IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-0401
Filed June 25, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAMES E. FARNSWORTH II,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Colleen D.
Weiland, Judge.
James Farnsworth appeals his conviction for second-degree murder.
AFFIRMED.
David A. Roth of Gallagher, Langlas & Gallagher, P.C., Waterloo, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kyle P. Hanson and Susan Krisko,
Assistant Attorneys General, and Carlyle D. Dalen, County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
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VOGEL, P.J.
James Farnsworth appeals his conviction for second-degree murder.
Farnsworth asserts three bases of error: (1) the State engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct when it referenced Farnsworth’s conduct earlier in the evening, prior
to the fight in which he stabbed the victim; (2) the district court abused its
discretion when it granted the State’s motion to strike a prospective juror for
cause; and (3) Farnsworth’s Miranda rights were violated when the State
introduced evidence of his statements to police. We conclude Farnsworth failed
to preserve error on both his prosecutorial misconduct and Miranda claims. We
further conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion when striking the
prospective juror for cause. Consequently, we affirm Farnsworth’s conviction.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Several witnesses to the details of this incident testified, each relating
slightly different facts depending on their proximity to certain actions. None,
however, contradicted another. Based on this testimony, the jury could have
found the following facts. On April 13, 2012, Farnsworth, his girlfriend, Victoria
Miller, and several others were at the apartment of Echo Dority. The group then
decided to go to a local bar. At the bar, Miller received a text of a smiley face
from her ex-boyfriend, Ian Decker, who is also the father of her child. Farnsworth
and Miller argued, and Farnsworth slapped Miller. Miller then told Farnsworth
she was “done with him” and that he should leave. With the encouragement of
others in the group, Farnsworth left.
Not long after that, the group decided to go back to Dority’s apartment.
Farnsworth was waiting around the corner from the bar. Miller ignored
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Farnsworth and others told him to leave. Undeterred, Farnsworth followed the
group, which continued to largely ignore his presence. When Farnsworth
approached Miller, Dority kicked Farnsworth in the crotch, causing him to fall to
the ground. Farnsworth got up and ran to Dority’s apartment, arriving ahead of
the group.
Dority did not allow Farnsworth to enter her apartment. In an effort to talk
with Miller, Farnsworth sent her numerous text messages. Miller replied, telling
him to leave and that “[e]veryone wants to beat the f*** out of you.” Farnsworth
threatened to kill himself and walked away from the door and out of sight of those
in the apartment.
Dority and Miller went outside the apartment to wait for Decker, whom
Dority had invited. After Decker’s arrival, Farnsworth came from around the
corner and made a request to speak with Miller, which she refused. Miller and
Decker told Farnsworth to leave, so he got in his car and drove quickly away.
However, a few minutes later, Farnsworth “came barreling back down the street”
as other guests, Alyssa Fullerton and Derek Wentworth, were leaving the
apartment. Miller and Wentworth told Farnsworth to leave. Farnsworth
approached Miller, and Wentworth stepped between the two. After Miller
informed Farnsworth she did not want to speak with him, Farnsworth stated: “If
Ian [Decker] tries anything, I’m going to f****** stab him.”1
Decker was standing around the corner of the apartment building. Upon
hearing Miller and Farnsworth arguing, Decker appeared to be very angry. He
1
At trial, Miller testified she knew Farnsworth kept a knife in the center console of his
car, but that, to her knowledge, he never carried the knife in his pocket.
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walked around the corner and began fighting with Farnsworth. It was not
disputed that Decker threw the first punch. Miller tried to warn Decker by yelling,
“[S]top, [Decker], he has a knife.” The two continued fighting and grappled on
the ground but both got back up. At one point, Decker was hunched over
Farnsworth, but Farnsworth was able to throw Decker off of him. When Decker
stood up, he lifted his shirt to reveal blood streaming down his chest and onto the
sidewalk. Decker collapsed; Miller and Dority applied pressure to his chest
wound. Farnsworth stood there briefly, then got in his car and sped away. It was
later revealed Decker had been stabbed once in the ribs, once in the thigh, and
had a cutting wound on his left forearm. Although police and paramedics quickly
arrived, Decker died at the scene from the stab wound in his side, which had
pierced his heart.
Police stopped Farnsworth shortly after he drove away. Farnsworth was
cooperative and informed police the knife was in his center console. When
asked what happened, Farnsworth replied Decker had punched him four or five
times, prompting Farnsworth to pull the knife from his pocket and “[fling] it
around.” Although Farnsworth had some visible injuries, he refused medical
treatment and was transported to the police station. Farnsworth later complained
about being dizzy, and was then taken to the hospital. A neurological exam
revealed the absence of a head injury, and though the doctor thought perhaps
Farnsworth’s nose was broken, Farnsworth refused to have X-rays taken and
declined further treatment.
Farnsworth was charged with murder in the second degree on April 20,
2012, in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and 707.3 (2011). A jury trial was
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held, and on January 17, 2013, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Farnsworth
appeals.
II. Error Preservation
To preserve error on appeal, the party must first state the objection in a
timely manner, that is, at a time when corrective action can be taken, in addition
to the basis for the objection. State v. Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d 518, 524 (Iowa
2011) (holding a one-page resistance that stated there was no legal basis for the
State’s actions did not properly preserve error with respect to the defendant’s
constitutional claims). This reflects both the substantive and timeliness
components of error preservation. Id. at 523. The court must then rule on the
properly raised objection. Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012).
“If the court’s ruling indicates that the court considered the issue and necessarily
ruled on it, even if the court’s reasoning is ‘incomplete or sparse,’ the issue has
been preserved.” Id. (quoting Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 540 (Iowa
2002)).
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Farnsworth first asserts the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct
when it argued that the relevant portion of time regarding whether Farnsworth
was the initial aggressor included the events of the evening, preceding the
ultimate altercation. He also claims that, during its closing arguments, the State
prejudicially misled the jury regarding the law of justification and whether
Farnsworth had an alternative course of action under the law.
However, at no point during the trial did Farnsworth claim the State
engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, or otherwise object to the statements he
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now contests on appeal. Even his generic post-trial motion was too late to
preserve error. See Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d at 524. Farnsworth cannot obtain a
new trial asserting prosecutorial misconduct when he failed to move for a mistrial
at the time the alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurred. See id. at 526. By
not objecting or otherwise alleging prosecutorial misconduct at the time of trial,
Farnsworth failed to preserve error.
However, regardless of the error preservation issue, Farnsworth’s
argument regarding prosecutorial misconduct fails. To prevail on this claim,
Farnsworth must show both that misconduct occurred and that he was so
prejudiced by the error he was deprived of a fair trial. See State v. Graves, 668
N.W.2d 860, 869 (Iowa 2003). Primarily, Farnsworth cannot show the prosecutor
improperly referenced his conduct from earlier in the evening, that is, slapping
Miller at the bar. The jury must consider the complete story of the crime in
deciding whether Farnsworth started or continued the incident, as required of a
justification defense. See State v. Shortridge, 589 N.W.2d 76, 83 (Iowa Ct. App.
1998). Consequently, there was no prosecutorial misconduct when the State
introduced evidence of the events leading up to the altercation. Moreover,
Farnsworth failed to demonstrate prejudice occurred when the prosecutor stated
Decker “had been seriously provoked by the fact that the defendant was
speaking to Miller.” The jury received the proper instruction defining serious
provocation. Furthermore, this was only relevant to the lesser included offense
of voluntary manslaughter, which was not the crime of which Farnsworth was
convicted. Therefore, this argument also fails.
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B. Miranda Violation
Farnsworth next argues the State unconstitutionally used his silence—or
lack of response—against him, resulting in a Miranda violation. The State
questioned the officer who apprehended Farnsworth as to whether Farnsworth
made any statements that would support his defense of justification.2 However,
Farnsworth did not file a motion to exclude this evidence or object to its
introduction at trial. This argument was thus never considered by the trial court,
and Farnsworth failed to preserve error. See Lamasters, 821 N.W.2d at 864.
Moreover, even if we were to address the merits of Farnsworth’s claim, it
would fail. Farnsworth asserted he acted in self defense. The State did not use
Farnsworth’s silence after his receipt of Miranda warnings to impeach his
justification claim, a strategy that would result in a Miranda violation. Rather, the
State engaged in a proper cross-examination by using Farnsworth’s voluntary
statements to police concerning his involvement in the incident to impeach his
claim. See State v. Metz, 636 N.W.2d 94, 97 (Iowa 2001) (“[T]he Fifth
Amendment guaranty against self-incrimination prohibits impeachment on the
basis of a criminal defendant’s silence after receipt of Miranda warnings.”); see
2
Specifically, the following exchange occurred:
Q: What’s the first thing that the defendant says that you can
recall about what had happened? A: He ran at me because I’m dating his
ex-girlfriend, slash, baby’s mama. He ran at me and punched me four to
five times. My right hand was in my pocket, and that’s where my knife
was. I pulled it out and flung it around. That’s when he fell down. He
then said—I apologize for my language—I f***ing put it back in my pocket
and I left.
Q: Is that his entire statement regarding what he told you? The
first statement that he ever made to a police officer, is that exactly what
he said? A: Yes.
Q: Did he say that he had acted in self-defense? A: No.
Q: Did he say that he was scared? A: No.
Q: Did he ask about Ian Decker? A: No.
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also Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980) (holding there is no Miranda
violation when the prosecutor engages in cross-examination that “merely inquires
into prior inconsistent statements”). Consequently, no Miranda violation
occurred.
III. Juror Strike
Farnsworth’s final claim is the district court abused its discretion by
granting the State’s challenge for cause. Farnsworth asserts he was prejudiced
by this decision because the State was then able to exercise more of its
peremptory strikes, which he asserts resulted in a biased jury.
We review the district court’s ruling on a challenge for cause for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Hardin, 498 N.W.2d 677, 681 (Iowa 1993). The test to be
applied in a ruling on challenges for cause is “whether the juror holds such a
fixed opinion on the merits of the case that he or she cannot judge impartially the
guilt or innocence of the defendant.” State v. Neuendorf, 509 N.W.2d 743, 746
(Iowa 1993) (internal citation omitted).
During voir dire, one prospective juror stated that his son had been
convicted of drug charges and “did not get treated fairly at all” when sentenced.
When asked if he could set aside his perception of his son’s treatment, the juror
responded “I would have a hard time convicting this young man. I would.” He
also stated that he would have to be “thoroughly convinced” of Farnsworth’s guilt.
When asked whether the State and Farnsworth would begin the trial on a level
playing field, the juror stated Farnsworth was “off to a head start with me.” He
said it would have to be “hands down” and “no doubt.” When inquiring further
into whether the juror would be able to apply the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
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standard of proof, he responded that he “would have a very difficult time doing
that.”
In granting the State’s motion to strike this juror for cause, the district court
stated:
I’m pretty uncomfortable with [this prospective juror]. When he’s
asked specific questions by [defense counsel], he says “yes” but he
backtracks immediately when [the State] is asking him questions
and his body language is telling me he’s not—his body language is
telling me he’s finding a way to acquit despite what evidence might
or might not be.
The court further noted this juror said he would not follow the law regarding the
State’s burden of proof.
We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to strike this juror for
cause. The juror clearly indicated his bias toward the defense. This is enough to
show he could not “judge impartially the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Id.
Consequently, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Having considered all issues properly preserved for appeal, we affirm
Farnsworth’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.