People v. Stevenson

Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Stevenson, 2014 IL App (4th) 130313

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Caption MARTIN STEVENSON, Defendant-Appellee.

District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-13-0313

Filed June 11, 2014
Rehearing denied July 15, 2014

Held In a prosecution for endangering the life of a child arising from
(Note: This syllabus allegations that defendant’s actions placed her in proximity to or
constitutes no part of the permitted access to Suboxone, a drug he was using to treat his opiate
opinion of the court but addiction, and led to her death, the trial court’s ruling allowing
has been prepared by the defendant’s motions in limine without limitation to exclude evidence
Reporter of Decisions of his substance-abuse history, treatment, prior use of Suboxone and
for the convenience of the prescription used to obtain the drug at the time of her death was
the reader.) reversed and the cause was remanded with directions to reconsider the
motions after requiring amendments to more specifically identify the
evidence sought to be excluded and to enter an order accurately
explaining its limitations, or decline to entertain the motions until they
are ripe for reconsideration.

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 12-CF-779; the
Review Hon. Scott Drazewski, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
 Counsel on Jason Chambers, State’s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino,
Appeal David J. Robinson, and Linda Susan McClain (argued), all of State’s
Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Jacqueline L. Bullard, Amber Corrigan, and
Nancy Vincent (argued), all of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of
Springfield, for appellee.

Panel JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Appleton and Justice Steigmann concurred in the
judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In August 2012, a McLean County grand jury indicted defendant, Martin J. Stevenson, for
endangering the life of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-21.6(a) (West 2010)). In February 2013,
defendant filed two motions in limine. The first motion in limine requested the trial court to
prohibit the State from introducing evidence (1) about his “history of prior substance abuse,”
(2) defendant sought treatment for his substance abuse, (3) he had previously been prescribed
Suboxone “on more than one occasion,” (4) he was prescribed Suboxone on the day before the
child died, and (5) the Suboxone prescription was a result of his “relapse.” Defendant asserted
the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial nature. The second
motion in limine requested the trial court to prohibit the State from introducing evidence (1)
defendant had been prescribed Suboxone before the date the offense was alleged to have
occurred; (2) he was questioned by police and told police he had been prescribed Suboxone on
May 6, 2012, and had been previously prescribed Suboxone; (3) he told police he had “last
been prescribed” Suboxone “1½ to 2 years” before the alleged offense; and (4) records would
indicate defendant’s “last” Suboxone prescription “had been written during the last three
months of 2011.” Defendant asserted his statements and these records were “collateral” and
could not be used as an exception to the hearsay rule. In April 2013, after a hearing, the court
granted defendant’s motions in limine.
¶2 The State argues the trial court erred when it granted defendant’s motions in limine. The
State argues the court erroneously concluded the indictment did not encompass the acts of
defendant administering, giving, or providing Suboxone to the child. It argues evidence of
defendant’s drug addiction is (1) part of the continuing narrative of the events giving rise to the
offense, (2) admissible to show his state of mind, and (3) relevant to its ability to inquire on
cross-examination whether Suboxone affected defendant’s memory and ability to recall events
of the crime. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

-2-
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In August 2012, a McLean County grand jury indicted defendant for endangering the life
of a child (720 ILCS 5/12-21.6(a) (West 2010)). The indictment stated as follows:
“[D]efendant willfully caused the life of [L.S.], a child under the age of 18 years, to be
endangered in that the defendant placed the child in proximity to or permitted access to
the drug Suboxone, a controlled substance, and said proximity to or access to the
Suboxone was the proximate cause of the death of [L.S.]”

¶5 A. Suboxone
¶6 Suboxone is a brand-name prescription drug. It contains buprenorphine and naloxone.

¶7 B. Defendant’s Motions in Limine
¶8 In February 2013, defendant filed two motions in limine. The first motion stated the State
had evidence, including (1) defendant’s “history of prior substance abuse,” (2) “defendant
sought treatment for substance abuse/addi[c]tion,” (3) defendant was prescribed “on more than
one occasion a medication known as Suboxone,” (4) defendant “was prescribed Suboxone on
the day before the death of his minor daughter which gives rise to this charge,” and (5) the May
6, 2012, Suboxone prescription was “issued due to the defendant’s ‘relapse’ (usage of
non-prescribed drugs) shortly before the date on which this offense is alleged to have
occurred.” Defendant argued the circumstances behind the Suboxone prescription were
“irrelevant and immaterial” to the charged offense and highly prejudicial. Defendant requested
the State be prohibited from “using, referring to or attempting to introduce the evidence”
referenced.
¶9 The second motion in limine requested the trial court to prohibit the State from introducing
evidence (1) defendant had been prescribed Suboxone before the date the offense was alleged
to have occurred; (2) defendant was questioned by police and “stated to police that he had been
prescribed Suboxone on May 6, 2012, and had previously been prescribed Suboxone in the
past”; (3) defendant told police he had “last been prescribed” Suboxone “1½ to 2 years” before
the alleged offense; and (4) records would indicate defendant’s “last” Suboxone prescription
“had been written during the last three months of 2011.” Defendant asserted his statements and
these records were “collateral” and could not be used as an exception to the hearsay rule,
namely as an admission against interest or a false exculpatory statement. Defendant requested
the State be prohibited from “using, referring to or attempting to introduce the evidence”
referenced.

¶ 10 C. The Motion in Limine Hearing
¶ 11 In April 2013, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motions in limine. Defense
counsel informed the court the parties agreed to the following facts: (1) Suboxone is used to
treat persons with opiate addiction or dependence; (2) defendant sought treatment for opiate
addiction in 2011 and 2012; (3) as a result of his treatment he was prescribed Suboxone; (4) he
had been prescribed Suboxone on May 6, 2012; (5) defendant was in possession of Suboxone
on May 7, 2012; (6) the victim, L.S., was a one-year-old child and defendant’s daughter; (7)
she was taken to the hospital on May 7, 2012, and died; (8) a toxicology report showed
Suboxone in her system; and (9) L.S. died as a result of Suboxone intoxication.

-3-
¶ 12 Defense counsel argued, in relevant part, as follows:
“The State did certain research, did conduct interviews of persons, and found [out]
about that history of substance abuse, *** found out about the prescription of the
medication, and has that body of knowledge, and they’re ready to present that at trial.
The problem that I see with a number of things that are set forth in the first motion in
limine is the following: A history of prior substance abuse, in reality, exists on the part
of the defendant; that he sought treatment for that substance abuse is available to the
State; that he was prescribed the medication, Suboxone; that he was prescribed that the
day before; that all of these things really are not relevant to the charges that are pending
in this case. To put someone on the stand to say, [‘]here’s what Suboxone is commonly
used for, and in the case of [defendant], was used to treat a substance abuse difficulty or
condition that he had,[’] paints him in a manner that is so extremely prejudicial, that
even if there were any relevance to that information, that it would be greatly and
substantially outweighed by the prejudicial value that would attach to that.
There is no prohibition from the State introducing the testimony that [defendant]
was prescribed that, that he admitted that he had that, but the purpose for which it was
prescribed, I would suggest that it is irrelevant. They can certainly provide testimony
that the ingredients of Suboxone, in certain dosages, can prove to be deleterious to an
adult’s health, or an adult’s life, and certainly can prove to be fatal in the case of an
infant, without the need for any reference to [defendant] having those conditions that
were precedent to him receiving or obtaining the prescription on that date. ***
As to the second motion in limine, *** what I am saying in that motion is, that even
if the defendant misspoke, or said something that was inconsistent as to when he had
last been prescribed Suboxone before [May] 2012, it’s a collateral issue, and it is not
something that is indicative of any hearsay exception that ought [to] be allowed at trial
in this cause. *** Whether or not [defendant] was prescribed [Suboxone] six months
before May of 2012, or three years before May of 2012, really is of no import, and does
nothing to get us closer to an answer of the issues that will be contained in the
instructions given to the jury for this charge.”
Counsel argued defendant’s alleged inconsistent statement was about a collateral matter and
whether he was prescribed Suboxone “six months before May of 2012, or three years before
May of 2012, really is of no import.”
¶ 13 The State responded it sought to introduce evidence about defendant’s substance-abuse
treatment and Suboxone prescription to show (1) defendant’s opportunity to have possession,
(2) his identity, (3) absence of mistake or accident, and (4) intent of willfully providing
Suboxone to L.S. The State stated police searched defendant’s residence on May 7, 2012, and
did not discover evidence of the medication. The State asserted there is “an important question
about where that Suboxone was on that date and time, and why it wasn’t there.” The State
added defendant’s spouse examined the Suboxone bottle on May 7, 2012, and “she saw a
certain pill inside that pill bottle” and “what she found in that pill bottle is important.”
Evidence would be presented to show L.S. was not feeling well on May 7, 2012. The State
articulated its theory that defendant, “who took this medicine that made him feel better,
possibly felt that it would make [L.S.] feel better, and *** that he provided her with a certain
amount of that drug.”

-4-
¶ 14 Defense counsel responded “absolutely nothing” in the discovery materials showed
defendant gave Suboxone to L.S. The following exchange occurred:
“THE COURT: Well, there’s no charge to support that at this point as well, nor is it
one of the issues or elements of the charge that has been filed.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That’s correct, [Y]our Honor. That theory, if it were to be
born[e] out in any fashion by evidence, you’d be looking at a charge of murder, as
opposed to a charge of endangering the life or health of a child.
THE COURT: Or some lesser mental state other than murder.”

¶ 15 D. The Trial Court’s Order
¶ 16 The trial court, in relevant part, announced its order as follows:
“There[ is] nothing in this charge that would indicate that the defendant administered
the drug, or in some manner specifically would have provided in essence this
controlled substance. And so that is a relevant factor from the Court’s standpoint.
*** [U]nder the circumstances, what we have, and I guess my suggestion is that the
information, with reference to the defendant having been prescribed, and there is no
dispute that he was, in fact, prescribed a legal, meaning with a prescription, controlled
substance, that being Suboxone, that that cuts both ways, or could cut both ways with
the jury, that being that Suboxone is a medically assisted treatment. And an individual
who has been prescribed Suboxone means that they’re addressing their addiction. That
they’re addressing their addiction, that being through means of accessing, that being
not just treatment per se, that being from a counseling standpoint, but also medically
assisted treatment. So a jury could go ahead and say, [‘]well, that’s a good thing, that
this individual was under the care of a doctor, and received a doctor’s prescription.[’]
On the flip side, we know then that the jury would be hearing about an addiction, that
being to opiates of some kind, and that this is a component in essence of the treatment
regimen that the defendant had been subjected to, or was involved with, to be more
specific, at the time of this incident.
You know, we could go ahead and touch upon this in *** voir dire, and I thought
about doing that, but the reality of it is that it really doesn’t matter. And when I’m
saying, [‘]it really doesn’t matter,[’] I[ am] agreeing with the defendant as far as the
motioning, which is, if the defendant had a legal right to this substance, which was a
controlled substance, the purpose for which he was prescribed that controlled substance
that was legally in his possession, is irrelevant and it could or might lead to prejudice as
it would relate to the defendant if the jury heard that this particular controlled
substance, which he had a right to possess, was for a particular purpose as it relates to
his present and/or past of having challenges with a drug addiction.
So while the drug itself, in essence, can and will be allowed to be utilized, clearly
by the State, with respect to the defendant having it in his possession, that it was a drug
that contained a substance or substances, which clearly, from both counsel’s
perspective, did cause the death of this child, the purpose for which the prescription
drug, Suboxone, was prescribed to the defendant, is irrelevant, and the motion in limine
will be granted, as it relates to that particular component.

-5-
 As to the other matter, that being *** whether it was for the previous prescription 9
months before, or 18 to 24 months before, irrelevant, immaterial, and impeachment on
the collateral matter. The fact that he had been prescribed it, you know, previously,
that’s what everybody agrees on, I don’t think that the difference of whether it was 9
months or 15 months, *** amounts to impeachment on a collateral matter, meaning it
would not be impeachment on a substantive matter with the prior inconsistent
statement that would be impermissible, under the rules of evidence, that being for
hearsay exceptions.
The last item, just to go ahead and touch, you know, base upon this, which is, I’m
looking at [Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No.] 3.14, and that being, I can’t
honestly see where the evidence of a prior bad act, i.e.[,] drug usage, how that would be
relevant in any way, shape, or form, on any of the issues, whether it be identification,
presence, intent, motive, design, knowledge. The only purpose for which this would be
introduced would be propensity, which is inadmissible, which is inappropriate, and so
I’m not finding that that information or evidence is relevant for any purpose as well.
So i[n] essence, both of the defendant’s motions in limine will be allowed.”
¶ 17 The State immediately requested the trial court to reconsider its ruling and stated the court
had “basically gutted [its] case.” The court reiterated its ruling and stated “it stretches the
imagination to go ahead and take the words, [‘]permitted access[,’] to include, administered or
gave. *** But under, again, this charge that has been launched, that information is irrelevant,
and immaterial, and [the] motion in limine is granted.”

¶ 18 E. The State’s Notice of Appeal
¶ 19 In April 2013, the State filed a notice of appeal stating the trial court’s grant of defendant’s
first and second motions in limine “substantially impair[ed]” its ability to prosecute.

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 A. The State’s Failure To File a Certificate of Impairment
¶ 22 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) allows the State to bring an
interlocutory appeal from a pretrial evidentiary order which has the “substantive effect” of
suppressing evidence. People v. Drum, 194 Ill. 2d 485, 489, 743 N.E.2d 44, 46 (2000). Rule
604(a)(1) requires the State to certify to the trial court the court’s ruling substantially impairs
the State’s ability to prosecute. People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247, 412 N.E.2d 501, 507
(1980); People v. Carlton, 98 Ill. 2d 187, 193, 455 N.E.2d 1385, 1388 (1983). Illinois Supreme
Court Rules, including case-law interpretations of them, “are not mere suggestions” and “have
the force of law.” People ex rel. Alvarez v. Skryd, 241 Ill. 2d 34, 39, 944 N.E.2d 337, 341
(2011). “[T]he presumption must be that they will be obeyed and enforced as written.” Id.
¶ 23 The State acknowledges it did not file a certificate of impairment and asserts its notice of
appeal satisfies Rule 604(a). In People v. Kantowski, 98 Ill. 2d 75, 78, 455 N.E.2d 1379, 1380
(1983), the State did not initially file a certificate of impairment but then filed, in the supreme
court, a motion for leave to supplement the record and file a certificate of impairment. The
supreme court found this court’s ruling in People v. Jones, 102 Ill. App. 3d 238, 429 N.E.2d
1094 (1981), convincing and concluded the certificate of impairment is not a jurisdictional
requisite and allowed the State to supplement the record and file the certificate. Kantowski, 98

-6-
 Ill. 2d at 79, 455 N.E.2d at 1381. In Jones, the State did not file a certificate of impairment in
the trial court but sought to file it in the appellate court after it had filed the notice of appeal.
Jones, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 239, 429 N.E.2d at 1096. This court looked to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 329 (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) and stated “[t]he certificate of impairment reflects merely the
State’s decision to appeal the suppression order and is properly considered an omission in the
record.” Jones, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 242, 429 N.E.2d at 1099. The State was allowed to
supplement the record and file the certificate of impairment in the appellate court. Id. at 245,
429 N.E.2d at 1101. Because the certificate of impairment is not a jurisdictional requisite, the
State’s failure to file a certificate does not deprive this court of the jurisdiction to hear the
merits of this appeal. See Kantowski, 98 Ill. 2d at 79, 455 N.E.2d at 1381.
¶ 24 Our next question is whether we should decline to consider the merits because the State has
not filed a certificate of impairment in accordance with Rule 604(a). After the trial court’s
ruling on defendant’s motions in limine, the State asked the court to reconsider because its
ruling “basically gutted [its] case.” This oral representation informed the trial court its ruling
substantially impaired the State’s ability to prosecute. In the notice of appeal, the State stated
the trial court’s ruling “substantially impair[ed] [its] ability to prosecute.” Defendant does not
allege he is prejudiced by the State’s noncompliance with Rule 604(a). Although the proper
practice is to file a written certificate of impairment with the trial court, in light of defendant’s
failure to allege prejudice and the State’s representations before the trial court and its notice of
appeal, we conclude Rule 604(a)’s requirements have been met. We therefore proceed to the
merits.

¶ 25 B. Standard of Review and Motions in Limine
¶ 26 A motion in limine is addressed to a trial court’s power to admit or exclude evidence.
People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369, 721 N.E.2d 539, 542 (1999). Motions in limine are
used to bring the trial court’s attention to potentially irrelevant, inadmissible, or prejudicial
evidence and obtain a pretrial order from the court excluding or permitting the evidence.
People v. Owen, 299 Ill. App. 3d 818, 822, 701 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (1998). The court’s
evidentiary ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171,
¶ 12, 998 N.E.2d 1247.
¶ 27 A motion in limine can be a “powerful” and “potentially dangerous” weapon because it
requests to restrict evidence. Reidelberger v. Highland Body Shop, Inc., 83 Ill. 2d 545, 550,
416 N.E.2d 268, 271 (1981). Because a ruling on the motion can restrict evidence, the motion
must be specific and allow the court and the parties to understand what evidence is at issue. See
Lockett v. Bi-State Transit Authority, 94 Ill. 2d 66, 76, 445 N.E.2d 310, 315 (1983). While oral
motions in limine are permitted, a written motion should be used whenever complicated or
sensitive evidence is at issue. This allows the movant to carefully identify the evidence sought
to be excluded and articulate his or her argument in support. A written motion prevents
confusion and misunderstanding by defining the evidence at issue and capturing the movant’s
arguments. See Compton v. Ubilluz, 353 Ill. App. 3d 863, 871, 819 N.E.2d 767, 776 (2004). If
nothing else, a written motion allows the parties and court to refer to a fixed version of the
movant’s request.
¶ 28 In resolving the evidentiary issue presented in a motion in limine, a trial court considers the
movant’s offer of proof. “[A]n offer of proof serves dual purposes: (1) it discloses to the court
and opposing counsel the nature of the offered evidence, thus enabling the court to take

-7-
 appropriate action, and (2) it provides the reviewing court with an adequate record to
determine whether the trial court’s action was erroneous.” People v. Pelo, 404 Ill. App. 3d 839,
875, 942 N.E.2d 463, 494 (2010); see also People v. Thompkins, 181 Ill. 2d 1, 10, 690 N.E.2d
984, 988-89 (1998) (an offer of proof is “the key to preserving a trial court’s error in excluding
evidence”). An offer of proof may be formal or informal, but an informal offer of proof must
identity the complained-of evidence with “particularity.” Pelo, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 875, 942
N.E.2d at 494. An offer of proof is inadequate if it is a mere summary or “offers unsupported
speculation” about the evidence. Id. at 876, 942 N.E.2d at 494. While an offer of proof assists
the parties, the trial court, and a reviewing court in determining the evidence at issue, “a court
is disadvantaged in ruling on a motion in limine because it is considered in a vacuum, before
the presentation of the full evidence at trial that may justify admission or require exclusion.”
Compton, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 871, 819 N.E.2d at 776.
¶ 29 In Owen, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 823-24, 701 N.E.2d at 1178-79, this court discussed the
problem of ruling on a motion in limine without the full evidence as follows:
“One difficulty common to all motions in limine is that they occur–by
definition–out of the normal trial context, and resolving such a motion requires the trial
court to determine what that context will be. Thus, the court must receive offers of
proof consisting either of live testimony or counsel’s representations that the court
finds sufficiently credible and reliable. Because a motion in limine typically asks the
court to bar certain evidence, the supreme court has deemed such motions ‘powerful
weapons’ and has urged caution in their use. [Reidelberger, 83 Ill. 2d at 550, 416
N.E.2d at 271] (‘Before granting a motion in limine, courts must be certain that such
action will not unduly restrict the opposing party’s presentation of its case’); Rush v.
Hamdy, 255 Ill. App. 3d 352, 365, 627 N.E.2d 1119, 1127 (1993) (motions in limine
precluding evidence ‘should be employed with caution’).
‘A trial judge has discretion in granting a motion in limine and a reviewing court
will not reverse a trial court’s order allowing or excluding evidence unless that
discretion was clearly abused.’ Swick v. Liautaud, 169 Ill. 2d 504, 521, 662 N.E.2d
1238, 1246 (1996). Similarly, depending upon the nature of the evidentiary issue
before it, the court has vast discretion as to how it will conduct the hearing on a motion
in limine–that is, requiring live witnesses or representations, affidavits, or
whatever–and the court has vast discretion as to how detailed such a hearing will be, as
well.
For the same reasons that the supreme court has ruled that trial courts have
discretion before granting a motion in limine–namely, because such motions constitute
‘powerful weapons,’ they must be exercised with caution–we hold that trial courts also
possess the discretion to choose not to entertain a motion in limine at all. That is, a court
is fully justified to exercise its discretion by telling the moving party that–for whatever
reason–the court chooses not to entertain the party’s motion in limine and instead will
require the evidence in question, if it is to be offered at all, to be presented in the normal
course of things during trial. The court will then make its ruling upon the evidentiary
question at issue when the matter has become ripe, assuming it ever does.
We so hold because, if the court must ‘balance the prejudice that might be avoided
if it grants the motion against the complication or inconvenience that would result if the
motion is denied’ (Rush, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 365, 627 N.E.2d at 1127), a court might

-8-
 easily conclude that the best way to ensure a correct ruling on a complicated
evidentiary issue is to wait for that issue to become ripe at trial. Then the court would
no longer need speculate about what the trial evidence might be; instead, the court has
already heard that evidence, and the context in which to decide the evidentiary issue
has become clear. As Professor Graham has noted, the most appropriate response to a
motion in limine, instead of conducting a hearing on its merits, may be to defer the
issue to such time, if ever, that the issue is presented at trial, while issuing ‘an order
requiring that the matter be brought to the attention of the court prior to being disclosed
in any fashion to the jury.’ [Michael H. Graham, Cleary & Graham’s Handbook of
Illinois Evidence § 103.9, at 30 (6th ed. 1994)].
Given the uncertainties that are inherent with any motion in limine, it is difficult to
envision a situation in which a trial court would abuse its discretion by choosing not to
entertain the motion and instead requiring that the matter be presented and resolved at
trial. Although we have trouble envisioning what might constitute an abuse of such
discretion, we have no difficulty in determining what does not: denying a motion in
limine on the ground that it is untimely or on the ground that resolving it might take too
much time cannot constitute an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.” (Emphases in
original.)
¶ 30 “Because the trial court rules on a motion in limine before hearing the full evidence at trial,
trial courts should be cautious in making broad rulings on motions in limine.” People v. Brown,
319 Ill. App. 3d 89, 96, 745 N.E.2d 173, 181 (2001). The Second District has elaborated
further and stated:
“Trial judges should attempt to enter narrow in limine orders, anticipate proper
evidence that might be excluded by the orders, and make the orders clear and precise so
that all parties concerned have an accurate understanding of their limitations. An
unclear order in limine is worse than no order at all ***.” Compton, 353 Ill. App. 3d at
871, 819 N.E.2d at 776.
The court’s “order should be in writing to prevent confusion and misunderstanding.” Id. Any
“in limine order [must] be clear and *** [provide] all parties concerned *** [with] an accurate
understanding of its limitations.” Reidelberger, 83 Ill. 2d at 550, 416 N.E.2d at 271.
¶ 31 To summarize, a motion in limine is a powerful weapon used to obtain an evidentiary
ruling before trial. The motion and offer of proof must identify, with particularity, what
evidence the movant seeks to be excluded. Speculative offers of proof are not sufficient. The
trial court has vast discretion in considering the motion and may decline to entertain the
motion. The court must be cautious in making its ruling and should announce its ruling in a
written order. The order must be clear and articulate its limitations.

¶ 32 C. Understanding the Trial Court’s Ruling
¶ 33 The record, the briefs, and the parties’ oral arguments reveal one constant: confusion about
the trial court’s in limine order. To understand the extent of the trial court’s ruling, it is
necessary to determine the scope of defendant’s motions in limine. Defendant’s first written
motion in limine requested the State be prohibited from introducing evidence of defendant’s
substance-abuse “history”; his substance-abuse “treatment”; his “relapse”; and the
“circumstances leading up” to the May 6, 2012, Suboxone prescription. Then, at the motion in
limine hearing, defense counsel framed his request as prohibiting the State from introducing

-9-
 evidence about the “purpose” for the Suboxone prescription. Counsel asserted evidence
Suboxone is commonly used to treat opiate addiction and was used to treat defendant was
“extremely prejudicial.” Defendant’s second written motion in limine requested the State be
prohibited from introducing evidence defendant was prescribed Suboxone before May 7, 2012;
he told police investigators he had been prescribed Suboxone on May 6, 2012, and he told
police he had “last” been prescribed Suboxone “1½ to 2 years” before May 2012.
¶ 34 Before this court, defendant has framed his motions in limine as requesting exclusion of
evidence of his “status” as a drug addict. But his requests in the trial court extended beyond the
fact he is an addict. Defendant’s varied language includes several identifiable and distinct
pieces of evidence, including the following: he (1) has a substance addiction; (2) sought
treatment for his substance addiction; (3) had a relapse shortly before May 6, 2012; (4) sought
treatment for this relapse; (5) was prescribed Suboxone as treatment for this relapse; (6) filled
the Suboxone prescription on May 6, 2012; (7) previously had been prescribed Suboxone; and
(8) made a statement to the police concerning his “last” Suboxone prescription. Defendant also
sought to preclude evidence of Suboxone’s “purpose.” Defendant sought to exclude far more
than evidence he has a drug addiction. He sought to broadly prohibit any evidence relating to
his opiate addiction, including evidence about his substance-abuse history, substance-abuse
treatment, relapse, Suboxone prescriptions, and the “purpose” for the prescriptions.
¶ 35 The trial court immediately ruled on defendant’s motions in limine and found “the purpose
for which the prescription drug, Suboxone, was prescribed to the defendant” was irrelevant.
We acknowledge the court initially stated it granted defendant’s first motion in limine “as it
relates to that particular component.” However, the court continued announcing its order and
twice stated it granted, without limitation, the motions in limine. The court could have taken a
different approach. One approach could have been to reject defendant’s offer of proof.
Defendant’s informal offer of proof was the State had a “body of knowledge” about
defendant’s “history of substance abuse” and the Suboxone prescription. This informal offer of
proof is inadequate because it does not identify with particularity what evidence defendant is
seeking to exclude. Another approach could have been to require defendant to further clarify
his motions. Did he seek to exclude everything about his substance abuse “history,”
“treatment,” and “relapse,” as his written motions suggest? What did defendant mean, when he
argued at the motion hearing, that the State should be prohibited from introducing evidence
about “the purpose for which [Suboxone] was prescribed”? Did this refer to the general
purpose of Suboxone–to treat opiate addiction–or its specific purpose–to treat defendant’s
opiate addiction and recent relapse? Answers to these questions would have helped illuminate
defendant’s requests. A third approach, as discussed in Owen, could have been for the court to
decline to entertain defendant’s motions. The court could have concluded a ruling would be
premature because it needed additional development of the evidence to understand how this
particular evidence fit into the case, or the evidence was in flux because the parties were still
engaged in discovery. The court’s decision to immediately rule on the motions, without
limitation, resulted in an order which does not serve to give the parties an “accurate
understanding of its limitations.” Reidelberger, 83 Ill. 2d at 550, 416 N.E.2d at 271. Because
defendant made a broad request and the trial court did not specifically limit its order, we
understand the trial court’s order to prohibit all the evidence outlined above.
¶ 36 We note the State uses the phrases “evidence of defendant’s drug addiction” and
“defendant’s drug addiction” in its argument. Considering the broad scope of defendant’s

- 10 -
 motions and the trial court’s unlimited ruling, we understand the State’s phrases “evidence of
defendant’s drug addiction” and “defendant’s drug addiction” to be shorthand for all the pieces
of evidence implicated by defendant’s motions in limine. This would include evidence of
defendant’s substance-abuse history, substance-abuse treatment, prior use of Suboxone, the
May 6, 2012, Suboxone prescription, and the purpose of the Suboxone prescription. We use
the phrase “evidence of defendant’s drug addiction” in this manner.

¶ 37 D. The State’s Indictment Argument
¶ 38 In announcing its ruling, the trial court explained the indictment stated defendant willfully
placed L.S. “in proximity to or permitted access to the drug Suboxone” and did not allege he
“administered” or “provided” Suboxone to L.S. The State argues the court erroneously
concluded the charging language did not encompass the acts of defendant administering,
giving, or providing Suboxone to L.S. It urges us to conduct a statutory-interpretation analysis
and conclude the indictment’s language “permitting access to” encompasses “administer” or
“give.”
¶ 39 Section 12-21.6 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-21.6(a)
(West 2010)) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“It is unlawful for any person to willfully cause or permit the life or health of a child
under the age of 18 to be endangered or to willfully cause or permit a child to be placed
in circumstances that endanger the child’s life or health ***.”
The “permitted access to” language does not appear in section 12-21.6 of the Criminal Code;
this language only appears in the indictment. A charging instrument is required to set forth the
“nature and elements of the offense.” 725 ILCS 5/111-3(a)(3) (West 2012); People v. Collins,
214 Ill. 2d 206, 219, 824 N.E.2d 262, 269 (2005) (“Where an indictment charges all essential
elements of an offense, other matters unnecessarily added may be regarded as surplusage.”).
Defendant filed a motion in limine, not a motion challenging the indictment. See 725 ILCS
5/114-1 (West 2012) (motion to dismiss charge). Because this is an interlocutory appeal, we
are cautious about assessing the State’s choice of language in crafting the indictment. It is well
established the State’s Attorney is vested with the exclusive discretion in the initiation and
management of criminal litigation. People ex rel. Daley v. Moran, 94 Ill. 2d 41, 45, 445 N.E.2d
270, 272 (1983); 55 ILCS 5/3-9005 (West 2012). This discretion includes whether to initiate
prosecution, what charges should be brought, including in circumstances where the same
conduct could be charged under different statutes, and whether to dismiss those charges.
People v. White, 2011 IL 109616, ¶ 25, 953 N.E.2d 398; People v. Van Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d
330, 339, 904 N.E.2d 29, 34 (2009); People v. Rhodes, 38 Ill. 2d 389, 396, 231 N.E.2d 400,
403 (1967); People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 339, 864 N.E.2d 196, 213 (2007); People v.
Jamison, 197 Ill. 2d 135, 161-62, 756 N.E.2d 788, 802 (2001). Moreover, as the State’s
investigation continues and it prepares for trial, the State may uncover additional information
leading it to alter the current charge or add new charges. See United States v. Goodwin, 457
U.S. 368, 381 (1982) (noting a pretrial decision to modify charges may be a result of the
prosecutor’s assessment not being “crystallized” at such an early stage in the proceedings). It is
within the State’s Attorney’s discretion whether he or she amends or dismisses the current
charge, files new charges, or declines to prosecute defendant, and it would be inappropriate for
this court to suggest how the State’s Attorney should charge defendant. See People v. Russell,
237 Ill. App. 3d 310, 313, 604 N.E.2d 420, 422 (1992). We decline to express any opinion

- 11 -
 about the appropriateness of the particular charge or the indictment’s language.

¶ 40 E. The State’s Motion in Limine Claims
¶ 41 The State argues the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s motions
in limine. Specifically, the State argues evidence of defendant’s drug addiction is (1) part of the
continuing narrative of the events giving rise to the offense; (2) admissible to show his state of
mind, in particular his familiarity with Suboxone and its effects; and (3) relevant to its ability
to inquire on cross-examination whether Suboxone affected defendant’s memory and ability to
recall the events in question.

¶ 42 1. Other-Crimes Evidence, Generally
¶ 43 Generally, evidence is admissible if it is relevant. Ill. R. Evid. 402 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Relevant evidence may be excluded
“if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice” or if
another rule of evidence excludes the evidence. Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
¶ 44 “It is well settled under the common law that evidence of other crimes is admissible if
relevant for any purpose other than to show a defendant’s propensity to commit crimes.”
People v. Chapman, 2012 IL 111896, ¶ 19, 965 N.E.2d 1119; Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1,
2011). Evidence concerning the facts and circumstances of the crime the defendant is accused
of committing is not other-crimes evidence. People v. Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d 513, 531, 739 N.E.2d
1277, 1286 (2000) (quoting People v. King, 29 Ill. 2d 150, 154, 193 N.E.2d 790, 792 (1963)).
In Pikes, the supreme court explained the other-crimes evidence rule as follows:
“The rule that evidence of the commission of other crimes, wrongs, or acts by the
accused is inadmissible for the purpose of showing a propensity to commit crimes is an
aspect of the rule that the prosecution may not introduce evidence of a character trait of
the accused. [Citation.] The concern is not that such evidence is lacking in probative
value, but that it may overpersuade the jury, which might convict the accused because
it believes he or she is a bad person.” Pikes, 2013 IL 115171, ¶ 16, 998 N.E.2d 1247.
Permissible purposes for other-crimes evidence include motive, intent, identity, lack of
mistake, and modus operandi. Chapman, 2012 IL 111896, ¶ 19, 965 N.E.2d 1119; see also
People v. Boand, 362 Ill. App. 3d 106, 124-25, 838 N.E.2d 367, 386-87 (2005). Where
other-crimes evidence is offered for a permissible purpose, it will not be admitted if its
prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value. Chapman, 2012 IL 111896, ¶ 19, 965 N.E.2d
1119.

¶ 45 2. The State’s Continuing-Narrative Argument
¶ 46 The State argues evidence of defendant’s drug addiction is admissible because it is part of a
continuing narrative of the charged offense. As discussed above, we understand and use
“evidence of defendant’s drug addiction” as a shorthand for all the evidence implicated by
defendant’s motions in limine. The State asserts evidence of defendant’s drug addiction is
“inextricably intertwined” with L.S.’s death as it explains his possession of Suboxone and it
furnishes a “back story” to assist the trier of fact in understanding the circumstances of the

- 12 -
 offense. Defendant argues the State has forfeited this argument because it did not present it
before the trial court.
¶ 47 Generally, issues not raised before the trial court are forfeited on appeal. This principle
applies to the State as well as a criminal defendant. People v. O’Neal, 104 Ill. 2d 399, 407, 472
N.E.2d 441, 444 (1984); People v. Galan, 229 Ill. 2d 484, 499, 893 N.E.2d 597, 606 (2008).
The record shows the State presented various arguments at the motion in limine hearing. It
argued defendant’s recent relapse and the May 6, 2012, Suboxone prescription provided
important information preceding the offense. While the State did not develop its argument as
fully as it has on appeal and did not articulate its argument in the trial court using the phrase
“continuing narrative,” it has not forfeited this argument.
¶ 48 Evidence of other crimes or bad acts may be “admissible if it is part of a continuing
narrative of the event[s] giving rise to the offense, intertwined with the charged offense, or
explains an aspect of the charge which would otherwise be implausible or inexplicable.”
People v. Patterson, 2013 IL App (4th) 120287, ¶ 58, 2 N.E.3d 642. As the supreme court
explained in Pikes, events forming a continuing narrative, even if they reflect negatively on the
defendant, are permitted because the events are “linked and it would be illogical for the trial
court to uncouple them and give the jury only half the story.” Pikes, 2013 IL 115171, ¶ 24, 998
N.E.2d 1247. Illinois courts have permitted evidence of a defendant’s prior narcotic use as part
of a continuing narrative of the events preceding the crime. People v. Thompson, 2013 IL App
(1st) 113105, ¶ 102, 997 N.E.2d 681 (evidence of defendant’s drug use explained events
preceding shooting); Patterson, 2013 IL App (4th) 120287, ¶ 67, 2 N.E.3d 642 (evidence about
defendant’s marijuana use was part of his account of the argument preceding the murder);
People v. Norwood, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1130, 841 N.E.2d 514, 523-24 (2005) (defendant’s
drug use provided background for a dispute which escalated to murder); People v. Spyres, 359
Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1114, 835 N.E.2d 974, 978-79 (2005) (evidence about previous cannabis
shipments were relevant to show defendant engaged in drug trafficking).
¶ 49 Suboxone’s role in defendant’s substance-abuse treatment and in causing L.S.’s death must
be differentiated. Evidence about Suboxone is evidence about the alleged crime because L.S.
died as a result of Suboxone overdose. Evidence about Suboxone such as its (1) ingredients, (2)
forms (i.e., oral, injection, transdermal), (3) packaging, (4) storage, (5) side effects, (6)
required warnings and information, (7) approved uses, (8) common uses (i.e., off-label uses),
(9) use to treat young children, and (10) harmful effect on young children is relevant to this
case because L.S. died from Suboxone overdose. It is also relevant to know whether L.S. was
prescribed Suboxone or any other medication which could have had an adverse reaction with
Suboxone.
¶ 50 Evidence about what Suboxone is approved and commonly used to treat is distinct from
evidence Suboxone was used to treat defendant’s opiate addiction. The record does not contain
any information about other uses, but at oral argument defense counsel suggested Suboxone
has uses other than to treat opiate addiction. The trial court did not request additional
information about Suboxone’s uses or draw a distinction between its approved and common
uses and its use to treat defendant. Had it done so, it could have considered whether evidence
about Suboxone’s approved and common uses reduce the potential prejudice of evidence
defendant’s Suboxone prescription was used to treat his opiate addiction.
¶ 51 Evidence about defendant’s substance-abuse history and substance-abuse treatment
presents more complicated questions. It is important to separate the events in defendant’s

- 13 -
 substance-abuse history and substance-abuse treatment from the underlying cause of these
events–defendant’s opiate addiction. Our question is whether evidence about defendant’s
substance-abuse history and substance-abuse treatment is relevant for any purpose other than
to show defendant’s propensity to commit crime. See Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011).
Evidence about defendant’s substance-abuse history could be quite broad and could include
details ranging from his introduction to drugs, all the drugs he has ever used, who he associates
with while using drugs, and where he has purchased the drugs. Evidence about defendant’s
substance-abuse treatment would be narrower and could include details about the medical
assessments, diagnosis, services, and care he has received. The essential question is whether
any of this evidence is relevant. Does it have a tendency to show it is more or less probable
defendant committed the alleged crime? See Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Obviously, not
every detail about defendant’s substance-abuse history and substance-abuse treatment is
relevant to this case. See Brown, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 96, 745 N.E.2d at 181 (advising against
“minitrials” about the other-conduct evidence). But some details could have a tendency to
show it is more or less probable defendant committed the alleged crime. The State argues
evidence about defendant’s previous Suboxone prescriptions, recent relapse, and the May 6,
2012, Suboxone prescription are relevant to the alleged crime. We agree. Defendant’s previous
Suboxone prescriptions are relevant to show his experience with the medication, which goes to
his knowledge of its attributes, appropriate uses, side effects, proper storage, and potential
harm to children. Evidence defendant was prescribed Suboxone on or before May 6, 2012, and
he filled the prescription on May 6, 2012, one day before L.S.’s death, is relevant to the
charged offense as it tends to show he had possession of Suboxone in close temporal proximity
to when L.S. overdosed from Suboxone. It also goes to the amount he had in his possession
(i.e., he was prescribed X amount and should have had Y amount in his possession on May 7,
2012). Evidence about defendant’s relapse is relevant because it occurred close to the time of
L.S.’s death and could show defendant, at the time of the alleged offense, was impaired by the
effects of the relapse, withdrawal, or treating medications. Thus, some of the details in
defendant’s substance-abuse history and substance-abuse treatment are relevant, but what
about the underlying cause of these events–defendant’s opiate addiction?
¶ 52 Drug addiction is more than mere drug use; it encompasses the compulsive use of a
substance and can include a physical dependence on the substance. See generally 20 ILCS
301/1-10 (West 2012) (defining “addiction” for purposes of the Alcoholism and Other Drug
Abuse and Dependency Act). The individual’s addiction may affect his behavior, social
interaction, and choices about engaging in risky situations. See generally 720 ILCS 570/102
(West 2012) (defining “addict” for purposes of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act as a
person whose use of a controlled substance has “lost the power of self control with reference to
his or her addiction”); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (noting “narcotic
addiction is an illness”). It is a complex problem that can reach into all corners of the addict’s
life.
¶ 53 The State argues the fact defendant has an opiate addiction assists to explain why he would
be in possession of Suboxone, he would carry Suboxone on his person, and the drug was not
found in a search of his residence after L.S.’s death. Defendant responds it is not necessary for
the trier of fact to learn why a person “needs” a prescription medication “to properly
understand that a child somehow gained access to it.” We disagree with any suggestion
potentially prejudicial evidence should be excluded because the trier of fact can fill in the

- 14 -
 blanks with speculation. This is not the law. See Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (“evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice”).
¶ 54 Defendant’s opiate addiction is relevant to his access to this particular prescription
medication. Defendant obtained Suboxone through a prescription, but because he obtained this
controlled substance through approved channels does not mean why he obtained it is not
relevant. Defendant disagrees the legitimate medical reason for a prescription medication can
be relevant. He presents a hypothetical in which the child dies from an overdose of Vicodin
and asserts, under the State’s theory, the child’s access would be “inexplicable without
presenting evidence that [the child’s parent] just had surgery.” A person’s legitimate medical
reason for a certain prescription may not always be relevant, but it could be relevant.
Relevancy is about any tendency to prove or disprove a fact of consequence. See Ill. R. Evid.
401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). It is common knowledge a prescription medication can be prescribed to
treat various conditions; persons may use a medication for nonprescribed purposes; and
persons may use the medication in an amount exceeding the dosage needed to treat the
condition for which it was prescribed. Defendant’s hypothetical fails to provide adequate
context to determine whether the fact the parent had surgery was not relevant. Evidence the
parent had a legitimate medical purpose for the Vicodin prescription could be relevant to his
possession of the particular controlled substance. Vicodin contains hydrocodone, which is a
schedule II controlled substance. See 720 ILCS 570/206(b)(1)(x) (West 2012). A schedule II
classification indicates “the substance has [a] high potential for abuse” and “the abuse of the
substance may lead to severe psychological or physiological dependence.” 720 ILCS
570/205(1), (3) (West 2012). The fact the parent had surgery shows he had a legitimate
medical purpose for Vicodin, which could be relevant to show the parent was informed of what
Vicodin should be used to treat–pain caused by the surgery. Further, because Vicodin has a
high potential for abuse, the fact the child’s parent had been prescribed Vicodin for a legitimate
medical purpose could be relevant if there was evidence the parent exceeded the prescribed
dosage amount or was using Vicodin for nonlegitimate purposes, i.e., the parent initially had a
legitimate reason for Vicodin but was now abusing it and not taking appropriate safeguards to
prevent the child’s access. Defendant’s hypothetical does little to show the medical purpose for
a prescription medication is never relevant. Here, the fact defendant has an opiate addiction
explains why he has this particular controlled substance in his possession. He had a legitimate
medical reason for Suboxone–to treat his opiate addiction. The fact defendant has an opiate
addiction has a tendency to show he was informed of the legitimate uses for Suboxone: he
could use it to treat his opiate addiction. His opiate addiction could be relevant to his usage of
Suboxone, such as whether he overused it, provided it to others, or stored it in a careless
manner. We agree with the State: defendant’s drug addiction can be relevant to explain certain
aspects of his behavior. Defendant’s opiate addiction could explain his behavior in carrying the
drug on his person. The alleged fact defendant carried Suboxone on his person is highly
relevant to L.S.’s ability to access the drug. If defendant carried it on his person it is more
likely he permitted her access. As discussed below, the fact Suboxone was not found in
defendant’s residence could go toward his state of mind. In sum, evidence Suboxone was
prescribed to treat defendant’s opiate addiction provides context for how defendant obtained
this controlled substance and it came to be in his possession, which in turn tends to show he
had access to the controlled substance and could cause or permit L.S.’s access to Suboxone.

- 15 -
¶ 55 Defendant is correct the fact he has an opiate addiction could be prejudicial, as is most
evidence introduced against a criminal defendant, but the inquiry is not whether evidence is
prejudicial. The question is whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Ill. R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011); People
v. Jenko, 410 Ill. 478, 482, 102 N.E.2d 783, 785 (1951) (“A party cannot have competent
evidence excluded merely because it might arouse feelings of horror and indignation in the
jury.”). The trial court concluded the prejudicial effect would be so great it would not even
consider addressing the issue in voir dire or using a jury instruction. Two problems arise from
this conclusion. On the current record, it is impossible to determine whether the probative
value of evidence defendant has an opiate addiction is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice. As discussed above, in determining the potential prejudice of this
evidence, one must also consider whether evidence about Suboxone’s approved and common
uses lessens the potential harm to defendant. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No.
3.14 (4th ed. 2000) is the appropriate jury instruction to be given to explain to the jury the
limited purpose of other-crimes evidence. A limiting instruction about defendant’s drug
addiction would reduce the prejudice created by admitting the evidence. See People v. Young,
381 Ill. App. 3d 595, 601, 887 N.E.2d 649, 654 (2008) (“A limiting instruction reduces any
prejudice created by admitting other-crimes evidence.”). It is true, in certain circumstances, a
jury instruction may not be sufficient to remove the taint created by the admission of
prejudicial evidence (People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294, 317, 456 N.E.2d 59, 70 (1983)), but
“[f]aith in the ability of a properly instructed jury to separate issues and reach a correct result is
the cornerstone of the jury system” (People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 376, 583 N.E.2d 515, 525
(1991)). Based the evidence before the trial court, its assessment the jury could not be trusted
with this evidence was premature.

¶ 56 3. The State’s State-of-Mind Argument
¶ 57 The State argues evidence of defendant’s addiction is admissible to explain his state of
mind and supports an inference of the willfulness of his conduct. It contends defendant’s
addiction shows his familiarity with Suboxone, its effect on him, and “whether he knew the
risk of leaving it in the proximity of a one-year-old.” As we discussed above, defendant’s
motion in limine sought exclusion of evidence in addition to the mere fact he has an opiate
addiction, and we understand the trial court’s ruling to include evidence about defendant’s
substance-abuse history, substance-abuse treatment, prior use of Suboxone, and the May 6,
2012, Suboxone prescription.
¶ 58 Other-crimes evidence may be relevant and admissible to prove the defendant’s state of
mind. Boand, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 124, 838 N.E.2d at 386; People v. Robinson, 391 Ill. App. 3d
822, 838, 909 N.E.2d 232, 248 (2009). It may be relevant to show the defendant’s
consciousness of guilt. People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 109, 560 N.E.2d 258, 278 (1990).
Evidence about a criminal defendant’s narcotic use has been found relevant to prove the
defendant’s intent, knowledge, and motive. See People v. LeCour, 273 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1008,
652 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (1995); Norwood, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 1130, 841 N.E.2d at 523-24.
¶ 59 Section 12-21.6(a) of the Criminal Code requires defendant to have acted “willfully.” 720
ILCS 5/12-21.6(a) (West 2010). Section 4-5 of the Criminal Code provides the term
“willfully” is synonymous with “knowledge.” 720 ILCS 5/4-5 (West 2010). It adds, “[w]hen
the law provides that acting knowingly suffices to establish an element of an offense, that

- 16 -
 element also is established if a person acts intentionally.” Id.; see 720 ILCS 5/4-4 (West 2010)
(definition of “intent”). The trial court announced its ruling by discussing the particular
language of the indictment. We conclude the trial court’s explanation was an inartful attempt to
articulate a distinction between the indictment’s language and an allegation defendant
intentionally caused L.S.’s death. We note immediately prior to announcing its order, the court
agreed with defense counsel the indictment did not support the contention defendant gave
Suboxone to L.S. and noted such an allegation would support a different charge, including one
with a “lesser mental state other than murder.” (As discussed above, the State’s Attorney is
vested with broad discretion in deciding the appropriate charge.) The trial court’s explanation
suggests it would permit this evidence if the State had alleged defendant acted intentionally.
This is flawed. The State can prove defendant acted willfully by proving he acted intentionally.
¶ 60 The next question is whether evidence of defendant’s drug addiction is relevant toward his
mental state. In support, the State relies on People v. Markiewicz, 246 Ill. App. 3d 31, 41, 615
N.E.2d 869, 876 (1993), where the trial court permitted evidence about the defendant’s drug
use and proficiency in delivering intravenous injections. The State’s theory was the defendant
murdered the victim by repeatedly injecting her with cocaine. Evidence about the defendant’s
involvement with drugs and “self-proclaimed proficiency at injecting narcotics was directly
relevant to the method utilized” to commit the murder. Id. It “eliminate[d] any speculation that
[the] defendant mistakenly injected [the victim] with a fatal overdose of cocaine.” Id. at 41,
615 N.E.2d at 877. Despite its obvious factual differences, Markiewicz supports the State’s
contention evidence of defendant’s drug use is relevant. As discussed above, evidence about
Suboxone is relevant because L.S. died of a Suboxone overdose. Because L.S. died of a
Suboxone overdose, defendant’s Suboxone use is relevant to whether he committed the
charged offense. Defendant’s Suboxone use is relevant to whether he knew or was aware of (1)
its effects on him, (2) proper uses and storage, (3) whether Suboxone was dangerous for
children, or (4) its effects on a one-year-old child. His use of Suboxone, or any other impairing
substance, before or at the time of the offense is relevant to his state of mind and whether he
was impaired or otherwise unfit to supervise the child.
¶ 61 The State contends defendant hid or concealed his Suboxone prescription from police on
May 7, 2012, and suggests this reflects on defendant’s guilty state of mind. Defendant’s
actions after the alleged crime can reflect upon his state of mind at the time of the offense. See
People v. Durk, 215 Ill. App. 3d 186, 188, 574 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1991) (“a discussion of the
defendant’s activities after a crime has been committed is relevant to a discussion of the event
itself”); People v. Spaulding, 309 Ill. 292, 306, 141 N.E. 196, 202 (1923) (“Evidence that the
accused has attempted to destroy evidence against himself is always admissible for the purpose
of showing consciousness of guilt ***.”). We agree it is relevant to know what defendant did
with his Suboxone prescription on May 7, 2012, and whether he attempted to conceal it from
police.

¶ 62 4. The State’s Cross-Examination Argument
¶ 63 The State asserts evidence of defendant’s drug addiction is relevant to his credibility and
ability to recall the events, and it should be permitted to use it against defendant in
cross-examination. See People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 270, 478 N.E.2d 267, 281 (1985)
(“The question of whether a witness is a narcotics addict at the time of testifying or at the time
that an event occurred is a proper subject of cross-examination because it goes to the credibility

- 17 -
 of the witness and the witness’ ability to recall.”). Defendant responds this argument is
premature. The State agrees, stating it is “premature, but anticipatory.” The State’s ability to
cross-examine defendant about his impairment or ability to recall the events on May 7, 2012,
will be determined by whether defendant testifies and the content of his testimony. See People
v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 69, 908 N.E.2d 1, 5 (2009) (“A defendant who chooses to testify
faces serious risks of impeachment and may open the door to otherwise inadmissible
evidence.”). We decline to consider this premature argument.

¶ 64 F. Summary
¶ 65 We agree it would violate Illinois Rule of Evidence 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) for the State
to introduce evidence defendant has a drug addiction to show his propensity to commit the
charged offense. But defendant’s request went further. He sought exclusion of evidence about
his substance-abuse history, substance-abuse treatment, prior use of Suboxone, and the May 6,
2012, Suboxone prescription–evidence beyond the mere fact he has an opiate addiction. The
trial court’s unlimited grant of defendant’s motions in limine broadly prohibited the State from
introducing relevant evidence about Suboxone, defendant’s Suboxone use, including his May
6, 2012, prescription, the circumstances surrounding the offense, and his state of mind. We
conclude the trial court abused its discretion in granting, without limitation, defendant’s
motions in limine.
¶ 66 On remand, the trial court may (1) reconsider defendant’s motions in limine in accordance
with the views expressed herein, endeavoring to carefully consider all the discrete pieces of
evidence, and issue an order which gives the parties “an accurate understanding of its
limitations” (Reidelberger, 83 Ill. 2d at 550, 416 N.E.2d at 271); (2) require defendant to
amend his motions in limine to be more specific and identify, with particularity, the evidence
sought to be excluded; or (3) decline to entertain the motions until they are ripe for
consideration.
¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 68 We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 69 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

- 18 -