FOURTH DIVISION
DOYLE, P. J.,
MILLER and DILLARD, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/
July 15, 2014
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A14A0425. ROGERS v. WOODRUFF.
DILLARD, Judge.
In this interlocutory appeal, Janice D. Rogers challenges the trial court’s denial
of her motion for summary judgment on Cory Woodruff’s personal-injury claims
related to an incident that occurred at Rogers’s home when a deck railing gave way
and Woodruff fell to the concrete below, resulting in serious injuries. On appeal,
Rogers argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment.
For the reasons set forth infra, we agree and reverse.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Woodruff,1 the nonmovant, the record
reflects that on the night of July 20, 2008, Woodruff was a social guest at the home
1
See, e.g., Cmty. Marketplace Props., LLC v. SunTrust Bank, 303 Ga. App.
403, 404 (693 SE2d 602) (2010).
of Janice Rogers. More specifically, Woodruff, who was then a college student at the
University of West Georgia, was visiting with Rogers’s daughter, Kelly, also a
student, at Kelly’s apartment located above her parents’ detached garage. It is
undisputed that Janice Rogers purchased the property in 2006, and the stairway and
deck leading up to the apartment over the detached garage were built in 1996 by the
property’s previous owner, who was a residential builder and who swore by affidavit
that the county inspected the improvements not long after construction.
Earlier on the day in question, Woodruff and Kelly visited her parents who
were away from home, camping overnight at a lake. But after this visit, Woodruff and
Kelly went back to her apartment and got ready to go out to a bar in nearby
downtown Carrollton. Along with another friend, Deanna Echols, Woodruff and
Kelly made their way to the bar, where they danced and consumed alcoholic
beverages until approximately 2:30 a.m. The amount of alcohol that Woodruff
consumed both before and after arriving at the bar is hotly disputed, with Woodruff
claiming that he imbibed only two drinks at the bar and nothing before and others
testifying that Woodruff consumed multiple alcoholic beverages at the bar, including
up to four shots of liquor, and that he consumed liquor at the apartment before
heading out for the evening.
2
What is undisputed is that while at the bar, the trio of friends ran into Devan
Hayes, who Woodruff and Kelly knew from school and who was working as a
bouncer that night. And although Kelly considered Woodruff a close friend,
Woodruff had deeper feelings for Kelly and became visibly upset over the course of
the evening as she increasingly directed her attention toward Hayes. Indeed, at one
point after 2:00 a.m., an emotionally distraught Woodruff telephoned his father from
the bar’s parking lot because he was so grieved by the situation (particularly because
Woodruff believed Hayes had treated girls poorly in the past).
Not long after this call, Kelly, Echols, and Hayes found Woodruff in the
parking lot and, before heading back to the apartment, Kelly invited Hayes to join
them there after he was done working. It is again highly disputed as to how much
alcohol Woodruff consumed upon returning to the apartment, with Woodruff denying
that he had anything alcoholic to drink, and Kelly, Echols, and Hayes (who arrived
at 3:30 a.m.) all testifying that Woodruff, although already highly intoxicated,
continued to imbibe multiple shots and mixed drinks. The tenor between Hayes and
Woodruff at this point is also disputed, with Kelly and Echols contending that
Woodruff was an out-of-control drunk who was openly hostile toward Hayes, and
3
both Hayes and Woodruff contending that the two were on much more congenial
terms.
Nevertheless, although the atmosphere surrounding the decision to do so is
disputed, it is undisputed that Hayes and Woodruff went outside of the apartment
after 4:00 a.m. According to Woodruff, he wanted to discuss how Hayes should treat
Kelly. And because Kelly’s apartment was located above her parents’ garage, it was
accessible only by an exterior stairway with a somewhat spacious deck landing at the
top entrance to the abode. Hayes and Woodruff were on this landing when the
incident causing Woodruff’s injuries occurred, while Kelly and Echols remained
inside the apartment.
According to Kelly and Echols, Woodruff and Hayes were outside only briefly
before the women heard loud voices, saw and heard Hayes get slammed up against
the door, and then heard another loud sound that, upon exiting the apartment, they
surmised must have been Woodruff falling through the deck railing to the ground
below. Woodruff, on the other hand, testified that while he could recall nothing after
he hit the ground, the fall occurred after he leaned up against the railing. He also
4
flatly denied fighting with Hayes. As for Hayes, he testified that Woodruff fell after
stumbling backwards and falling into the railing, but he too denied fighting.2
Woodruff was seriously injured as a result of the fall and subsequently filed
suit against Kelly Rogers’s parents, Janice and Darryl.3 During the course of
discovery, Woodruff deposed an expert in construction, who testified that his
examination of the deck and railing revealed that the railing violated building-code
requirements for minimum height and load capacity. The Rogers eventually filed a
motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied as to Janice but granted
as to Darryl because the evidence established that Janice (hereinafter “Rogers”) was
the sole owner of the property where the incident occurred. Specifically, the trial
court found that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Rogers breached
a duty owed to Woodruff by failing to have the deck inspected when there was
evidence that the deck was not built to code. We granted Rogers’s application for
interlocutory appeal, which we now consider.
2
We note in passing that it is undisputed that following Woodruff’s fall, Hayes
immediately and heroically rendered aid to Woodruff until paramedics arrived,
perhaps saving Woodruff’s life.
3
Woodruff also filed suit against Devan Hayes, but he is not a party to this
appeal.
5
At the outset, we note that on appeal from the denial of a motion for summary
judgment, we view the evidence de novo in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.4 Of course, summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”5 With this
guiding principle in mind, we turn now to Rogers’s enumerations of error on appeal.
Rogers contends that the trial court erroneously identified the standard of care
owed to Woodruff, a licensee, when the deck railing was a static condition and,
accordingly, misapplied the law to the facts.
It is undisputed that Woodruff was visiting Rogers’s property as a social guest
and, therefore, he was a licensee under Georgia law.6 A property owner incurs
liability for breaching a duty to a licensee “only for wilfully or wantonly allowing a
4
See, e.g., Cmty. Marketplace Props., LLC, 303 Ga. App. at 404 (“We apply
a de novo standard of appellate review and view the evidence, and all reasonable
conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant.” (punctuation omitted)).
5
Id. (punctuation omitted).
6
See Thompson v. Oursler, 318 Ga. App. 377, 378 (733 SE2d 359) (2012)
(“Georgia has adopted the rule that a social guest is not an invitee but is a licensee.”
(punctuation omitted)); see also OCGA § 51-3-2 (a) (defining the characteristics of
a “licensee”); Trulove v. Jones, 271 Ga. App. 681, 681 (1) (610 SE2d 649) (2005)
(noting that a social guest is a licensee).
6
dangerous static condition . . . to cause his injuries.”7 And “wanton conduct” has been
described as “that which is so reckless or so charged with indifference to the
consequences as to be the equivalent in spirit to actual intent to do harm or inflict
injury.”8 Furthermore, a property owner has no duty to a licensee to keep his or her
premises up to any standard of safety, “except that [it] must not contain pitfalls,
mantraps, and things of that type.”9
Here, the deck and railing did not amount to a mantrap or pitfall, the doctrine
of which is “rested upon the theory that the owner is expecting a trespasser or a
licensee and has prepared the premises to do him injury.”10 Indeed, a mantrap or
pitfall is a “contrivance so dangerous in character as to imply a disregard of
7
Thompson, 318 Ga. App. at 378; see also OCGA § 51-3-2 (b) (“The owner
of the premises is liable to a licensee only for willful or wanton injury.”); Trulove,
271 Ga. App. at 681 (1) (“[Appellant] was a social guest or licensee on the premises,
and as such [Appellee] can only be liable for wilful or wanton injury.”).
8
Trulove, 271 Ga. App. at 681 (1) (punctuation omitted).
9
Id. at 682 (1) (punctuation omitted).
10
Frank Mayes & Assoc., Inc. v. Massood, 238 Ga. App. 416, 418-19 (2) (518
SE2d 903) (1999) (punctuation omitted); accord Mansfield v. Colwell Constr. Co.,
242 Ga. App. 669, 672 (530 SE2d 793) (2000).
7
consequences or a willingness to inflict injury”11—for example, a vending machine
booby-trapped with dynamite to discourage theft.12 Rogers argues that the deck and
railing in the case sub judice constituted a static condition, which is “one that does
not change and is dangerous only if someone fails to see it and walks into it.”13 The
trial court did determine that the deck’s railing was a static condition; however, the
court also determined that there was evidence that the railing in question was
defective. And relying upon our decision in Hicks v. Walker,14 the trial court denied
Janice Rogers’s motion for summary judgment.
Like the trial court, we also find that the deck amounted to a static condition;15
however, as in Hicks, the alleged cause of the injury—underlying defective
11
Massood, 238 Ga. App. at 419 (2) (punctuation omitted); see also Mansfield,
242 Ga. App. at 672 (“Examples of a mantrap include a spring gun or a trap or a
dangerous condition hidden with sufficient cover to obscure it or to render it
unobservable to one who approaches it.” (punctuation omitted)).
12
McKinsey v. Wade, 136 Ga. App. 109, 111 (5) (220 SE2d 30) (1975).
13
Bullard v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 293 Ga. App. 679, 681 (2) (667 SE2d 909)
(2008) (punctuation omitted).
14
262 Ga. App. 216 (585 SE2d 83) (2003).
15
See Thompson, 318 Ga. App. at 378 (deck was a static condition); Trulove,
271 Ga. App. at 682 (1) (deck with missing railing was a static condition); Davis v.
Scott, 232 Ga. App. 493, 493 (502 SE2d 332) (1998) (stairway was a static
condition).
8
construction—is more akin to a hidden peril.16 Nevertheless, we conclude that the
trial court erred in denying summary judgment by relying upon Hicks.
In Hicks, we noted the general duty that a property owner owes to a licensee
(i.e., not to wilfully or wantonly injure a licensee)17 and then quoted the well-
established principle that it is “usually wilful or wanton not to exercise ordinary care
to prevent injuring a person who is actually known to be or may reasonably be
expected to be, within range of a dangerous act being done or a hidden peril on one’s
premises.”18 Additionally, we emphasized that a property owner is subject to liability
for physical harm caused to a licensee by a condition on the property owner’s land if,
but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to licensees,
and should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, and
16
See Bragg v. Missroon, 186 Ga. App. 803, 804-05 (368 SE2d 564) (1988)
(affirming denial of motion for summary judgment when decedent was electrocuted
while ascending ladder on dock beside boathouse equipped with electrical door with
wiring defects).
17
262 Ga. App. at 218.
18
Id.; accord Thompson, 318 Ga. App. at 378.
9
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to
warn the licensees of the condition and the risk involved.19
Regrettably, in Hicks, we neglected to mention the third requirement, which is that
“(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and the risk
involved.”20
19
Hicks, 262 Ga. App. at 218; accord Thompson, 318 Ga. App. at 378; Bragg,
186 Ga. App. at 804.
20
Thompson, 318 Ga. App. at 378 (punctuation omitted); accord Bragg, 186
Ga. App. at 804. In Hicks, we also invoked the principle that “[a]fter the presence of
a licensee is known, exactly the same acts of caution may be required of the owner
to satisfy the legal duty as would be necessary if the licensee were invited,” 262 Ga.
App. at 218, before citing duties ordinarily owed by property owners to invitees, not
licensees, see id. at 218 & n.12 (citing Freyer v. Silver, 234 Ga. App. 243, 245 (2)
(507 SE2d 7) (1998), for the proposition that “[i]n cases of defective construction, the
owner is presumed to have notice of the danger”); id. at 218 & n.13. (citing Freyer,
234 Ga. App. at 245 (2), for the proposition that an “owner’s duty to exercise ordinary
care includes inspecting the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions of
which the owner does not have actual knowledge, and taking reasonable precautions
to protect invitees from dangers foreseeable from the use of the premises”); id. at 218
& n. 15 (citing Long Leaf Indus. v. Mitchell, 252 Ga. App. 343, 346-47 (3) (a) (556
SE2d 242) (2001), for the proposition that “evidence of nonconformity with code
standards may be proof of a landowner’s superior knowledge of a defect under
OCGA § 51-3-1,” which Code section applies to invitees). But see Bryant v. Rucker,
121 Ga. App. 395, 409 (2) (173 SE2d 875) (1970) (“As to a licensee the owner or
occupier is under no duty to inspect the premises.”). As will be clear from our
discussion infra, the use of this precedent in Hicks was entirely unnecessary to the
holding in that case —i.e., that under the unique facts of Hicks, there was evidence
by which the jury could find that the property owners had constructive knowledge of
the deck’s defects. Accordingly, any reference to these duties in Hicks is dicta and of
10
The facts in Hicks involved a 2-year-old child who was injured in a deck
collapse during a barbeque hosted by the property owners.21 And although there was
no evidence that the property owners had actual knowledge of the deck’s dangerous
condition,22 we held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the
owners had constructive knowledge of such defects and whether they exercised
ordinary care.23 Indeed, the facts established that the property owners’ son had
recently built the deck, the deck was not built in accordance with codes in force at the
time of construction, and the deck would not have passed an inspection.24 Thus, under
no precedential utility. See Hoesch Am., Inc. v. Dai Yang Metal Co., 217 Ga. App.
845, 847 (1) (459 SE2d 187) (1995) (indicating that the term “dicta” refers to
language in a judicial opinion that is “unnecessary to the holding of the case”).
21
262 Ga. App. at 216-17.
22
Id. at 219.
23
Id.
24
Hicks, 262 Ga. App. at 217-18. Specifically, as to the allegedly defective
construction, the facts showed that
the deck failed at the point at which the deck was attached to the house,
and the deck had been attached to the house with carpentry nails, though
the codes required the use of hex bolts; contrary to code requirements,
no flashing was used to protect the wood from water damage, and the
wood was damaged as a result; the support posts were set on top of
11
the facts of Hicks, genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the owners
failed to exercise ordinary care to protect the injured child–licensee from the hidden
peril of the defective deck because there was evidence by which a jury could have
determined that the property owners should have known of the deck’s condition.
In stark contrast, here, the undisputed evidence shows that although one person
testified that he had previously noticed that the stairway railing was wobbly, neither
Kelly Rogers nor her parents were aware of any problem with the stairway or deck
railing. And Woodruff himself testified that he saw no visible problem with the
railing. Accordingly, there was no evidence of actual knowledge. Additionally, there
was no evidence by which a jury could find constructive knowledge. Indeed, although
Woodruff presented expert testimony to establish that the deck railing did not meet
building-code standards in 2008, the expert witness did not know when the deck was
built. Instead, the undisputed evidence showed that the deck was built by a prior
owner of the property in 1996 and that the county inspected the improvement at that
cinder blocks instead of being set into a foundation sufficient to support
the weight load of the deck; and the posts were improperly “toe-nailed”
into the deck.
Id. at 217.
12
time. And there was no evidence to show that the deck did not meet applicable
building-code standards when it was constructed in 1996 and inspected by the
county.25
Thus, because the undisputed evidence established that the deck and railing in
question were built by a previous property owner ten years prior to Rogers’s purchase
of the property and that the county inspected the improvement soon after its
construction, we find the facts in the case sub judice wholly inapposite to those at
issue in Hicks v. Walker.26 Accordingly, because there is no evidence by which
Rogers could be said to have superior knowledge of the deck railing’s allegedly
25
Cf. Chisholm v. Fulton Supply Co., 184 Ga. App. 378, 379 (1) (361 SE2d
540) (1987) (“Appellant’s allegations as to a defect in the steps because of their
construction is not supported by Atlanta’s adoption of its Building Code in 1983
when the building was built in 1922. The stairs were legal as a nonconforming use.”
(punctuation omitted)); Ray v. Gallant-Belk Co. of Elberton, 147 Ga. App. 580, 581
(2) (249 SE2d 635) (1978) (“The stairs in question had been built over forty years
previously and did not meet the standards of the Southern Building Code, which the
City of Elberton had adopted by ordinance. They were consequently legal as a
nonconforming use.”).
26
262 Ga. App. 216 (585 SE2d 83) (2003).
13
dangerous condition,27 the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary
judgment.28
Judgment reversed. Doyle, P. J., and Miller, J., concur in judgment only.
27
Compare Bragg, 186 Ga. App. at 805 (affirming denial of motion for
summary judgment when evidence established that defects in wiring of electrical door
for boathouse were “apparent and stood out” and “visibly defective,” creating genuine
question of material fact “as to whether appellants should have known of the hazards
created by the defects in wiring at their boat dock”), with Barksdale v. Nuwar, 203
Ga. App. 184, 184-85 (416 SE2d 546) (1992) (affirming grant of motion for summary
judgment when evidence established that deck collapsed due to allegedly defective
construction, but homeowner had no actual knowledge of defects and there was no
evidence of constructive knowledge when deck was professionally built, homeowner
personally inspected the deck, and deck appeared to be well constructed).
28
See Jordan v. Bennett, 312 Ga. App. 838, 841 (1) (720 SE2d 301) (2011)
(reversing denial of motion for summary judgment in case concerning licensee’s fall
off of outdoor deck, and holding that “[b]ecause there [was] no evidence . . . that
[appellant] wilfully or wantonly injured [appellee] or that he knowingly exposed her
to a dangerous activity, hidden peril, pitfall, or mantrap, there [was] no evidence that
[appellant] breached his duty of care to [appellee] such that he has any liability for her
injuries”); Ruffin v. Ruffin, 159 Ga. App. 830, 830-31 (285 SE2d 261) (1981)
(affirming grant of summary judgment to property owner on claim for injuries arising
out of minor’s fall through rotten board on dock when plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that
board was a hidden peril, but there was no evidence of actual knowledge or evidence
to support a jury finding of constructive knowledge).
14