IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 12–0139
Filed May 2, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
CRAIG E. HARRISON,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, C.H. Pelton,
Judge (suppression hearing) and Marlita A. Greve, Judge (trial).
Defendant challenges validity of traffic stop upheld by court of
appeals and district court. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS
AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson, Assistant
Attorney General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Kelly G.
Cunningham, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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WATERMAN, Justice.
Are police officers permitted to stop a motorist because his license
plate frame covers up the county name? Two district court judges in this
case issued conflicting rulings on that question, although both denied
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of the crack cocaine found in
his possession after the traffic stop at issue. Police officers gave two
reasons for stopping defendant’s Jeep—their belief his license plate was
in violation of Iowa Code section 321.37(3) (2009) and their suspicion he
was drug dealing based on an informant’s tip and his evasive behavior.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver crack
cocaine, a drug tax stamp violation, and driving under suspension, but
not for a license plate violation.
A district court judge, who presided at the suppression hearing,
initially ruled the license plate frame gave no reason to stop defendant
because the large plate numbers and letters were visible, but upheld the
traffic stop based on a reasonable suspicion of drug dealing. A different
judge who presided at trial upheld the stop based on the license plate
violation alone and excluded evidence of the informant and suspicious
behavior preceding the traffic stop. The jury found defendant guilty as
charged. He appealed, and we transferred his appeal to the court of
appeals, which held the traffic stop was lawful based on reasonable
suspicion of drug dealing without deciding the license plate issue. That
court also affirmed the district court’s rejection of defendant’s claim the
State breached a plea agreement. We granted defendant’s application for
further review to decide whether a license plate violation justified this
traffic stop.
For the reasons explained below, we hold a license plate frame that
covers up the county name violates Iowa Code section 321.37(3) and
3
provides a valid basis for a traffic stop. We decline to reach the issue of
whether the traffic stop was otherwise lawful based on reasonable
suspicion of drug dealing and, therefore, vacate the court of appeals
decision on that issue. We affirm the court of appeals decision on the
plea agreement issue and affirm the district court judgment and
sentence.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The evening of July 7, 2009, Davenport police officers Craig Burkle
and Jason Ellerbach were on patrol in an unmarked Crown Victoria
when they received a phone call from a confidential informant. The
informant gave the officers an address and told them they would find “a
black male . . . slinging dope” in a red Jeep Cherokee with Iowa license
plate No. 994 RDB. The officers drove to the address, found the Jeep
parked there unoccupied, and waited nearby for the driver to return. A
few minutes later, a black male got into the Jeep and drove away. The
officers followed the Jeep for approximately five blocks, until the driver
pulled over to the side of the road. The officers drove past without seeing
the driver get out of his vehicle. The officers believed the driver had
pulled over to avoid their tail and to “prevent[] himself from making any
traffic violation mistakes” that would allow them to “initiate a traffic
stop.” The officers circled the block. When they returned to where the
driver had stopped, the Jeep was gone.
Minutes later, the officers located the Jeep a few blocks away. The
officers followed the driver back to the address given by the informant,
where he parked. The officers believed the driver “possibly was doing
drops, dropping off narcotics to other residences.” Shortly thereafter, the
driver left again in the Jeep. The officers followed for three miles and
then initiated a traffic stop because the Jeep’s license plate frame
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covered up the county name on the license plate, which the officers
believed violated Iowa Code section 321.37(3). During the stop, the
officers identified the driver as Craig Harrison and placed him in the
back of their vehicle. They soon discovered he possessed eighteen
prepackaged crack cocaine rocks.
On August 11, the State charged Harrison with (1) possession with
intent to deliver a schedule II controlled substance, in violation of Iowa
Code sections 124.206(2)(d), 124.401(1)(c)(3), and 703.1; (2) failure to
affix a drug tax stamp, in violation of Iowa Code sections 453B.1(3)(d),
453B.3, 453B.7(4), 453B.12, and 703.1; and (3) driving while suspended,
in violation of Iowa Code sections 321.210A and 321.218. He was not
charged with a license plate violation under Iowa Code section 321.37(3).
On January 6, 2010, Harrison submitted a guilty plea pursuant to a plea
agreement with the State. The State later withdrew from the plea
agreement after Harrison’s criminal record was discovered to be more
extensive than it had originally appeared. Harrison withdrew his guilty
plea and proceeded to trial.
On June 7, Harrison filed a motion to suppress the evidence found
during the traffic stop. A hearing on the motion was held June 9.
Officer Ellerbach and Officer Burkle testified regarding the events leading
up to the traffic stop. Officer Ellerbach acknowledged the county name
on a license plate is unnecessary for law enforcement to conduct a
license plate check.
On June 14, the district court issued its ruling on Harrison’s
motion to suppress. The court first concluded Iowa Code section
321.37(3) “refers to the large letters and large numbers on the Iowa
license plate, not the small letters at the bottom of the plate designating
the county.” The court noted Harrison was not charged with a license
5
plate violation. The court thus concluded “the alleged license plate
violation” was “pretextual” and “an invalid ground for initiating the stop
of the vehicle and search of Harrison.”1 The district court ruled,
however, the stop was justified by “sufficient objective facts to support an
investigatory stop of the vehicle and driver for suspicion of possessing
and selling illegal controlled substances.” The district court specifically
noted “the tip from an informant, fully corroborated by the officers’
observation, . . . the driver’s activity, and driver’s attempt to evade being
followed.” The district court denied Harrison’s motion to suppress.
The jury trial began September 19, 2011. A different judge
presided over the trial, and this judge disagreed with the prior ruling on
the license plate issue. The trial judge gave this explanation for
upholding the traffic stop based on the license plate violation:
[I] looked at this file and my concern is that the motion to
suppress was granted on one ground, and the Court at that
time found that the other ground was pretextual for the
traffic stop. I disagree with that. The traffic stop was done
by the policemen because they could not see the entire
writing on the license plate, and I looked at the statute and
I’m having trial this morning, so I would find that the traffic
stop was a valid traffic stop because the section 321.166(2)
requires a license plate to have a county designation on it.
The other statute, 321.37, states that a registration plate or
a license plate has to permit full view of all numerals and
letters printed on the registration plate. So I believe it was a
valid traffic stop, which means that the confidential
informant does not have to be mentioned whatsoever.
The trial court thus excluded any mention of the confidential informant
or Harrison’s behavior before the traffic stop. The jury ultimately found
Harrison guilty on all counts.
1The parties did not raise on appeal the issue of whether a pretextual traffic stop
is valid. We therefore do not reach that issue.
6
Harrison appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of
appeals. Harrison argued the district court erroneously denied his
motion to suppress because neither the alleged license plate violation nor
the surrounding circumstances created reasonable suspicion to justify a
traffic stop. He also challenged the district court’s ruling that allowed
the State to withdraw from the plea agreement.
The court of appeals concluded the informant’s tip and Harrison’s
driving gave the officers reasonable suspicion to stop him. The court of
appeals did not consider whether the alleged violation of Iowa Code
section 321.37(3) provided an independent basis for the stop. The court
of appeals also rejected Harrison’s argument that the district court
should have enforced the plea agreement. We granted Harrison’s
application for further review.
II. Scope of Review.
“On further review, we have the discretion to review all or some of
the issues raised on appeal . . . .” State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 494
(Iowa 2012). In this appeal, we exercise that discretion and confine our
review to whether the officers validly stopped Harrison for violating Iowa
Code section 321.37(3). We decline to review the court of appeals
decision affirming the district court ruling that allowed the State to
withdraw from the plea agreement. “Therefore, the court of appeals
decision on that issue stands.” Schaefer v. Putnam, 841 N.W.2d 68, 74
(Iowa 2013).
The validity of the traffic stop based on the frame covering up the
county name on the license plate presents a question of statutory
interpretation that we review for correction of errors at law. See State v.
Romer, 832 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 2013).
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III. Analysis.
“When a peace officer observes a traffic offense, however minor, the
officer has probable cause to stop the driver of the vehicle.” State v.
Mitchell, 498 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Iowa 1993). A traffic violation therefore
also establishes reasonable suspicion. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301, 309 (1990)
(“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable
cause . . . .”). “The motivation of the officer stopping the vehicle is not
controlling in determining whether reasonable suspicion existed. The
officer is therefore not bound by his real reasons for the stop.” State v.
Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002) (internal citation omitted).
However, “a mistake of law is not sufficient to justify a stop.” State v.
Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 294–96 (Iowa 2013) (requiring suppression of
evidence obtained when officer pulled over driver based on mistaken
belief license plate cover was illegal). “[T]he possibility for racial profiling
requires us to carefully review the objective basis for asserted
justifications behind traffic stops.” Id. at 297 n.4.
Iowa Code section 321.37(3) makes it unlawful “for the owner of a
vehicle to place any frame around or over the registration plate which
does not permit full view of all numerals and letters printed on the
registration plate.” We must determine if covering up the county name
on a license plate violates Iowa Code section 321.37(3). This is a
question of first impression. If Harrison did indeed violate Iowa Code
section 321.37(3), the officers had reasonable suspicion to pull him over
and the district court correctly denied his motion to suppress.
Harrison argues the phrase “numerals and letters” in Iowa Code
section 321.37(3) is a term of art that refers only to the large numbers
and letters in the center of a license plate that are commonly referred to
8
as the “registration plate number.” See Iowa Code § 321.166(2). The
first district court judge to rule on the question agreed. The trial judge
disagreed. Harrison relies on Iowa Code section 321.166(2), which states
in relevant part:
Every registration plate or pair of plates shall display a
registration plate number which shall consist of alphabetical
or numerical characters or a combination thereof and the
name of this state, which may be abbreviated. Every
registration plate issued by the county treasurer shall
display the name of the county, . . . except Pearl Harbor and
purple heart registration plates issued prior to January 1,
1997, and collegiate, fire fighter, and medal of honor
registration plates.
Id. (emphasis added). Harrison notes this section separately mentions
(1) the “registration plate number,” which consists of “alphabetical or
numerical characters”; (2) “the name of this state”; and (3) “the name of
the county.” He believes section 321.166(2) makes it clear that
“alphabetical or numerical characters” is synonymous with “registration
plate number,” both of which are distinct from the county name. He
then argues the phrases “alphabetical or numerical characters” in
section 321.166(2) and “numerals and letters” in section 321.37(3) are
interchangeable—both are terms of art referring only to the registration
plate number. See, e.g., id. § 321.34 (referring to license plate number
for various specialized license plates as “letter-number” designation); id.
§ 321.34(12)(c) (noting personalized license plates “shall be limited to no
more than five initials, letters, or combinations of numerals and letters”).
Harrison argues that when the legislature intends to refer broadly
to all of the information on a license plate, it uses different terminology
than “numerals and letters.” Namely, Iowa Code section 321.166(5)
requires that “[t]here shall be a marked contrast between the color of the
registration plates and the data which is required to be displayed on the
9
registration plates.” (Emphasis added.) He asserts that if the legislature
intended section 321.37(3) to prohibit drivers from covering up the
county name on a license plate, it would have written the statute to say:
“It is unlawful for the owner of a vehicle to place any frame around or
over the registration plate which does not permit full view of the data
which is required to be displayed on the registration plates.”
Harrison further argues Iowa Code sections 321.166(2) and
321.166(4) indicate the legislature does not view the county name as an
important piece of information. Iowa Code section 321.166(2) exempts
certain types of license plates from displaying the county name: “Pearl
Harbor and purple heart registration plates issued prior to January 1,
1997, and collegiate, fire fighter, and medal of honor registration plates.”
Iowa Code section 321.166(4) requires only “the registration plate
number” to “be of sufficient size to be readable from a distance of one
hundred feet during daylight.” Harrison bolsters this argument with
Officer Ellerbach’s testimony that officers use the registration plate
number to run a license plate check and do not use the county name to
retrieve information from the license plate database. For all those
reasons, Harrison urges us to conclude a license plate frame covering up
the county name does not violate Iowa Code section 321.37(3).
The State counters that the language of Iowa Code section
321.37(3) is clear and unambiguous: it requires “full view of all numerals
and letters printed on the registration plate,” and the county name on
the plate is indisputably made up of letters. (Emphasis added.) The
State asserts that if the legislature intended to limit the full-view
requirement in section 321.37(3) to the “registration plate number,” it
would have used that phrase instead of “all numerals and letters printed
on the registration plate.” The State points to Iowa Code section
10
321.166(2) as evidence of the legislature’s ability to refer specifically to
the “registration plate number.”
In response to Harrison’s argument that the county name is not an
important piece of information, the State emphasizes that Iowa Code
section 321.166(2) requires every license plate, except those exempted by
statute, to display the county name. The State asserts this demonstrates
“the county name is an integral element of the registration plate.” The
State points out that, although the county name is not necessary for a
license plate check, it nonetheless helps police and citizens identify
vehicles. While a person who sees a driver commit a crime may not be
able to remember a complete license plate number, the person may be
more easily able to recall the county name. This would narrow the
search to identify the vehicle. The county name on a plate also shows
whether a vehicle is registered locally or not, which may be relevant in
identifying suspicious behavior.
The State alternatively asserts Harrison violated Iowa Code section
321.38 by covering up the county name on his license plate. Iowa Code
section 321.38 requires license plates “to be clearly visible and . . .
maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly
legible.” The State emphasizes that this requirement is not limited to
only the license plate number. The State argues Harrison’s license plate
frame was “foreign material” that prevented his license plate from being
“clearly legible.”
We have not previously interpreted section 321.37(3). “When
interpreting a statute, ‘our primary goal is to give effect to the intent of
the legislature. That intent is evidenced by the words used in the
statute.’ ” State v. Walker, 804 N.W.2d 284, 290 (Iowa 2011) (quoting
Anderson v. State, 801 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Iowa 2011)). “In determining what
11
the legislature intended . . . , we are constrained to follow the express
terms of the statute.” State v. Byers, 456 N.W.2d 917, 919 (Iowa 1990).
“When more than one statute is relevant, we consider the statutes
together and try to harmonize them.” State v. Snyder, 634 N.W.2d 613,
615–16 (Iowa 2001) (construing interrelated provisions of Iowa Code
chapter 321 to define “motor vehicle”). “Statutory words are presumed to
be used in their ordinary and usual sense and with the meaning
commonly attributable to them.” State v. Royer, 632 N.W.2d 905, 908
(Iowa 2001). “Generally understood words of ordinary usage need not be
defined; however, technical terms or legal terms of art must be
explained.” State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996).
We conclude the plain language of Iowa Code section 321.37(3),
read together with section 321.166(2), dictates the outcome of this
appeal. Iowa Code section 321.166(2) requires a license plate such as
Harrison’s to “display the name of the county.” Section 321.37(3) in turn
provides:
It is unlawful for the owner of a vehicle to place any frame
around or over the registration plate which does not permit
full view of all numerals and letters printed on the
registration plate.
Iowa Code § 321.37(3) (emphasis added). The language “all numerals
and letters” unambiguously requires drivers to display all information
printed on the license plate, including the county name. See Hinojosa v.
State, 319 S.W.3d 258, 262 (Ark. 2009) (finding probable cause based on
violation of statute that prohibits “obscuring the license ‘plate’ ” and
noting “[n]othing in the language of the statute restricts its applicability
to the registration numbers alone”); Nelson v. State, 544 S.E.2d 189, 190
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (denying motion to suppress when a defendant’s
license plate cover obscured name of state on license plate tag, noting
12
“the statute does not specify that only certain portions of the tag must
not be obscured”). But see State v. St. Jean, 697 So. 2d 956, 957 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding county name was not an “identification
mark” and, therefore, did not have to be visible on license plate); State v.
Stearns, 101 P.3d 811, 815–16 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (interpreting
ambiguous statute in light of legislative intent and concluding statute did
not prohibit obscuring the word “Oregon”).
We reject Harrison’s interpretation that section 321.37(3) only
prohibits covering up the registration plate number. If the legislature
had intended this full-view requirement to apply only to the characters of
the registration plate number, it would have used that term in section
321.37(3). Instead, the legislature used broader language: “all numerals
and letters printed on the registration plate.” See Iowa Code § 321.37(3).
We give that phrase its generally understood meaning.
Harrison’s interpretation would undermine the display
requirements for Iowa license plates. Section 321.166(2) expressly
required Harrison’s license plate to display the name of the county. See
Iowa Code § 321.166(2). Why permit motorists to cover up information
on license plates they are required to display? Furthermore, Iowa Code
sections 321.38 and 321.388 demonstrate that the legislature intended
that all information to be displayed on a license plate must remain
readable. Iowa Code section 321.38 requires “[e]very registration plate”
“to be clearly visible and . . . maintained free from foreign materials and
in a condition to be clearly legible.” Iowa Code section 321.388 requires
the illumination of “the rear registration plate [to] render it clearly legible
from a distance of fifty feet.” Taken together, these statutes reinforce our
conclusion that covering up the county name on a license plate violates
Iowa Code section 321.37(3). See State v. Hayes, 660 P.2d 1387, 1389
13
(Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (construing equivalent statutory language to require
state name on license plate to be legible). Our interpretation harmonizes
section 321.37(3) with these related statutory provisions governing the
visibility and legibility of information to be displayed on license plates.
Our interpretation of section 321.37(3) also furthers the purpose of
the statute. See Walker, 804 N.W.2d at 290 (“ ‘We seek a reasonable
interpretation which will best effectuate the purpose of the statute . . . .’ ”
(quoting State v. Johnson, 528 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Iowa 2011))). An
important purpose of Iowa Code section 321.37(3), along with related
sections, is to allow police and citizens to identify vehicles. See State v.
Johnson, 219 S.W.3d 386, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (Johnson, J.,
concurring) (noting “license plates frequently contribute to the
investigation and resolution of crime”). “License plates are primarily
functional items, and it is not unreasonable to prohibit decorative items
or accessories that affect that functionality even to a small degree.” Id. at
388 (majority opinion). Although the county name is unnecessary to
conduct a license plate check, it can be useful to help law enforcement
track down a vehicle driven by someone who has been observed breaking
the law. Citizens unable to remember a complete registration plate
number may be able to help identify a particular vehicle by providing the
county name with a partial number.2
The trial judge correctly ruled that Iowa Code section 321.37(3) is
violated when the license plate frame covers up the county name.
Harrison’s violation of section 321.37(7) justified the traffic stop. The
2We recognize that certain specialty plates, such as those for medal of honor
winners, firefighters, and collegiate plates, need not display a county name. See Iowa
Code §§ 321.34, .166(2). Those plates, however, would be easier for a citizen to
remember than a random combination of letters and numbers without the county name
displayed.
14
district court therefore correctly denied his motion to suppress. Because
we uphold the stop on the basis of his license plate violation, we need not
decide and do not reach the issue of whether the stop was independently
justified on grounds of reasonable suspicion of drug dealing.
IV. Disposition.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of appeals opinion
on the plea agreement issue, vacate its decision on the reasonable
suspicion issue, and affirm the district court judgment and sentence.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND
VACATED IN PART; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE
AFFIRMED.
All justices concur except Appel and Hecht, JJ., who dissent.
15
#12–0139, State v. Harrison
APPEL, Justice (dissenting).
In my view, the term “all numerals and letters” in Iowa Code
section 321.37(3) means “all numerals and letters,” not “all numerals,
letters, and the name of the county.” I reach this conclusion by
examining Iowa Code section 321.166(2) (2009), which provides:
Every registration plate or pair of plates shall display a
registration plate number which shall consist of alphabetical
or numerical characters or a combination thereof and the
name of this state, which may be abbreviated. Every
registration plate issued by the county treasurer shall
display the name of the county . . . .
(Emphasis added.)
This provision distinguishes between the registration plate
number, which contains alphabetical or numerical characters, and the
name of the county. Reading the statutes in pari materia, I would
conclude “all numerals and letters” in section 321.37(3) refers to the
registration plate number, not the name of the county. Notwithstanding
my conclusion, I recognize there is a plausible contrary interpretation,
based in part on policy, which is presented in the majority opinion.
There is, however, a countervailing policy and a larger story in this
case that should not be overlooked. Davenport police had received a tip
from a confidential informant, but the tip contained only conclusory
information. Unlike a tip from a citizen informant, a tip from a
confidential informant is not entitled to a presumption of reliability. See
State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 669 (Iowa 1996) (“Because the
confidential informant was not a citizen informant, the informant was
not entitled to a presumption of reliability.”); State v. Drake, 224 N.W.2d
476, 478–79 (Iowa 1974) (noting the rule requiring the state to prove the
16
informant’s “prior reliability is considerably relaxed” in the case of a
citizen informant).
At the suppression hearing, the State offered no evidence of the
informant’s reliability. Instead, the State attempted to rely on
corroboration at the scene, which consisted almost solely of
corroboration of innocent facts like the make, model, and license plate
number. Mere corroboration of innocent facts does not establish the
basis for a Terry-type traffic stop. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272, 120
S. Ct. 1375, 1379, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254, 261 (2000) (holding that to
establish reasonable suspicion, the tip must “be reliable in its assertion
of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person”);
United States v. Roch, 5 F.3d 894, 897–98 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding tip
from known confidential informant who had previously given reliable
information did not provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory
stop because the tip failed to provide “significant details” or “a prediction
of future behavior” and police did not observe any suspicious behavior in
their surveillance of the defendant).
The only allegedly suspicious activity is that the suspect’s car
pulled over to the side of the road for a few minutes after having been
followed from “a far distance,” or at a distance of “a block or two,” by an
unmarked police car. I am not sure a car pulling over gives rise to a
hunch, let alone the reasonable suspicion traditionally required to
execute a traffic stop under either the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution or article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. See,
e.g., People v. Revoal, 269 P.3d 1238, 1241 (Colo. 2012) (no reasonable
suspicion when defendant looked left, looked right, and walked away
when he noticed a police vehicle); State v. McCleery, 560 N.W.2d 789,
793 (Neb. 1997) (holding approaching motorist who turns around and
17
drives away rather than pass through a checkpoint does not trigger
reasonable suspicion for a stop); State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d 649, 661
(Tenn. 2006) (flight, without more, does not establish reasonable
suspicion); State v. Gatewood, 182 P.3d 426, 428 (Wash. 2008) (walking
away from police does not give rise to reasonable suspicion).
The officers seem to have realized they did not have a basis for the
traffic stop based upon the unreliable and uncorroborated confidential
informant’s tip and the mere pulling over of a vehicle along the side of
the road. So, instead, they defended the stop by asserting the license
plate frame covered the name of the county on the bottom of the plate.
This stop raises the question of pretext. The officers were not
engaged in their stakeout to look for license plate violations, nor did they
activate their emergency lights and drive through intersections to catch
up with Harrison merely to stem the rising tide of license plate
infractions. The officers’ obvious goal was not to take care of the license
plate, but rather to investigate an alleged crime for which they had no
basis to initiate a stop.
There is a question as to whether a pretextual basis for a stop or
search is constitutionally sufficient. The United States Supreme Court in
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–16, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774–76,
135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 97–100 (1996), answered this question in the
affirmative under the Fourth Amendment, and we are bound by that
interpretation for purposes of the United States Constitution. Following
the Supreme Court’s lead, one court allowed a stop based on the
obstruction caused by hanging air fresheners and fuzzy dice. See
Commonwealth v. Shabazz, 18 A.3d 1217, 1222 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
At least two state appellate courts, however, have rejected Whren
in the context of traffic stops in interpreting their state constitutions.
18
The most recent case is State v. Ochoa, 206 P.3d 143 (N.M. Ct. App.
2008). In this case, the New Mexico appellate court considered whether
a stop for a seat belt violation of a suspect being investigated for drug
activity violated the search and seizure clause of the New Mexico
Constitution. Id. at 146–47. The New Mexico court canvassed numerous
authorities, noting, in particular, the ease with which law enforcement
may stop automobiles on the road in light of the pervasiveness of minor
traffic violations. Id. at 148–50. The New Mexico court emphasized that
under the New Mexico Constitution, there is no reduced expectation of
privacy in an automobile. Id. at 151. The New Mexico court further
stated:
In performing a pretextual traffic stop, a police officer is
stopping the driver, “not to enforce the traffic code, but to
conduct a criminal investigation unrelated to the driving.
Therefore the reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic
infraction has occurred which justifies an exception to the
warrant requirement for an ordinary traffic stop does not
justify a stop for criminal investigation.”
Id. at 149 (quoting State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 837–38 (Wash. 1999)).
The New Mexico court relied on a case from the Washington
Supreme Court, which reached a similar conclusion. See id. (citing
Ladson, 979 P.2d at 837–38); see also State v. Heath, 929 A.2d 390, 402
(Del. Super. Ct. 2006) (concluding that stops “demonstrated to have been
made exclusively for the purpose of investigating an officer’s hunch
about some other offense” violate the Delaware Constitution). See
generally Michael Sievers, Note, State v. Ochoa: The End of Pretextual
Stops in New Mexico?, 42 N.M. L. Rev. 595 (2012) (discussing the New
Mexico court’s decision in Ochoa and concluding the court was right to
depart from United States Supreme Court precedent).
19
While we have recognized police may stop a vehicle when there is
reason to believe there is an ongoing civil infraction, State v. Pals, 805
N.W.2d 767, 774 (Iowa 2011), we have never directly considered the
validity of a traffic stop where the basis of the stop was alleged to be
pretextual. This issue of whether Whren is good law under the Iowa
Constitution when a traffic stop is based on pretext, however, was not
raised by Harrison and we do not address it today.
Much has been written about unbridled discretion to stop vehicles
on the open road. In particular, commentary has been concerned that
without some constitutional restraints, African-Americans and other
minority groups may be subject to stops for “driving while black.” David
A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The
Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
544, 550–53 (1997); see also David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth
Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 556, 582–84
(1998) (concluding evidence supports a finding that police stop minorities
“in numbers greatly disproportionate to their presence in the driving
population” even though “there is no race- or ethnicity-neutral
explanation for it”); Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the
Fourth Amendment, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1413, 1421–33 (2013) (noting
that Whren “solidified a trend in United States jurisprudence toward
ignoring police officers’ racial biases, admitted or otherwise” and
concluding the only workable solution to pretextual traffic stops is
through a reconsideration of Whren); Wayne R. LaFave, The Routine
Traffic Stop from Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth
Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843, 1860–61 (2004) (discussing the
difficulties of an equal protection challenge to selective enforcement of
traffic laws). While I recognize the need to allow law enforcement to do
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its job, article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution requires us to ensure
individuals are protected from unwarranted seizures on the open road.
We recently began to closely examine traffic stops to prevent
expanded and unwarranted searches and seizures. See, e.g., State v.
Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 297–98 (Iowa 2013) (concluding there was
neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle for a
license plate violation and that the officer may have specifically targeted
the vehicle for some other unknown reason); Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 782–84
(holding consent to search a vehicle was invalid where the suspect had
been subject to a pat-down search, detained in the police vehicle, and
was not advised that he was free to leave, that he could refuse consent,
or that all business related to the initial stop was complete). Other state
supreme courts have utilized their state constitutions to prevent
arbitrary police conduct on the open road in a variety of contexts. See,
e.g., Sitz v. Dep’t of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 210 (Mich. 1993)
(declining to follow under state constitution on remand the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990)); State v.
Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 361–63 (Minn. 2004) (rejecting United States
Supreme Court decision in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001), which permitted custodial
arrest for seat belt violation); Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519
N.W.2d 183, 187 (Minn. 1994) (declining to follow the United Sates
Supreme Court’s decision in Sitz, in case involving temporary road
block); State v. Sterndale, 656 A.2d 409, 411 (N.H. 1995) (rejecting
“automobile exception” to warrant requirement and declining to follow
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572
(1982)); State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 912 (N.J. 2002) (consent to search
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a vehicle must be based on reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing
beyond initial valid motor vehicle stop, departing from Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973), in
context of traffic stop). These state supreme courts refuse to simply color
match cases under their state constitutions with federal precedent and,
instead, engage in independent analysis of the state constitutional issues
presented.
In the meantime, the take-away point for Iowa citizens is that they
better go out to the garage and check their license plate frames if they
want to avoid being pulled over by law enforcement on the open road.
For the thousands of Iowans who have a frame that promotes a sports
team, or an auto dealer, or have a nice (or not so nice) slogan, beware! If
the license plate frame happens to obscure the county name on the
plate, the State will take the position that police may stop the vehicle
anywhere and at any time, whether one is dropping the kids off at
school, returning home from the football game, or on the way to work,
without any further sign of criminal wrongdoing. The State will likely
take the position that the decision to stop a vehicle will rest in the
unreviewable discretion of the police regardless of pretext. Sounds a bit
like a general warrant, doesn’t it? See State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260,
269–73 (Iowa 2010) (discussing the desire of the framers of the Fourth
Amendment to reject the general warrants authorized by the British
Crown).
Hecht, J., joins this dissent.