UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4944
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CARL QUENTIN WOODS, a/k/a Q, a/k/a Carl Quentin Davis,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District
Judge. (3:12-cr-00040-JFA-2)
Submitted: July 24, 2014 Decided: July 28, 2014
Before FLOYD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William W. Watkins, Sr., WILLIAM W. WATKINS, PA, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William Kenneth Witherspoon, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carl Quentin Woods pled guilty to two counts of using
a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) and aiding and abetting
under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). He was sentenced to a total of 384
months of imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but raising the
following issues: (1) whether the appeal in the case was timely
filed; (2) whether Woods’ guilty plea was conducted in
compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11; and (3) whether Woods’
sentence was properly imposed and substantively reasonable. For
the following reasons, we affirm.
Regarding the first issue, we agree with Anders
counsel that the notice of appeal is late. In criminal cases,
the defendant must file the notice of appeal within fourteen
days after the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A).
With or without a motion, upon a showing of excusable neglect or
good cause, the district court may grant an extension of up to
thirty days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P.
4(b)(4); United States v. Reyes, 759 F.2d 351, 353 (4th Cir.
1985). Here, the district court entered judgment on August 22,
2013. Woods filed the notice of appeal, at the earliest, on
November 25, 2013, after both the fourteen-day appeal period and
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the thirty-day excusable neglect period had expired. Because
the Government has not filed a motion to dismiss on this basis,
we consider this appeal on the merits.
Second, because Dixon did not seek to withdraw his
guilty plea or otherwise preserve any allegation of Rule 11
error, this court reviews his plea colloquy for plain error.
United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002).
Our review of the record reveals that the district court
substantially complied with Rule 11 and that Woods knowing and
voluntarily pled guilty.
Finally, we find that Woods’ sentence was reasonable.
We review a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id.
We first assess the procedural reasonableness of a sentence,
whether the district court properly calculated the Sentencing
Guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Id. at 49–50; see
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). We
next consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
examining the totality of the circumstances to see whether the
sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the
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sentence it chose satisfied the § 3553(a) standards. United
States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, we presume on
appeal that the sentence is reasonable. See Rita v. United
States, 551 U.S. 338, 346–56 (2007) (permitting appellate
presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentence).
We find that the sentence is procedurally and substantively
reasonable and note that Woods asked for and received the
statutory mandatory minimum sentence for both counts, 84 months
for Count 5, for brandishing under § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and 300
months to be served consecutively (25-year sentence because it
is a second or successive § 924(c) offense under
§ 924(c)(1)(C)(i)) for Count 9, for discharging under
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case, including the issues raised in Woods’ pro se
supplemental briefs, and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. This court requires that counsel inform Woods, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Woods requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Woods. We dispense with
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oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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