IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–1020
Filed July 18, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
GABRIEL DETRACE TAYLOR,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Ian K.
Thornhill, Judge.
An offender convicted of first-degree robbery committed as a
juvenile appeals mandatory minimum sentence as cruel and unusual
punishment under the Iowa Constitution. DECISION OF COURT OF
APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT SENTENCE VACATED;
REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan N. Jennisch,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers,
Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Vander Sanden, County Attorney,
and Nicholas G. Maybanks and Jason A. Burns, Assistant County
Attorneys, for appellee.
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CADY, Chief Justice.
Gabriel Taylor was convicted of first-degree robbery for a crime he
committed when he was seventeen years of age. As required by statute,
Taylor was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five
years. Another statute required Taylor to serve at least seventy percent
of his sentence before he was eligible for parole. Taylor challenges his
sentence as cruel and unusual punishment under the Iowa Constitution.
For the reasons expressed in State v. Lyle, ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2014),
filed on this date, we conclude the mandatory sentence was
unconstitutional under the cruel and unusual punishment provision of
the Iowa Constitution. We vacate the sentence and remand the case to
the district court for resentencing.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Gabriel Taylor was seventeen years old when he committed the
crime of robbery in the first degree. Along with two companions, he
robbed the occupants of an apartment, and one of his companions shot
one of the occupants in the head. He was prosecuted as an adult,
convicted of first-degree robbery, and sentenced to a term of
incarceration not to exceed twenty-five years. Under statute, this
sentence was mandatory. See Iowa Code § 902.9(2) (2009). Additionally,
under statute, Taylor was required to serve seventy percent of the
sentence before being eligible for parole. See id. § 902.12(5). Taylor
appealed from his judgment and sentence. We transferred his case to
the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the sentence. Taylor
sought further review, which we granted. On appeal, he claims his
sentence violated article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution, which
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. Iowa Const. art. I, § 17.
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II. Disposition.
Based on the reasoning and our holding in Lyle, ___ N.W.2d at ___,
we vacate the sentence imposed on Taylor and remand the case for
resentencing under the standards set forth in Lyle.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
All justices concur except Waterman, Mansfield, and Zager, JJ.,
who dissent for the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinions in State
v. Lyle, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2014).