United States v. Jose Valdovinos

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4768

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSE RAMON SOLIS VALDOVINOS, a/k/a Angel Victorio Mendoza,
a/k/a Jose Valdavinos,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:13-cr-00183-FDW-1)

Argued: May 15, 2014 Decided: July 25, 2014

Before MOTZ and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the majority
opinion, in which Judge Diaz joined. Senior Judge Davis wrote a
dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: Ann Loraine Hester, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH
CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy
Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Henderson Hill,
Executive Director, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA,
INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M.
Tompkins, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

Jose Valdovinos, a citizen of Mexico, pled guilty to

unlawfully entering the United States after being deported, in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). The district court increased

Valdovinos’s sentence on the ground that he illegally reentered

the country after a prior North Carolina conviction for felony

drug trafficking, i.e., a drug offense punishable by more than

one year in prison. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). Valdovinos

challenges his sentence enhancement, arguing that this prior

conviction was not punishable by more than a year in prison

because he was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement that

capped his prison term at 12 months. Accordingly, he contends,

the prior North Carolina conviction was not a felony for

Guidelines purposes. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

Valdovinos entered the United States in November 2008 and

quickly ran afoul of the law. Authorities in Mecklenburg

County, North Carolina arrested him the following month on drug

trafficking charges. Valdovinos pled guilty in state court to

four counts of selling heroin, each a Class G felony offense

under North Carolina law. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a) & (b).

Because Valdovinos had no criminal record, his prior-record

level was I. The state court made no findings of either

2
aggravation or mitigation. Based on these facts, the parties

agree that Valdovinos’s prior conviction carried a maximum

statutory sentence of 16 months in prison pursuant to North

Carolina’s Structured Sentencing Act (“the Act”). See N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 15A-1340.17(c) & (d) (codifying North Carolina

sentencing scheme) (version effective until November 2009). 1

But Valdovinos was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement

that, upon acceptance by the court, established a binding

sentencing range of 10 to 12 months’ imprisonment. Under state

law, once the trial judge accepted the plea, the judge had to

sentence Valdovinos within the agreement’s recommended range.

See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1023(b) (codifying role of sentencing

judge in plea arrangements relating to sentence). Of course,

the judge remained free to reject the recommended range along

with Valdovinos’s guilty plea. See id. But in this case the

judge elected to accept the agreement and accordingly sentenced

Valdovinos to 10 to 12 months in prison. In January 2010, after

serving his sentence, Valdovinos was removed to Mexico.

1
In December 2011, the North Carolina legislature amended
the Act to provide for higher maximum terms of imprisonment.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(d). The maximum sentence for
an offender in Valdovinos’s position (Class G felony, prior
record level of I, and no findings of mitigation or aggravation)
is now 25 months’ imprisonment. Valdovinos was convicted before
the amendment, however, so the previous maximum penalty of 16
months applies here.

3
 In May 2013, Valdovinos reentered the United States without

permission and returned to North Carolina. He was arrested a

few weeks later for resisting a public officer, and charged with

illegal reentry by a removed alien in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a). He pled guilty to the charge.

In preparation for Valdovinos’s sentencing, a probation

officer prepared a presentence report calculating Valdovinos’s

recommended term of imprisonment for this reentry conviction.

The probation officer recommended a base offense level of 8 and

a 12-point enhancement on the ground that Valdovinos had

previously been convicted of a “felony drug trafficking

offense,” i.e., his 2009 North Carolina conviction for selling

heroin. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B). After a 3-point

reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Valdovinos’s total

recommended offense level was 17. Combined with a criminal

history category of II, this offense level produced a Guidelines

range of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment.

Valdovinos objected to the felony drug-offense enhancement.

He noted that under the Guidelines, a “felony” is “any federal,

state, or local offense punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.2. Valdovinos

argued that because his guilty plea to the prior North Carolina

conviction was entered as part of an agreement that capped his

sentence at 12 months once the court accepted his plea, that

4
conviction was not punishable by more than one year in prison.

Consequently, he maintained, his prior conviction for selling

heroin did not constitute a felony under the Guidelines and so

could not serve as a predicate offense to enhance his federal

sentence for illegal reentry.

The district court rejected the argument. It recognized

that the plea agreement reduced Valdovinos’s prior North

Carolina sentence. The court found, however, that this did not

alter the fact that the offense was punishable by imprisonment

exceeding one year because the maximum statutory penalty of 16

months remained unchanged. The court therefore applied the

enhancement and sentenced Valdovinos to 27 months in prison.

This appeal followed.

II.

Valdovinos contends that the district court erred in

enhancing his sentence on the basis of his prior state

conviction. As he argued in the district court, Valdovinos

again claims that, due to his plea agreement, his North Carolina

conviction was not punishable by more than a year in prison and

therefore does not qualify as a felony under Section

2L1.2(b)(1)(B) of the Guidelines. We review de novo the

question whether a prior state conviction constitutes a

predicate felony conviction for purposes of a federal sentence

5
enhancement. United States v. Jones, 667 F.3d 477, 482 (4th

Cir. 2012).

A.

Our approach to determining whether a prior North Carolina

conviction was punishable by a prison term exceeding one year

(and thus constitutes a federal sentencing predicate) has

changed in recent years. We once answered that question by

considering “the maximum aggravated sentence that could be

imposed for that crime upon a defendant with the worst possible

criminal history.” United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246

(4th Cir. 2005). As a result, many defendants who, based on

their own criminal histories, could not possibly have been

sentenced to prison for more than a year were deemed to have

been convicted of predicate felonies and so sentenced to

enhanced federal prison terms. We faithfully followed that

precedent in numerous cases, including United States v. Simmons,

340 F. App’x 141 (4th Cir. 2009).

In 2010, however, the Supreme Court decided Carachuri-

Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010). The Court held in

Carachuri that, for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality

Act, a prior conviction constitutes an “aggravated felony” –-

i.e., a crime for which the maximum term of imprisonment exceeds

one year –- only if the defendant was “actually convicted of a

crime that is itself punishable as a felony under federal law.”

6
Id. at 582. The Court explained that whether the defendant’s

conduct underlying his prior conviction hypothetically could

have received felony treatment is irrelevant. See id. at 576-

81. The critical question is simply whether he was convicted of

an offense punishable by more than one year in prison.

The Supreme Court then vacated our judgment in Simmons and

remanded the case to us for “further consideration in light of

Carachuri-Rosendo.” See 130 S. Ct. 3455 (2010). On remand, we

recognized that, although Carachuri arose in the immigration

context, its rationale undercut our use of “an imagined worst-

case offender” to calculate a defendant’s maximum term of

imprisonment for a prior conviction. United States v. Simmons,

649 F.3d 237, 249 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc). Accordingly, we

held that a defendant’s prior North Carolina conviction was

punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year (and thus a

federal sentencing predicate) only if the particular defendant’s

crime of conviction was punishable under North Carolina law by a

prison term exceeding one year. Id.

Valdovinos contends that Carachuri and Simmons support his

argument that his prior conviction for selling heroin does not

constitute a felony under the Guidelines. In particular, he

seizes on the instruction in those cases that a court must “look

to the conviction itself as [its] starting place” when

considering whether a prior conviction qualifies as a federal

7
sentencing predicate. Carachuri, 560 U.S. at 576; accord

Simmons, 649 F.3d at 242. Valdovinos argues that because the

state court could not have imposed a sentence greater than 12

months once it accepted his guilty plea –- that is, once

Valdovinos was convicted of his drug offense –- this conviction

was not punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year.

Appellant’s Br. at 12-13. Accordingly, Valdovinos claims that

his prior North Carolina conviction is not a felony under

Carachuri and Simmons because “[t]here was no point when [his]

conviction exposed him to a sentence greater than one year’s

imprisonment.” Reply Br. at 8.

Valdovinos’s argument is clever, but unpersuasive. North

Carolina’s unique sentencing regime, not a plea agreement,

determines whether a defendant’s conviction is punishable by

imprisonment exceeding one year and so qualifies as a federal

sentencing predicate. Simmons, 649 F.3d at 240.

B.

North Carolina’s Structured Sentencing Act “creates felony

sentences strictly contingent on two factors: the designated

‘class of offense’ and the offender’s ‘prior record level.’”

Id. (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.13(b)). The sentencing

judge calculates the offender’s prior record level by adding

together the points, assigned by the Act, for each of the

offender’s prior convictions. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(a).

8
The judge then matches the offense class and prior record level

using a statutory table, which provides three sentencing ranges

–- a mitigated range, a presumptive range, and an aggravated

range. Id. § 15A–1340.17(c). The judge must sentence the

defendant within the presumptive range unless the judge makes

written findings of aggravating or mitigating factors. Id.

§§ 15A-1340.13(e) & 15A-1340.16(c). And the judge may sentence

a defendant within the aggravated range only if the state

provides the defendant notice of its intent to prove aggravating

factors, and a jury finds such factors beyond a reasonable doubt

or the defendant pleads to their existence. Id. § 15A-1340.16

(a6). Once the judge selects the applicable range, the judge

must choose the defendant’s minimum sentence from within that

range; a separate statutory chart provides the corresponding

maximum term. Id. § 15A-1340.17(d).

Critically, North Carolina’s sentencing scheme is not a

discretionary, guidelines system. Rather, “it mandates specific

sentences,” so “no circumstances exist under the Structured

Sentencing Act in which a North Carolina judge may impose a

sentence that exceeds the top of the range set forth in the

Act.” Simmons, 649 F.3d at 244 (quotation marks and citation

omitted). Determining the maximum punishment for an offender’s

prior conviction, then, simply “requires examination of three

pieces of evidence: the offense class, the offender’s prior

9
record level, and the applicability of the aggravated sentencing

range.” Id. at 247, n.9.

In Simmons, based on these three pieces of evidence, the

Structured Sentencing Act authorized a maximum sentence of only

8 months’ community punishment (no imprisonment) for the

defendant’s prior conviction. Id. at 241. Because Simmons’s

prior offense was not punishable under North Carolina law by

more than one year in prison, it did not qualify as a felony

predicate for a federal sentence enhancement. Id. at 248.

In Valdovinos’s case, by contrast, the Structured

Sentencing Act authorized a maximum sentence of 16 months’

imprisonment for his prior conviction. That the sentence

ultimately imposed pursuant to his plea deal was 10 to 12

months’ imprisonment is irrelevant. See United States v.

Edmonds, 679 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2012) (reaffirming that

“the qualification of a prior conviction [as a sentencing

predicate] does not depend on the sentence [a defendant]

actually received” but on the maximum sentence permitted),

vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 376, aff’d on remand, 700

F.3d 146 (4th Cir. 2012). Valdovinos’s North Carolina

conviction was punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year

based on his prior record level, offense class, and sentencing

range. It therefore qualifies as a federal sentencing

predicate.

10
 Valdovinos’s contrary argument rests on a misreading of

Carachuri and Simmons. Those cases direct that an offender’s

conviction must serve as our “starting place” not because, as

Valdovinos suggests, the moment of conviction (i.e., the moment

the defendant enters his guilty plea) is a magical one. Rather,

it is because the critical question for purposes of a federal

sentence enhancement is whether the particular defendant’s prior

offense of conviction was itself punishable by imprisonment

exceeding one year. Carachuri, 560 U.S. at 576 & 582; Simmons,

649 F.3d at 243; see also U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.2 (defining

“felony” as “any federal, state, or local offense punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”) (emphasis added).

Undoubtedly, Valdovinos’s prior offense of conviction –- sale of

heroin -- was itself punishable by imprisonment for more than

one year.

Simmons, and Carachuri before it, teach that we may not

measure a defendant’s maximum punishment based on a hypothetical

charge, a hypothetical criminal history, or other “facts outside

the record of conviction.” Simmons, 649 F.3d at 244 (quoting

Carachuri, 560 U.S. at 582). But we do not do so in holding

that North Carolina’s “carefully crafted sentencing scheme,” id.

at 249, not a negotiated plea agreement, determines whether

Valdovinos’s prior conviction qualifies as a federal sentencing

predicate. In looking to the Structured Sentencing Act to

11
establish Valdovinos’s maximum sentence, we consider only

Valdovinos’s own offense class and criminal history, and thus

attribute to him only the crime of which he was “actually

convicted.” Carachuri, 560 U.S. at 582 (emphasis omitted).

This is the approach mandated by Carachuri and Simmons.

III.

Nonetheless, Valdovinos contends that a plea agreement of

the sort he negotiated –- that binds the judge to a sentence

once the judge accepts the plea -- displaces North Carolina’s

Structured Sentencing Act and establishes the maximum punishment

for every defendant sentenced pursuant to such a deal. The

argument fails. Precedent offers no support for the outcome

Valdovinos seeks. In fact, that outcome is fundamentally at

odds with important principles animating our decision in Simmons

and North Carolina’s sentencing scheme.

A.

A negotiated plea agreement differs in critical respects

from a legislative mandate like the Structured Sentencing Act.

While a plea agreement reflects only the interests of the

prosecutor and individual defendant, the Act reflects “North

Carolina's judgment as to the seriousness of a North Carolina

crime.” Simmons, 649 F.3d at 249. And while, under a plea

agreement, a defendant’s sentence hinges on merely the ability

12
of the parties to reach a deal and the willingness of the

sentencing judge to accept that deal, the Structured Sentencing

Act ensures that objective, uniformly applicable factors

determine each offender’s maximum punishment.

Thus, to determine an offender’s maximum sentence, Simmons

instructs that in every case we look to the same three pieces of

evidence: “the offense class, the offender’s prior record

level, and the applicability of the aggravated sentencing

range.” Id. at 247 n.9. A plea agreement applies to just one

case. Simmons’s instruction ensures that offenders with similar

criminal backgrounds who commit similar crimes will be sentenced

to similar prison terms. Of course, an individual plea

agreement provides no similar assurance.

Moreover, in contrast to North Carolina’s mandatory

sentencing scheme, under which a judge may never “impose a

sentence that exceeds the top of the range set forth in the

Act,” id. at 244 (quotation marks and citation omitted), a plea

agreement’s recommended sentence is not the final word under

North Carolina law. This is so because the sentencing judge

remains free to reject the agreement.

Neither a defendant nor a prosecutor may “bind the State to

the dispensation of a particular sentence . . . until the trial

judge has approved of the proposed sentence.” State v. Marlow,

432 S.E.2d 275, 279 (N.C. 1993) (citation and alteration

13
omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1023(b). And “the

prosecutor may rescind his offer of a proposed plea arrangement

at any time before it is consummated by actual entry of the

guilty plea and the acceptance and approval of the proposed

sentence by the trial judge.” Marlow, 432 S.E.2d at 279

(emphasis omitted). “A decision by the judge disapproving a

plea arrangement,” moreover, “is not subject to appeal.” N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 15A-1023(b). Accordingly, the state judge could

have rejected Valdovinos’s plea agreement and required a

sentence of up to 16 months in prison, the statutory maximum

under the Act.

Valdovinos protests that this argument “ignores the most

important procedural protection included in [the statute

governing his plea agreement]: the defendant’s right to withdraw

from the plea agreement and plead not guilty if the judge

rejects the agreed sentence.” Reply Br. at 5-6. Certainly, a

defendant has this right. The relevant North Carolina statute

provides:

Before accepting a plea pursuant to a plea arrangement
in which the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a
particular sentence, the judge must advise the parties
whether he approves the arrangement and will dispose
of the case accordingly. If the judge rejects the
arrangement, he must so inform the parties, refuse to
accept the defendant’s plea of guilty or no contest,
and advise the defendant personally that neither the
State nor the defendant is bound by the rejected
arrangement. The judge must advise the parties of the

14
 reasons he rejected the arrangement and afford them an
opportunity to modify the arrangement accordingly.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1023(b) (emphasis added). We cannot,

therefore, be sure what would have happened if the state judge

had rejected Valdovinos’s plea. Perhaps Valdovinos would have

withdrawn his plea, and perhaps a jury would have acquitted him

of selling heroin in North Carolina. But the fact remains that

Valdovinos, like countless other defendants, chose to plead

guilty under a plea agreement that allowed him to avoid trial

and its associated risk of a higher sentence than the agreement

offered. And he pleaded guilty to an offense that carried a

maximum sentence of 16 months in prison under North Carolina

law. His conviction thus constitutes a proper sentencing

predicate under the Guidelines.

B.

Valdovinos’s remaining arguments to the contrary are

similarly unconvincing.

First, he contends that just as North Carolina prosecutors

declined to pursue Simmons as an aggravated offender, Simmons,

649 F.3d at 245, so too they “declined to pursue [him] as a

felon” by agreeing to a sentence capped at 12 months in prison.

Appellant’s Br. at 17 (quotation marks omitted). Not so.

Valdovinos was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, a North

Carolina Class G felony offense. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-1(4)

15
(defining felony as, inter alia, a crime “denominated as a

felony by statute”). That prosecutors agreed to a lower

sentence does not eliminate the fact that they did indeed

“pursue [him] as a felon.”

In a similar vein, Valdovinos claims that “the prosecutor

must have found the existence of mitigating circumstances in

order to agree to a sentence of less than one year.”

Appellant’s Br. at 17. But it is just as likely that the

prosecutor agreed to the lower sentence to avoid the time and

expense of trial. 2 And contrary to Valdovinos’s claim, it

matters not that his maximum sentence under the Structured

Sentencing Act would similarly have been 12 months if the

parties had “obtained a mitigated-range sentence” based on

judicial findings of mitigation rather than through plea

negotiations. Id. Because a North Carolina sentencing judge

“remain[s] free at all times to sentence [a defendant] to a

presumptive prison term” despite the existence of mitigating

factors, Valdovinos’s conviction would still have been

punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year and so would have

qualified as a sentencing predicate. United States v. Kerr, 737

F.3d 33, 38-39 (4th Cir. 2013).

2
Of course, the prosecutor knew that Valdovinos faced
immediate deportation upon his release from prison, a fact that
might also have played a role in sentencing negotiations.

16
 Finally, contrary to his suggestion, Valdovinos had ample

notice of the consequences of his plea. Measuring his maximum

sentence by reference to the Structured Sentencing Act therefore

does not rob him of the benefits of that plea. This case does

not, for example, involve a defendant who negotiated a plea to a

lesser charge, only to have a later sentencing court impose an

enhancement on the basis of the defendant’s underlying conduct

or initial indictment on a greater charge. That approach might

unfairly deprive defendants of the benefits of their negotiated

pleas, because it is “unfair to impose a sentence enhancement as

if the defendant had pleaded guilty to [a sentencing predicate]”

when in fact he did not. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct.

2276, 2289 (2013) (quotation mark and citation omitted).

Here, however, Valdovinos did plead guilty to a sentencing

predicate, i.e., a felony punishable by more than one year. Had

he wished to avoid a conviction punishable under North Carolina

law by imprisonment exceeding one year, he should have sought a

plea to a lesser crime. 3 Perhaps he did so, and perhaps the

prosecutor refused. Whatever the case, Valdovinos ultimately

3
North Carolina classifies felonies in descending order of
seriousness from Class A (most serious) through Class I (least
serious). See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(c). At the time of
Valdovinos’s conviction, a North Carolina Class H felony offense
carried a maximum (presumptive) sentence of only eight months in
prison for an offender with his criminal history. See N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1340.17 (version effective until November 30, 2009).

17
elected to plead guilty to an offense punishable under state law

by a maximum term of 16 months in prison. He knew this, or

should have known it, at the time of his conviction and so

cannot now claim that the district court unfairly attributed to

him this predicate offense.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that North Carolina’s

legislatively mandated sentencing scheme, not a recommended

sentence hashed out in plea negotiations, determines whether an

offender’s prior North Carolina conviction was punishable by

more than a year in prison. Because Valdovinos’s offense of

conviction was indeed punishable by imprisonment exceeding one

year, it qualifies as a predicate felony under Section

2L1.2(b)(1)(B) of the Guidelines. We appreciate the fervor and

policy arguments of our friend in dissent. Indeed, we can agree

with many of the latter. What we cannot agree with is that

“application of relevant precedent” does not require the result

here. Carachuri and Simmons do just that. The judgment of the

district court is

AFFIRMED.

18
DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The majority holds that a federal sentencing enhancement

should be applied under the illegal reentry guideline, U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(B), whenever an offender’s rap sheet contains a

prior North Carolina conviction that, given his offense and

criminal history levels, could have resulted in a sentence of

incarceration exceeding one year. I would hold instead that such

an offense does not qualify as a predicate felony if, due to a

statutorily authorized, judicially-accepted, binding plea

agreement, the state sentencing judge is legally compelled to

impose a sentence of no more than one year. Put differently, and

consonant with our relevant circuit precedent, I would treat

such an offender as if the state court judge had found him

statutorily ineligible for a sentence of more than one year,

which of course was true once the judge accepted his guilty plea

and before imposing sentence. See infra pp. 32-36 (explaining

the operation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1023(b)).

Our disagreement as to the outcome in this case stems, I

think, less over the content and application of relevant

precedent and more from a fundamental disagreement regarding our

role as arbiters of a flailing federal sentencing regime. Where,

as here, we have been presented with a choice in how to

interpret the interstices of federal sentencing law, and where

one choice would exacerbate the harmful effects of over-

19
incarceration that every cadre of social and political

scientists (as well as an ever-growing cohort of elected and

appointed officials, state and federal, as well as respected

members of the federal judiciary) has recognized as unjust and

inhumane, as well as expensive and ineffectual, this insight can

and should inform our analysis. I deeply regret the panel’s

failure to take advantage of the opportunity to do so here.

I.

First, some necessary and useful background.

A.

Over the latter half of the last century, enthusiasm for

incarceration pervaded crime reduction policy and the related

public discourse. The policy choices that resulted have created

an unparalleled rate of incarceration – nearly 2.23 million

people, or 1 out of every 100 adults, currently sit in an

American prison or jail - a marked departure from the historical

experience of the United States as well as the modern experience

of peer democracies. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice

Statistics, L. Glaze & E. Herberman, Correctional Populations in

the United States, 2012, at 3 (2013),

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf. The United States

now holds the highest prison population rate in the world, over

5 to 10 times more than western European democracies. Int’l Ctr.

for Prison Studies, R. Walmsley, World Prison Population List 1-

20
3 (10th ed. 2013). Though it is home to only 5 percent of the

world’s population, our nation accounts for nearly 25 percent of

its prisoners. Congressional Research Service, S. Kirchhoff,

Economic Impacts of Prison Growth 9 (2010),

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41177.pdf.

By all accounts, these “tough on crime” policies have been

an abject failure. A rapidly accumulating group of multi-

disciplinary research studies have come to the conclusion that

the rate of incarceration in the United States needs to be

significantly reduced, and both the executive and legislative

branches seem to agree. As a recent study prepared by the

research arm of the National Academy of Sciences put it, the

United States has “gone past the point where the numbers of

people in prison can be justified by social benefits,” and

arrived at a point where mass incarceration itself is a major

“source of injustice.” National Research Council, J. Travis, et

al., The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring

Causes and Consequences 9 (2014) (“National Research Council

Report”).

Justice Kennedy summarized it best ten years ago: “Our

resources are misspent, our punishments too severe, our

sentences too long.” Greenhouse, High Court Justice Supports Bar

Plan to Ease Sentencing, N.Y. Times, June 24, 2004, p. A14.

Consider the present state of our federal Bureau of Prisons:

21
more than half of its 200,000 inmates are incarcerated for drug-

related offenses, and only 6 percent for violent crimes. Dept.

of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, E.A. Carson & D.

Golinelli, Prisoners in 2012: Trends in Admissions and Releases,

1991-2012, at 43 (2013),

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf. Almost half

of the inmates suffer from substance abuse disorders. Dept. of

Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, C. Mumola & J.

Karberg, Drug Use and Dependence, State and Federal Prisoners,

2004, at 1 (2006),

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dudsfp04.pdf. And of those

released, 40 percent are rearrested or have their supervision

revoked within five years, frequently for minor violations of

the terms of their release. W. Rhodes, et al., Recidivism of

Offenders on Federal Community Supervision 8 (2012),

https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/241018.pdf.

Each inmate costs our system, and thus the taxpayers,

$29,291 annually. Congressional Research Service, N. James, The

Federal Prison Population Buildup: Overview, Policy Changes,

Issues, and Options 15 (2014),

http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf. A Brookings Institute

project shows that direct corrections expenses total $80 billion

a year; total expenditure soars to more than $260 billion once

police, judicial, and legal services are included. The Hamilton

22
Project, M. Kearney, et al., Ten Economic Facts about Crime and

Incarceration in the United States 13 (2014),

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/05/0

1%20crime%20facts/v8_thp_10crimefacts (“Hamilton Project

Report”).

Perhaps these numbers would be easier to accept if we had

conclusive data that severe punishment resulted in lower crime

rates. But there are no such data. “Through the 1990s and 2000s,

crime rates fell significantly, but the evidence indicates it is

unlikely that the rise in incarceration rates played a powerful

role in this trend.” National Research Council Report, at 340.

The data are, at best, mixed, and there is compelling evidence

that severe prison sentences actually make reoffending more

likely when offenders reenter society. Id. at 135-40, 150-52;

see also, e.g., Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty—First

Century 201, 42 Crime and Justice 199, 201 (M. Tonry, ed. 2013)

(“[T]here is little [empirical] evidence that increases in the

length of already long prison sentences yield general deterrent

effects that are sufficiently large to justify their social and

economic costs.”); Anne Morrison Piehl & Bert Useem, Prisons, in

Crime and Public Policy, 542 (Joan Petersilia and James Q.

Wilson, eds., 2nd ed. 2011) (same).

23
 B.

The heady weight of this experiment’s failure falls

disproportionately on our poor, our communities of color, and

excruciatingly so on young black men:

Those who are incarcerated in U.S. prisons come
largely from the most disadvantaged segments of the
population. They comprise mainly [of] minority men
under age 40, poorly educated, and often carrying
additional deficits of drug and alcohol addiction,
mental and physical illness, and a lack of work
preparation or experience. . . . The meaning and
consequences of this new reality cannot be separated
from issues of social inequality and the quality of
citizenship of the nation’s racial and ethnic
minorities.

National Research Council Report, at 2; see also Hamilton

Project Report, at 17 (“There is nearly a 70 percent chance that

an African-American man without a high school diploma will be

imprisoned by his mid-thirties.”). Such disparities make

official responses to crime and criminality a racially fraught

phenomenon. In 2011, blacks were incarcerated at nearly six

times, and Hispanics at three times, the rate for non-Hispanic

whites; the combination of those two groups accounted for no

less than 60 percent of the total prison population. Dept. of

Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, E.A. Carson & W. Sabol,

Prisoners in 2011, at 7-8; 26 (2012),

www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.

I should note that no respected researcher has suggested

that the disparities in imprisonment rates can be attributed to

24
disparities in criminality. Studies have shown that, controlling

for legally relevant differences, black defendants are more

likely to be confined before trial, more likely to be sentenced

to prison when non-prison sentences are available, and more

likely to receive longer sentences than their white

counterparts. See Michael Tonry, Punishing Race: A Continuing

American Dilemma 70-76 (2011); Cassia Spohn, Racial Disparities

In Prosecution, Sentencing, And Punishment 166-93, in The Oxford

Handbook of Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration (S. Bucerius, et

al., ed. 2013). Findings in a recent study of the New York

County District Attorney’s Office by the highly-regarded Vera

Institute of Justice exemplify these nationwide realities: it

concluded that racial disparities manifested in nearly every

identifiable point of “significant prosecutorial discretion.”

See Vera Institute of Justice, B. Kutateladze & N. Andiloro,

Prosecution and Racial Justice in New York County 217,

http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race

-and-prosecution-manhattan-technical.pdf (“Vera Institute

Study”).

As a result, according to a United States Sentencing

Commission (USSC) report, black male offenders receive sentences

20 percent longer than those imposed on white males convicted of

similar crimes. USSC, Report on the Continuing Impact of United

States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing 108 (2012). The truth is

25
that “once they’re in [the] system, people of color often face

harsher punishments than their peers”; as Attorney General Eric

G. Holder recently stated, “[t]his isn’t just unacceptable – it

is shameful[,] unworthy of our great country, and our great

legal tradition.” Eric G. Holder, Attorney General, Remarks at

Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association’s House of

Delegates (Aug. 12, 2013), in Justice News,

http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-

130812.html (“Holder Speech at ABA”) (saved as ECF opinion

attachment).

C.

The dangers of over-incarceration also present themselves

in the immigration context. Approximately 21,000 inmates are

currently serving sentences for immigration-related offenses in

the federal Bureau of Prisons. Federal Bureau of Prisons, Inmate

Statistics: Offenses,

http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.j

sp (last updated June 28, 2014). This sum reflects a

staggering 900 percent increase in admission since 1994; in

fact, immigration prosecutions now make up the single largest

category of federal cases annually. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of

Justice Statistics, M. Motivans, Federal Criminal Justice

Trends, 2003, at 48 (2006),

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fcjt03.pdf; Exec. Office for

26
U.S. Attorneys, Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’

Annual Statistical Report: Fiscal Year 2012, at 10 (2012).

Immigration cases are processed in a manner bordering on

mechanical. Prosecutorial discretion is almost unheard of: less

than 1 percent of immigration matters referred to U.S. Attorneys

were declined for further prosecution. Dept. of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, M. Motivans, Immigration Offenders in the

Federal Justice System, 2010, at 18 (2013),

http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iofjs10.pdf. Over 95 percent

of immigration defendants plead guilty; in the Fourth Circuit,

this figure is 98.6 percent. Id. at 8; USSC, Statistical

Information Packet, Fourth Circuit, Fiscal Year 2013, at 8

(2013. The median case processing time for such cases, from

inception until termination in district court, is approximately

120 days. Motivans, Immigration Offenders, at 25.

For those lacking documentation, disproportionate

sentencing is still another cause for concern. Recent literature

has indicated that one’s immigration status – in addition to

one’s race – becomes fodder for disparate treatment at the

sentencing stage. See Michael T. Light, The New Face of Legal

Inequality: Noncitizens and the Long-Term Trends in Sentencing

Disparities Across U.S. District Courts, 1992-2009, 48 L. & Soc.

Rev. 447 (2014); see also Jeff Yates, et al., A War on Drugs or

a War on Immigrants? Expanding the Definition of “Drug

27
Trafficking” in Determining Aggravated Felon Status for

Noncitizens, 64 Md. L. Rev. 875, 880-81 (2005). According to one

study, non-citizens are over three times more likely to be

incarcerated compared to similarly situated citizens. Light, at

465. And the length of non-citizens’ prison terms were adversely

affected, too: they were 8.5 percent longer than their

counterparts, suggesting “a broader pattern of punitiveness

against non-U.S. citizens, culminating in more incarceration and

longer prison terms.” Id. at 466; 470.

All told, almost one-quarter of the Bureau of Prisons

population is composed of non-citizens – over 50,000 people -

and that has been the case since at least 2011. The overwhelming

majority serves time for drug convictions (44%), illegal reentry

(33%), illegal entry (6%), or some combination thereof, and the

average sentence for this population is approximately 85 months.

Bureau of Prisons Office of Public Affairs, Information on

Sentenced Inmates by U.S. Citizen and non-U.S. Citizen as of

Sept. 2013 (July 2014) (saved as ECF opinion attachment). * Of

course, common practice for most of these non-citizen criminals

is that they are passed along to be civilly deported once their

federal sentences come to an end.

*
These data were provided directly to me, upon request, by
the Bureau of Prisons.

28
 II.

Any reader who has come this far has my deep appreciation.

Let’s examine legal doctrine.

It is against the above backdrop that we are called upon to

decide the appeal of Mr. Jose Ramon Solis Valdovinos.

The facts governing Mr. Valdovinos’s appeal are not

complicated: we know that in July 2009, he pled guilty in state

court to four counts of selling heroin over a four-week period

during the fall of 2008. Had he chosen to proceed to trial and,

upon conviction, to sentencing without a binding plea agreement,

Mr. Valdovinos would have faced a maximum sentence of sixteen

months. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.17(c) & (d) (2008). But we

also know that, upon his actual conviction, the state sentencing

court ceased to have the option of sentencing him in that range.

Because the state prosecutor had offered a plea agreement, and

because the state judge unconditionally approved its terms,

including the binding provision to impose a sentence of no more

than twelve months, the court could only sentence Mr. Valdovinos

to a determinate range of ten to twelve months’ imprisonment.

J.A. 80. And so it did. Id.

The underlying legal issue is also straightforward. Though

we are guided by Supreme Court holdings in Carachuri-Rosendo v.

Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010), and United States v. Rodriquez, 553

U.S. 377 (2008), as well as our own precedent in Simmons and its

29
progeny, see infra, my colleagues and I are in agreement that

this case presents a novel issue of federal sentencing law, one

that is posed only by virtue of the special circumstances

presented by prior convictions under North Carolina’s Structured

Sentencing Act and obtained pursuant to a related state statute

authorizing a certain kind of plea agreement. The particular

question is: which characteristic of Mr. Valdovinos’s 2009 North

Carolina conviction, (1) the terms of his judicially-accepted,

and therefore statutorily-binding, non-felony (for federal law

purposes) sentence, imposed by virtue of a duly-negotiated

binding plea agreement, or (2) the sentence that could have been

imposed on a defendant with his offense class and criminal

history category who goes to trial or pleads guilty without the

benefit of a binding plea agreement, should govern the analysis

of whether he has committed a prior “felony . . . offense” for

purposes of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B), the federal sentencing enhancement

applicable to those convicted of illegal reentry after

deportation.

The majority chooses the latter option, largely on the

ground that the “principles animating [the] decision in

Simmons,” ante, at 12, support such a conclusion. Perhaps so. I

choose the former, and my reasoning is as follows: (1) it is

wholly consistent with the lessons of Carachuri-Rosendo,

Rodriquez, and Simmons, and their “animating principles,” not

30
least among them a due regard for federalism interests, and (2)

in the absence of precedent mandating a result, our decision

ought to be grounded in an informed understanding of the

realities of the existing state and federal sentencing regimes

and the consequences that our rulings may bring to bear.

A.

Let us begin with the Supreme Court’s instructions in

Carachuri-Rosendo and Rodriquez. Both cases involved the use of

a defendant’s prior state conviction to justify the later

imposition of enhanced penalties under federal law, and both

teach a single lesson: “[W]e are to look to the conviction

itself as our starting place, not to what might have or could

have been charged.” Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 576 (emphasis

added). In Carachuri-Rosendo, the Court eschewed the so-called

“hypothetical” approach, which would have permitted federal law

to treat the defendant as having committed an aggravated felony

if, hypothetically, his previous state court proceedings could

have treated him as such. This method, according to the Court,

inappropriately ignored both “the conviction (the relevant

statutory hook), and the conduct actually punished by the state

offense.” Id. at 580.

We later observed, in United States v. Simmons, that a

state court finding could “set the maximum term of imprisonment,

but only when the finding [of recidivism] is a part of the

31
record of conviction.” 649 F.3d 237, 243 (4th Cir. 2011) (en

banc) (quoting Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 577, n.12)

(emphasis added). And “in those cases in which the records that

may properly be consulted do not show that the defendant faced

the possibility of a recidivist enhancement, it may well be that

the Government will be precluded from establishing that a

conviction was for a qualifying offense.” Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at

389. Use of “facts outside the record of conviction . . . cannot

and does not” substantiate a conclusion to the contrary.

Simmons, 649 F.3d at 244 (internal citations omitted).

No one doubts that a sentence of twelve months does not

qualify as a felony sentence under federal law. (The majority

opinion elides Mr. Valdovinos’s careful differentiation between

the definitions of “felony” for state and federal purposes, as

it elides, as well, his differentiation between “felons” and

“aggravated offenders.” Ante, at 15-16.) If we look, as Simmons

instructs, to Mr. Valdovinos’s record of conviction, it is clear

that his conviction was not “punishable by imprisonment for a

term exceeding one year” as is required by the Sentencing

Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.2. According to the state

court judgment, the court “impose[d] the prison term pursuant to

a plea arrangement as to sentence under Article 58 of G.S.

Chapter 15A.” J.A. 80. The court had accepted Mr. Valdovinos’s

guilty plea, and, under North Carolina law, it was obligated to

32
impose the sentence agreed to by the prosecutor and defendant,

which, in this case, was ten to twelve months.

Mr. Valdovinos’s appeal underscores a crucial

characteristic of the plea negotiation system as enacted by the

North Carolina legislature: once the plea agreement is

“approved,” Article 58 of G.S. Chapter 15A “establish[es the]

maximum term of imprisonment” that can legally be imposed on a

particular defendant. Simmons, 649 F.3d at 244. Specifically,

under North Carolina law,

Before accepting a plea pursuant to a plea arrangement
in which the prosecutor has agreed to recommend a
particular sentence, the judge must advise the parties
whether he approves the arrangement and will dispose
of the case accordingly. If the judge rejects the
arrangement, he must so inform the parties, refuse to
accept the defendant’s plea of guilty or no contest,
and advise the defendant personally that neither the
State nor the defendant is bound by the rejected
arrangement.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1023(b) (emphasis added). Indeed, that is

the entire point of the system: once a judge accepts a 1023(b)

guilty plea, she is bound by the terms of the corresponding plea

agreement, and she may not go on to rewrite its terms in a

manner she sees fit. Cf. Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct.

2685, 2696 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (observing that

the “very purpose” of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C), the federal

analogue of a North Carolina 1023(b) plea agreement, is “to bind

the district court and allow the Government and the defendant to

33
determine what sentence he will receive.”). In other words, the

North Carolina judge was not “guide[d]” by the terms of the plea

agreement; rather, the specific sentence is “mandate[d]” by

North Carolina statutory law. Cf. Simmons, 649 F.3d at 244.

If the above language sounds familiar, this is because we

pointed to this precise characteristic to support our conclusion

in Simmons that the North Carolina Structured Sentencing Act

should inform our federal predicate felony analysis. There, we

observed that the North Carolina legislature had set forth a

rigid procedure that made sentencing ranges “strictly

contingent” on a defendant’s offense class and prior record

level, and expressly limited sentences above that range “unless

the judge makes written findings” on the record. Id. at 240.

Unlike the federal Guidelines system, under which the sentencing

judge could impose a sentence outside of the suggested range, a

North Carolina judge lacked such discretion. To read into a

state conviction a finding of aggravation that no judge ever

made, and that (as in the instant case) is beyond the legal

authority of the sentencing judge to make at all, is to use

“facts outside the record of conviction” in a manner barred by

Carachuri-Rosendo. Id. at 244-45.

Though the government boldly takes the position that some

enactments of the North Carolina legislature are more important

than others, this argument is unavailing. Through Article 58 of

34
G.S. Chapter 15A, the North Carolina legislature has implemented

a rigid procedure that makes sentencing ranges “strictly

contingent” on the agreed-upon plea agreement - and in fact

allows for no option for the judge to sentence a defendant

outside that range. Mr. Valdovinos’s “record of conviction”

makes clear that the maximum possible term of imprisonment was

the range set forth in the plea agreement, and, as to this

“conviction itself,” the state court was compelled to impose a

sentence no greater than one year. We should take Carachuri-

Rosendo and Simmons at their word and decline the government’s

invitation to pick and choose among subsisting enactments of the

North Carolina legislature, assigning to such enactments tiers

of importance or creating statutory hierarchies that have no

basis whatsoever in federal sentencing law.

The majority disagrees. By the “conviction itself,” it

hastens to explain, Simmons actually meant the “offense of

conviction” itself, and by the “offense of conviction” itself,

it really meant an offender’s maximum punishment given his

offense class and criminal history point. My friends contend

that Mr. Valdovinos’s argument does not make sense because it

imparts undue importance to the “moment of conviction,” which is

not, after all, some sort of “magical” moment. Ante, at 11.

The “moment of conviction” may not be magical (little if

anything in our broken criminal justice system is,

35
notwithstanding its “considerable virtues” extolled by some, see

Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal

Justice, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1099, 1172 (2014)), but it certainly

is a logical one, an apt benchmark to apply in the course of

exercising our discretion to make choices about mass and

prolonged incarceration. And though it is painfully obvious to

say so, there simply is no “conviction itself,” see Carachuri-

Rosendo, 560 U.S. at 576, until the “moment” of conviction, and

there can be no “record of conviction,” see Simmons, 649 F.3d at

243, until the judge “approves” the plea agreement and accepts

the guilty plea. “Any bargain between the parties is contingent

until the court accepts the agreement.” Freeman, 131 S. Ct. at

2692 (plurality op.); see also id., 131 S. Ct. at 2696

(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (treating as important, if not

“magical,” “the moment of sentencing”). Unless and until the

guilty plea is accepted, the state of affairs surrounding a

North Carolina defendant with the benefit of a 1023(b) plea

agreement is speculative at best – and certainly just as

“hypothetical” as the circumstances, addressed in Simmons and

Rodriquez, of a person who stands charged with offense conduct

that could have exposed him to an aggravated sentencing range

but the prosecutor and/or judge declined to pursue that course.

If hypotheticals are inoperative in the latter circumstances,

then they should be inoperative in the former.

36
 * * * * *

The critical point here is that neither the holding nor the

reasoning of Simmons mandates the proper resolution of this

case. Despite the protestation from the majority to the

contrary, ante, at 18, Carachuri-Rosendo and Simmons are not

“controlling” here, in that their “animating principles” do not

compel the result reached by the majority. (Of course, on the

other hand, there is a reason why our opinions are labeled

“majority” and “dissent:” they have the votes, but not the

better approach or the better arguments.)

Whether or not the majority will acknowledge it, we have a

choice in fashioning our rule of decision here, as appellate

judges sometimes do. What might inform our choice in this

instance?

B.

How about the important federalism interests at stake in

this case?

That is, in the course of offering the plea agreement at

issue, the state of North Carolina evaluated Mr. Valdovinos’s

background and the circumstances of the case and determined that

he deserved a sentence of ten to twelve months - or, more aptly

put, that he did not deserve a sentence of any greater duration

than twelve months. This decision was made by the state’s local

prosecutors, whom we presume to have their fingers on the pulse

37
of community concerns and to act with genuine regard for

community mores. Their decision-making authority is of course

validated by the state Constitution and statutes, as well as its

corresponding rules of procedure. Today’s holding goes far to

derogate the discretion and independence exercised by state

officials to enforce their own laws.

Both Carachuri-Rosendo and Simmons expressed concern that

applying hypothetical sentencing enhancements to prior state

convictions triggers significant federalism concerns. Carachuri-

Rosendo emphasized that the federal sentencing regime should not

“denigrate the independent judgment of state prosecutors to

execute the laws” of their states. 560 U.S. at 580. And we have

reiterated that when a state prosecutor has “declined to pursue”

a defendant as an aggravated offender, we ought not to “second-

guess” her judgment. Simmons, 649 at 249-50.

The same logic applies here – in fact, even more so,

insofar as it involves the independent but collective exercise

of the combined constitutional authority of both the state

prosecutor and the state judge, each expressing the community’s

judgment that Mr. Valdovinos is not among the most dangerous and

incorrigible offenders deserving of the full retributive weight

allowed under state law.

For any number of reasons, be it pragmatism, compassion, or

otherwise, the state prosecutor (and state judge) weighed the

38
recourses available to her and opted to agree to an

incarceration term of no more than one year. What today’s

holding says is that that doesn’t matter: federal courts can and

will “second-guess” this judgment. Even though a state

prosecutor (and state judge) chose a shorter, more humane term

of imprisonment, we are urged to disregard her decision because

it does not comport with the policy choice of one United States

Attorney’s Office as to its view of state sentencing values.

The government concedes, as it must, that “a guilty plea

entered into [sic] under § 15A-1023(b) restricts a sentencing

judge’s discretion,” Gov. Br. 19, but the majority concludes

that this does not matter. It points to the fact that each plea

agreement is individualized, hinging on “the ability of the

parties to reach a deal,” ante, at 12-13. And it emphasizes the

fact that Mr. Valdovinos “chose to plead guilty under a plea

agreement that allowed him to avoid trial,” ante, at 15.

Manifestly, this describes every plea agreement, all of which

also “allow” the prosecutor to “avoid trial.” The majority’s

reasoning is aimed at identifying a seeming contrast, I suppose,

to the Structured Sentencing Act’s more wide-lensed “reflect[ion

of] North Carolina’s judgment as to the seriousness of a North

Carolina crime.” Ante, at 12. But its reasoning proves too much.

First, the majority’s assertion that “a plea agreement

reflects only the interests of the prosecutor and individual

39
defendant,” id., would surely strike many as shockingly ill-

informed. Every federal district judge in this circuit knows

that plea agreements in the federal system are subjected to

rigorous review for conformity to broad policies by multiple

levels of supervisory prosecutors, whose initials customarily

appear in the margins of the written agreements. Cf. Vera

Institute Study, at 115-16 (describing Manhattan District

Attorney’s guidelines for plea agreement offers). There is no

reason to suppose, as the majority opinion seems to suggest,

that conscientious prosecutors in a jurisdiction as large as

Mecklenburg County, North Carolina are any less rigorous in

fulfilling their responsibilities to the public. In my view,

such discretionary exercises of state authority are equally

instructive – if not more so – of “North Carolina’s judgment as

to the seriousness” of a criminal offense committed within its

jurisdiction and in violation of its own law.

Indeed, the fact that the North Carolina legislature has

instituted such a plea agreement system in the first instance

belies the majority’s dismissive approach. As every prosecutor

and criminal practitioner well knows, a plea agreement that

binds a judge to a particular sentence is a horse of a different

color, for most judges will not routinely bind themselves. That

the special procedure is embodied in a duly-enacted state

statute undoubtedly heightens the respect we owe it. I simply

40
fail to see how the particularized evaluation of the need for

just punishment by a local prosecutor (an agent of a duly-

elected, Constitutional officer of the sovereign State of North

Carolina), under the authority of state statutory law, of the

actual facts at issue, and agreed to by a state judge (likewise,

a duly-elected, Constitutional officer of the sovereign State of

North Carolina), can be dismissed so blithely.

And while it is certainly true that Mr. Valdovinos “chose

to plead guilty under a plea agreement that allowed him to avoid

trial[,]” ante, at 15, the benefits afforded to the prosecutor

when a plea agreement is accepted are equally individualized and

equally critical to the administration of her office’s duties.

“[T]he reality [is] that criminal justice today is for the most

part a system of pleas, not a system of trials”. Lafler v.

Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012); see also id. (over 97% of

federal convictions and 94% of state convictions are a result of

guilty pleas); USSC, Statistical Information Packet, Fourth

Circuit, Fiscal Year 2013, at 8 (2013) (guilty pleas resolve

98.6% of immigration cases in the Fourth Circuit). It is true

that the presiding prosecutor offers plea agreements for any

number of reasons: a weak case, a sympathetic defendant, the

expense of trial, and on and on. As a matter of course, however,

she will only reach a plea agreement if it is in the state’s

interest (i.e., the community’s interest) to do so.

41
 Actually, the majority’s ostensible distinction between the

sentencing act and the plea agreement statute seems to distract

more than it informs. There is no doubt that any plea

negotiation system is, by its very nature, flexible and

individualized, grounded in real world intentions and

consequences. But there is also no doubt that it plays a crucial

role in North Carolina’s sentencing scheme. Though its

instructions cannot be fashioned into a neat table or grid, it

strictly and steadfastly “mandates [the] specific sentences”

available to the state court when the court accepts a

prosecutor’s recommended sentence for any given conviction. Cf.

Simmons, 649 F.3d at 244. At least according to Simmons, that is

what should carry the day.

III.

My point thus far has been that the lessons of Carachuri-

Rosendo and Rodriquez are consistent with acceptance of Mr.

Valdovinos’s argument, and that the principles animating Simmons

remain equally at play in this case, as well. In other words, as

is common in cases involving the intricacies of federal

sentencing law, our traditional tools do not provide us with a

clearly mandated holding. I do not believe that my good

colleagues in the majority dispute this; rather, where we differ

is what we choose to do with this jurisprudential license.

42
 The truly baffling question is why, when presented with a

choice in the interpretation of federal sentencing law, any

federal appellate judge acting in good faith (as my friends in

the majority indisputably are) would choose to exacerbate,

rather than mitigate, the harmful effects of our nation’s

“throw-away-the-key” approach to incarceration?

Now, more than ever, every measure of political and social

scientists has recognized that our nation’s mass incarceration

strategies have been a “moral, legal, social, and economic

disaster” that “cannot end soon enough.” Editorial, End Mass

Incarceration Now, N.Y. Times, May 24, 2014, p. SR10. In

February of this year, the U.S. House of Representatives renewed

the bipartisan task force it created to review the federal

criminal code and the trend toward “over-criminalization;”

groups who have testified in support of reform include the

American Bar Association, the Heritage Foundation, and, just

this past month, the Judicial Conference of the United States

and the Sentencing Commission. See Hearings Before the Over-

Criminalization Task Force of 2013 of the Committee on the

Judiciary, House of Representatives (June 14, 2013) (Testimony

of William N. Shepherd, American Bar Association; John G.

Malcolm, The Heritage Foundation); id. (Jul. 11, 2014)

(Testimony of Hon. Irene M. Keeley, Judicial Conference of the

United States; Hon. Patti B. Saris, USSC).

43
 The consensus for reform includes, not least of all, the

Attorney General himself, who has concluded that “far too many

Americans [are] serving too much time in too many prisons – and

beyond the point of serving any good law enforcement reason.”

Eric G. Holder, Attorney General, Remarks at Fourth Meeting of

Ministers Responsible for Public Security in the Americas (Nov.

21, 2013), in Justice News,

http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2013/ag-speech-

131121.html (saved as ECF opinion attachment). The Department of

Justice has directed federal prosecutors to exercise their

discretion toward minimizing the number of inmates in federal

prisons for low-level drug crimes and has urged Congress to

enact changes in the federal sentencing guidelines to that

effect. See U.S. Department of Justice, Smart on Crime:

Reforming the Criminal Justice System for the 21st Century

(2013).

In fact, even as I write this, the United States Sentencing

Commission has issued a momentous, unanimous decision providing

that its previously-approved Guidelines amendment reducing

federal drug base offense levels by two would be retroactively

applied. While Congress retains the authority to reject this

twenty-first century innovation before the end of this year, it

seems highly unlikely that it will do so, for all the reasons

discussed herein. It is, indeed, nearly impossible to keep up

44
with the groundswell of support evidencing our long-overdue

recognition that federal sentencing law and policy are in

desperate need of repair.

All of this gives me pause. We federal judges have invested

no uncertain effort into crafting our tools of legal analysis,

and on many occasions those traditional tools reveal a true and

worthy answer. But at a point where actors from all sides of the

political spectrum have concluded that federal sentencing law

and policies have gone off the rails, at a point where even the

Executive Branch has recognized that “widespread incarceration

at the federal, state, and local levels is both ineffective and

unsustainable,” see Holder Speech at ABA, I would think that our

analytical process ought not to blink at these very real

concerns.

The majority opinion declines to examine Mr. Valdovinos’s

case through this lens, clinging instead to the myopic notion

that only our ostensibly “legal” analytical tools dictate the

holding in his case. I understand, in some instances, the need

for formalist thought and decision-making. But in the context of

federal sentencing, and in the face of mounting evidence of the

societal costs of this sort of legal reasoning, I cannot condone

or join in it.

I suppose, in truth, this case is really United States v.

Kerr, 737 F.3d 33 (4th Cir. 2013), redux. (Kerr earns a single

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citation in the majority opinion, see ante, at 16, but it looms,

ominously, over this appeal.) Just as the North Carolina state

judge there had discretion to sentence in the presumptive range

(but did not), so too, here, the North Carolina state judge had

discretion to reject the binding plea agreement (but did not).

In each instance, reliance on an inchoate, hypothetical state of

affairs to lengthen a federal sentence runs into the teeth of

the relevant circuit precedents. I dissented in Kerr and I do so

here. Formalist, counter-factual responses to real world events

hold no comfort for me when the subject is federal sentencing.

IV.

I am reminded of the following prudent instruction from the

National Academy of Sciences:

The decision to deprive another human being of his or
her liberty is, at root, anchored in beliefs about the
just relationship between the individual and society
and the role of criminal sanctions in preserving the
social compact. Thus, good justice policy is
necessarily based on a combination of empirical
research and explicit normative commitments.

National Research Council Report, at 341. Where there are

choices that can be made that would permit progress in the

individual case without doing harm to the transcendent legal

infrastructure rooted in deductive reasoning, we can and should

choose that path.

Here, in a tiny corner of the chaotic morass that is

federal sentencing law, Mr. Valdovinos has offered us a measured

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approach, to a novel issue of federal sentencing law, that

adheres to Supreme Court and our relevant circuit precedents and

is consistent with our values. If accepted by this panel, his

argument, which is surely more than merely “clever”, see ante,

at 8, would affect a tiny number of federal cases drawing legal

relevance from North Carolina’s historical (and now superseded)

sentencing regime. And Mr. Valdovinos’s sentence in this case

likely would be reduced to a bottom guideline of 15 months,

instead of the bottom guideline sentence he received, 27 months.

He’d soon be on his way home to Mexico, if not already arrived.

That the majority declines the opportunity to decide this

case on the foundations discussed herein is regrettable, a

choice that not only ignores the growing wisdom informed by

widespread acknowledgement of our unjust federal sentencing

jurisprudence, but actually hinders its progress. Would that my

friends could see that it’s a new century, complete with a host

of profound and valuable insights at our avail. I discern no

compelling reason why, in the performance of our adjudicative

responsibilities, which every member of the panel has

unfailingly carried out to the best of our ability in this case

and in full accordance with our solemn oath to “administer

justice,” 28 U.S.C. § 453, we ought not to draw on these

insights.

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 One of them is that sometimes, in our shared quest for

justice under law, it requires so little of us to achieve so

much.

Respectfully, I dissent.

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