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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-13510
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20452-KMM-4
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DARVIS SANTIESTEBAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(July 30, 2014)
Before PRYOR, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Darvis Santiesteban appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. Santiesteban pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute 1,000 or more marijuana plants, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846, and one count of conspiracy to launder money, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1956(h). The district court sentenced Santiesteban to 262 months’
imprisonment—the low end of his advisory guidelines range. Santiesteban
maintains he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because he did
not know he would be subject to the career offender guidelines in U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.1. After review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Santiesteban’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea and we therefore affirm. See United States v.
Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We review the denial of a request
to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted)).1
As the district court found, Santiesteban failed to demonstrate “a fair and
just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); see also
United States v. Izquierdo, 448 F.3d 1269, 1277 (11th Cir. 2006) (“A
defendant-movant clearly has the burden on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.”).
In determining whether the defendant demonstrated a fair and just reason for
withdrawal, we consider “(1) whether close assistance of counsel was available;
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Santiesteban’s motion to file a reply brief out of time is GRANTED.
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(2) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources
would be conserved; and (4) whether the government would be prejudiced if the
defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea.” Brehm, 442 F.3d at 1298
(quotation omitted).
First, Santiesteban had the close assistance of counsel. During the
change-of-plea hearing, Santiesteban acknowledged that he (1) had reviewed the
evidence against him with his lawyer, (2) had thoroughly discussed the decision to
plead guilty with his lawyer, (3) had reviewed the plea agreement with his
attorney, and (4) was satisfied with counsel’s representation.
Second, Santiesteban’s plea was not unknowing and involuntary because he
expected a lower advisory guidelines range and did not know he would be subject
to the career offender guidelines. The express terms of Santiesteban’s plea
agreement, and his own statements during the change-of-plea hearing, demonstrate
the meritless nature of his arguments on appeal. See United States v. Medlock, 12
F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994) (“There is a strong presumption that the statements
made during the [plea] colloquy are true.”). In particular, Santiesteban’s plea
agreement explicitly stated his sentence had not yet been determined and any
estimate of his probable sentencing range or ultimate sentence, whether received
from counsel, the Government, or the probation office, was merely a prediction
that was not binding on the district court. During the plea colloquy, the magistrate
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judge expressly informed Santiesteban that “regardless of any expectation you may
have as to what the sentence may be, if the Court were to sentence you to a term
that was either different or greater than what you’re anticipating, you cannot use
that fact as a basis to withdraw your plea. You would still be bound by your plea.”
Santiesteban responded “I understand, your Honor.” In addition, both the plea
agreement and the magistrate judge informed Santiesteban of the statutory
minimum and maximum sentences he could receive, and he confirmed to the
magistrate judge that his decision to plead guilty was not the product of coercion
and was made knowingly and voluntarily.
Finally, upholding Santiesteban’s guilty plea would avoid a trial and
conserve judicial resources, and we agree with the district court that the
Government would be prejudiced by allowing Santiesteban to withdraw his guilty
plea.
AFFIRMED.
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