SECOND DIVISION
ANDREWS, P. J.,
MCFADDEN and RAY , JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/
July 25, 2014
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A14A0791. HOLCOMB v. THE STATE.
MCFADDEN, Judge.
Michael Holcomb appeals from his convictions for child molestation and
aggravated sexual battery, contending that the evidence is insufficient to support the
guilty verdict. We disagree and affirm.
When a criminal defendant challenges his conviction on the ground of
insufficient evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (b) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979)
(citation omitted; emphasis in original).
So viewed, the evidence showed that, beginning in 2006, A. H. and her brother
lived with their grandmother and Holcomb, their uncle. Holcomb’s bedroom was
right next to A.H.’s bedroom. A. H. testified that in February 2008, when she was 12
years old, Holcomb began coming into her room at night and touching her
inappropriately. Over the course of about a month, he progressed from fondling A.
H.’s breasts and genitals to digitally penetrating her, as well as exposing himself to
her and forcing her to touch his genitals.
This evidence authorized the jury to find that Holcomb committed the offense
of child molestation, which occurs when a person “does any immoral or indecent act
to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to
arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person.” OCGA § 16-6-4
(a) (1). This evidence also authorized the jury to find that Holcomb committed the
offense of aggravated sexual battery, which occurs when a person “intentionally
penetrates with a foreign object the sexual organ . . . of another person without the
consent of that person.” OCGA § 16-6-22.2 (b). A. H.’s testimony alone was
sufficient to establish the elements of these offenses. See Hammontree v. State, 283
Ga. App. 736, 737 (1) (624 SE2d 412) (2007).
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Nevertheless, Holcomb argues the evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions, because other evidence challenged A. H.’s credibility. He points to
testimony that A. H. had a reputation for untruthfulness, evidence that A. H. delayed
her outcry in this case, and A. H.’s own admission that she lied in her testimony for
another molestation case in which she was the victim. He also points to the fact that
A. H.’s family members did not corroborate her story. But see Mauldin v. State, 313
Ga. App. 228, 231 (1) (721 SE2d 182) (2011) (a victim’s testimony is sufficient,
regardless of whether there are corroborating witnesses). Citing former OCGA § 24-
9-85 (a), Holcomb argues that he successfully impeached A. H.’s testimony, and
consequently the jury should not have believed her. (A similar witness impeachment
statute may be found in Georgia’s new Evidence Code at OCGA § 24-6-608.)
Whether A. H. gave a credible account of Holcomb’s actions, however, was for
the jury to decide. It is well-established that
[i]t is the function of the jury, not this [c]ourt, to judge the credibility of
witnesses, resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. In so doing, a jury is
authorized to believe or disbelieve all or any part of the testimony of
witnesses. Ultimately, as long as there is some competent evidence, even
though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the
state’s case, the jury’s verdict will be upheld.
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Mauldin, 313 Ga. App. at 231 (1) (citations omitted). Additionally, “[t]his court does
not re-weigh evidence or resolve conflicts in testimony; instead, evidence is reviewed
in a light most favorable to the verdict, with deference to the jury’s assessment of the
weight and credibility of the evidence.” Cook v. State, 276 Ga. App. 803, 804 (1) (625
SE2d 83) (2005) (citation omitted).
Judgment affirmed. Andrews, P. J., and Ray, J., concur.
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