UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4689
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL CURTIS MANESS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:12-cr-00428-WO-1)
Submitted: June 27, 2014 Decided: July 15, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand,
United States Attorney, Clifton T. Barrett, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Curtis Maness appeals the sentence imposed
after he pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to
possession of ammunition after having been convicted of a crime
punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. The district
court applied a cross-reference pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2K2.1(c)(1)(A) to the kidnapping
guideline, USSG § 2A4.1 because Maness possessed the ammunition
in connection with an assault and kidnapping. The court varied
downward from the 120-month sentencing range and imposed a
sentence of 108 months of imprisonment. On appeal, Maness
asserts that the district court erred in finding the evidence
sufficient to establish that the kidnapping occurred, because
the testimony at sentencing was not credible. Maness also
argues that, even if the incident occurred, it is not relevant
conduct to his possession of ammunition because it lacks any
connection to that offense, and thus cannot support application
of the cross-reference. The Government argues that the district
court did not err, and that even if the cross-reference was
erroneously applied, the error was harmless. We find merit in
this latter argument and affirm.
A procedural sentencing error is harmless where this
court has “(1) knowledge that the district court would have
reached the same result even if it had decided the [G]uidelines
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issue the other way, and (2) a determination that the sentence
would be reasonable even if the [G]uidelines issue had been
decided in the defendant’s favor.” United States v. Savillon-
Matute, 636 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Assuming that the cross-reference was
erroneously applied, Maness’s sentencing range would have been
fifty-seven to seventy-one months of imprisonment, and the
court’s 108-month sentence is a variance of fifty-two percent.
The district court thoroughly and repeatedly explained that,
even if it erred in applying the cross-reference, it would
impose the same sentence to satisfy the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) sentencing factors.
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that, in
light of the district court’s consideration of the parties’
arguments and the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and its
articulation of reasons warranting the imposition of an upward
variant sentence, we should defer to the district court’s
determination as to the extent of the variance. United
States v. Hargrove, 701 F.3d 156, 163-64 (4th Cir. 2012)
(affirming variance from zero-to-six-month Guidelines range to
sixty-month sentence), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2403 (2013);
United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 366-67 (4th Cir.
2011) (affirming variance sentence six years greater than
Guidelines range because sentence was based on the district
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court’s examination of relevant § 3553(a) factors); see also
United States v. Angle, 598 F.3d 352, 359 (7th Cir. 2010) (“All
that matters is that the sentence imposed be reasonable in
relation to the ‘package’ of reasons given by the court.”).
Maness’s sentence is reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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