UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4403
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE LAMAR WIGGINS, a/k/a T-Wig, a/k/a Barnwell,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District
Judge. (1:12-cr-00333-MBS-1)
Submitted: June 30, 2014 Decided: July 15, 2014
Before WYNN and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John M. Ervin, III, ERVIN LAW OFFICE, Darlington, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Julius Ness Richardson, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrance Lamar Wiggins was convicted, after a jury
trial, of one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2012),
one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012),
and one count of felon in possession of firearms and ammunition,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). The district court
sentenced Wiggins to life imprisonment on the conspiracy count,
120 months on the felon in possession count, to be served
concurrently, and sixty months consecutive on the § 924(c)
count. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there
are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether
the district court erred in denying Wiggins’s motion for
judgment of acquittal on the § 924(c) count. Wiggins was
advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but
has not filed a brief. The Government declined to file a brief.
This court reviews de novo the district court’s denial
of a Rule 29 motion. United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93
(4th Cir. 2011). “If there is substantial evidence to support
the verdict, after viewing all of the evidence and the
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
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Government, the court must affirm.” United States v.
Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “Substantial evidence is that
evidence which a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Al Sabahi,
719 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 464 (2013). The court does
not “review the credibility of the witnesses and assume[s] that
the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor
of the government.” United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245
(4th Cir. 2007).
In order to prove the § 924(c) violation charged in
the indictment, the Government was required to establish that:
(1) Wiggins possessed a firearm, and (2) “that the possession
. . . furthered, advanced, or helped forward a drug trafficking
crime.” United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir.
2002). “[T]here are many factors that might lead a fact finder
to conclude that a connection existed between a defendant’s
possession of a firearm and his drug trafficking activity.” Id.
These include the “type of drug activity . . . being conducted,
accessibility of the firearm, the type of weapon, whether the
weapon is stolen, the status of the possession (legitimate or
illegal), whether the gun is loaded, proximity to drugs or drug
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profits, and the time and circumstances under which the gun is
found.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of
the record leads us to conclude that the evidence was sufficient
to sustain the jury’s verdict and the district court did not err
in denying Wiggins’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Wiggins’s convictions and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Wiggins, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Wiggins requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Wiggins.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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