295 Ga. 217
FINAL COPY
S14Y0661. IN THE MATTER OF MARGRETT A. SKINNER.
PER CURIAM.
The State Bar of Georgia made a formal complaint against respondent
Margrett A. Skinner (State Bar No. 650748), alleging violations of Rules 1.3,
1.4, 1.6, and 1.16 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. Prior to an
evidentiary hearing on the formal complaint, Skinner filed a petition for
voluntary discipline, admitting that she violated Rule 1.6 by improperly
disclosing confidential information about a former client, and in which she
agreed to accept a Review Panel reprimand for the violation. The special master
and the State Bar recommended that we accept the petition for voluntary
discipline. We rejected the petition, however, noting that a Review Panel
reprimand is “the mildest form of public discipline authorized . . . for the
violation of Rule 1.6,” In the Matter of Skinner, 292 Ga. 640, 642 (740 SE2d
171) (2013), and noting as well that the petition and accompanying record did
not “reflect the nature of the disclosures (except that they concern [unspecified]
personal and confidential information) or the actual or potential harm to the
client as a result of the disclosures.” Id. at 642, n. 6. Following our rejection of
the petition, the special master conducted an evidentiary hearing, and he made
his report and recommendation on December 18, 2013, in which he found that
Skinner violated Rules 1.4 and 1.6 but not Rules 1.3 and 1.16.1 Neither party
sought review of the report by the Review Panel, and the matter is again before
this Court for decision.
In his report, the special master found that a client retained Skinner in July
2009 to represent her in an uncontested divorce, and she paid Skinner $900,
including $150 for the filing fee. For six weeks, the client did not hear anything
from Skinner, and after multiple attempts to contact Skinner, the client finally
was able to reach Skinner again in October 2009. At that point, Skinner
informed the client that Skinner had lost the paperwork that the client had given
to Skinner in July. Skinner and the client then met again, and Skinner finally
began to draft pleadings for the divorce. The initial drafts of the pleadings had
multiple errors, and Skinner and the client exchanged several drafts and
communicated by e-mail about the status of the case in October and early
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Joseph A. Boone was appointed as special master in this matter.
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November 2009. Those communications concluded by mid-November, and
Skinner and the client had no more communications until March 18, 2010, when
the client reported to Skinner that her husband would not sign the divorce papers
without changes. In April 2010, both the client and her husband signed the
papers.
A disagreement developed about the fees and expenses of the divorce.
Skinner asked the client for an additional $185 for certain travel expenses and
the filing fee. In April and early May 2010, Skinner and the client exchanged
several e-mails about the request for additional money. Then, on May 18, the
client informed Skinner that she had hired another lawyer to complete her
divorce, and she asked Skinner to deliver her file to new counsel and to refund
$750. Skinner replied that she would not release the file unless she were paid.
Although Skinner eventually refunded $650 to the client, Skinner never
delivered the file to new counsel, contending that it only contained her “work
product.” New counsel completed the divorce within three months of her
engagement.
Around this time, the client posted negative reviews of Skinner on three
consumer Internet pages. When Skinner learned of the negative reviews, she
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posted a response on the Internet, a response that contained personal and
confidential information about her former client that Skinner had obtained in the
course of her representation of the client. In particular, Skinner identified the
client by name, identified the employer of the client, stated how much the client
had paid Skinner, identified the county in which the divorce had been filed, and
stated that the client had a boyfriend. The client filed a grievance against
Skinner, and in response to the grievance, Skinner said in August 2011 that she
would remove her posting from the Internet. It was not removed, however, until
February 2012.
The special master found that Skinner violated Rule 1.4 when she failed
between July and October 2010 to keep her client reasonably informed of the
status of the divorce, and the special master found that Skinner violated Rule 1.6
when she disclosed confidential information about her client on the Internet. The
special master found no violation of Rules 1.3 and 1.16.2 Turning to the
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About Rule 1.16, the special master reported his belief that Skinner technically
violated the rule by failing to deliver the file of her client to successor counsel based on a
mistaken belief that signed pleadings in the file belonged to her as “work product.” See
Formal Advisory Opinion 87-5; Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers v. Henry, 276 Ga. 571 (581
SE2d 37) (2003). But the special master did not actually find a violation nor recommend any
discipline under Rule 1.16. The special master reported that he made no such finding or
recommendation because there was no clear and convincing evidence of prejudice, insofar
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appropriate discipline for these violations, the special master noted that Skinner
had substantial experience as a practicing lawyer — she was admitted to the Bar
in 1987 — which is an aggravating circumstance. The special master also found,
however, a number of mitigating circumstances, including that Skinner had no
prior discipline, the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive for her improper
conduct, that she refunded a substantial portion of her fee to the client even after
doing work for the client, that she accepted responsibility for her misconduct by
filing a petition for voluntary discipline, that she otherwise was cooperative in
the disciplinary proceedings, and that she had expressed remorse for her
misconduct. In addition, the special master found as mitigation that Skinner
experienced a number of personal problems during her representation of the
client and the subsequent time that she posted the confidential information about
her client on the Internet, including colon surgery in April 2010, the diagnosis
of both her mother and father with cancer (she was their primary caregiver), and
the death of her father. For both violations, the special master recommended a
public reprimand, with the additional condition that Skinner “be instructed to
as the client already had the documents contained in the file. As to the retention of unearned
fees, the special master found the issue moot in light of the refund of $650 to the client.
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take advantage of the State Bar’s Law Practice Management services and
recommendations with respect to internal office procedures, client files, and case
tracking procedures.”
We have reviewed carefully the record and the very detailed report of the
special master, and we agree with his recommendation of a public reprimand,
as well as the additional condition that Skinner be instructed to take advantage
of the State Bar’s Law Practice Management services and recommendations
with respect to internal office procedures, client files and case tracking
procedures. See In the Matter of Adams, 291 Ga. 173 (729 SE2d 313) (2012).
Although other jurisdictions occasionally have disciplined lawyers more
severely for improper disclosures of client confidences, we note that those cases
involved numerous clients and violations of other rules, see Office of Lawyer
Regulation v. Peshek, 334 Wis.2d 373 (798 NW2d 879 (2011) (60-day
suspension), or the disclosure of especially sensitive information that posed
serious harm or potential harm to the client, see In re Quillinan, 20 DB Rptr. 288
(Ore. Disp. Bd. 2006) (90-day suspension), available at
www.osbar.org/_docs/dbreport/dbr20.pdf. In this case, the improper disclosure
of confidential information was isolated and limited to a single client, it does not
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appear that the information worked or threatened substantial harm to the
interests of the client, and there are significant mitigating circumstances.
Accordingly, we hereby order that Skinner receive a public reprimand in
accordance with Bar Rules 4-102 (b) (3) and 4-220 (c), and we order that she
consult with the Law Practice Management Program of the State Bar as set forth
above and implement its suggestions in her law practice.
Public reprimand. All the Justices concur.
Decided May 19, 2014.
Public reprimand.
Paula J. Frederick, General Counsel State Bar, Jenny K. Mittelman,
Assistant General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia.
William H. Noland, for Skinner.
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