IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1841
Filed May 29, 2014
IN THE INTEREST OF J.S., E.S., P.S., AND J.S.,
Minor Children,
M.S., Father,
Appellant,
S.B., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Audubon County, Susan L.
Christensen, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Jennifer Plumb of Cambridge Law Firm, P.L.C., Atlantic, for appellant
father.
David L. Wiederstein of Otto,. Lorence & Wiederstein, P.L.L.C., Atlantic,
for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Janet L. Hoffman, Assistant Attorney
General, and Francine Anderson, County Attorney, for appellee State.
Karen Mailander, Anita, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
2
DOYLE, J.
A mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her four
children: two-year-old J.S., three-year-old E.S., four-year-old P.S., and six-year-
old J.S.1 We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This family came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Human
Services (DHS) in November 2011 following concerns about deplorable and
unsafe home conditions. A child abuse assessment resulted in a founded report
of denial of critical care against the mother and father. Concerns about the
parents’ failure to provide adequate health care for one of the children, P.S.,
resulted in a second founded report of denial of critical care against the parents.
The children were adjudicated in need of assistance in February 2012.
The children remained in the family home and services were initiated to eliminate
the concerns regarding the condition of the home. Unfortunately, the parents
were unable to maintain a clean, safe home environment for the children. The
children were filthy and had no specific routines. They did not have consistent
mealtimes and were allowed to stay up until 1:00 a.m. on a regular basis. The
older three children did not wear diapers and were allowed to urinate and
defecate throughout the home. Animal feces, discarded food, debris, and small
choking hazards cluttered the floor.
The children were removed from the parents’ care in June 2012. In its
order removing the children following a review hearing, the juvenile court noted
1
The father of the children also appealed, but the Iowa Supreme Court dismissed his
appeal as untimely on May 12, 2014.
3
the lack of progress and motivation by the parents and found, “Enough is
enough. [The children are] too young to self-protect [and to] allow them to
remain in their parents’ care is contrary to their welfare and poses an immediate
and imminent threat to their lives and safety.” The children have not returned to
the parents’ care since their removal.
The mother and father were unemployed and unable to maintain
employment. The mother received monthly social security disability payments
but struggled to meet basic needs. She did not have a driver’s license because
she had a fear of driving. The father married another woman who was pregnant
with his child, moved to Oklahoma, and ceased participation in reunification
services. Meanwhile, the mother began living with her seventeen-year-old
boyfriend and became pregnant with his child.
To her credit, the mother was able to improve the conditions of her home
after the children were removed from her care. Unfortunately, the mother
remained unable to implement appropriate parenting skills to keep her young
children safe. The children’s behaviors were reported to be “extremely difficult”
and the mother was unable to parent the children without significant assistance
and constant supervision.2
The mother’s supervised visits took place once per week for two hours.
During the visits, the mother struggled to maintain control over the children and
became overwhelmed. Care providers played an active role in keeping the
children safe during visits. The mother also had two four-hour supervised visits
2
Although the children have developed challenging behaviors, case providers believe
they are adoptable.
4
and two eight-hour supervised visits. Although the mother attempted to use the
parenting skills she was learning through reunification services, she became
frustrated and relied on care providers to help care for the children. Care
providers opined the mother could not have the children overnight without posing
a risk to the children’s well-being. The mother did not request extended visits at
her home, and stated she felt “safer” when visits took place at the DHS office.
The State filed a petition to terminate parental rights in August 2013. The
termination hearing was held in August 2013. By that time, the mother had given
birth to her fifth child.3 The mother acknowledged she struggled caring for her
older four children by herself but expressed it would be better if she had
someone with her. The guardian ad litem’s statement to the court recommended
termination of parental rights and placement of the children with adoptive
families, noting the mother “has tried very hard to learn to parent better, and has
been completely compliant with all services [but] she is unable to care for all four
at once.”
Following the termination hearing, the juvenile court entered its order
terminating the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections
232.116(1)(f) and (h) (2013). The mother appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
We review proceedings to terminate parental rights de novo. In re A.B.,
815 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Iowa 2012). We give weight to the juvenile court’s factual
findings, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but we are not
bound by them. Id. We will uphold an order terminating parental rights if there is
3
That child is not subject to these proceedings.
5
clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under Iowa Code
section 232.116. In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). Evidence is
clear and convincing when there are no serious or substantial doubts as to the
correctness or conclusions of law drawn from the evidence. Id.
III. Discussion
A. Grounds for Termination
We must first determine whether a ground for termination under section
232.116(1) is established. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). Here, the
mother does not dispute the statutory grounds under sections 232.116(1)(f) and
(h) have been proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Rather, the mother claims she did “not have enough opportunity to have
visits with her children due to restrictions imposed on her by DHS,” 4 including the
chance to “parent her children in the new and improved home environment that
she had established” or “test the visitation with one or two of her four children at
a time rather than all four at the same time.” We interpret this contention as a
claim the State did not engage in reasonable efforts to reunite her with the
children.
Reasonable services must be provided to attempt to reunite a family
before the State can terminate parental rights.5 See In re L.M.W., 518 N.W.2d
804, 807 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994). Although the State has the obligation to make
4
We disregard the inconsistency with this claim and the mother’s further claim that she
“had regular visitation and contact with the children.”
5
Iowa Code section 232.102(5)(b) requires the State to make reasonable efforts to
preserve the family before removing a child from the home. After removal, the State
must make reasonable efforts to reunify the family as quickly as possible. See Iowa
Code § 232.102(7). In determining whether reasonable efforts have been made, the
court considers “[t]he type, duration, and intensity of services or support offered or
provided to the child and the child’s family.” Id. § 232.102(10)(a)(1).
6
reasonable efforts, it is the parent’s responsibility to demand services if they are
not offered prior to the termination hearing. In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679
(Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
At each stage of the proceedings, the juvenile court consistently found
reasonable efforts were being made. The mother did not request any specific
services prior to termination, and indeed, asked that visits take place at the DHS
office rather than her home. After a careful review of the record, we find the
services offered were reasonable under the facts of this case.
B. Factors in Termination
Even if a statutory ground for termination is met, a decision to terminate
must still be in the best interests of the children after a review of section
232.116(2). P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 37. In determining the best interests, this
court’s primary considerations are “the child’s safety, the best placement for
furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and the physical,
mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Id.
The mother does not dispute termination is in the best interests of the
children, and we agree with the juvenile court’s finding that termination of the
mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children and would best
provide for the children’s long-term nurturing and growth. “It is well-settled law
that we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a
ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will
learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id. at 41;
see A.B., 815 N.W.2d at 778 (noting the parent’s past conduct is instructive in
determining the parent’s future behavior). Here, the mother is unable to assume
7
custody of the child now or at any time in the foreseeable future. Children are
not equipped with pause buttons. There is no reason to delay the children the
permanency they need and deserve.
C. Factors Against Termination
Finally, we give consideration to whether any exception or factor in section
232.116(3) applies to make termination unnecessary. The mother claims the
juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights due to her close bond with
the children. Termination is not mandatory when clear and convincing evidence
is found that termination would be detrimental to the children due to the
closeness of the parent-child relationship. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c).
We have discretion, based on the unique circumstances of each case and
the best interests of the children, whether to apply the factors in this section to
save the parent-child relationships. See P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40. Although the
mother clearly loves the children, there is no evidence the mother’s relationships
with the children are so close it would be detrimental to the children if termination
occurred. Termination is not prevented by a consequential factor under section
232.116(3).
IV. Conclusion
There is clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination exist,
termination of parental rights is in the children’s best interests, and no
consequential factor weighing against termination requires a different conclusion.
Accordingly, we affirm termination of the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.