Timothy Bostic v. George Schaefer

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-1167

TIMOTHY B. BOSTIC; TONY C. LONDON; CAROL SCHALL; MARY
TOWNLEY,

Plaintiffs − Appellees,

JOANNE HARRIS; JESSICA DUFF; CHRISTY BERGHOFF; VICTORIA
KIDD, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated,

Intervenors,

v.

GEORGE E. SCHAEFER, III, in his official capacity as the
Clerk of Court for Norfolk Circuit Court,

Defendant – Appellant,

and

JANET M. RAINEY, in her official capacity as State Registrar
of Vital Records; ROBERT F. MCDONNELL, in his official
capacity as Governor of Virginia; KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II,
in his official capacity as Attorney General of Virginia,

Defendants,

MICHÈLE MCQUIGG,

Intervenor/Defendant.

------------------------------------

DAVID A. ROBINSON; ALAN J. HAWKINS; JASON S. CARROLL; NORTH
CAROLINA VALUES COALITION; LIBERTY, LIFE, AND LAW
FOUNDATION; SOCIAL SCIENCE PROFESSORS; FAMILY RESEARCH
COUNCIL; VIRGINIA CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, LLC; CENTER FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA;
INSTITUTE FOR MARRIAGE AND PUBLIC POLICY; HELEN M. ALVARE;
STATE OF INDIANA; STATE OF ALABAMA; STATE OF ALASKA; STATE
OF ARIZONA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF IDAHO; STATE OF
LOUISIANA; STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF NEBRASKA; STATE OF
OKLAHOMA; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA;
STATE OF UTAH; STATE OF WYOMING; WALLBUILDERS, LLC; LIBERTY
COUNSEL; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PEDIATRICIANS; SCHOLARS OF
HISTORY AND RELATED DISCIPLINES; AMERICAN LEADERSHIP FUND;
ROBERT P. GEORGE; SHERIF GIRGIS; RYAN T. ANDERSON; PAUL
MCHUGH; UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EVANGELICALS; CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER−DAY SAINTS; THE ETHICS & RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
COMMISSION OF THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION; LUTHERAN
CHURCH−MISSOURI SYNOD; THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY; EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION AND LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; DAVID
BOYLE; ROBERT OSCAR LOPEZ; CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AMERICA; THE
FAMILY FOUNDATION OF VIRGINIA,

Amici Supporting Appellant,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS; ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT; LEE
BOLLINGER; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY; WALTER DELLINGER; MICHAEL C.
DORF; LEE EPSTEIN; DANIEL FARBER; BARRY FRIEDMAN; MICHAEL
JAY GERHARDT, Professor; DEBORAH HELLMAN; JOHN CALVIN
JEFFRIES, JR.; LAWRENCE LESSIG; WILLIAM MARSHALL; FRANK
MICHELMAN; JANE S. SCHACTER; CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER;
SUZANNA SHERRY; GEOFFREY R. STONE; DAVID STRAUSS; LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, Professor; WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE; OUTSERVE−SLDN; THE
AMERICAN MILITARY PARTNER ASSOCIATION; THE AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION; VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PROFESSORS; AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION; THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS; VIRGINIA
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION; EQUALITY NC; SOUTH CAROLINA
QUALITY COALITION; CHANTELLE FISHER−BORNE; MARCIE
FISHER−BORNE; CRYSTAL HENDRIX; LEIGH SMITH; SHANA CARIGNAN;
MEGAN PARKER; TERRI BECK; LESLIE ZANAGLIO; LEE KNIGHT
CAFFERY; DANA DRAA; SHAWN LONG; CRAIG JOHNSON; ESMERALDA
MEJIA; CHRISTINA GINTER−MEJIA; CATO INSTITUTE;
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER; HISTORIANS OF
MARRIAGE; PETER W. BARDAGLIO; NORMA BASCH; STEPHANIE COONTZ;
NANCY F. COTT; TOBY L. DITZ; ARIELA R. DUBLER; LAURA F.
EDWARDS; SARAH BARRINGER GORDON; MICHAEL GROSSBERG; HENDRIK
HARTOG; ELLEN HERMAN; MARTHA HODES; LINDA K. KERBER; ALICE
KESSLER−HARRIS; ELAINE TYLER MAY; SERENA MAYERI; STEVEN
MINTZ; ELIZABETH PLECK; CAROLE SHAMMAS; MARY L. SHANLEY; AMY
DRU STANLEY; BARBARA WELKE; PARENTS, FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF

2
LESBIANS AND GAYS, INC.; KERRY ABRAMS, Albert Clark Tate,
Jr. Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law;
VIVIAN HAMILTON, Professor of Law, William and Mary;
MEREDITH HARBACH, Professor of Law, University of Richmond;
JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, John and Elizabeth Boalt Lecturer in
Residence, University of California, Berkeley School of Law;
COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, Professor of Law, University of
California, Davis School of Law; NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATION FUND, INC.; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE; HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC; FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL; COLAGE;
GLMA: HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ADVANCING LGBT EQUALITY; WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR.; REBECCA L. BROWN; DANIEL A. FARBER;
MICHAEL GERHARDT; JACK KNIGHT; ANDREW KOPPELMAN; MELISSA
LAMB SAUNDERS; NEIL S. SIEGEL; JANA B. SINGER; HISTORIANS OF
ANTI−GAY DISCRIMINATION; ANTI−DEFAMATION LEAGUE; AMERICANS
UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE; BEND THE ARC: A
JEWISH PARTNERSHIP FOR JUSTICE; HADASSAH, THE WOMEN'S
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA; HINDU AMERICAN FOUNDATION;
THE INTERFAITH ALLIANCE FOUNDATION; JAPANESE AMERICAN
CITIZENS LEAGUE; JEWISH SOCIAL POLICY ACTION NETWORK;
KESHET; METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY CHURCHES; MORE LIGHT
PRESBYTERIANS; THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN;
NEHIRIM; PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION;
PRESBYTERIAN WELCOME; RECONCILINGWORKS: LUTHERANS FOR FULL
PARTICIPATION; RELIGIOUS INSTITUTE, INC.; SIKH AMERICAN
LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND; SOCIETY FOR HUMANISTIC
JUDAISM; T'RUAH: THE RABBINIC CALL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS; WOMEN'S
LEAGUE FOR CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM; COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL
SEXUALITY AND GENDER LAW CLINIC; BISHOPS OF THE EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN VIRGINIA; CENTRAL ATLANTIC CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST; CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN
RABBIS; MORMONS FOR EQUALITY; RECONSTRUCTIONIST RABBINICAL
ASSOCIATION; RECONSTRUCTIONIST RABBINICAL COLLEGE AND JEWISH
RECONSTRUCTIONIST COMMUNITIES; UNION FOR REFORM JUDAISM; THE
UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST ASSOCIATION; AFFIRMATION; COVENANT
NETWORK OF PRESBYTERIANS; METHODIST FEDERATION FOR SOCIAL
ACTION; MORE LIGHT PRESBYTERIANS; PRESBYTERIAN WELCOME;
RECONCILING MINISTRIES NETWORK; RECONCILINGWORKS: LUTHERANS
FOR FULL PARTICIPATION; RELIGIOUS INSTITUTE, INC.; WOMEN OF
REFORM JUDAISM; 28 EMPLOYERS AND ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING
EMPLOYERS; COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF
CALIFORNIA; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA;
STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF IOWA; STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF
MARYLAND; STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE; STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE
OF NEW YORK; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF
WASHINGTON; GARY J. GATES; NATIONAL AND WESTERN STATES

3
WOMEN'S RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; VIRGINIA CHAPTER OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS; THE NATIONAL
WOMEN'S LAW CENTER; EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES; LEGAL MOMENTUM;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN LAWYERS; NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP
FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES; SOUTHWEST WOMEN'S LAW CENTER; WOMEN'S
LAW PROJECT; PROFESSORS OF LAW ASSOCIATED WITH THE WILLIAMS
INSTITUTE; BAY AREA LAWYERS FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM;
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS; PUBLIC
INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS; BAR ASSOCIATIONS; FAMILY LAW AND
CONFLICT OF LAWS PROFESSORS; GAY AND LESBIAN ADVOCATES AND
DEFENDERS; PEOPLE OF FAITH FOR EQUALITY IN VIRGINIA;
CELEBRATION CENTER FOR SPIRITUAL LIVING; CLARENDON
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH; COMMONWEALTH BAPTIST CHURCH;
CONGREGATION OR AMI; HOPE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST; LITTLE
RIVER UCC; METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY CHURCH OF NORTHERN
VIRGINIA; MT. VERNON UNITARIAN CHURCH; ST. JAMES UCC,; ST.
JOHN'S UCC; NEW LIFE METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY CHURCH;
UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST FELLOWSHIP OF THE PENINSULA;
UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST CONGREGATION OF STERLING; UNITED
CHURCH OF CHRIST OF FREDERICKSBURG; UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST
CHURCH OF LOUDOUN; ANDREW MERTZ; REV. MARIE HULM ADAM; REV.
MARTY ANDERSON; REV ROBIN ANDERSON; REV. VERNE ARENS; RABBI
LIA BASS; REV. JOSEPH G. BEATTIE; REV. SUE BROWNING; REV.
JIM BUNDY; REV. MARK BYRD; REV. STEVEN C. CLUNN; REV. DR.
JOHN COPERHAVER; RABBI GARY CREDITOR; REV. DAVID ENSIGN;
REV. HENRY FAIRMAN; RABBI JESSE GALLOP; REV. TOM
GERSTENLAUER; REV. ROBIN H. GORSLINE; REV. TRISH HALL; REV.
WARREN HAMMONDS; REV. JON HEASLET; REV. DOUGLAS HODGES; REV.
PHYLLIS HUBBELL; REV. STEPHEN G. HYDE; REV. JANET JAMES;
REV. JOHN MANWELL; REV. JAMES W. MCNEAL; REV. MARC BOSWELL;
REV. ANDREW CLIVE MILLARD; REV. DR. MELANIE MILLER; REV.
AMBER NEUROTH; REV. JAMES PAPILE; REV. LINDA OLSON PEEBLES;
REV. DON PRANGE; RABBI MICHAEL RAGOZIN; RABBI BEN ROMER;
REV. JENNIFER RYU; REV. ANYA SAMMLER−MICHAEL; REV. AMY
SCHWARTZMAN; REV. DANNY SPEARS; REV. MARK SURIANO; REV. ROB
VAUGHN; REV. DANIEL VELEZ−RIVERA; REV. KATE R. WALKER; REV.
TERRYE WILLIAMS; REV. DR. KAREN−MARIE YUST,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

4
 No. 14-1169

TIMOTHY B. BOSTIC; TONY C. LONDON; CAROL SCHALL; MARY
TOWNLEY,

Plaintiffs − Appellees,

JOANNE HARRIS; JESSICA DUFF; CHRISTY BERGHOFF; VICTORIA
KIDD, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated,

Intervenors,

v.

JANET M. RAINEY, in her official capacity as State Registrar
of Vital Records,

Defendant – Appellant,

and

GEORGE E. SCHAEFER, III, in his official capacity as the
Clerk of Court for Norfolk Circuit Court; ROBERT F.
MCDONNELL, in his official capacity as Governor of Virginia;
KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of Virginia,

Defendants,

MICHÈLE MCQUIGG,

Intervenor/Defendant.

------------------------------------

DAVID A. ROBINSON; ALAN J. HAWKINS; JASON S. CARROLL; NORTH
CAROLINA VALUES COALITION; LIBERTY, LIFE, AND LAW
FOUNDATION; SOCIAL SCIENCE PROFESSORS; FAMILY RESEARCH
COUNCIL; VIRGINIA CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, LLC; CENTER FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA;
INSTITUTE FOR MARRIAGE AND PUBLIC POLICY; HELEN M. ALVARE;
STATE OF INDIANA; STATE OF ALABAMA; STATE OF ALASKA; STATE
OF ARIZONA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF IDAHO; STATE OF

5
LOUISIANA; STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF NEBRASKA; STATE OF
OKLAHOMA; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA;
STATE OF UTAH; STATE OF WYOMING; WALLBUILDERS, LLC; LIBERTY
COUNSEL; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PEDIATRICIANS; SCHOLARS OF
HISTORY AND RELATED DISCIPLINES; AMERICAN LEADERSHIP FUND;
ROBERT P. GEORGE; SHERIF GIRGIS; RYAN T. ANDERSON; PAUL
MCHUGH; UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EVANGELICALS; CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER−DAY SAINTS; THE ETHICS & RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
COMMISSION OF THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION; LUTHERAN
CHURCH−MISSOURI SYNOD; THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY; EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION AND LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; DAVID
BOYLE; ROBERT OSCAR LOPEZ; CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AMERICA; THE
FAMILY FOUNDATION OF VIRGINIA,

Amici Supporting Appellant,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS; ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT; LEE
BOLLINGER; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY; WALTER DELLINGER; MICHAEL C.
DORF; LEE EPSTEIN; DANIEL FARBER; BARRY FRIEDMAN; MICHAEL
JAY GERHARDT, Professor; DEBORAH HELLMAN; JOHN CALVIN
JEFFRIES, JR.; LAWRENCE LESSIG; WILLIAM MARSHALL; FRANK
MICHELMAN; JANE S. SCHACTER; CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER;
SUZANNA SHERRY; GEOFFREY R. STONE; DAVID STRAUSS; LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, Professor; WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE; OUTSERVE−SLDN; THE
AMERICAN MILITARY PARTNER ASSOCIATION; THE AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION; VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PROFESSORS; AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION; THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS; VIRGINIA
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION; EQUALITY NC; SOUTH CAROLINA
QUALITY COALITION; CHANTELLE FISHER−BORNE; MARCIE
FISHER−BORNE; CRYSTAL HENDRIX; LEIGH SMITH; SHANA CARIGNAN;
MEGAN PARKER; TERRI BECK; LESLIE ZANAGLIO; LEE KNIGHT
CAFFERY; DANA DRAA; SHAWN LONG; CRAIG JOHNSON; ESMERALDA
MEJIA; CHRISTINA GINTER−MEJIA; CATO INSTITUTE;
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER; HISTORIANS OF
MARRIAGE; PETER W. BARDAGLIO; NORMA BASCH; STEPHANIE COONTZ;
NANCY F. COTT; TOBY L. DITZ; ARIELA R. DUBLER; LAURA F.
EDWARDS; SARAH BARRINGER GORDON; MICHAEL GROSSBERG; HENDRIK
HARTOG; ELLEN HERMAN; MARTHA HODES; LINDA K. KERBER; ALICE
KESSLER−HARRIS; ELAINE TYLER MAY; SERENA MAYERI; STEVEN
MINTZ; ELIZABETH PLECK; CAROLE SHAMMAS; MARY L. SHANLEY; AMY
DRU STANLEY; BARBARA WELKE; PARENTS, FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF
LESBIANS AND GAYS, INC.; KERRY ABRAMS, Albert Clark Tate,
Jr. Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law;
VIVIAN HAMILTON, Professor of Law, William and Mary;

6
MEREDITH HARBACH, Professor of Law, University of Richmond;
JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, John and Elizabeth Boalt Lecturer in
Residence, University of California, Berkeley School of Law;
COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, Professor of Law, University of
California, Davis School of Law; NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATION FUND, INC.; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE; HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC; FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL; COLAGE;
GLMA: HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ADVANCING LGBT EQUALITY; WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR.; REBECCA L. BROWN; DANIEL A. FARBER;
MICHAEL GERHARDT; JACK KNIGHT; ANDREW KOPPELMAN; MELISSA
LAMB SAUNDERS; NEIL S. SIEGEL; JANA B. SINGER; HISTORIANS OF
ANTI−GAY DISCRIMINATION; ANTI−DEFAMATION LEAGUE; AMERICANS
UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE; BEND THE ARC: A
JEWISH PARTNERSHIP FOR JUSTICE; HADASSAH, THE WOMEN'S
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA; HINDU AMERICAN FOUNDATION;
THE INTERFAITH ALLIANCE FOUNDATION; JAPANESE AMERICAN
CITIZENS LEAGUE; JEWISH SOCIAL POLICY ACTION NETWORK;
KESHET; METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY CHURCHES; MORE LIGHT
PRESBYTERIANS; THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN;
NEHIRIM; PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION;
PRESBYTERIAN WELCOME; RECONCILINGWORKS: LUTHERANS FOR FULL
PARTICIPATION; RELIGIOUS INSTITUTE, INC.; SIKH AMERICAN
LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND; SOCIETY FOR HUMANISTIC
JUDAISM; T'RUAH: THE RABBINIC CALL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS; WOMEN'S
LEAGUE FOR CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM; COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL
SEXUALITY AND GENDER LAW CLINIC; BISHOPS OF THE EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN VIRGINIA; CENTRAL ATLANTIC CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST; CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN
RABBIS; MORMONS FOR EQUALITY; RECONSTRUCTIONIST RABBINICAL
ASSOCIATION; RECONSTRUCTIONIST RABBINICAL COLLEGE AND JEWISH
RECONSTRUCTIONIST COMMUNITIES; UNION FOR REFORM JUDAISM; THE
UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST ASSOCIATION; AFFIRMATION; COVENANT
NETWORK OF PRESBYTERIANS; METHODIST FEDERATION FOR SOCIAL
ACTION; MORE LIGHT PRESBYTERIANS; PRESBYTERIAN WELCOME;
RECONCILING MINISTRIES NETWORK; RECONCILINGWORKS: LUTHERANS
FOR FULL PARTICIPATION; RELIGIOUS INSTITUTE, INC.; WOMEN OF
REFORM JUDAISM; 28 EMPLOYERS AND ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING
EMPLOYERS; COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF
CALIFORNIA; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA;
STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF IOWA; STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF
MARYLAND; STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE; STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE
OF NEW YORK; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF
WASHINGTON; GARY J. GATES; NATIONAL AND WESTERN STATES
WOMEN'S RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; VIRGINIA CHAPTER OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS; THE NATIONAL
WOMEN'S LAW CENTER; EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES; LEGAL MOMENTUM;

7
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN LAWYERS; NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP
FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES; SOUTHWEST WOMEN'S LAW CENTER; WOMEN'S
LAW PROJECT; PROFESSORS OF LAW ASSOCIATED WITH THE WILLIAMS
INSTITUTE; BAY AREA LAWYERS FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM;
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS; PUBLIC
INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS; BAR ASSOCIATIONS; FAMILY LAW AND
CONFLICT OF LAWS PROFESSORS; GAY AND LESBIAN ADVOCATES AND
DEFENDERS; PEOPLE OF FAITH FOR EQUALITY IN VIRGINIA;
CELEBRATION CENTER FOR SPIRITUAL LIVING; CLARENDON
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH; COMMONWEALTH BAPTIST CHURCH;
CONGREGATION OR AMI; HOPE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST; LITTLE
RIVER UCC; METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY CHURCH OF NORTHERN
VIRGINIA; MT. VERNON UNITARIAN CHURCH; ST. JAMES UCC,; ST.
JOHN'S UCC; NEW LIFE METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY CHURCH;
UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST FELLOWSHIP OF THE PENINSULA;
UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST CONGREGATION OF STERLING; UNITED
CHURCH OF CHRIST OF FREDERICKSBURG; UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST
CHURCH OF LOUDOUN; ANDREW MERTZ; REV. MARIE HULM ADAM; REV.
MARTY ANDERSON; REV ROBIN ANDERSON; REV. VERNE ARENS; RABBI
LIA BASS; REV. JOSEPH G. BEATTIE; REV. SUE BROWNING; REV.
JIM BUNDY; REV. MARK BYRD; REV. STEVEN C. CLUNN; REV. DR.
JOHN COPERHAVER; RABBI GARY CREDITOR; REV. DAVID ENSIGN;
REV. HENRY FAIRMAN; RABBI JESSE GALLOP; REV. TOM
GERSTENLAUER; REV. ROBIN H. GORSLINE; REV. TRISH HALL; REV.
WARREN HAMMONDS; REV. JON HEASLET; REV. DOUGLAS HODGES; REV.
PHYLLIS HUBBELL; REV. STEPHEN G. HYDE; REV. JANET JAMES;
REV. JOHN MANWELL; REV. JAMES W. MCNEAL; REV. MARC BOSWELL;
REV. ANDREW CLIVE MILLARD; REV. DR. MELANIE MILLER; REV.
AMBER NEUROTH; REV. JAMES PAPILE; REV. LINDA OLSON PEEBLES;
REV. DON PRANGE; RABBI MICHAEL RAGOZIN; RABBI BEN ROMER;
REV. JENNIFER RYU; REV. ANYA SAMMLER−MICHAEL; REV. AMY
SCHWARTZMAN; REV. DANNY SPEARS; REV. MARK SURIANO; REV. ROB
VAUGHN; REV. DANIEL VELEZ−RIVERA; REV. KATE R. WALKER; REV.
TERRYE WILLIAMS; REV. DR. KAREN−MARIE YUST,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

8
 No. 14-1173

TIMOTHY B. BOSTIC; TONY C. LONDON; CAROL SCHALL; MARY
TOWNLEY,

Plaintiffs − Appellees,

JOANNE HARRIS; JESSICA DUFF; CHRISTY BERGHOFF; VICTORIA
KIDD, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated,

Intervenors,

v.

MICHÈLE MCQUIGG,

Intervenor/Defendant – Appellant,

and

GEORGE E. SCHAEFER, III, in his official capacity as the
Clerk of Court for Norfolk Circuit Court; JANET M. RAINEY,
in her official capacity as State Registrar of Vital
Records; ROBERT F. MCDONNELL, in his official capacity as
Governor of Virginia; KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II, in his
official capacity as Attorney General of Virginia,

Defendants.

------------------------------------

DAVID A. ROBINSON; ALAN J. HAWKINS; JASON S. CARROLL; NORTH
CAROLINA VALUES COALITION; LIBERTY, LIFE, AND LAW
FOUNDATION; SOCIAL SCIENCE PROFESSORS; FAMILY RESEARCH
COUNCIL; VIRGINIA CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, LLC; CENTER FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA;
INSTITUTE FOR MARRIAGE AND PUBLIC POLICY; HELEN M. ALVARE;
STATE OF INDIANA; STATE OF ALABAMA; STATE OF ALASKA; STATE
OF ARIZONA; STATE OF COLORADO; STATE OF IDAHO; STATE OF
LOUISIANA; STATE OF MONTANA; STATE OF NEBRASKA; STATE OF
OKLAHOMA; STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA;
STATE OF UTAH; STATE OF WYOMING; WALLBUILDERS, LLC; LIBERTY
COUNSEL; AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PEDIATRICIANS; SCHOLARS OF

9
HISTORY AND RELATED DISCIPLINES; AMERICAN LEADERSHIP FUND;
ROBERT P. GEORGE; SHERIF GIRGIS; RYAN T. ANDERSON; PAUL
MCHUGH; UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EVANGELICALS; CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST
OF LATTER−DAY SAINTS; THE ETHICS & RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
COMMISSION OF THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION; LUTHERAN
CHURCH−MISSOURI SYNOD; THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY; EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION AND LEGAL DEFENSE FUND; DAVID
BOYLE; ROBERT OSCAR LOPEZ; CONCERNED WOMEN FOR AMERICA; THE
FAMILY FOUNDATION OF VIRGINIA,

Amici Supporting Appellant,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS; ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT; LEE
BOLLINGER; ERWIN CHEMERINSKY; WALTER DELLINGER; MICHAEL C.
DORF; LEE EPSTEIN; DANIEL FARBER; BARRY FRIEDMAN; MICHAEL
JAY GERHARDT, Professor; DEBORAH HELLMAN; JOHN CALVIN
JEFFRIES, JR.; LAWRENCE LESSIG; WILLIAM MARSHALL; FRANK
MICHELMAN; JANE S. SCHACTER; CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER;
SUZANNA SHERRY; GEOFFREY R. STONE; DAVID STRAUSS; LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, Professor; WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE; OUTSERVE−SLDN; THE
AMERICAN MILITARY PARTNER ASSOCIATION; THE AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION; VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
PROFESSORS; AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION; THE AMERICAN
ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS; AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SOCIAL WORKERS; VIRGINIA
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION; EQUALITY NC; SOUTH CAROLINA
QUALITY COALITION; CHANTELLE FISHER−BORNE; MARCIE
FISHER−BORNE; CRYSTAL HENDRIX; LEIGH SMITH; SHANA CARIGNAN;
MEGAN PARKER; TERRI BECK; LESLIE ZANAGLIO; LEE KNIGHT
CAFFERY; DANA DRAA; SHAWN LONG; CRAIG JOHNSON; ESMERALDA
MEJIA; CHRISTINA GINTER−MEJIA; CATO INSTITUTE;
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER; HISTORIANS OF
MARRIAGE; PETER W. BARDAGLIO; NORMA BASCH; STEPHANIE COONTZ;
NANCY F. COTT; TOBY L. DITZ; ARIELA R. DUBLER; LAURA F.
EDWARDS; SARAH BARRINGER GORDON; MICHAEL GROSSBERG; HENDRIK
HARTOG; ELLEN HERMAN; MARTHA HODES; LINDA K. KERBER; ALICE
KESSLER−HARRIS; ELAINE TYLER MAY; SERENA MAYERI; STEVEN
MINTZ; ELIZABETH PLECK; CAROLE SHAMMAS; MARY L. SHANLEY; AMY
DRU STANLEY; BARBARA WELKE; PARENTS, FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF
LESBIANS AND GAYS, INC.; KERRY ABRAMS, Albert Clark Tate,
Jr. Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law;
VIVIAN HAMILTON, Professor of Law, William and Mary;
MEREDITH HARBACH, Professor of Law, University of Richmond;
JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER, John and Elizabeth Boalt Lecturer in
Residence, University of California, Berkeley School of Law;
COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, Professor of Law, University of

10
California, Davis School of Law; NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND
EDUCATION FUND, INC.; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE; HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF
LAW CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC; FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL; COLAGE;
GLMA: HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ADVANCING LGBT EQUALITY; WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR.; REBECCA L. BROWN; DANIEL A. FARBER;
MICHAEL GERHARDT; JACK KNIGHT; ANDREW KOPPELMAN; MELISSA
LAMB SAUNDERS; NEIL S. SIEGEL; JANA B. SINGER; HISTORIANS OF
ANTI−GAY DISCRIMINATION; ANTI−DEFAMATION LEAGUE; AMERICANS
UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE; BEND THE ARC: A
JEWISH PARTNERSHIP FOR JUSTICE; HADASSAH, THE WOMEN'S
ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA; HINDU AMERICAN FOUNDATION;
THE INTERFAITH ALLIANCE FOUNDATION; JAPANESE AMERICAN
CITIZENS LEAGUE; JEWISH SOCIAL POLICY ACTION NETWORK;
KESHET; METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY CHURCHES; MORE LIGHT
PRESBYTERIANS; THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN;
NEHIRIM; PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY FOUNDATION;
PRESBYTERIAN WELCOME; RECONCILINGWORKS: LUTHERANS FOR FULL
PARTICIPATION; RELIGIOUS INSTITUTE, INC.; SIKH AMERICAN
LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND; SOCIETY FOR HUMANISTIC
JUDAISM; T'RUAH: THE RABBINIC CALL FOR HUMAN RIGHTS; WOMEN'S
LEAGUE FOR CONSERVATIVE JUDAISM; COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL
SEXUALITY AND GENDER LAW CLINIC; BISHOPS OF THE EPISCOPAL
CHURCH IN VIRGINIA; CENTRAL ATLANTIC CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST; CENTRAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN
RABBIS; MORMONS FOR EQUALITY; RECONSTRUCTIONIST RABBINICAL
ASSOCIATION; RECONSTRUCTIONIST RABBINICAL COLLEGE AND JEWISH
RECONSTRUCTIONIST COMMUNITIES; UNION FOR REFORM JUDAISM; THE
UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST ASSOCIATION; AFFIRMATION; COVENANT
NETWORK OF PRESBYTERIANS; METHODIST FEDERATION FOR SOCIAL
ACTION; MORE LIGHT PRESBYTERIANS; PRESBYTERIAN WELCOME;
RECONCILING MINISTRIES NETWORK; RECONCILINGWORKS: LUTHERANS
FOR FULL PARTICIPATION; RELIGIOUS INSTITUTE, INC.; WOMEN OF
REFORM JUDAISM; 28 EMPLOYERS AND ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING
EMPLOYERS; COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF
CALIFORNIA; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA;
STATE OF ILLINOIS; STATE OF IOWA; STATE OF MAINE; STATE OF
MARYLAND; STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE; STATE OF NEW MEXICO; STATE
OF NEW YORK; STATE OF OREGON; STATE OF VERMONT; STATE OF
WASHINGTON; GARY J. GATES; NATIONAL AND WESTERN STATES
WOMEN'S RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS; VIRGINIA CHAPTER OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS; THE NATIONAL
WOMEN'S LAW CENTER; EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES; LEGAL MOMENTUM;
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN LAWYERS; NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP
FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES; SOUTHWEST WOMEN'S LAW CENTER; WOMEN'S
LAW PROJECT; PROFESSORS OF LAW ASSOCIATED WITH THE WILLIAMS
INSTITUTE; BAY AREA LAWYERS FOR INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM;

11
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS; PUBLIC
INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS; BAR ASSOCIATIONS; FAMILY LAW AND
CONFLICT OF LAWS PROFESSORS; GAY AND LESBIAN ADVOCATES AND
DEFENDERS; PEOPLE OF FAITH FOR EQUALITY IN VIRGINIA;
CELEBRATION CENTER FOR SPIRITUAL LIVING; CLARENDON
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH; COMMONWEALTH BAPTIST CHURCH;
CONGREGATION OR AMI; HOPE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST; LITTLE
RIVER UCC; METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY CHURCH OF NORTHERN
VIRGINIA; MT. VERNON UNITARIAN CHURCH; ST. JAMES UCC,; ST.
JOHN'S UCC; NEW LIFE METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY CHURCH;
UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST FELLOWSHIP OF THE PENINSULA;
UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST CONGREGATION OF STERLING; UNITED
CHURCH OF CHRIST OF FREDERICKSBURG; UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST
CHURCH OF LOUDOUN; ANDREW MERTZ; REV. MARIE HULM ADAM; REV.
MARTY ANDERSON; REV ROBIN ANDERSON; REV. VERNE ARENS; RABBI
LIA BASS; REV. JOSEPH G. BEATTIE; REV. SUE BROWNING; REV.
JIM BUNDY; REV. MARK BYRD; REV. STEVEN C. CLUNN; REV. DR.
JOHN COPERHAVER; RABBI GARY CREDITOR; REV. DAVID ENSIGN;
REV. HENRY FAIRMAN; RABBI JESSE GALLOP; REV. TOM
GERSTENLAUER; REV. ROBIN H. GORSLINE; REV. TRISH HALL; REV.
WARREN HAMMONDS; REV. JON HEASLET; REV. DOUGLAS HODGES; REV.
PHYLLIS HUBBELL; REV. STEPHEN G. HYDE; REV. JANET JAMES;
REV. JOHN MANWELL; REV. JAMES W. MCNEAL; REV. MARC BOSWELL;
REV. ANDREW CLIVE MILLARD; REV. DR. MELANIE MILLER; REV.
AMBER NEUROTH; REV. JAMES PAPILE; REV. LINDA OLSON PEEBLES;
REV. DON PRANGE; RABBI MICHAEL RAGOZIN; RABBI BEN ROMER;
REV. JENNIFER RYU; REV. ANYA SAMMLER−MICHAEL; REV. AMY
SCHWARTZMAN; REV. DANNY SPEARS; REV. MARK SURIANO; REV. ROB
VAUGHN; REV. DANIEL VELEZ−RIVERA; REV. KATE R. WALKER; REV.
TERRYE WILLIAMS; REV. DR. KAREN−MARIE YUST,

Amici Supporting Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Arenda L. Wright Allen,
District Judge. (2:13-cv-00395-AWA-LRL)

Argued: May 13, 2014 Decided: July 28, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

12
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the majority
opinion, in which Judge Gregory joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a
separate dissenting opinion.

ARGUED: David Brandt Oakley, POOLE MAHONEY PC, Chesapeake,
Virginia; David Austin Robert Nimocks, ALLIANCE DEFENDING
FREEDOM, Washington, D.C., for Appellants George E. Schaefer,
III and Michèle McQuigg. Stuart Alan Raphael, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant
Janet M. Rainey. Theodore B. Olson, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER,
LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. James D. Esseks, AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, New York, New York, for Intervenors. ON
BRIEF: Jeffrey F. Brooke, POOLE MAHONEY PC, Chesapeake,
Virginia, for Appellant George E. Schaefer, III. Byron J.
Babione, Kenneth J. Connelly, J. Caleb Dalton, ALLIANCE
DEFENDING FREEDOM, Scottsdale, Arizona, for Appellant Michèle B.
McQuigg. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, Cynthia E. Hudson,
Chief Deputy Attorney General, Rhodes B. Ritenour, Deputy
Attorney General, Allyson K. Tysinger, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Catherine Crooks Hill, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Trevor S. Cox, Deputy Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant
Janet M. Rainey. David Boies, Armonk, New York, William A.
Isaacson, Washington, D.C., Jeremy M. Goldman, Oakland,
California, Robert Silver, Joshua I. Schiller, BOIES, SCHILLER &
FLEXNER LLP, New York, New York; Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr.,
Joshua S. Lipshutz, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Los Angeles,
California; Thomas B. Shuttleworth, Robert E. Ruloff, Charles B.
Lustig, Andrew M. Hendrick, Erik C. Porcaro, SHUTTLEWORTH,
RULOFF, SWAIN, HADDAD & MORECOCK, P.C., Virginia Beach,
Virginia, for Appellees. Rebecca K. Glenberg, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF VIRGINIA FOUNDATION, INC., Richmond,
Virginia; Joshua A. Block, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION, New York, New York; Gregory R. Nevins, Tara L.
Borelli, LAMBDA LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., Atlanta,
Georgia; Paul M. Smith, Luke C. Platzer, Mark P. Gaber, JENNER &
BLOCK LLP, Washington, D.C., for Intervenors. David A.
Robinson, North Haven, Connecticut, as Amicus. Lynn D. Wardle,
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, Provo, Utah; William C.
Duncan, MARRIAGE LAW FOUNDATION, Lehi, Utah, for Amici Alan J.
Hawkins and Jason S. Carroll. Deborah J. Dewart, DEBORAH J.
DEWART, ATTORNEY AT LAW, Swansboro, North Carolina, for Amici
North Carolina Values Coalition and Liberty, Life, and Law
Foundation. Steve C. Taylor, ALLIANCE LEGAL GROUP, Chesapeake,
Virginia, for Amicus Social Science Professors. Paul Benjamin

13
Linton, Northbrook, Illinois, for Amicus Family Research
Council. John C. Eastman, Anthony T. Caso, Center for
Constitutional Jurisprudence, CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY DALE E. FOWLER
SCHOOL OF LAW, Orange, California, for Amici Virginia Catholic
Conference, LLC and Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence.
Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, Julie Marie Blake, Assistant
Attorney General, Elbert Lin, Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Amicus State of West Virginia. D. John Sauer, St. Louis,
Missouri, for Amicus Institute for Marriage and Public Policy.
Henry P. Wall, Columbia, South Carolina, for Amicus Helen M.
Alvare. Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General, Thomas M. Fisher,
Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Indianapolis,
Indiana; Luther Strange, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ALABAMA, Montgomery, Alabama; Michael C.
Geraghty, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
ALASKA, Juneau, Alaska; Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA, Phoenix, Arizona;
John Suthers, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF COLORADO, Denver, Colorado; Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF IDAHO, Boise, Idaho;
James D. "Buddy" Caldwell, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LOUISIANA, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Timothy
C. Fox, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MONTANA, Helena, Montana; Jon Bruning, Attorney General, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEBRASKA, Lincoln, Nebraska; E. Scott
Pruitt, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
OKLAHOMA, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Alan Wilson, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
Columbia, South Carolina; Marty J. Jackley, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Pierre, South
Dakota; Sean Reyes, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF UTAH, Salt Lake City, Utah; Peter K.
Michael, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
WYOMING, Cheyenne, Wyoming, for Amici States of Indiana,
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Louisiana, Montana,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, and
Wyoming. Stephen M. Crampton, Mary E. McAlister, LIBERTY
COUNSEL, Lynchburg, Virginia, for Amicus WallBuilders, LLC.
Mathew D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, LIBERTY COUNSEL, Orlando,
Florida, for Amici Liberty Counsel and American College of
Pediatricians. Frank D. Mylar, MYLAR LAW, P.C., Salt Lake City,
Utah, for Amici Scholars of History and Related Disciplines and
American Leadership Fund. Michael F. Smith, THE SMITH APPELLATE
LAW FIRM, Washington, D.C., for Amici Robert P. George, Sherif
Girgis, and Ryan T. Anderson. Gerard V. Bradley, NOTRE DAME LAW
SCHOOL, Notre Dame, Indiana; Kevin T. Snider, PACIFIC JUSTICE

14
INSTITUTE, Oakland, California, for Amicus Paul McHugh. Anthony
R. Picarello, Jr., U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS,
Washington, D.C.; R. Shawn Gunnarson, KIRTON MCCONKIE, Salt Lake
City, Utah, for Amici United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops, National Association of Evangelicals, Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, The Ethics & Religious Liberty
Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, and Lutheran
Church-Missouri Synod. Eric Rassbach, Asma Uddin, THE BECKET
FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, Washington, D.C., for Amicus The
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. Lawrence J. Joseph,
Washington, D.C. for Amicus Eagle Forum Education and Legal
Defense Fund. David Boyle, Long Beach, California, as Amicus.
David Boyle, Long Beach, California, for Amicus Robert Oscar
Lopez. Abbe David Lowell, Christopher D. Man, CHADBOURNE &
PARKE LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Outserve-SLDN and The
American Military Partner Association. Geoffrey R. Stone, THE
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL, Chicago, Illinois; Lori Alvino
McGill, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici
Constitutional Law Scholars Ashutosh Bhagwat, Lee Bollinger,
Erwin Chemerinsky, Walter Dellinger, Michael C. Dorf, Lee
Epstein, Daniel Farber, Barry Friedman, Michael J. Gerhardt,
Deborah Hellman, John C. Jeffries, Jr., Lawrence Lessig, William
Marshall, Frank Michelman, Jane S. Schacter, Christopher H.
Schroeder, Suzanna Sherry, Geoffrey R. Stone, David Strauss,
Laurence H. Tribe, and William Van Alstyne. Steven W. Fitschen,
THE NATIONAL LEGAL FOUNDATION, Virginia Beach, Virginia; Holly
L. Carmichael, San Jose, California, for Amicus Concerned Women
for America. Carmine D. Boccuzzi, Jr., Mark A. Lightner, Andra
Troy, Andrew P. Meiser, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP,
New York, New York, for Amicus The American Sociological
Association. L. Steven Emmert, SYKES, BOURDON, AHERN & LEVY,
P.C., Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Amicus Virginia
Constitutional Law Professors. Nathalie F.P. Gilfoyle, AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, Washington, D.C.; Bruce V. Spiva, THE
SPIVA LAW FIRM PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Amici American
Psychological Association, American Academy of Pediatrics,
American Psychiatric Association, National Association of Social
Workers, and Virginia Psychological Association. Mark
Kleinschmidt, TIN FULTON WALKER & OWEN, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina; Ryan T. Butler, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Amici
Equality NC and South Carolina Equality Coalition. Rose A.
Saxe, James D. Esseks, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION, New York, New York; Garrard R. Beeney, David A.
Castleman, Catherine M. Bradley, W. Rudolph Kleysteuber,
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, New York, New York, for Amici Marcie
and Chantelle Fisher-Borne, Crystal Hendrix and Leigh Smith,
Shana Carignan and Megan Parker, Terri Beck and Leslie Zanaglio,

15
Lee Knight Caffery and Dana Draa, Shawn Long and Craig Johnson,
and Esmeralda Mejia and Christina Ginter-Mejia. Elizabeth B.
Wydra, Douglas T. Kendall, Judith E. Schaeffer, David H. Gans,
CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER, Washington, D.C.; Ilya
Shapiro, CATO INSTITUTE, Washington, D.C., for Amici Cato
Institute and Constitutional Accountability Center. Daniel
McNeel Lane, Jr., Matthew E. Pepping, San Antonio, Texas,
Jessica M. Weisel, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, Los
Angeles, California, for Amici Historians of Marriage Peter W.
Bardaglio, Norma Basch, Stephanie Coontz, Nancy F. Cott, Toby L.
Ditz, Ariela R. Dubler, Laura F. Edwards, Sarah Barringer
Gordon, Michael Grossberg, Hendrik Hartog, Ellen Herman, Martha
Hodes, Linda K. Kerber, Alice Kessler-Harris, Elaine Tyler May,
Serena Mayeri, Steve Mintz, Elizabeth Pleck, Carole Shammas,
Mary L. Shanley, Amy Dru Stanley, and Barbara Welke. Jiyun
Cameron Lee, Andrew J. Davis, FOLGER LEVIN LLP, San Francisco,
California, for Amicus Parents, Families and Friends of Lesbians
and Gays, Inc. Rita F. Lin, Laura W. Weissbein, Sara Bartel,
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici
Kerry Abrams, Albert Clark Tate, Jr. Professor of Law University
of Virginia School of Law, Vivian Hamilton, Professor of Law
William and Mary, Meredith Harbach, Professor of Law University
of Richmond, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, John and Elizabeth Boalt
Lecturer in Residence University of California, Berkeley School
of Law, Courtney G. Joslin, Professor of Law University of
California, Davis School of Law, and Forty-Four Other Family Law
Professors. Sherrilyn Ifill, Christina A. Swarns, Ria Tabacco
Mar, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., New York, New
York; Kim M. Keenan, NAACP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Amici NAACP
Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. and National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People. Aderson Bellegarde
Francois, HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CIVIL RIGHTS CLINIC,
Washington, D.C.; Brad W. Seiling, Benjamin G. Shatz, MANATT,
PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Amicus
Howard University School of Law Civil Rights Clinic. Alec W.
Farr, Washington, D.C., Tracy M. Talbot, Katherine Keating,
BRYAN CAVE LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici Family
Equality Council and COLAGE. Nicholas M. O'Donnell, SULLIVAN &
WORCESTER LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, for Amicus GLMA: Health
Professionals Advancing LGBT Equality. Kathleen M. O'Sullivan,
Mica D. Simpson, PERKINS COIE LLP, Seattle, Washington, for
Amici William N. Eskridge, Jr., Rebecca L. Brown, Daniel A.
Farber, Michael Gerhardt, Jack Knight, Andrew Koppelman, Melissa
Lamb Saunders, Neil S. Siegel, and Jana B. Singer. Catherine E.
Stetson, Erica Knievel Songer, Mary Helen Wimberly, Katie D.
Fairchild, Madeline H. Gitomer, HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Amicus Historians of Antigay

16
Discrimination. Rocky C. Tsai, Samuel P. Bickett, Rebecca
Harlow, ROPES & GRAY LLP, San Francisco, California; Steven M.
Freeman, Seth M. Marnin, Melissa Garlick, ANTI-DEFAMATION
LEAGUE, New York, New York, for Amici Anti-Defamation League,
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Bend the
Arc: A Jewish Partnership for Justice, Hadassah, The Women's
Zionist Organization of America, Hindu American Foundation, The
Interfaith Alliance Foundation, Japanese American Citizens
League, Jewish Social Policy Action Network, Keshet,
Metropolitan Community Churches, More Light Presbyterians, The
National Council of Jewish Women, Nehirim, People For the
American Way Foundation, Presbyterian Welcome, Reconcilingworks:
Lutherans for Full Participation, Religious Institute, Inc.,
Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Society for
Humanistic Judaism, T'Ruah: The Rabbinic Call for Human Rights,
and Women's League For Conservative Judaism. Matthew P.
McGuire, Beverlee E. Silva, Diane S. Wizig, ALSTON & BIRD LLP,
Durham, North Carolina; Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sexuality and
Gender Law Clinic, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, New York, New York, for
Amicus Columbia Law School Sexuality and Gender Law Clinic.
Jeffrey S. Trachtman, Norman C. Simon, Jason M. Moff, Kurt M.
Denk, Jessica N. Witte, KRAMER LEVIN NAFTALIS & FRANKEL LLP, New
York, New York, for Amici Bishops of the Episcopal Church in
Virginia, The Central Atlantic Conference of the United Church
of Christ, Central Conference of American Rabbis, Mormons for
Equality, Reconstructionist Rabbinical Association,
Reconstructionist Rabbinical College and Jewish
Reconstructionist Communities, Union for Reform Judaism, The
Unitarian Universalist Association, Affirmation, Covenant
Network of Presbyterians, Methodist Federation for Social
Action, More Light Presbyterians, Presbyterian Welcome,
Reconciling Ministries Network, Reconsilingworks: Lutherans For
Full Participation, Religious Institute, Inc., and Women of
Reform Judaism. Susan Baker Manning, Michael L. Whitlock,
Margaret E. Sheer, Jared A. Craft, Sara M. Carian, Jessica C.
Brooks, Katherine R. Moskop, John A. Polito, Stephanie Schuster,
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus 28 Employers
and Organizations Representing Employers. Martha Coakley,
Attorney General, Jonathan B. Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, Genevieve C. Nadeau, Assistant Attorney General,
Michelle L. Leung, Assistant Attorney General, Frederick D.
Augenstern, Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Boston,
Massachusetts; Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, Sacramento, California; George
Jepsen, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
CONNECTICUT, Hartford, Connecticut; Irvin B. Nathan, Attorney

17
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA, Washington, D.C.; Lisa Madigan, Attorney General,
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ILLINOIS, Chicago, Illinois;
Tom Miller, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
IOWA, Des Moines, Iowa; Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MAINE, Augusta, Maine; Douglas F.
Gansler, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland; Joseph A. Foster, Attorney
General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
Concord, New Hampshire; Gary K. King, Attorney General, OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW MEXICO, Santa Fe, New Mexico;
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF NEW YORK, New York, New York; Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OREGON,
Salem, Oregon; William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VERMONT, Montpelier, Vermont; Robert W.
Ferguson, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
WASHINGTON, Olympia, Washington, for Amici Massachusetts,
California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oregon,
Vermont, and Washington. Brad W. Seiling, Benjamin G. Shatz,
MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for
Amicus Gary J. Gates. Bruce A. Wessel, Moez M. Kaba, C.
Mitchell Hendy, Brian Eggleston, IRELL & MANELLA LLP, Los
Angeles, California, for Amicus National and Western States
Women's Rights Organizations. Donald K. Butler, BATZLI STILES
BUTLER, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; Susan M. Butler, SHOUNBACH,
P.C., Fairfax, Virginia; Daniel L. Gray, Stephanie J. Smith,
Kristen L. Kugel, Anne B. Robinson, COOPER GINSBERG GRAY, PLLC,
Fairfax, Virginia, for Amicus Virginia Chapter of The American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers. Marcia D. Greenberger, Emily J.
Martin, Cortelyou C. Kenney, NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER,
Washington, D.C., for Amici The National Women's Law Center,
Equal Rights Advocates, Legal Momentum, National Association of
Women Lawyers, National Partnership for Women & Families,
Southwest Women's Law Center, Women's Law Project, and
Professors of Law Associated with The Williams Institute.
Jerome C. Roth, Nicole S. Phillis, MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP,
San Francisco, California, for Amicus Bay Area Lawyers for
Individual Freedom. Shannon P. Minter, Christopher F. Stoll,
Jaime Huling Delaye, NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS,
Washington, D.C., for Amici Leadership Conference on Civil and
Human Rights, Public Interest Organizations, and Bar
Associations. Joanna L. Grossman, HOFSTRA LAW SCHOOL,
Hempstead, New York; Marjory A. Gentry, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, San
Francisco, California, for Amicus Family Law and Conflict of
Laws Professors. Mark C. Fleming, Felicia H. Ellsworth, Boston,

18
Massachusetts, Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Dina B. Mishra, Leah M.
Litman, Washington, D.C., Alan Schoenfeld, WILMER CUTLER
PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, New York, New York, for Amicus Gay
& Lesbian Advocates & Defenders. John Humphrey, THE HUMPHREY
LAW FIRM, Alexandria, Virginia, for Amici People of Faith For
Equality in Virginia (POFEV), Celebration Center for Spiritual
Living, Clarendon Presbyterian Church, Commonwealth Baptist
Church, Congregation or AMI, Hope United Church of Christ,
Little River UCC, Metropolitan Community Church of Northern
Virginia, Mt. Vernon Unitarian Church, St. James UCC, St. John's
UCC, New Life Metropolitan Community Church, Unitarian
Universalist Fellowship of the Peninsula, Unitarian Universalist
Congregation of Sterling, United Church of Christ of
Fredericksburg, Unitarian Universalist Church of Loudoun, Rev.
Marie Hulm Adam, Rev. Marty Anderson, Rev. Robin Anderson, Rev.
Verne Arens, Rabbi Lia Bass, Rev. Joseph G. Beattie, Rev. Marc
Boswell, Rev. Sue Browning, Rev. Jim Bundy, Rev. Mark Byrd, Rev.
Steven C. Clunn, Rev. Dr. John Coperhaver, Rabbi Gary Creditor,
Rev. David Ensign, Rev. Henry Fairman, Rabbi Jesse Gallop, Rev.
Tom Gerstenlauer, Rev. Dr. Robin H. Gorsline, Rev. Trish Hall,
Rev. Warren Hammonds, Rev. Jon Heaslet, Rev. Douglas Hodges,
Rev. Phyllis Hubbell, Rev. Stephen G. Hyde, Rev. Janet James,
Rev. John Manwell, Rev. James W. McNeal, Andrew Mertz, Rev.
Andrew Clive Millard, Rev. Dr. Melanie Miller, Rev. Amber
Neuroth, Rev. James Papile, Rev. Linda Olson Peebles, Rev. Don
Prange, Rabbi Michael Ragozin, Rabbi Ben Romer, Rev. Jennifer
Ryu, Rev. Anya Sammler-Michael, Rabbi Amy Schwartzman, Rev.
Danny Spears, Rev. Mark Suriano, Rev. Rob Vaughn, Rev. Daniel
Velez-Rivera, Rev. Kate R. Walker, Rev. Terrye Williams, and
Rev. Dr. Karen-Marie Yust.

19
FLOYD, Circuit Judge:

Via various state statutes and a state constitutional

amendment, Virginia prevents same-sex couples from marrying and

refuses to recognize same-sex marriages performed elsewhere.

Two same-sex couples filed suit to challenge the

constitutionality of these laws, alleging that they violate the

Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The district court granted the couples’ motion for

summary judgment and enjoined Virginia from enforcing the laws.

This appeal followed. Because we conclude that Virginia’s same-

sex marriage bans impermissibly infringe on its citizens’

fundamental right to marry, we affirm.

I.

A.

This case concerns a series of statutory and constitutional

mechanisms that Virginia employed to prohibit legal recognition

for same-sex relationships in that state. 1 Virginia enacted the

1
Three other states in this Circuit have similar bans:
North Carolina, N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 6; N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 51-1, 51-1.2; South Carolina, S.C. Const. art. XVII, § 15;
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 20-1-10, 20-1-15; and West Virginia, W. Va.
Code § 48-2-603. The Southern District of West Virginia has
stayed a challenge to West Virginia’s statute pending our
resolution of this appeal. McGee v. Cole, No. 3:13-cv-24068
(S.D. W. Va. June 10, 2014) (order directing stay).

20
first of these laws in 1975: Virginia Code section 20-45.2,

which provides that “marriage between persons of the same sex is

prohibited.” After the Supreme Court of Hawaii took steps to

legalize same-sex marriage in the mid-1990s, Virginia amended

section 20-45.2 to specify that “[a]ny marriage entered into by

persons of the same sex in another state or jurisdiction shall

be void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights

created by such marriage shall be void and unenforceable.” In

2004, Virginia added civil unions and similar arrangements to

the list of prohibited same-sex relationships via the

Affirmation of Marriage Act. See Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.3.

Virginia’s efforts to ban same-sex marriage and other

legally recognized same-sex relationships culminated in the

Marshall/Newman Amendment to the Virginia Constitution:

That only a union between one man and one woman may be
a marriage valid in or recognized by this Commonwealth
and its political subdivisions.

This Commonwealth and its political subdivisions shall
not create or recognize a legal status for
relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to
approximate the design, qualities, significance, or
effects of marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or
its political subdivisions create or recognize another
union, partnership, or other legal status to which is
assigned the rights, benefits, obligations, qualities,
or effects of marriage.

Va. Const. art. I, § 15-A. The Virginia Constitution imposes

two hurdles that a potential amendment must jump before becoming

law: the General Assembly must approve the amendment in two

21
separate legislative sessions, and the people must ratify it.

Va. Const. art. XII, § 1. The General Assembly approved the

Marshall/Newman Amendment in 2005 and 2006. In November 2006,

Virginia’s voters ratified it by a vote of fifty-seven percent

to forty-three percent. In the aggregate, Virginia Code

sections 20-45.2 and 20-45.3 and the Marshall/Newman Amendment

prohibit same-sex marriage, ban other legally recognized same-

sex relationships, and render same-sex marriages performed

elsewhere legally meaningless under Virginia state law.

B.

Same-sex couples Timothy B. Bostic and Tony C. London and

Carol Schall and Mary Townley (collectively, the Plaintiffs)

brought this lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of

Virginia Code sections 20-45.2 and 20-45.3, the Marshall/Newman

Amendment, and “any other Virginia law that bars same-sex

marriage or prohibits the State’s recognition of otherwise-

lawful same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions”

(collectively, the Virginia Marriage Laws). The Plaintiffs

claim that the “inability to marry or have their relationship

recognized by the Commonwealth of Virginia with the dignity and

respect accorded to married opposite-sex couples has caused them

significant hardship . . . and severe humiliation, emotional

distress, pain, suffering, psychological harm, and stigma.”

22
 Bostic and London have been in a long-term, committed

relationship with each other since 1989 and have lived together

for more than twenty years. They “desire to marry each other

under the laws of the Commonwealth in order to publicly announce

their commitment to one another and to enjoy the rights,

privileges, and protections that the State confers on married

couples.” On July 1, 2013, Bostic and London applied for a

marriage license from the Clerk for the Circuit Court for the

City of Norfolk. The Clerk denied their application because

they are both men.

Schall and Townley are women who have been a couple since

1985 and have lived together as a family for nearly thirty

years. They were lawfully married in California in 2008. In

1998, Townley gave birth to the couple’s daughter, E. S.-T.

Schall and Townley identify a host of consequences of their

inability to marry in Virginia and Virginia’s refusal to

recognize their California marriage, including the following:

• Schall could not visit Townley in the hospital for several

hours when Townley was admitted due to pregnancy-related

complications.

• Schall cannot legally adopt E. S.-T., which forced her to

retain an attorney to petition for full joint legal and

physical custody.

23
 • Virginia will not list both Schall and Townley as E. S.-

T.’s parents on her birth certificate.

• Until February 2013, Schall and Townley could not cover one

another on their employer-provided health insurance.

Townley has been able to cover Schall on her insurance

since then, but, unlike an opposite-sex spouse, Schall must

pay state income taxes on the benefits she receives.

• Schall and Townley must pay state taxes on benefits paid

pursuant to employee benefits plans in the event of one of

their deaths.

• Schall and Townley cannot file joint state income tax

returns, which has cost them thousands of dollars.

On July 18, 2013, Bostic and London sued former Governor

Robert F. McDonnell, former Attorney General Kenneth T.

Cuccinelli, and George E. Schaefer, III, in his official

capacity as the Clerk for the Circuit Court for the City of

Norfolk. The Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on

September 3, 2013. The First Amended Complaint added Schall and

Townley as plaintiffs, removed McDonnell and Cuccinelli as

defendants, and added Janet M. Rainey as a defendant in her

official capacity as the State Registrar of Vital Records. The

Plaintiffs allege that the Virginia Marriage Laws are facially

invalid under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of

24
the Fourteenth Amendment and that Schaefer and Rainey violated

42 U.S.C. § 1983 by enforcing those laws.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The

Plaintiffs also requested a permanent injunction in connection

with their motion for summary judgment and moved, in the

alternative, for a preliminary injunction in the event that the

district court denied their motion for summary judgment. The

district court granted a motion by Michèle McQuigg—the Prince

William County Clerk of Court—to intervene as a defendant on

January 21, 2014. Two days later, new Attorney General Mark

Herring—as Rainey’s counsel—submitted a formal change in

position and refused to defend the Virginia Marriage Laws,

although Virginia continues to enforce them. McQuigg adopted

Rainey’s prior motion for summary judgment and the briefs in

support of that motion.

The district court held that the Virginia Marriage Laws

were unconstitutional on February 14, 2014. Bostic v. Rainey,

970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 483 (E.D. Va. 2014). It therefore denied

Schaefer’s and McQuigg’s motions for summary judgment and

granted the Plaintiffs’ motion. The district court also

enjoined Virginia’s employees—including Rainey and her

employees—and Schaefer, McQuigg, and their officers, agents, and

employees from enforcing the Virginia Marriage Laws. Id. at

25
484. The court stayed the injunction pending our resolution of

this appeal. Id.

Rainey, Schaefer, and McQuigg timely appealed the district

court’s decision. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. On March 10, 2014, we allowed the plaintiffs from

Harris v. Rainey—a similar case pending before Judge Michael

Urbanski in the Western District of Virginia—to intervene.

Judge Urbanski had previously certified that case as a class

action on behalf of “all same-sex couples in Virginia who have

not married in another jurisdiction” and “all same-sex couples

in Virginia who have married in another jurisdiction,” excluding

the Plaintiffs. Harris v. Rainey, No. 5:13-cv-077, 2014 WL

352188, at *1, 12 (W.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2014).

Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we consider

whether the Plaintiffs possess standing to bring their claims.

Second, we evaluate whether the Supreme Court’s summary

dismissal of a similar lawsuit in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810

(1972) (mem.), remains binding. Third, we determine which level

of constitutional scrutiny applies here and test the Virginia

Marriage Laws using the appropriate standard. For purposes of

this opinion, we adopt the terminology the district court used

to describe the parties in this case. The Plaintiffs, Rainey,

and the Harris class are the “Opponents” of the Virginia

Marriage Laws. Schaefer and McQuigg are the “Proponents.”

26
 II.

Before we turn to the merits of the parties’ arguments in

this case, we consider Schaefer’s contention that “[t]he trial

court erred as a matter of law when it found all Plaintiffs had

standing and asserted claims against all Defendants.” We review

the district court’s disposition of cross-motions for summary

judgment—including its determinations regarding standing—de

novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party. Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308,

313 (4th Cir. 2013); Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of N.

Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 427-28 (4th Cir. 2007). Summary

judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Libertarian Party of Va., 718 F.3d at 313-14

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

To establish standing under Article III of the

Constitution, a plaintiff must “allege (1) an injury that is

(2) fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful

conduct and that is (3) likely to be redressed by the requested

relief.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 590

(1992) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984))

(internal quotation marks omitted). The standing requirement

applies to each claim that a plaintiff seeks to press.

DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006).

27
Schaefer premises his argument that the Plaintiffs lack standing

to bring their claims on the idea that every plaintiff must have

standing as to every defendant. However, the Supreme Court has

made it clear that “the presence of one party with standing is

sufficient to satisfy Article III’s case-or-controversy

requirement.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional

Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (2006); see also Dep’t of

Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 330

(1999) (holding that a case is justiciable if some, but not

necessarily all, of the plaintiffs have standing as to a

particular defendant); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.

Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263-64 (1977) (same). The

Plaintiffs’ claims can therefore survive Schaefer’s standing

challenge as long as one couple satisfies the standing

requirements with respect to each defendant.

Schaefer serves as the Clerk for the Circuit Court for the

City of Norfolk. In Virginia, circuit court clerks are

responsible for issuing marriage licenses and filing records of

marriage. Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-14, 32.1-267. Although Schall

and Townley did not seek a marriage license from Schaefer, the

district court found that Bostic and London did so and that

Schaefer denied their request because they are a same-sex

28
couple. 2 Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 462, 467. This license

denial constitutes an injury for standing purposes. See S.

Blasting Servs., Inc. v. Wilkes Cnty., 288 F.3d 584, 595 (4th

Cir. 2002) (explaining that the plaintiffs had not suffered an

injury because they had not applied for, or been denied, the

permit in question); Scott v. Greenville Cnty., 716 F.2d 1409,

1414-15 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that denial of building

permit constituted an injury). Bostic and London can trace this

denial to Schaefer’s enforcement of the allegedly

unconstitutional Virginia Marriage Laws, 3 and declaring those

2
Schaefer contends that Schall and Townley cannot bring a
§ 1983 claim against him for the same reason: he did not commit
any act or omission that harmed them. To bring a successful
§ 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that “the alleged
infringement of federal rights [is] ‘fairly attributable to the
state[.]’” Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982)
(quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
Schaefer’s action in denying Bostic and London’s application for
a marriage license is clearly attributable to the state. The
district court could therefore entertain a § 1983 claim against
Schaefer without ascertaining whether he committed any action
with respect to Schall and Townley.
3
For this reason, and contrary to Schaefer’s assertions,
Schaefer is also a proper defendant under Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908). Pursuant to Ex parte Young, the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar a citizen from suing a state officer to
enjoin the enforcement of an unconstitutional law when the
officer has “some connection with the enforcement of the act.”
Lytle v. Griffith, 240 F.3d 404, 412 (4th Cir. 2001) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157). Schaefer
bears the requisite connection to the enforcement of the
Virginia Marriage Laws due to his role in granting and denying
applications for marriage licenses.

29
laws unconstitutional and enjoining their enforcement would

redress Bostic and London’s injuries. Bostic and London

therefore possess Article III standing with respect to Schaefer.

We consequently need not consider whether Schall and Townley

have standing to sue Schaefer. See Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S.

433, 446-47 (2009) (declining to analyze whether additional

plaintiffs had standing when one plaintiff did).

Rainey—as the Registrar of Vital Records—is tasked with

developing Virginia’s marriage license application form and

distributing it to the circuit court clerks throughout Virginia.

Va. Code Ann. §§ 32.1-252(A)(9), 32.1-267(E). Neither

Schaefer’s nor Rainey’s response to the First Amended Complaint

disputes its description of Rainey’s duties:

Defendant Rainey is responsible for ensuring
compliance with the Commonwealth’s laws relating to
marriage in general and, more specifically, is
responsible for enforcement of the specific provisions
at issue in this Amended Complaint, namely those laws
that limit marriage to opposite-sex couples and that
refuse to honor the benefits of same-sex marriages
lawfully entered into in other states.

In addition to performing these marriage-related functions,

Rainey develops and distributes birth certificate forms,

oversees the rules relating to birth certificates, and furnishes

forms relating to adoption so that Virginia can collect the

information necessary to prepare the adopted child’s birth

30
certificate. Id. §§ 32.1-252(A)(2)-(3), (9), 32.1-257, 32.1-

261(A)(1), 32.1-262, 32.1-269.

Rainey’s promulgation of a marriage license application

form that does not allow same-sex couples to obtain marriage

licenses resulted in Schaefer’s denial of Bostic and London’s

marriage license request. For the reasons we describe above,

this license denial constitutes an injury. Bostic and London

can trace this injury to Rainey due to her role in developing

the marriage license application form in compliance with the

Virginia Marriage Laws, and the relief they seek would redress

their injuries. Bostic and London consequently have standing to

sue Rainey.

Schall and Townley also possess standing to bring their

claims against Rainey. They satisfy the injury requirement in

two ways. First, in equal protection cases—such as this case—

“[w]hen the government erects a barrier that makes it more

difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it

is for members of another group, . . . . [t]he ‘injury in fact’

. . . is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the

imposition of the barrier[.]” Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated

Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656,

666 (1993). The Virginia Marriage Laws erect such a barrier,

which prevents same-sex couples from obtaining the emotional,

social, and financial benefits that opposite-sex couples realize

31
upon marriage. Second, Schall and Townley allege that they have

suffered stigmatic injuries due to their inability to get

married in Virginia and Virginia’s refusal to recognize their

California marriage. Stigmatic injury stemming from

discriminatory treatment is sufficient to satisfy standing’s

injury requirement if the plaintiff identifies “some concrete

interest with respect to which [he or she] [is] personally

subject to discriminatory treatment” and “[t]hat interest . . .

independently satisf[ies] the causation requirement of standing

doctrine.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 757 n.22, abrogated on other

grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, 134

S. Ct. 1377 (2014). Schall and Townley point to several

concrete ways in which the Virginia Marriage Laws have resulted

in discriminatory treatment. For example, they allege that

their marital status has hindered Schall from visiting Townley

in the hospital, prevented Schall from adopting E. S.-T., 4 and

subjected Schall and Townley to tax burdens from which married

opposite-sex couples are exempt. Because Schall and Townley

highlight specific, concrete instances of discrimination rather

4
Virginia does not explicitly prohibit same-sex couples
from adopting children. The Virginia Marriage Laws impose a
functional ban on adoption by same-sex couples because the
Virginia Code allows only married couples or unmarried
individuals to adopt children. Va. Code Ann. § 63.2-1232(A)(6).

32
than making abstract allegations, their stigmatic injuries are

legally cognizable.

Schall and Townley’s injuries are traceable to Rainey’s

enforcement of the Virginia Marriage Laws. Because declaring

the Virginia Marriage Laws unconstitutional and enjoining their

enforcement would redress Schall and Townley’s injuries, they

satisfy standing doctrine’s three requirements with respect to

Rainey. In sum, each of the Plaintiffs has standing as to at

least one defendant.

III.

Having resolved the threshold issue of whether the

Plaintiffs have standing to sue Schaefer and Rainey, we now turn

to the merits of the Opponents’ Fourteenth Amendment arguments.

We begin with the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s summary

dismissal in Baker v. Nelson settles this case. Baker came to

the Supreme Court as an appeal from a Minnesota Supreme Court

decision, which held that a state statute that the court

interpreted to bar same-sex marriages did not violate the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses.

Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971). At the time,

28 U.S.C. § 1257 required the Supreme Court to accept appeals of

state supreme court cases involving constitutional challenges to

state statutes, such as Baker. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S.

33
332, 344 (1975). The Court dismissed the appeal in a one-

sentence opinion “for want of a substantial federal question.”

Baker, 409 U.S. 810.

Summary dismissals qualify as “votes on the merits of a

case.” Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344 (quoting Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.

Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). They therefore “prevent lower courts from coming to

opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and

necessarily decided.” Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176

(1977) (per curiam). However, the fact that Baker and the case

at hand address the same precise issues does not end our

inquiry. Summary dismissals lose their binding force when

“doctrinal developments” illustrate that the Supreme Court no

longer views a question as unsubstantial, regardless of whether

the Court explicitly overrules the case. Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344

(quoting Port Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of N.Y.

Auth., 387 F.2d 259, 263 n.3 (2d Cir. 1967)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The district court determined that doctrinal

developments stripped Baker of its status as binding precedent.

Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 469-70. Every federal court to

consider this issue since the Supreme Court decided United

States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), has reached the same

conclusion. See Bishop v. Smith, Nos. 14-5003, 14-5006, 2014 WL

3537847, at *6-7 (10th Cir. July 18, 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert,

34
No. 13-4178, 2014 WL 2868044, at *7-10 (10th Cir. June 25,

2014); Love v. Beshear, No. 3:13-cv-750-H, 2014 WL 2957671, *2-3

(W.D. Ky. July 1, 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, Nos. 1:14-cv-00355-

RLY-TAB, 1:14-cv-00404-RLY-TAB, 2014 WL 2884868, at *4-6 (S.D.

Ind. June 25, 2014); Wolf v. Walker, No. 14-cv-64-bbc, 2014 WL

2558444, at *4-6 (W.D. Wis. June 6, 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf,

No. 1:13-cv-1861, 2014 WL 2058105, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. May 20,

2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, Nos. 6:13-cv-01834-MC, 6:13-cv-

02256-MC, 2014 WL 2054264, at *1 n.1 (D. Or. May 19, 2014);

Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13-cv-00482-CWD, 2014 WL 1909999, at *8-9

(D. Idaho May 13, 2014); DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757,

773 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 2014); De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d

632, 647-49 (W.D. Tex. 2014); McGee v. Cole, No. 3:13-24068,

2014 WL 321122, at *8-10 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 29, 2014).

Windsor concerned whether section 3 of the federal Defense

of Marriage Act (DOMA) contravened the Constitution’s due

process and equal protection guarantees. Section 3 defined

“marriage” and “spouse” as excluding same-sex couples when those

terms appeared in federal statutes, regulations, and directives,

rendering legally married same-sex couples ineligible for myriad

federal benefits. 133 S. Ct. at 2683, 2694. When it decided

the case below, the Second Circuit concluded that Baker was no

longer precedential, Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169,

178-79 (2d Cir. 2012), over the dissent’s vigorous arguments to

35
the contrary, see id. at 192-95 (Straub, J., dissenting in part

and concurring in part). Despite this dispute, the Supreme

Court did not discuss Baker in its opinion or during oral

argument. 5

The Supreme Court’s willingness to decide Windsor without

mentioning Baker speaks volumes regarding whether Baker remains

good law. The Court’s development of its due process and equal

protection jurisprudence in the four decades following Baker is

even more instructive. On the Due Process front, Lawrence v.

Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Windsor are particularly

relevant. In Lawrence, the Court recognized that the Due

Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “afford

constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to

marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,

child rearing, and education. . . . Persons in a homosexual

relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as

5
The constitutionality of a law that prohibited marriage
from encompassing same-sex relationships was also at issue in
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), a case that the
Supreme Court ultimately decided on standing grounds. Although
the petitioners’ attorney attempted to invoke Baker during oral
argument, Justice Ginsburg interjected: “Baker v. Nelson was
1971. The Supreme Court hadn’t even decided that gender-based
classifications get any kind of heightened scrutiny. . . .
[S]ame-sex intimate conduct was considered criminal in many
states in 1971, so I don’t think we can extract much in Baker v.
Nelson.” Oral Argument at 11:33, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 2652 (No. 12-144), available at 2013 WL 1212745.

36
heterosexual persons do.” Id. at 574. These considerations led

the Court to strike down a Texas statute that criminalized same-

sex sodomy. Id. at 563, 578-79. The Windsor Court based its

decision to invalidate section 3 of DOMA on the Fifth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Court concluded that

section 3 could not withstand constitutional scrutiny because

“the principal purpose and the necessary effect of [section 3]

are to demean those persons who are in a lawful same-sex

marriage,” who—like the unmarried same-sex couple in Lawrence—

have a constitutional right to make “moral and sexual choices.”

133 S. Ct. at 2694-95. These cases firmly position same-sex

relationships within the ambit of the Due Process Clauses’

protection.

The Court has also issued several major equal protection

decisions since it decided Baker. The Court’s opinions in Craig

v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411

U.S. 677 (1973), identified sex-based classifications as quasi-

suspect, causing them to warrant intermediate scrutiny rather

than rational basis review, see Craig, 429 U.S. at 218

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (coining the term “intermediate

level scrutiny” to describe the Court’s test (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Two decades later, in Romer v. Evans, the

Supreme Court struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment

that prohibited legislative, executive, and judicial action

37
aimed at protecting gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals from

discrimination. 517 U.S. 620, 624, 635 (1996). The Court

concluded that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal

Protection Clause because “its sheer breadth is so discontinuous

with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems

inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it

affects,” causing the law to “lack[] a rational relationship to

legitimate state interests.” Id. at 632. Finally, the Supreme

Court couched its decision in Windsor in both due process and

equal protection terms. 133 S. Ct. at 2693, 2695. These cases

demonstrate that, since Baker, the Court has meaningfully

altered the way it views both sex and sexual orientation through

the equal protection lens.

In light of the Supreme Court’s apparent abandonment of

Baker and the significant doctrinal developments that occurred

after the Court issued its summary dismissal in that case, we

decline to view Baker as binding precedent and proceed to the

meat of the Opponents’ Fourteenth Amendment arguments.

IV.

A.

Our analysis of the Opponents’ Fourteenth Amendment claims

has two components. First, we ascertain what level of

constitutional scrutiny applies: either rational basis review

38
or some form of heightened scrutiny, such as strict scrutiny.

Second, we apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to determine

whether the Virginia Marriage Laws pass constitutional muster.

Under both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,

interference with a fundamental right warrants the application

of strict scrutiny. 6 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,

719-20 (1997); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978).

We therefore begin by assessing whether the Virginia Marriage

Laws infringe on a fundamental right. Fundamental rights spring

from the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of individual

liberty, which the Supreme Court has described as “the right to

define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the

universe, and of the mystery of human life.” Planned Parenthood

of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). This liberty

includes the fundamental right to marry. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at

383; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); see Griswold v.

6
The Equal Protection Clause also dictates that some form
of heightened scrutiny applies when a law discriminates based on
a suspect or quasi-suspect classification, such as race or
gender. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 440-41 (1985); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
313-14 (1976) (per curiam). This Court previously declined to
recognize sexual orientation as a suspect classification in
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
and Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 731-32 (4th Cir. 2002).
Because we conclude that the Virginia Marriage Laws warrant
strict scrutiny due to their infringement of the fundamental
right to marry, we need not reach the question of whether
Thomasson and Veney remain good law.

39
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (placing the right to

marry within the fundamental right to privacy); see also Skinner

v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)

(characterizing marriage as “one of the basic civil rights of

man”); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (calling

marriage “the most important relation in life” and “the

foundation of the family and of society, without which there

would be neither civilization nor progress”).

The Opponents and Proponents agree that marriage is a

fundamental right. They strongly disagree, however, regarding

whether that right encompasses the right to same-sex marriage.

The Opponents argue that the fundamental right to marry belongs

to the individual, who enjoys the right to marry the person of

his or her choice. By contrast, the Proponents point out that,

traditionally, states have sanctioned only man-woman marriages.

They contend that, in light of this history, the right to marry

does not include a right to same-sex marriage.

Relying on Washington v. Glucksberg, the Proponents aver

that the district court erred by not requiring “a careful

description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest,” 521

U.S. at 721 (internal quotation marks omitted), which they

characterize as the right to “marriage to another person of the

same sex,” not the right to marry. In Glucksberg, the Supreme

Court described the right at issue as “a right to commit suicide

40
with another’s assistance.” Id. at 724. The Court declined to

categorize this right as a new fundamental right because it was

not, “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and

tradition.” See id. at 720-21 (quoting Moore v. City of E.

Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The Proponents urge us to reject the right to same-

sex marriage for the same reason.

We do not dispute that states have refused to permit same-

sex marriages for most of our country’s history. However, this

fact is irrelevant in this case because Glucksberg’s analysis

applies only when courts consider whether to recognize new

fundamental rights. See id. at 720, 727 & n.19 (identifying the

above process as a way of “expand[ing] the concept of

substantive due process” beyond established fundamental rights,

such as the right to marry (quoting Collins v. City of Harker

Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Because we conclude that the fundamental right to

marry encompasses the right to same-sex marriage, Glucksberg’s

analysis is inapplicable here.

Over the decades, the Supreme Court has demonstrated that

the right to marry is an expansive liberty interest that may

stretch to accommodate changing societal norms. Perhaps most

notably, in Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court invalidated a

Virginia law that prohibited white individuals from marrying

41
individuals of other races. 388 U.S. at 4. The Court explained

that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of

the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of

happiness by free men” and that no valid basis justified the

Virginia law’s infringement of that right. Id. at 12.

Subsequently, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the Supreme Court

considered the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that

required people obligated to pay child support to obtain a court

order granting permission to marry before they could receive a

marriage license. 434 U.S. at 375, 383-84. The statute

specified that a court should grant permission only to

applicants who proved that they had complied with their child

support obligations and demonstrated that their children were

not likely to become “public charges.” Id. at 375 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The Court held that the statute

impermissibly infringed on the right to marry. See id. at 390-

91. Finally, in Turner v. Safley, the Court determined that a

Missouri regulation that generally prohibited prison inmates

from marrying was an unconstitutional breach of the right to

marry. 482 U.S. 78, 82, 94-99 (1987).

These cases do not define the rights in question as “the

right to interracial marriage,” “the right of people owing child

support to marry,” and “the right of prison inmates to marry.”

Instead, they speak of a broad right to marry that is not

42
circumscribed based on the characteristics of the individuals

seeking to exercise that right. The Supreme Court’s

unwillingness to constrain the right to marry to certain

subspecies of marriage meshes with its conclusion that the right

to marry is a matter of “freedom of choice,” Zablocki, 434 U.S.

at 387, that “resides with the individual,” Loving, 388 U.S. at

12. If courts limited the right to marry to certain couplings,

they would effectively create a list of legally preferred

spouses, rendering the choice of whom to marry a hollow choice

indeed.

The Proponents point out that Loving, Zablocki, and Turner

each involved opposite-sex couples. They contend that, because

the couples in those cases chose to enter opposite-sex

marriages, we cannot use them to conclude that the Supreme Court

would grant the same level of constitutional protection to the

choice to marry a person of the same sex. However, the Supreme

Court’s decisions in Lawrence and Windsor suggest otherwise. In

Lawrence, the Court expressly refused to narrowly define the

right at issue as the right of “homosexuals to engage in

sodomy,” concluding that doing so would constitute a “failure to

appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake.” 539 U.S. at

566-67. Just as it has done in the right-to-marry arena, the

Court identified the right at issue in Lawrence as a matter of

choice, explaining that gay and lesbian individuals—like all

43
people—enjoy the right to make decisions regarding their

personal relationships. Id. at 567. As we note above, the

Court reiterated this theme in Windsor, in which it based its

conclusion that section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional, in part,

on that provision’s disrespect for the “moral and sexual

choices” that accompany a same-sex couple’s decision to marry.

133 S. Ct. at 2694. Lawrence and Windsor indicate that the

choices that individuals make in the context of same-sex

relationships enjoy the same constitutional protection as the

choices accompanying opposite-sex relationships. We therefore

have no reason to suspect that the Supreme Court would accord

the choice to marry someone of the same sex any less respect

than the choice to marry an opposite-sex individual who is of a

different race, owes child support, or is imprisoned.

Accordingly, we decline the Proponents’ invitation to

characterize the right at issue in this case as the right to

same-sex marriage rather than simply the right to marry.

Of course, “[b]y reaffirming the fundamental character of

the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state

regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or

prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous

scrutiny.” Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386. Strict scrutiny applies

only when laws “significantly interfere” with a fundamental

right. See id. at 386-87. The Virginia Marriage Laws

44
unquestionably satisfy this requirement: they impede the right

to marry by preventing same-sex couples from marrying and

nullifying the legal import of their out-of-state marriages.

Strict scrutiny therefore applies in this case.

B.

Under strict scrutiny, a law “may be justified only by

compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to

express only those interests.” Carey v. Population Servs.

Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977). The Proponents bear the burden

of demonstrating that the Virginia Marriage Laws satisfy this

standard, see Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct.

2411, 2420 (2013), and they must rely on the laws’ “actual

purpose[s]” rather than hypothetical justifications, see Shaw v.

Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 n.4 (1996). The Proponents 7 contend that

five compelling interests undergird the Virginia Marriage Laws:

(1) Virginia’s federalism-based interest in maintaining control

over the definition of marriage within its borders, (2) the

history and tradition of opposite-sex marriage, (3) protecting

the institution of marriage, (4) encouraging responsible

7
Although some of these arguments appear only in McQuigg’s
briefs, we attribute them to the Proponents because Schaefer
“reserved the right to adopt and incorporate in whole or in
part” McQuigg’s discussion of the rationales underlying the
Virginia Marriage Laws.

45
procreation, and (5) promoting the optimal childrearing

environment. We discuss each of these interests in turn.

1. Federalism

The Constitution does not grant the federal government any

authority over domestic relations matters, such as marriage.

Accordingly, throughout our country’s history, states have

enjoyed the freedom to define and regulate marriage as they see

fit. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691-92. States’ control over

marriage laws within their borders has resulted in some

variation among states’ requirements. For example, West

Virginia prohibits first cousins from marrying, W. Va. Code

§ 48-2-302, but the remaining states in this Circuit allow first

cousin marriage, see Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 2-202; N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 51-3; S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-10; Va. Code Ann. § 20-38.1.

States’ power to define and regulate marriage also accounts for

their differing treatment of same-sex couples.

The Windsor decision rested in part on the Supreme Court’s

respect for states’ supremacy in the domestic relations sphere. 8

8
In Windsor, the Court did not label the type of
constitutional scrutiny it applied, leaving us unsure how the
Court would fit its federalism discussion within a traditional
heightened scrutiny or rational basis analysis. The lower
courts have taken differing approaches, with some discussing
Windsor and federalism as a threshold matter, see, e.g., Wolf,
2014 WL 2558444, at *8-12; Bishop v. United States ex rel.

46
The Court recognized that section 3 of DOMA upset the status quo

by robbing states of their ability to define marriage. Although

states could legalize same-sex marriage, they could not ensure

that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage would

be uniform within their borders. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at

2692. However, the Court did not lament that section 3 had

usurped states’ authority over marriage due to its desire to

safeguard federalism. Id. (“[T]he State’s power in defining the

marital relation is of central relevance in this case quite

apart from the principles of federalism.”). Its concern sprung

from section 3’s creation of two classes of married couples

within states that had legalized same-sex marriage: opposite-

sex couples, whose marriages the federal government recognized,

and same-sex couples, whose marriages the federal government

ignored. Id. The resulting injury to same-sex couples served

as the foundation for the Court’s conclusion that section 3

violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 2693.

Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1277-79 (N.D. Okla. 2014); Kitchen
v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1193-94 (D. Utah 2013), and
others—such as the district court in this case—considering
federalism as a state interest underlying the same-sex marriage
bans at issue, see, e.g., Latta, 2014 WL 1909999, at *25-26;
DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 773-75; Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at
475-77. Although we follow the district court’s lead and
situate our federalism discussion within our application of
strict scrutiny, our conclusion would remain the same even if we
selected an alternate organizational approach.

47
 Citing Windsor, the Proponents urge us to view Virginia’s

federalism-based interest in defining marriage as a suitable

justification for the Virginia Marriage Laws. However, Windsor

is actually detrimental to their position. Although the Court

emphasized states’ traditional authority over marriage, it

acknowledged that “[s]tate laws defining and regulating

marriage, of course, must respect the constitutional rights of

persons.” Id. at 2691 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. 1); see also id.

at 2692 (“The States’ interest in defining and regulating the

marital relation[] [is] subject to constitutional guarantees.”).

Windsor does not teach us that federalism principles can justify

depriving individuals of their constitutional rights; it

reiterates Loving’s admonition that the states must exercise

their authority without trampling constitutional guarantees.

Virginia’s federalism-based interest in defining marriage

therefore cannot justify its encroachment on the fundamental

right to marry.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Schuette v.

Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014),

does not change the conclusion that Windsor dictates. In

Schuette, the Court refused to strike down a voter-approved

state constitutional amendment that barred public universities

in Michigan from using race-based preferences as part of their

admissions processes. Id. at 1629, 1638. The Court declined to

48
closely scrutinize the amendment because it was not “used, or

. . . likely to be used, to encourage infliction of injury by

reason of race.” See id. at 1638. Instead, the Court dwelled

on the need to respect the voters’ policy choice, concluding

that “[i]t is demeaning to the democratic process to presume

that the voters are not capable of deciding an issue of this

sensitivity on decent and rational grounds” and the judiciary’s

role was not to “disempower the voters from choosing which path

to follow.” Id. at 1635-38.

The Proponents emphasize that Virginia’s voters approved

the Marshall/Newman Amendment. Like the Michigan amendment at

issue in Schuette, the Marshall/Newman Amendment is the

codification of Virginians’ policy choice in a legal arena that

is fraught with intense social and political debate. Americans’

ability to speak with their votes is essential to our democracy.

But the people’s will is not an independent compelling interest

that warrants depriving same-sex couples of their fundamental

right to marry.

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights 9 was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
9
Of course, the Fourteenth Amendment is not part of the
Bill of Rights. This excerpt from Barnette is nevertheless
relevant here due to the Fourteenth Amendment’s similar goal of
protecting unpopular minorities from government overreaching,
see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 293 (1978),
and its role in rendering the Bill of Rights applicable to the
states, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968).

49
 controversy, to place them beyond the reach of
majorities and officials and to establish them as
legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech,
a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and
other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote;
they depend on the outcome of no elections.

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)

(footnote added); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (invalidating

a voter-approved amendment to Colorado’s constitution); Lucas v.

Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 736-37 (1964)

(“A citizen’s constitutional rights can hardly be infringed

simply because a majority of the people choose that it be.”).

Accordingly, neither Virginia’s federalism-based interest in

defining marriage nor our respect for the democratic process

that codified that definition can excuse the Virginia Marriage

Laws’ infringement of the right to marry.

2. History and Tradition

The Proponents also point to the “history and tradition” of

opposite-sex marriage as a compelling interest that supports the

Virginia Marriage Laws. The Supreme Court has made it clear

that, even under rational basis review, the “[a]ncient lineage

of a legal concept does not give it immunity from attack.”

Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 326 (1993). The

closely linked interest of promoting moral principles is

similarly infirm in light of Lawrence: “the fact that the

50
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a

particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for

upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor

tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from

constitutional attack.” 539 U.S. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers v.

Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 601 (Scalia,

J., dissenting) (“But ‘preserving the traditional institution of

marriage’ is just a kinder way of describing the State’s moral

disapproval of same-sex couples.”). Preserving the historical

and traditional status quo is therefore not a compelling

interest that justifies the Virginia Marriage Laws.

3. Safeguarding the Institution of Marriage

In addition to arguing that history and tradition are

compelling interests in their own rights, the Proponents warn

that deviating from the tradition of opposite-sex marriage will

destabilize the institution of marriage. The Proponents suggest

that legalizing same-sex marriage will sever the link between

marriage and procreation: they argue that, if same-sex couples—

who cannot procreate naturally—are allowed to marry, the state

will sanction the idea that marriage is a vehicle for adults’

emotional fulfillment, not simply a framework for parenthood.

According to the Proponents, if adults are the focal point of

51
marriage, “then no logical grounds reinforce stabilizing norms

like sexual exclusivity, permanence, and monogamy,” which exist

to benefit children.

We recognize that, in some cases, we owe “substantial

deference to the predictive judgments” of the Virginia General

Assembly, for whom the Proponents purport to speak. Turner

Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997). However,

even if we view the Proponents’ theories through rose-colored

glasses, we conclude that they are unfounded for two key

reasons. First, the Supreme Court rejected the view that

marriage is about only procreation in Griswold v. Connecticut,

in which it upheld married couples’ right not to procreate and

articulated a view of marriage that has nothing to do with

children:

Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way
of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial
or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.

381 U.S. at 485-86; see also Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-96

(describing many non-procreative purposes of marriage). The

fact that marriage’s stabilizing norms have endured in the five

decades since the Supreme Court made this pronouncement weakens

52
the argument that couples remain in monogamous marriages only

for the sake of their offspring.

Second, the primary support that the Proponents offer for

their theory is the legacy of a wholly unrelated legal change to

marriage: no-fault divorce. Although no-fault divorce

certainly altered the realities of married life by making it

easier for couples to end their relationships, we have no reason

to think that legalizing same-sex marriage will have a similar

destabilizing effect. In fact, it is more logical to think that

same-sex couples want access to marriage so that they can take

advantage of its hallmarks, including faithfulness and

permanence, and that allowing loving, committed same-sex couples

to marry and recognizing their out-of-state marriages will

strengthen the institution of marriage. We therefore reject the

Proponents’ concerns.

4. Responsible Procreation

Next, the Proponents contend that the Virginia Marriage

Laws’ differentiation between opposite-sex and same-sex couples

stems from the fact that unintended pregnancies cannot result

from same-sex unions. By sanctioning only opposite-sex

marriages, the Virginia Marriage Laws “provid[e] stability to

the types of relationships that result in unplanned pregnancies,

thereby avoiding or diminishing the negative outcomes often

53
associated with unintended children.” The Proponents allege

that children born to unwed parents face a “significant risk” of

being raised in unstable families, which is harmful to their

development. Virginia, “of course, has a duty of the highest

order to protect the interests of minor children, particularly

those of tender years.” Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433

(1984). However, the Virginia Marriage Laws are not

appropriately tailored to further this interest.

If Virginia sought to ensure responsible procreation via

the Virginia Marriage Laws, the laws are woefully

underinclusive. Same-sex couples are not the only category of

couples who cannot reproduce accidentally. For example,

opposite-sex couples cannot procreate unintentionally if they

include a post-menopausal woman or an individual with a medical

condition that prevents unassisted conception.

The Proponents attempt to downplay the similarity between

same-sex couples and infertile opposite-sex couples in three

ways. First, they point out that sterile individuals could

remedy their fertility through future medical advances. This

potentiality, however, does not explain why Virginia should

treat same-sex and infertile opposite-sex couples differently

during the course of the latter group’s infertility. Second,

the Proponents posit that, even if one member of a man-woman

couple is sterile, the other member may not be. They suggest

54
that, without marriage’s monogamy mandate, this fertile

individual is more likely to have an unintended child with a

third party. They contend that, due to this possibility, even

opposite-sex couples who cannot procreate need marriage to

channel their procreative activity in a way that same-sex

couples do not. The Proponents’ argument assumes that

individuals in same-sex relationships never have opposite-sex

sexual partners, which is simply not the case. Third, the

Proponents imply that, by marrying, infertile opposite-sex

couples set a positive example for couples who can have

unintended children, thereby encouraging them to marry. We see

no reason why committed same-sex couples cannot serve as similar

role models. We therefore reject the Proponents’ attempts to

differentiate same-sex couples from other couples who cannot

procreate accidentally. Because same-sex couples and infertile

opposite-sex couples are similarly situated, the Equal

Protection Clause counsels against treating these groups

differently. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439 (explaining

that the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a direction

that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike”).

Due to the Virginia Marriage Laws’ underinclusivity, this

case resembles City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.

In City of Cleburne, the Supreme Court struck down a city law

that required group homes for the intellectually disabled to

55
obtain a special use permit. Id. at 447-50. The city did not

impose the same requirement on similar structures, such as

apartment complexes and nursing homes. Id. at 447. The Court

determined that the permit requirement was so underinclusive

that the city’s motivation must have “rest[ed] on an irrational

prejudice,” rendering the law unconstitutional. Id. at 450. In

light of the Virginia Marriage Laws’ extreme underinclusivity,

we are forced to draw the same conclusion in this case.

The Proponents’ responsible procreation argument falters

for another reason as well. Strict scrutiny requires that a

state’s means further its compelling interest. See Shaw, 517

U.S. at 915 (“Although we have not always provided precise

guidance on how closely the means . . . must serve the end (the

justification or compelling interest), we have always expected

that the legislative action would substantially address, if not

achieve, the avowed purpose.”). Prohibiting same-sex couples

from marrying and ignoring their out-of-state marriages does not

serve Virginia’s goal of preventing out-of-wedlock births.

Although same-sex couples cannot procreate accidentally, they

can and do have children via other methods. According to an

amicus brief filed by Dr. Gary J. Gates, as of the 2010 U.S.

Census, more than 2500 same-sex couples were raising more than

4000 children under the age of eighteen in Virginia. The

56
Virginia Marriage Laws therefore increase the number of children

raised by unmarried parents.

The Proponents acknowledge that same-sex couples become

parents. They contend, however, that the state has no interest

in channeling same-sex couples’ procreative activities into

marriage because same-sex couples “bring children into their

relationship[s] only through intentional choice and pre-planned

action.” Accordingly, “[t]hose couples neither advance nor

threaten society’s public purpose for marriage”—stabilizing

parental relationships for the benefit of children—“in the same

manner, or to the same degree, that sexual relationships between

men and women do.”

In support of this argument, the Proponents invoke the

Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361

(1974). Johnson concerned educational benefits that the federal

government granted to military veterans who served on active

duty. Id. at 363. The government provided these benefits to

encourage enlistment and make military service more palatable to

existing servicemembers. Id. at 382-83. A conscientious

objector—who refused to serve in the military for religious

reasons—brought suit, contending that the government acted

unconstitutionally by granting benefits to veterans but not

conscientious objectors. Id. at 363-64. The Court explained

that, “[w]hen, as in this case, the inclusion of one group

57
promotes a legitimate governmental purpose, and the addition of

other groups would not, we cannot say that the statute’s

classification of beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries is

invidiously discriminatory.” Id. at 383. Because offering

educational benefits to conscientious objectors would not

incentivize military service, the federal government’s line-

drawing was constitutional. Johnson, 415 U.S. at 382-83. The

Proponents claim that treating opposite-sex couples differently

from same-sex couples is equally justified because the two

groups are not similarly situated with respect to their

procreative potential.

Johnson applied rational basis review, id. at 374-75, so we

strongly doubt its applicability to our strict scrutiny

analysis. In any event, we can easily distinguish Johnson from

the instant case. In Johnson, offering educational benefits to

veterans who served on active duty promoted the government’s

goal of making military service more attractive. Extending

those benefits to conscientious objectors, whose religious

beliefs precluded military service, did not further that

objective. By contrast, a stable marital relationship is

attractive regardless of a couple’s procreative ability.

Allowing infertile opposite-sex couples to marry does nothing to

further the government’s goal of channeling procreative conduct

into marriage. Thus, excluding same-sex couples from marriage

58
due to their inability to have unintended children makes little

sense. Johnson therefore does not alter our conclusion that

barring same-sex couples’ access to marriage does nothing to

further Virginia’s interest in responsible procreation.

5. Optimal Childrearing

We now shift to discussing the merit of the final

compelling interest that the Proponents invoke: optimal

childrearing. The Proponents aver that “children develop best

when reared by their married biological parents in a stable

family unit.” They dwell on the importance of “gender-

differentiated parenting” and argue that sanctioning same-sex

marriage will deprive children of the benefit of being raised by

a mother and a father, who have “distinct parenting styles.” In

essence, the Proponents argue that the Virginia Marriage Laws

safeguard children by preventing same-sex couples from marrying

and starting inferior families.

The Opponents and their amici cast serious doubt on the

accuracy of the Proponents’ contentions. For example, as the

American Psychological Association, American Academy of

Pediatrics, American Psychiatric Association, National

Association of Social Workers, and Virginia Psychological

Association (collectively, the APA) explain in their amicus

brief, “there is no scientific evidence that parenting

59
effectiveness is related to parental sexual orientation,” and

“the same factors”—including family stability, economic

resources, and the quality of parent-child relationships—“are

linked to children’s positive development, whether they are

raised by heterosexual, lesbian, or gay parents.” According to

the APA, “the parenting abilities of gay men and lesbians—and

the positive outcomes for their children—are not areas where

most credible scientific researchers disagree,” and the contrary

studies that the Proponents cite “do not reflect the current

state of scientific knowledge.” See also DeBoer, 973 F. Supp.

2d at 760-68 (making factual findings and reaching the same

conclusion). In fact, the APA explains that, by preventing

same-sex couples from marrying, the Virginia Marriage Laws

actually harm the children of same-sex couples by stigmatizing

their families and robbing them of the stability, economic

security, and togetherness that marriage fosters. The Supreme

Court reached a similar conclusion in Windsor, in which it

observed that failing to recognize same-sex marriages

“humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by

same-sex couples” and “makes it even more difficult for the

children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own

family and its concord with other families in their community

and in their daily lives.” 133 S. Ct. at 2694.

60
 We find the arguments that the Opponents and their amici

make on this issue extremely persuasive. However, we need not

resolve this dispute because the Proponents’ optimal

childrearing argument falters for at least two other reasons.

First, under heightened scrutiny, states cannot support a law

using “overbroad generalizations about the different talents,

capacities, or preferences of” the groups in question. United

States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (rejecting

“inherent differences” between men and women as a justification

for excluding all women from a traditionally all-male military

college); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-58

(1972) (holding that a state could not presume that unmarried

fathers were unfit parents). The Proponents’ statements

regarding same-sex couples’ parenting ability certainly qualify

as overbroad generalizations. Second, as we explain above,

strict scrutiny requires congruity between a law’s means and its

end. This congruity is absent here. There is absolutely no

reason to suspect that prohibiting same-sex couples from

marrying and refusing to recognize their out-of-state marriages

will cause same-sex couples to raise fewer children or impel

married opposite-sex couples to raise more children. The

Virginia Marriage Laws therefore do not further Virginia’s

interest in channeling children into optimal families, even if

61
we were to accept the dubious proposition that same-sex couples

are less capable parents.

Because the Proponents’ arguments are based on overbroad

generalizations about same-sex parents, and because there is no

link between banning same-sex marriage and promoting optimal

childrearing, this aim cannot support the Virginia Marriage

Laws. All of the Proponents’ justifications for the Virginia

Marriage Laws therefore fail, and the laws cannot survive strict

scrutiny.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Virginia

Marriage Laws violate the Due Process and Equal Protection

Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that they

prevent same-sex couples from marrying and prohibit Virginia

from recognizing same-sex couples’ lawful out-of-state

marriages. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of

the Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and its decision to

enjoin enforcement of the Virginia Marriage Laws. 10

10
Because we are able to resolve the merits of the
Opponents’ claims, we need not consider their alternative
request for a preliminary injunction. We assume that the
district court’s decision to enjoin enforcement of the Virginia
Marriage Laws encompassed a permanent injunction, which the
Plaintiffs requested in connection with their motion for summary
judgment.

62
 We recognize that same-sex marriage makes some people

deeply uncomfortable. However, inertia and apprehension are

not legitimate bases for denying same-sex couples due process

and equal protection of the laws. Civil marriage is one of the

cornerstones of our way of life. It allows individuals to

celebrate and publicly declare their intentions to form lifelong

partnerships, which provide unparalleled intimacy,

companionship, emotional support, and security. The choice of

whether and whom to marry is an intensely personal decision that

alters the course of an individual’s life. Denying same-sex

couples this choice prohibits them from participating fully in

our society, which is precisely the type of segregation that the

Fourteenth Amendment cannot countenance.

AFFIRMED

63
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

To be clear, this case is not about whether courts favor or

disfavor same-sex marriage, or whether States recognizing or

declining to recognize same-sex marriage have made good policy

decisions. It is much narrower. It is about whether a State’s

decision not to recognize same-sex marriage violates the

Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Thus, the

judicial response must be limited to an analysis applying

established constitutional principles.

The Commonwealth of Virginia has always recognized that

“marriage” is based on the “mutual agreement of a man and a

woman to marry each other,” Burke v. Shaver, 23 S.E. 749, 749

(Va. 1895), and that a marriage’s purposes include “establishing

a family, the continuance of the race, the propagation of

children, and the general good of society,” Alexander v.

Kuykendall, 63 S.E.2d 746, 748 (Va. 1951). In recent years, it

codified that understanding in several statutes, which also

explicitly exclude from the definition of “marriage” the union

of two men or two women. Moreover, in 2006 the people of

Virginia amended the Commonwealth’s Constitution to define

marriage as only between “one man and one woman.” Va. Const.

art. I, § 15-A.

The plaintiffs, who are in long-term same-sex

relationships, are challenging the constitutionality of
Virginia’s marriage laws under the Due Process and Equal

Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The district court

sustained their challenge, concluding that the plaintiffs have a

fundamental right to marry each other under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore that any

regulation of that right is subject to strict scrutiny.

Concluding that Virginia’s definition of marriage failed even

“to display a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose and

so must be viewed as constitutionally infirm,” the court struck

down Virginia’s marriage laws as unconstitutional and enjoined

their enforcement. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 482

(E.D. Va. 2014).

The majority agrees. It concludes that the fundamental

right to marriage includes a right to same-sex marriage and that

therefore Virginia’s marriage laws must be reviewed under strict

scrutiny. It holds that Virginia has failed to advance a

compelling state interest justifying its definition of marriage

as between only a man and a woman. In reaching this conclusion,

however, the majority has failed to conduct the necessary

constitutional analysis. Rather, it has simply declared

syllogistically that because “marriage” is a fundamental right

protected by the Due Process Clause and “same-sex marriage” is a

form of marriage, Virginia’s laws declining to recognize same-

65
sex marriage infringe the fundamental right to marriage and are

therefore unconstitutional.

Stated more particularly, the majority’s approach begins

with the parties’ agreement that “marriage” is a fundamental

right. Ante at 40. From there, the majority moves to the

proposition that “the right to marry is an expansive liberty

interest,” ante at 41, “that is not circumscribed based on the

characteristics of the individuals seeking to exercise that

right,” ante at 42-43. For support, it notes that the Supreme

Court has struck down state restrictions prohibiting interracial

marriage, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); prohibiting

prison inmates from marrying without special approval, see

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); and prohibiting persons

owing child support from marrying, see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434

U.S. 374 (1978). It then declares, ipse dixit, that “the

fundamental right to marry encompasses the right to same-sex

marriage” and is thus protected by the substantive component of

the Due Process Clause. Ante at 41. In reaching this

conclusion, the majority “decline[s] the Proponents’ invitation

to characterize the right at issue in this case as the right to

same-sex marriage rather than simply the right to marry.” Ante

at 44. And in doing so, it explicitly bypasses the relevant

constitutional analysis required by Washington v. Glucksberg,

521 U.S. 702 (1997), stating that a Glucksberg analysis is not

66
necessary because no new fundamental right is being recognized.

Ante at 41-42.

This analysis is fundamentally flawed because it fails to

take into account that the “marriage” that has long been

recognized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right is

distinct from the newly proposed relationship of a “same-sex

marriage.” And this failure is even more pronounced by the

majority’s acknowledgment that same-sex marriage is a new notion

that has not been recognized “for most of our country’s

history.” Ante at 41. Moreover, the majority fails to explain

how this new notion became incorporated into the traditional

definition of marriage except by linguistic manipulation. Thus,

the majority never asks the question necessary to finding a

fundamental right -- whether same-sex marriage is a right that

is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and

“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither

liberty nor justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed.”

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland,

431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); Palko v.

Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

At bottom, in holding that same-sex marriage is encompassed

by the traditional right to marry, the majority avoids the

necessary constitutional analysis, concluding simply and broadly

67
that the fundamental “right to marry” -- by everyone and to

anyone -- may not be infringed. And it does not anticipate or

address the problems that this approach causes, failing to

explain, for example, why this broad right to marry, as the

majority defines it, does not also encompass the “right” of a

father to marry his daughter or the “right” of any person to

marry multiple partners.

If the majority were to recognize and address the

distinction between the two relationships -- the traditional one

and the new one -- as it must, it would simply be unable to

reach the conclusion that it has reached.

I respectfully submit that, for the reasons that follow,

Virginia was well within its constitutional authority to adhere

to its traditional definition of marriage as the union of a man

and a woman and to exclude from that definition the union of two

men or two women. I would also agree that the U.S. Constitution

does not prohibit a State from defining marriage to include

same-sex marriage, as many States have done. Accordingly, I

would reverse the judgment of the district court and uphold

Virginia’s marriage laws.

I

As the majority has observed, state recognition of same-sex

marriage is a new phenomenon. Its history began in the early

68
2000s with the recognition in some States of civil unions. See,

e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1202 (2000); D.C. Code §

32-701 (1992) (effective in 2002); Cal. Fam. Code §§ 297-298

(2003); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:8A-2 (2003); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.

§ 46b-38nn (2006), invalidated by Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub.

Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). And the notion of same-sex

marriage itself first gained traction in 2003, when the

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the

Commonwealth’s prohibition on issuing marriage licenses to same-

sex couples violated the State’s Constitution -- the first

decision holding that same-sex couples had a right to marry.

See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968

(Mass. 2003). In 2009, Vermont became the first State to enact

legislation recognizing same-sex marriage, and, since then, 11

other States and the District of Columbia have also done so.

See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-20 to 46b-20a; Del. Code Ann. tit.

13, § 101; D.C. Code § 46-401; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 572-1; 750 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 5/201; Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 19-A, § 650-A; Md. Code

Ann., Fam. Law §§ 2-201 to 2-202; Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 517.01 to

517.03; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 457:1-a to 457:2; N.Y. Dom. Rel.

Law § 10-a; R.I. Gen. Laws § 15-1-1 et seq.; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.

15, § 8; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 26.04.010 to 26.04.020. Moreover,

seven other States currently allow same-sex marriage as a result

of court rulings. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652

69
(2013); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge,

798 N.E.2d 941; Garden State Equality v. Dow, 79 A.3d 1036 (N.J.

2013); Griego v. Oliver, 316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013); Geiger v.

Kitzhaber, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, No. 6:13-CV-01834-MC, 2014 WL

2054264 (D. Or. May 19, 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, ___ F. Supp.

2d ___, No. 1:13-CV-1861, 2014 WL 2058105 (M.D. Pa. May 20,

2014). This is indeed a recent phenomenon.

Virginia only recognizes marriage as between one man and

one woman, and, like a majority of States, it has codified this

view. See Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.2 (prohibiting same-sex

marriage and declining to recognize same-sex marriages conducted

in other States); id. § 20-45.3 (prohibiting civil unions and

similar arrangements between persons of the same sex). The bill

originally proposing what would become § 20-45.3 noted the basis

for Virginia’s legislative decision:

[H]uman marriage is a consummated two in one communion
of male and female persons made possible by sexual
differences which are reproductive in type, whether or
not they are reproductive in effect or motivation.
This present relationship recognizes the equality of
male and female persons, and antedates recorded
history.

Affirmation of Marriage Act, H.D. 751, 2004 Gen. Assembly, Reg.

Sess. (Va. 2004). The bill predicted that the recognition of

same-sex marriage would “radically transform the institution of

marriage with serious and harmful consequences to the social

order.” Id. Virginia also amended its Constitution in 2006 to

70
define marriage as only between “one man and one woman” and to

prohibit “a legal status for relationships of unmarried

individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities,

significance, or effects of marriage.” Va. Const. art. I, § 15-

A. The plaintiffs commenced this action to challenge the

constitutionality of Virginia’s marriage laws.

Plaintiffs Timothy B. Bostic and Tony C. London have lived

in a committed same-sex relationship since 1989 and have lived

in Virginia since 1991. The two desired to marry in Virginia,

and on July 1, 2013, when they applied for a marriage license at

the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court for the City of

Norfolk, they were denied a license and told that same-sex

couples are ineligible to marry in Virginia. In their complaint

challenging Virginia’s marriage laws, they alleged that their

inability to marry has disadvantaged them in both economic and

personal ways -- it has prevented them from filing joint tax

returns, kept them from sharing health insurance on a tax-free

basis, and signaled that they are “less than” other couples in

Virginia.

Plaintiffs Carol Schall and Mary Townley likewise have

lived in a committed same-sex relationship since 1985 and have

lived in Virginia throughout their 29-year relationship. In

1998, Townley gave birth to a daughter, E.S.-T., whom Schall and

Townley have raised together, and in 2008, the two traveled to

71
California where they were lawfully married. They alleged in

their complaint that because Virginia does not recognize their

marriage as valid, they have been injured in several ways.

Schall is unable to legally adopt E.S.-T., and the two are

unable to share health insurance on a tax-free basis. The two

also claimed that they and E.S.-T. have experienced stigma as a

result of Virginia’s nonrecognition of their marriage.

The plaintiffs’ complaint, filed in July 2013, alleged that

Virginia’s marriage laws violate their constitutional rights

under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the

Fourteenth Amendment. They named as defendants George E.

Schaefer, III, Clerk of Court for the Norfolk Circuit Court, and

Janet M. Rainey, the State Registrar of Vital Records. A third

Virginia official, Michèle B. McQuigg, Clerk of Court for the

Prince William County Circuit Court, was permitted to intervene

as a defendant. As elected circuit court clerks, Schaefer and

McQuigg are responsible for issuing individual marriage licenses

in the localities in which they serve. And Rainey, as the State

Registrar of Vital Records, is responsible for ensuring

compliance with Virginia’s marriage laws, including the laws

challenged in this case.

After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment,

Virginia underwent a change in administrations, and the newly

elected Attorney General of Virginia, Mark Herring, filed a

72
notice of a change in his office’s legal position on behalf of

his client, defendant Janet Rainey. His notice stated that

because, in his view, the laws at issue were unconstitutional,

his office would no longer defend them on behalf of Rainey. He

noted, however, that Rainey would continue to enforce the laws

until the court’s ruling. The other officials have continued to

defend Virginia’s marriage laws, and, for convenience, I refer

to the defendants herein as “Virginia.”

Following a hearing, the district court, by an order and

memorandum dated February 14, 2014, granted the plaintiffs’

motion for summary judgment and denied Virginia’s cross-motion.

The court concluded that same-sex partners have a fundamental

right to marry each other under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, thus requiring that Virginia’s marriage

laws restricting that right be narrowly drawn to further a

compelling state interest. It concluded that the laws did not

meet that requirement and, indeed, “fail[ed] to display a

rational relationship to a legitimate purpose, and so must be

viewed as constitutionally infirm under even the least onerous

level of scrutiny.” Bostic, 970 F. Supp. 2d at 482. Striking

down Virginia’s marriage laws, the court also issued an order

enjoining their enforcement but stayed that order pending

appeal. This appeal followed.

73
 II

The plaintiffs contend that, as same-sex partners, they

have a fundamental right to marry that is protected by the

substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the U.S.

Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting any State

from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law”), and that Virginia’s laws defining

marriage as only between a man and a woman and excluding same-

sex marriage infringe on that right. The constitutional

analysis for adjudging their claim is well established.

The Constitution contains no language directly protecting

the right to same-sex marriage or even traditional marriage.

Any right to same-sex marriage, therefore, would have to be

found, through court interpretation, as a substantive component

of the Due Process Clause. See Planned Parenthood of

Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“Although a

literal reading of the Clause might suggest that it governs only

the procedures by which a State may deprive persons of liberty,

for at least 105 years . . . the Clause has been understood to

contain a substantive component as well”).

The substantive component of the Due Process Clause only

protects “fundamental” liberty interests. And the Supreme Court

has held that liberty interests are only fundamental if they

are, “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and

74
tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’

such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were

sacrificed.’” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (citation omitted)

(quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion); Palko, 302

U.S. at 325-26). When determining whether such a fundamental

right exists, a court must always make “a ‘careful description’

of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.” Id. at 721

(emphasis added) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302

(1993)). This “careful description” involves characterizing the

right asserted in its narrowest terms. Thus, in Glucksberg,

where the Court was presented with a due process challenge to a

state statute banning assisted suicide, the Court narrowly

characterized the right being asserted in the following manner:

The Court of Appeals stated that “[p]roperly analyzed,
the first issue to be resolved is whether there is a
liberty interest in determining the time and manner of
one’s death,” or, in other words, “[i]s there a right
to die?” Similarly, respondents assert a “liberty to
choose how to die” and a right to “control of one’s
final days,” and describe the asserted liberty as “the
right to choose a humane, dignified death,” and “the
liberty to shape death.” As noted above, we have a
tradition of carefully formulating the interest at
stake in substantive-due-process cases. . . . The
Washington statute at issue in this case prohibits
“aid[ing] another person to attempt suicide,” and,
thus, the question before us is whether the “liberty”
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes
a right to commit suicide which itself includes a
right to assistance in doing so.

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722-23 (alterations in original)

(emphasis added) (citations omitted).

75
 Under this formulation, because the Virginia laws at issue

prohibit “marriage between persons of the same sex,” Va. Code

Ann. § 20-45.2, “the question before us is whether the ‘liberty’

specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right”

to same-sex marriage. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723; see also

Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1095 (D. Haw.

2012) (“[M]issing from Plaintiffs’ asserted ‘right to marry the

person of one’s choice’ is its centerpiece: the right to marry

someone of the same gender”).

When a fundamental right is so identified, then any statute

restricting the right is subject to strict scrutiny and must be

“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”

Flores, 507 U.S. at 302. Such scrutiny is extremely difficult

for a law to withstand, and, as such, the Supreme Court has

noted that courts must be extremely cautious in recognizing

fundamental rights because doing so ordinarily removes freedom

of choice from the hands of the people:

[W]e “ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the
concept of substantive due process because guideposts
for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered
area are scarce and open-ended.” By extending
constitutional protection to an asserted right or
liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the
matter outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action. We must therefore “exercise the
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground
in this field,” lest the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy
preferences of the Members of this Court.

76
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (second alteration in original)

(emphasis added) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503

U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).

The plaintiffs in this case, as well as the majority,

recognize that narrowly defining the asserted liberty interest

would require them to demonstrate a new fundamental right to

same-sex marriage, which they cannot do. Thus, they have made

no attempt to argue that same-sex marriage is, “objectively,

deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,” and

“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Glucksberg, 521

U.S. at 720-21 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, they

have acknowledged that recognition of same-sex marriage is a

recent development. See ante at 41; see also United States v.

Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013) (“Until recent years, many

citizens had not even considered the possibility of [same-sex

marriage]” (emphasis added)); id. at 2715 (Alito, J.,

dissenting) (noting that it is “beyond dispute that the right to

same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in this Nation’s history

and tradition”); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993)

(“[W]e do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so

rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of our people

that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental

principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all

our civil and political institutions”).

77
 Instead, the plaintiffs and the majority argue that the

fundamental right to marriage that has previously been

recognized by the Supreme Court is a broad right that should

apply to the plaintiffs without the need to recognize a new

fundamental right to same-sex marriage. They argue that this

approach is supported by the fact that the Supreme Court did not

narrowly define the right to marriage in its decisions in

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Turner, 482 U.S. at 94-96; or Zablocki,

434 U.S. at 383-86.

It is true that, in those cases, the Court did not

recognize new, separate fundamental rights to fit the factual

circumstances in each case. For example, in Loving, the Court

did not examine whether interracial marriage was, objectively,

deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition. But it was

not required to do so. Each of those cases involved a couple

asserting a right to enter into a traditional marriage of the

type that has always been recognized since the beginning of the

Nation -- a union between one man and one woman. While the

context for asserting the right varied in each of those cases,

it varied only in ways irrelevant to the concept of marriage.

The type of relationship sought was always the traditional, man-

woman relationship to which the term “marriage” was theretofore

always assumed to refer. Thus, none of the cases cited by the

plaintiffs and relied on by the majority involved the assertion

78
of a brand new liberty interest. To the contrary, they involved

the assertion of one of the oldest and most fundamental liberty

interests in our society.

To now define the previously recognized fundamental right

to “marriage” as a concept that includes the new notion of

“same-sex marriage” amounts to a dictionary jurisprudence, which

defines terms as convenient to attain an end.

It is true that same-sex and opposite-sex relationships

share many attributes, and, therefore, marriages involving those

relationships would, to a substantial extent, be similar. Two

persons who are attracted to each other physically and

emotionally and who love each other could publicly promise to

live with each other thereafter in a mutually desirable

relationship. These aspects are the same whether the persons

are of the same sex or different sexes. Moreover, both

relationships could successfully function to raise children,

although children in a same-sex relationship would come from one

partner or from adoption. But there are also significant

distinctions between the relationships that can justify

differential treatment by lawmakers.

Only the union of a man and a woman has the capacity to

produce children and thus to carry on the species. And more

importantly, only such a union creates a biological family unit

that also gives rise to a traditionally stable political unit.

79
Every person’s identity includes the person’s particular

biological relationships, which create unique and meaningful

bonds of kinship that are extraordinarily strong and enduring

and that have been afforded a privileged place in political

order throughout human history. Societies have accordingly

enacted laws promoting the family unit -- such as those relating

to sexual engagement, marriage rites, divorce, inheritance, name

and title, and economic matters. And many societies have found

familial bonds so critical that they have elevated marriage to

be a sacred institution trapped with religious rituals. In

these respects, the traditional man-woman relationship is

unique.

Thus, when the Supreme Court has recognized, through the

years, that the right to marry is a fundamental right, it has

emphasized the procreative and social ordering aspects of

traditional marriage. For example, it has said: “[Marriage] is

an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the

public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the

family and of society, without which there would be neither

civilization nor progress,” Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211

(1888) (emphasis added); Marriage is “one of the basic civil

rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the

very existence and survival of the race,” Skinner v. Oklahoma ex

rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); “It is not surprising

80
that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of

importance as decisions relating to procreation, childbirth,

childrearing, and family relationships. . . . [Marriage] is the

foundation of the family in our society,” Zablocki, 434 U.S. at

386.

Because there exist deep, fundamental differences between

traditional and same-sex marriage, the plaintiffs and the

majority err by conflating the two relationships under the

loosely drawn rubric of “the right to marriage.” Rather, to

obtain constitutional protection, they would have to show that

the right to same-sex marriage is itself deeply rooted in our

Nation’s history. They have not attempted to do so and could

not succeed if they were so to attempt.

In an effort to bridge the obvious differences between the

traditional relationship and the new same-sex relationship, the

plaintiffs argue that the fundamental right to marriage “has

always been based on, and defined by, the constitutional liberty

to select the partner of one’s choice.” (Emphasis added). They

rely heavily on Loving to assert this claim. In Loving, the

Court held that a state regulation restricting interracial

marriage infringed on the fundamental right to marriage.

Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. But nowhere in Loving did the Court

suggest that the fundamental right to marry includes the

unrestricted right to marry whomever one chooses, as the

81
plaintiffs claim. Indeed, Loving explicitly relied on Skinner

and Murphy, and both of those cases discussed marriage in

traditional, procreative terms. Id.

This reading of Loving is fortified by the Court’s summary

dismissal of Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971),

appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), just five years after

Loving was decided. In Baker, the Minnesota Supreme Court

interpreted a state statute’s use of the term “marriage” to be

one of common usage meaning a union “between persons of the

opposite sex” and thus not including same-sex marriage. Id. at

186. On appeal, the Supreme Court dismissed the case summarily

“for want of a substantial federal question.” 409 U.S. at 810.

The Court’s action in context indicates that the Court did not

view Loving or the cases that preceded it as providing a

fundamental right to an unrestricted choice of marriage partner.

Otherwise, the state court’s decision in Baker would indeed have

presented a substantial federal question.

In short, Loving simply held that race, which is completely

unrelated to the institution of marriage, could not be the basis

of marital restrictions. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. To

stretch Loving’s holding to say that the right to marry is not

limited by gender and sexual orientation is to ignore the

inextricable, biological link between marriage and procreation

that the Supreme Court has always recognized. See Windsor, 133

82
S. Ct. at 2689 (recognizing that throughout history, “marriage

between a man and a woman no doubt had been thought of by most

people as essential to the very definition of that term and to

its role and function”). The state regulation struck down in

Loving, like those in Zablocki and Turner, had no relationship

to the foundational purposes of marriage, while the gender of

the individuals in a marriage clearly does. Thus, the majority

errs, as did the district court, by interpreting the Supreme

Court’s marriage cases as establishing a right that includes

same-sex marriage.

The plaintiffs also largely ignore the problem with their

position that if the fundamental right to marriage is based on

“the constitutional liberty to select the partner of one’s

choice,” as they contend, then that liberty would also extend to

individuals seeking state recognition of other types of

relationships that States currently restrict, such as polygamous

or incestuous relationships. Cf. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,

648-50 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Such an extension would

be a radical shift in our understanding of marital

relationships. Laws restricting polygamy are foundational to

the Union itself, having been a condition on the entrance of

Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah into statehood. Id.

While the plaintiffs do attempt to assure us that such laws are

safe because “there are weighty government interests underlying”

83
them, such an argument does not bear on the question of whether

the right is fundamental. The government’s interests would

instead be relevant only to whether the restriction could meet

the requisite standard of review. And because laws prohibiting

polygamous or incestuous marriages restrict individuals’ right

to choose whom they would like to marry, they would, under the

plaintiffs’ approach, have to be examined under strict scrutiny.

Perhaps the government’s interest would be strong enough to

enable such laws to survive strict scrutiny, but regardless,

today’s decision would truly be a sweeping one if it could be

understood to mean that individuals have a fundamental right to

enter into a marriage with any person, or any people, of their

choosing.

At bottom, the fundamental right to marriage does not

include a right to same-sex marriage. Under the Glucksberg

analysis that we are thus bound to conduct, there is no new

fundamental right to same-sex marriage. Virginia’s laws

restricting marriage to man-woman relationships must therefore

be upheld if there is any rational basis for the laws.

III

Under rational-basis review, courts are required to give

heavy deference to legislatures. The standard

simply requires courts to determine whether the
classification in question is, at a minimum,

84
 rationally related to legitimate governmental goals.
In other words, the fit between the enactment and the
public purposes behind it need not be mathematically
precise. As long as [the legislature] has a
reasonable basis for adopting the classification,
which can include “rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data,” the statute will pass
constitutional muster. The rational basis standard
thus embodies an idea critical to the continuing
vitality of our democracy: that courts are not
empowered to “sit as a superlegislature to judge the
wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations.”

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344, 347-48 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis

added) (citations omitted) (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc.,

508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.

297, 303 (1976)). Statutes subject to rational-basis review

“bear[] a strong presumption of validity, and those attacking

the rationality of the legislative classification have the

burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis which might support

[them].’” Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 314-15 (emphasis added)

(citation omitted) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts

Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973)).

In contending that there is a rational basis for its

marriage laws, Virginia has emphasized that children are born

only to one man and one woman and that marriage provides a

family structure by which to nourish and raise those children.

It claims that a biological family is a more stable environment,

and it renounces any interest in encouraging same-sex marriage.

It argues that the purpose of its marriage laws “is to channel

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the presumptive procreative potential of man-woman relationships

into enduring marital unions so that if any children are born,

they are more likely to be raised in stable family units.”

(Emphasis omitted). Virginia highlights especially marriage’s

tendency to promote stability in the event of unplanned

pregnancies, asserting that it has “a compelling interest in

addressing the particular concerns associated with the birth of

unplanned children. . . . [C]hildren born from unplanned

pregnancies where their mother and father are not married to

each other are at significant risk of being raised outside

stable family units headed by their mother and father jointly.”

Virginia states that its justifications for promoting

traditional marriage also explain its lack of interest in

promoting same-sex marriage. It maintains that a traditional

marriage is “exclusively [an] opposite-sex institution

. . . inextricably linked to procreation and biological

kinship,” Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting),

and that same-sex marriage prioritizes the emotions and sexual

attractions of the two partners without any necessary link to

reproduction. It asserts that it has no interest in “licensing

adults’ love.”

The plaintiffs accept that family stability is a legitimate

state goal, but they argue that licensing same-sex relationships

will not burden Virginia’s achievement of that goal. They

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contend that “there is simply no evidence or reason to believe

that prohibiting gay men and lesbians from marrying will

increase ‘responsible procreation’ among heterosexuals.”

But this argument does not negate any of the rational

justifications for Virginia’s legislation. States are permitted

to selectively provide benefits to only certain groups when

providing those same benefits to other groups would not further

the State’s ultimate goals. See Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S.

361, 383 (1974) (“When . . . the inclusion of one group promotes

a legitimate governmental purpose, and the addition of other

groups would not, we cannot say that the statute's

classification of beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries is

invidiously discriminatory”). Here, the Commonwealth’s goal of

ensuring that unplanned children are raised in stable homes is

furthered only by offering the benefits of marriage to opposite-

sex couples. As Virginia correctly asserts, “the relevant

inquiry here is not whether excluding same-sex couples from

marriage furthers [Virginia’s] interest in steering man-woman

couples into marriage.” Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether

also recognizing same-sex marriages would further Virginia’s

interests. With regard to its interest in ensuring stable

families in the event of unplanned pregnancies, it would not.

The plaintiffs reply that even if this is so, such “line-

drawing” only makes sense if the resources at issue are scarce,

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justifying the State’s limited provision of those resources.

They argue that because “[m]arriage licenses . . . are not a

remotely scarce commodity,” the line-drawing done by Virginia’s

marriage laws is irrational. But this fundamentally

misunderstands the nature of marriage benefits. When the

Commonwealth grants a marriage, it does not simply give the

couple a piece of paper and a title. Rather, it provides a

substantial subsidy to the married couple -- economic benefits

that, the plaintiffs repeatedly assert, are being denied them.

For example, married couples are permitted to file state income

taxes jointly, lowering their tax rates. See Va. Code Ann.

§ 58.1-324. Although indirect, such benefits are clearly

subsidies that come at a cost to the Commonwealth. Virginia is

willing to provide these subsidies because they encourage

opposite-sex couples to marry, which tends to provide children

from unplanned pregnancies with a more stable environment.

Under Johnson, the Commonwealth is not obligated to similarly

subsidize same-sex marriages, since doing so could not possibly

further its interest. This is no different from the subsidies

provided in other cases where the Supreme Court has upheld line-

drawing, such as Medicare benefits, Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.

67, 83-84 (1976), or veterans’ educational benefits, Johnson,

415 U.S. at 383.

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 As an additional argument, Virginia maintains that marriage

is a “[c]omplex social institution[]” with a “set of norms,

rules, patterns, and expectations that powerfully (albeit often

unconsciously) affect people’s choices, actions, and

perspectives.” It asserts that discarding the traditional

definition of marriage will have far-reaching consequences that

cannot easily be predicted, including “sever[ing] the inherent

link between procreation . . . and marriage . . . [and] in

turn . . . powerfully convey[ing] that marriage exists to

advance adult desires rather than [to] serv[e] children’s

needs.”

The plaintiffs agree that changing the definition of

marriage may have unforeseen social effects, but they argue that

such predictions should not be enough to save Virginia’s

marriage laws because similar justifications were rejected in

Loving. The Loving Court, however, was not applying rational-

basis review. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12. We are on a

different footing here. Under rational-basis review,

legislative choices “may be based on rational speculation

unsupported by evidence or empirical data.” Beach Commc’ns, 508

U.S. at 315. “Sound policymaking often requires legislators to

forecast future events and to anticipate the likely impact of

these events based on deductions and inferences for which

complete empirical support may be unavailable.” Turner Broad.

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Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) (plurality opinion).

And the legislature “is far better equipped than the judiciary”

to make these evaluations and ultimately decide on a course of

action based on its predictions. Id. at 665-66. In enacting

its marriage laws, Virginia predicted that changing the

definition of marriage would have a negative effect on children

and on the family structure. Although other States do not share

those concerns, such evaluations were nonetheless squarely

within the province of the Commonwealth’s legislature and its

citizens, who voted to amend Virginia’s Constitution in 2006.

Virginia has undoubtedly articulated sufficient rational

bases for its marriage laws, and I would find that those bases

constitutionally justify the laws. Those laws are grounded on

the biological connection of men and women; the potential for

their having children; the family order needed in raising

children; and, on a larger scale, the political order resulting

from stable family units. Moreover, I would add that the

traditional marriage relationship encourages a family structure

that is intergenerational, giving children not only a structure

in which to be raised but also an identity and a strong

relational context. The marriage of a man and a woman thus

rationally promotes a correlation between biological order and

political order. Because Virginia’s marriage laws are

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rationally related to its legitimate purposes, they withstand

rational-basis scrutiny under the Due Process Clause.

IV

The majority does not substantively address the plaintiffs’

second argument -- that Virginia’s marriage laws invidiously

discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, in violation of

the Equal Protection Clause -- since it finds that the laws

infringe on the plaintiffs’ fundamental right to marriage. But

because I find no fundamental right is infringed by the laws, I

also address discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.

The Equal Protection Clause, which forbids any State from

“deny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, prohibits

invidious discrimination among classes of persons. Some

classifications -- such as those based on race, alienage, or

national origin -- are “so seldom relevant to the achievement of

any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such

considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy --

a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or

deserving as others.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,

473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). Any laws based on such “suspect”

classifications are subject to strict scrutiny. See id. In a

similar vein, classifications based on gender are “quasi-

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suspect” and call for “intermediate scrutiny” because they

“frequently bear[] no relation to ability to perform or

contribute to society” and thus “generally provide[] no sensible

ground for differential treatment.” Id. at 440-41 (quoting

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality

opinion)); see also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).

Laws subject to intermediate scrutiny must be substantially

related to an important government objective. See United States

v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).

But when a regulation adversely affects members of a class

that is not suspect or quasi-suspect, the regulation is

“presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the

classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a

legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440

(emphasis added). Moreover, the Supreme Court has made it clear

that

where individuals in the group affected by a law have
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests
the State has the authority to implement, the courts
have been very reluctant, as they should be in our
federal system and with our respect for the separation
of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices
as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests
should be pursued. In such cases, the Equal
Protection Clause requires only a rational means to
serve a legitimate end.

Id. at 441-42 (emphasis added). This is based on the

understanding that “equal protection of the laws must coexist

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with the practical necessity that most legislation classifies

for one purpose or another, with resulting disadvantage to

various groups or persons.” Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.

The plaintiffs contend that Virginia’s marriage laws should

be subjected to some level of heightened scrutiny because they

discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Yet they

concede that neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit

has ever applied heightened scrutiny to a classification based

on sexual orientation. They urge this court to do so for the

first time. Governing precedent, however, counsels otherwise.

In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court did not employ any

heightened level of scrutiny in evaluating a Colorado

constitutional amendment that prohibited state and local

governments from enacting legislation that would allow persons

to claim “any minority status, quota preferences, protected

status, or . . . discrimination” based on sexual orientation.

Romer, 517 U.S. at 624. In holding the amendment

unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court

applied rational-basis review. See id. at 631-33.

And the Supreme Court made no change as to the appropriate

level of scrutiny in its more recent decision in Windsor, which

held Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional.

The Court was presented an opportunity to alter the Romer

standard but did not do so. Although it did not state the level

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of scrutiny being applied, it did explicitly rely on rational-

basis cases like Romer and Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,

413 U.S. 528 (1973). See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693. In his

dissenting opinion in Windsor, Justice Scalia thus noted, “As

nearly as I can tell, the Court agrees [that rational-basis

review applies]; its opinion does not apply strict scrutiny, and

its central propositions are taken from rational-basis cases

like Moreno.” Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

Finally, we have concluded that rational-basis review

applies to classifications based on sexual orientation. See

Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726, 731-32 (4th Cir. 2002). In Veney,

a prisoner filed a § 1983 action alleging that he had been

discriminated against on the basis of sexual preference and

gender. Id. at 729-30. We noted that the plaintiff “[did] not

allege that he [was] a member of a suspect class. Rather, he

claim[ed] that he ha[d] been discriminated against on the basis

of sexual preference and gender. Outside the prison context,

the former is subject to rational basis review, see Romer v.

Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996).” Id. at 731-32 (footnote

omitted).

The vast majority of other courts of appeals have reached

the same conclusion. See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st

Cir. 2008) (“Romer nowhere suggested that the Court recognized a

new suspect class. Absent additional guidance from the Supreme

94
Court, we join our sister circuits in declining to read Romer as

recognizing homosexuals as a suspect class for equal protection

purposes”); Price-Cornelison v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 1103, 1113-14 &

n.9 (10th Cir. 2008) (“A government official

can . . . distinguish between its citizens on the basis of

sexual orientation, if that classification bears a rational

relation to some legitimate end” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859,

865-66 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing Romer and reaching the

conclusion that “[t]hough the most relevant precedents are

murky, we conclude for a number of reasons that [Nebraska’s

same-sex marriage ban] should receive rational-basis review

under the Equal Protection Clause, rather than a heightened

level of judicial scrutiny”); Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503,

532 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[A] state violates the Equal Protection

Clause if it disadvantages homosexuals for reasons lacking any

rational relationship to legitimate governmental aims”); Lofton

v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 818

(11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]ll of our sister circuits that have

considered the question have declined to treat homosexuals as a

suspect class. Because the present case involves neither a

fundamental right nor a suspect class, we review

the . . . statute under the rational-basis standard” (footnote

omitted)); Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of

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Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 294, 300 (6th Cir. 1997) (applying

rational-basis review in upholding a city charter amendment

restricting homosexual rights and stating that in Romer, the

Court “did not assess Colorado Amendment 2 under ‘strict

scrutiny’ or ‘intermediate scrutiny’ standards, but instead

ultimately applied ‘rational relationship’ strictures to that

enactment and resolved that the Colorado state constitutional

provision did not invade any fundamental right and did not

target any suspect class or quasi-suspect class”); Ben-Shalom v.

Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying rational-

basis review prior to the announcement of Romer); Woodward v.

United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“The

Supreme Court has identified only three suspect classes: racial

status, national ancestry and ethnic original, and alienage.

Two other classifications have been identified by the Court as

quasi-suspect: gender and illegitimacy. [Plaintiff] would have

this court add homosexuality to that list. This we decline to

do” (citations and footnote omitted)). But see SmithKline

Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014)

(applying heightened scrutiny to a Batson challenge that was

based on sexual orientation); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d

169, 180-85 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding intermediate scrutiny

appropriate in assessing the constitutionality of Section 3 of

the Defense of Marriage Act).

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 Thus, following Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent,

I would hold that Virginia’s marriage laws are subject to

rational-basis review. Applying that standard, I conclude that

there is a rational basis for the laws, as explained in Part

III, above. At bottom, I agree with Justice Alito’s reasoning

that “[i]n asking the court to determine that [Virginia’s

marriage laws are] subject to and violate[] heightened scrutiny,

[the plaintiffs] thus ask us to rule that the presence of two

members of the opposite sex is as rationally related to marriage

as white skin is to voting or a Y-chromosome is to the ability

to administer an estate. That is a striking request and one

that unelected judges should pause before granting.” Windsor,

133 S. Ct. at 2717-18 (Alito, J., dissenting).

V

Whether to recognize same-sex marriage is an ongoing and

highly engaged political debate taking place across the Nation,

and the States are divided on the issue. The majority of courts

have struck down statutes that deny recognition of same-sex

marriage, doing so almost exclusively on the idea that same-sex

marriage is encompassed by the fundamental right to marry that

is protected by the Due Process Clause. While I express no

viewpoint on the merits of the policy debate, I do strongly

disagree with the assertion that same-sex marriage is subject to

97
the same constitutional protections as the traditional right to

marry.

Because there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage

and there are rational reasons for not recognizing it, just as

there are rational reasons for recognizing it, I conclude that

we, in the Third Branch, must allow the States to enact

legislation on the subject in accordance with their political

processes. The U.S. Constitution does not, in my judgment,

restrict the States’ policy choices on this issue. If given the

choice, some States will surely recognize same-sex marriage and

some will surely not. But that is, to be sure, the beauty of

federalism.

I would reverse the district court’s judgment and defer to

Virginia’s political choice in defining marriage as only between

one man and one woman.

98