, 2014**
Seattle, Washington
Before: ALARCÓN, KLEINFELD, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Jesus Guadalupe Sanchez challenges the 400-month sentence imposed
following his jury-trial conviction for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Sanchez argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights
when it made factual findings to determine his base offense level and apply various
adjustments in accordance with the advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. This
argument is foreclosed by our precedent. Sanchez relies primarily on Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151
(2013). Taken together, Apprendi and Alleyne hold that any fact that increases the
statutorily prescribed maximum or mandatory minimum sentence must be found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Alleyne, 133 S.
Ct. at 2158. But the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a sentencing court
finds facts while exercising its discretion to impose a sentence within the
statutorily prescribed range. United States v. Vallejos, 742 F.3d 902, 906–07 (9th
Cir. 2014); see also Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163; United States v. Treadwell, 593
F.3d 990, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2010). The jury convicted Sanchez of conspiring to
possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of actual methamphetamine, a
crime for which the mandatory minimum sentence is ten years and the maximum
sentence is life in prison. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A). The court sentenced
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Sanchez to 400 months. Because the court’s findings did not affect the statutory
maximum or mandatory minimum sentence, Apprendi and Alleyne do not apply.
Vallejos, 742 F.3d at 906.
Next, Sanchez contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing
to address his arguments for reducing his sentence based on the disparity between
his sentence and some of his co-conspirators and the disparity between sentences
for methamphetamine crimes and other drugs. We review for plain error. See
United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010).
Though the district court did not explicitly reject Sanchez’s arguments, this
does not constitute plain error. We held in United States v. Carter that the
sentencing judge is not required to specifically address each and every argument
for a sentence reduction where the record reflects that the judge considered the
arguments alongside the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and adequately explained the
sentence imposed. 560 F.3d 1107, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2009). Like the sentencing
judge in Carter, the judge in this case presided over the trial, reviewed the pre-
sentence report and the parties’ submissions, listened to argument by both parties
at the sentencing hearing, considered the § 3553(a) factors and discussed most of
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them, was familiar with the defendant’s crimes and personal situation, and
adequately explained the sentence. See id. Indeed, the judge ultimately imposed a
below-Guidelines sentence after adopting some of Sanchez’s other arguments. We
also note that the judge had good reasons for not reducing the sentence based on a
disparity between Sanchez’s sentence and those of his co-conspirators. Unlike his
co-conspirators, who cooperated with the prosecution and got reduced sentences,
Sanchez did not cooperate, obstructed justice, and was found to be the leader of the
conspiracy. See, e.g., id. at 1121 (noting that “a sentencing disparity based on
cooperation is not unreasonable”). No plain error occurred.
For similar reasons, we reject Sanchez’s argument that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing a below-Guidelines sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See id.
AFFIRMED.
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