IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1025
Filed July 30, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
SCOTT KRAMER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Karen
Kaufman Salic, District Associate Judge.
The defendant appeals his conviction for operating while intoxicated,
second offense. AFFIRMED.
Brian D. Miller of Miller & Miller, P.C., Hampton, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney
General, Carlyle D. Dalen, County Attorney, and Nichole M. Benes, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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MULLINS, J.
Scott Kramer appeals following his conviction for operating while
intoxicated, second offense. He asserts on appeal he crossed his vehicle over
the center lane to avoid a pothole and vehicles parked along the side of the road,
and did not otherwise violate any traffic laws. Thus, he claims the officer did not
have probable cause to make a vehicle stop. He also claims a report that his
vehicle was at the location of a physical altercation earlier that evening did not
give the officer reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
On June 25, 2012, at approximately 10:38 p.m., a man phoned the police
and reported there were people arguing and yelling outside of his neighbor’s
house, as well as a vehicle out front with its hazard lights on. By the time officers
arrived on the scene, the vehicle was gone, and so they began to search the
area for the vehicle. Shortly thereafter, an officer located and began to follow a
vehicle that matched the description given by the caller. The officer observed the
vehicle cross over the center line, three-quarters of the way into the lane
reserved for oncoming traffic. He pulled the vehicle over and noticed that both
the driver and the passenger showed signs of intoxication. The officer also
noticed the passenger showed signs of having been involved in an altercation, as
his eye was swollen shut and there were cuts and blood on his face.
Investigation confirmed the vehicle was the one the citizen had reported.
The driver was Scott Kramer, and the passenger was his son. The officers
arrested Kramer and charged him with operating while intoxicated, in violation of
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Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2011). Kramer pled not guilty and filed a motion to
suppress, alleging the stop was a violation of his state and federal constitutional
rights. Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress,
finding Kramer’s traffic violation established probable cause to stop the vehicle.
Kramer waived jury trial, and the parties stipulated the case would be submitted
to the court upon the minutes of testimony. Based on the minutes, the court
found Kramer guilty as charged. Kramer filed a timely notice of appeal
challenging the district court’s denial of his suppression motion.
II. SCOPE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Because Kramer claims the district court failed to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of the federal and state constitutions, our review is de novo.
See State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 164 (Iowa 2013). When deciding such
claims, “‘we make an independent evaluation [based on] the totality of the
circumstances as shown by the entire record,’” and in light of each case’s unique
characteristics. See id. (quoting State v. Kurth, 813 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa
2012)). While deference is given to the factual findings of the district court,
especially concerning the credibility of witnesses, we are not bound by such
findings. See State v. Lane, 726 N.W.2d 371, 377 (Iowa 2007).
III. PROBABLE CAUSE OF A TRAFFIC VIOLATION
Kramer contends there was insufficient probable cause of a traffic violation
to warrant his stop. He points to Iowa Code section 321.297(1)(b), which
provides:
1. A vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the
roadway upon all roadways of sufficient width, except as follows:
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....
b. When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to
the left of the center of the roadway, provided, any person so doing
shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles travelling in the proper
direction upon the unobstructed portion of the roadway within such
distance as to constitute an immediate hazard.
Kramer claims he crossed over the center line to avoid a “6-8 inch deep road
pothole,” as well as cars that were parked along the side of the road in front of an
apartment building. He argues this qualifies for the exception permitting a driver
to cross the center line when an obstruction necessitates such a maneuver.
Kramer also argues there was no probable cause because the officer who pulled
him over testified he stopped Kramer’s vehicle to investigate the earlier
altercation and did not mention the traffic violation.
“If a traffic violation actually occurred and the officer witnessed it, the State
has established probable cause.” State v. Tyler, 830 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Iowa
2013). It does not matter how minor the traffic violation is. See id. “‘Probable
cause exists if the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable and
prudent person would lead that person to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing it.’” State v. Tague,
676 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Iowa 2004) (quoting State v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619,
624 (Iowa 1990)). If an officer has probable cause to stop, it does not matter if
the traffic violation is a mere “pretextual” reason for stopping the vehicle. See
State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 360 (Iowa 2000), overruled on other
grounds in State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).
Here, the officer witnessed Kramer’s vehicle cross over the center line,
nearly three-quarters of the way into the oncoming lane. Kramer admits he
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crossed the center line. The officer testified it was unnecessary for the vehicle to
make such a maneuver at that time because, despite the vehicles parked on the
side of the road, the driving lane was wide enough to accommodate Kramer’s
vehicle without needing to cross the center line. Although Kramer may have had
an explanation for crossing the center line, and arguably even a defense to a
charge of a traffic violation under section 321.297(1)(b), the fact remains that the
officer observed what he believed was a traffic violation. As noted above, we
defer to the district court concerning credibility of witnesses. See Lane, 726
N.W.2d at 377. The officer had probable cause to stop Kramer’s vehicle.
We affirm the district court’s suppression ruling. Accordingly, we need not
consider Kramer’s claim that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe
he was involved in the altercation that was being investigated.
AFFIRMED.