[Cite as Cleveland v. Rini, 2014-Ohio-3328.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 100866
CITY OF CLEVELAND
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
RAEMARIE C. RINI
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cleveland Municipal Court
Case No. 2013 TRD 071577
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, P.J., E.A. Gallagher, J., and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 31, 2014
FOR APPELLANT
Raemarie C. Rini, pro se
7216 Brookside Road
Independence, OH 44131
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara A. Langhenry
Director of Law
City of Cleveland
By: Victor R. Perez
Assistant City Prosecutor
Justice Center - 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
{¶1} Appellant Raemarie C. Rini appeals the decision of the Cleveland Municipal
Court that found her guilty of violating Cleveland Codified Ordinance (“CCO”)
403.02(a). For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the matter for the conviction to be vacated.
{¶2} Appellant was issued a citation on November 24, 2013, for violating CCO
403.02(a), which provides: “a) No person shall fail to comply with any lawful order or
direction of any police officer invested with authority to direct, control, or regulate
traffic.” Appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
{¶3} The case proceeded to trial on December 16, 2013. The state called Officer
Charles Lipscomb to testify. Officer Lipscomb testified that on November 24, 2013, he
was on patrol at the stadium at the Cleveland Browns game and was flagged down by
another officer. He observed Officer Johnson conferring with a female on the side of
West 3rd Street and the Route 2 ramp. Because Officer Johnson was directing traffic,
Officer Lipscomb spoke to appellant and issued her a citation for failure to comply with
the order of the officer who was telling her to stop. Appellant informed Officer
Lipscomb that she did not hear or see Officer Johnson, or realize that Officer Johnson
was pulling pedestrian traffic off the ramp, and that there was a “walk” signal at the time
she was walking across the street. Officer Lipscomb conceded he had not given any
orders to appellant and that appellant complied with his requests for identification and to
sign the citation he issued. Officer Johnson did not testify in the matter.
{¶4} The trial court found appellant guilty, imposed a $25 fine and court costs.
Appellant was also assessed two traffic points. She timely appealed to this court.
{¶5} Initially, we find that although appellant paid the fine and costs associated
with the judgment, the imposition of points is a collateral disability that is sufficient to
preserve the justiciability of an appeal. In re S.J.K., 114 Ohio St.3d 23, 2007-Ohio-2621,
867 N.E.2d 408, ¶ 18.
{¶6} Appellant raises two assignments of error, under which she claims (1) the city
of Cleveland failed to introduce sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under CCO
403.02(a), and (2) Officer Lipscomb’s testimony about the subjective observations of
Officer Johnson was in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. We find merit to both assignments of error.
{¶7} A claim of insufficient evidence raises the question whether the evidence is
legally sufficient to support the verdict as a matter of law. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d 380, 386, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 N.E.2d 541. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge,
“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d
492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶8} In the case at bar, the officer who allegedly observed the violation did not
testify at trial. In order to establish the factual basis of the crime, the state offered
testimony, via Officer Lipscomb, to prove appellant failed to comply with a lawful order
of a police officer. However, Officer Lipscomb did not witness a violation, and he
testified that appellant complied with his orders. Officer Lipscomb wrote the citation
based on the information he learned from Officer Johnson.
{¶9} It is a violation of the Confrontation Clause to admit testimonial statements of
a witness who does not appear at trial unless the witness is unavailable to testify and the
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Officer Lipscomb lacked any
firsthand knowledge of the alleged violation, and his testimony relating to the
observations of Officer Johnson was barred by the operation of the Confrontation Clause.
The trial court erroneously permitted this testimony at trial.
{¶10} Additionally, the only information Officer Lipscomb learned from appellant
was that she did not hear or see Officer Johnson, or realize that he was pulling pedestrian
traffic off the ramp, and that she had a “walk” signal as she was crossing the street. The
city did not present testimony from Officer Johnson to establish a lawful order from a
police officer was given or appellant’s failure to comply therewith.
{¶11} On this record, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to support the
conviction for failing to comply with the lawful order of a police officer in violation of
CCO 403.02(a). Appellant’s two assignments of error are sustained, and we reverse her
conviction.
{¶12} The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court to
vacate the conviction. The trial court shall also order reimbursement of the fine paid and
the removal of the points assessed to appellant’s driving record.
It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the municipal
court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR