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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-14560
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-03206-ODE
MARQUIS K. PASCHAL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(July 25, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Marquis K. Paschal, an African-American part-time supervisor at United
Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of UPS in his employment discrimination suit, filed pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Paschal argues
the district court erred in determining that UPS offered a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for failing to promote him to a full-time supervisor
position and choosing a Caucasian candidate instead, namely, that UPS did not
consider him for the promotion because his required paperwork for the promotion
process was not completed. Paschal also asserts the district court erred in
determining he did not show that UPS’s proffered reason was pretextual. He
contends he was not required to present evidence beyond that used to establish his
prima facie case of discrimination because UPS promoted employees through a
secretive, informal process. After review,1 we affirm.
Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 n.4
(1973). When a plaintiff offers circumstantial evidence of discrimination, we
1
We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, construing all facts and
drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Jones v. UPS Ground
Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
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apply the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas. Alvarez v.
Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). Under this
framework, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, and the
employer “articulat[es] one or more legitimate non-discriminatory reasons” for the
adverse employment decision, the plaintiff must then show that the stated reason is
mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. Specifically, to overcome a motion
for summary judgment, a plaintiff must put forth evidence sufficient to allow a
reasonable fact finder to conclude that the employer’s proffered reasons were
pretext. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1024-25 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
banc). A plaintiff can do so directly, by persuading the court that a discriminatory
reason more likely than not motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing
“such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a
reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Alvarez, 610 F.3d
at 1265 (quotation omitted).
Assuming Paschal established a prima facie case, the district court did not
err in determining that UPS proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
not considering Paschal for the full-time supervisor promotion, namely, the fact
that UPS did not have Paschal’s completed promotion paperwork on file. Thus,
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the burden then shifted back to Paschal to show that UPS’s reason was mere
pretext. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264.
As an initial matter, Paschal’s own evidence makes clear that Robert
Wahnschaff, the employee promoted to full-time supervisor, complied with UPS’s
Management Assessment and Promotion Process (MAPP), which was UPS’s
procedure for promoting employees to full-time management positions.
Construing the facts in the light most favorable to Paschal, Paschal submitted his
MAPP paperwork to Virgil Tindal by email, and at some point, his paperwork was
lost. However, Paschal has provided little evidence other than affidavits based
upon personal belief and opinion that there was any deliberate, discriminatory
reason for losing his paperwork. See Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2005) (explaining mere conclusions, unsupported factual allegations, and
statements in affidavits based in part on information and belief cannot raise
genuine issues of fact, and, thus, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
judgment). Charles Inman’s affidavit corroborated portions of Paschal’s affidavit,
including Paschal’s conversation with Tindal in which Tindal reassured Pascal that
his MAPP paperwork had been submitted. Although Inman’s affidavit lends
support to Paschal’s recollection of the conversation with Tindal, this evidence
does not tend to show that Paschal’s paperwork was lost or misplaced after Tindal
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submitted it to human resources for a discriminatory reason, and, thus, fails to
show pretext. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265.
Paschal also has pointed to no weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in UPS’s proffered reason for not hiring him. See
id. UPS has consistently presented the same reason for not hiring Paschal because,
as noted in Paschal’s EEOC charge, UPS managers told him from the beginning
that the MAPP paperwork issue was why he was not considered for the promotion.
At most, the evidence suggests that Paschal’s paperwork was lost, and he offers no
evidence for his conclusory assertion that UPS lost other African-American
employees’ paperwork, such as affidavits or testimony from those other African-
American employees. Paschal’s argument that he was not required to cast doubt
on UPS’s argument is also without merit because MAPP was not a secretive
promotion procedure. See Roberts v. Gadsden Mem’l Hosp., 835 F.2d 793, 798
(11th Cir. 1988) (noting informal, secretive hiring or promotion processes tend to
facilitate the consideration of impermissible criteria). The undisputed record
makes clear that all employees were told about MAPP and how to comply with
MAPP. As Paschal has failed to show UPS’s legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for failing to promote him was mere pretext, the district court did not err in
granting UPS’s motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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