[Cite as State v. Buchanan, 2014-Ohio-3282.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 13CA0041-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
SARAH B. BUCHANAN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 12CR0198
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: July 28, 2014
BELFANCE, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Sarah B. Buchanan appeals from the judgment of the
Medina County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I.
{¶2} In the early morning hours of March 18, 2012, Ms. Buchanan drove to the scene
of a traffic stop in Wadsworth with another individual to see if she could reclaim the vehicle
involved in the stop, which was registered to her mother. She parked the vehicle a short distance
from the scene of the stop. As she approached the scene, she encountered Trooper Harley
Steppenbacker of the Ohio State Highway Patrol and asked him if she could retrieve the stopped
vehicle. Based upon the surrounding circumstances, Trooper Steppenbacker became suspicious
that Ms. Buchanan might be linked to the methamphetamine found in the vehicle involved in the
stop or to other criminal activity. While still investigating the situation, Trooper Steppenbacker
walked Ms. Buchanan back to the vehicle she had arrived in and had a drug dog present at the
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scene sniff her vehicle. The dog alerted to several areas of the vehicle. Consequently, a search
of the vehicle was conducted, and drug-related items were found in that vehicle.
{¶3} Ms. Buchanan was initially indicted in April 2012 on one count of illegal
assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamine in violation of
R.C. 2925.041(A). Two additional counts were added in October 2012: one for aggravated
possession of drugs (methamphetamine) in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(a) and one for
possession of cocaine in violation of R.C. 2925(A)(C)(4)(a). Ms. Buchanan filed a motion to
suppress, and the matter proceeded to a hearing. The trial court ultimately denied Ms.
Buchanan’s motion, concluding that, while Trooper Steppenbacker had seized Ms. Buchanan, he
had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that she was engaged in criminal activity and,
thus, was justified in detaining her at the time the drug dog walked around the vehicle.
{¶4} Ms. Buchanan then entered a no contest plea and was sentenced to an aggregate
term of 18 months in prison. She has appealed, raising a single assignment of error for our
review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING SARAH B.
BUCHANAN[’]S MOTION TO SUPPRESS ON THE BASIS THAT A
SEARCH WAS IMPROPERLY CONDUCTED ON HER VEHICLE
RESULTING IN HER CONVICTION.
{¶5} Ms. Buchanan asserts in her sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in
denying her motion to suppress because Trooper Steppenbacker did not have the reasonable
suspicion necessary to detain her.
{¶6} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that
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[a]ppellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and
fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of
trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and
evaluate the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must
accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent,
credible evidence. Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then
independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court,
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.
(Internal citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.
{¶7} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14, Article
1 of the Ohio Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Kinney, 83 Ohio
St.3d 85, 87 (1998). “Searches and seizures without a warrant are per se unreasonable except in
a few well-defined and carefully circumscribed instances.” (Emphasis, internal quotations, and
citation omitted.) State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, ¶ 98.
{¶8} “A seizure occurs when an individual is detained under circumstances in which a
reasonable person would not feel free to leave the scene[. Therefore,] both an investigatory stop
and an arrest constitute 'seizures' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” State v.
Snyder, 9th Dist. Medina No. 06CA0018-M, 2006-Ohio-6911, ¶ 13. Likewise, the Supreme
Court has noted that “not all seizures of the person must be justified by probable cause to arrest
for a crime.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983). “An investigatory stop must be
justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in
criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). “[R]easonable suspicion
can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). Reasonable suspicion requires that the officer
“point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those
facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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{¶9} Likewise, “some brief detentions of personal effects may be so minimally
intrusive of Fourth Amendment interests that strong countervailing governmental interests will
justify a seizure based only on specific articulable facts that the property contains contraband or
evidence of a crime.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983). In considering whether
there is reasonable articulable suspicion, we consider the totality of the circumstances. See State
v. Walker, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25744, 2011-Ohio-5779, ¶ 12.
{¶10} The only two witnesses to testify at the suppression hearing were Trooper
Steppenbacker and Officer Phillip Cantora of the Wadsworth Police Department. In addition to
having other duties, Officer Cantora is a canine handler.
{¶11} Around 1:30 a.m. on March 18, 2012, Trooper Hasler of the Ohio State Highway
Patrol initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle in Wadsworth. After Trooper Hasler noticed a syringe
full of fluid near the driver’s (Shaun Roland’s) leg, Trooper Hasler called for assistance, and
Trooper Steppenbacker came to the scene. Trooper Steppenbacker spoke briefly to Mr. Roland
at which point he indicated that the syringe contained methamphetamine. After speaking with
Mr. Roland, Trooper Steppenbacker noticed that the passenger Sharice Lemon was speaking
“frantically” on her cell phone. Trooper Steppenbacker asked her to hang up the phone and step
out of the vehicle. He then placed Ms. Lemon in the rear of the patrol car, at which time she
admitted to having methamphetamine on her person. Trooper Steppenbacker then called a
female officer to the scene to retrieve the methamphetamine from Ms. Lemon’s person.
{¶12} Trooper Steppenbacker conducted a search of the vehicle and found “coffee
filters, what appeared to be muriatic acid * * *, a bunch of tubing jars, [and] tubing bottles[,]”
items which in Trooper Steppenbacker’s experience were used in the production of
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methamphetamine. At this point, the drug task force was contacted due to the hazardous nature
of some of the substances used in the manufacture of methamphetamine.
{¶13} Trooper Steppenbacker stated that a car pulled up close to the traffic stop up in
front of them off to the right in a parking lot. At that time, there were four police cruisers parked
behind the vehicle Mr. Roland was driving. When he observed the vehicle, Trooper
Steppenbacker called Wadsworth police for backup. The driver of that vehicle, Ms. Buchanan,
approached the scene, told Trooper Steppenbacker that the vehicle involved in the stop was hers,
and asked if she could take it. Trooper Steppenbacker described Ms. Buchanan as “fairly frantic
about getting the vehicle.” He also indicated that she “appeared * * * to be extremely nervous *
* * [and] somewhat shaking. [He] noticed that she had a lot of scratches around her face and
neck and was like picking at herself which is an indication that someone is using
methamphetamine.” Trooper Steppenbacker explained that people who use methamphetamine
get what he described as the “crawlies where they think they have bugs crawling on them so they
pick at themselves.”
{¶14} Trooper Steppenbacker learned that, while the vehicle was actually registered to
Ms. Buchanan’s mother, Ms. Buchanan had loaned the vehicle to Mr. Roland. At this point in
time, Trooper Hasler relayed to Trooper Steppenbacker that “Mr. Roland had told him that [Ms.
Buchanan] should be on the world’s dumbest criminals for coming on a scene where she knows
there is a meth lab in the car.” Trooper Steppenbacker indicated that he then suspected Ms.
Buchanan was involved in criminal activity. Trooper Steppenbacker had Ms. Buchanan produce
her license and was able to quickly determine that she did not have any outstanding warrants,
although he was not certain whether he found that information out before or after the dog sniff.
However, he testified that it took much longer to obtain other information relative to Ms.
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Buchanan’s criminal history. From the transcript, it appears that he did not receive that
information prior to the dog sniff of the vehicle. Trooper Steppenbacker made the decision to go
back to Ms. Buchanan’s vehicle because there was another occupant in the vehicle. He testified
that, because Officer Cantora and his canine, Ozzie, were either on scene or almost at the scene,
he requested that Officer Cantora walk Ozzie around the vehicle that Ms. Buchanan had brought
to the scene. Trooper Steppenbacker testified that, at the point he started walking Ms. Buchanan
back to her vehicle, she was not free to leave because “[t]here was an ongoing investigation.”
Trooper Steppenbacker additionally testified that, despite denying any knowledge of anything
related to the traffic stop and appearing relaxed and well-dressed, the man who accompanied Ms.
Buchanan also was not free to leave due to the ongoing nature of the investigation.
{¶15} Officer Cantora testified that he was called to the scene “for mutual aide to assist
the state highway patrol” and was on the scene when Ms. Buchanan initially approached Trooper
Steppenbacker. Officer Cantora indicated that, because the driver of the vehicle originally
stopped (Mr. Roland) admitted to having drugs, Officer Cantora’s services were not needed for
that vehicle. Officer Cantora stated, that “[a]bout that time, a second vehicle arrived and there
was some discussion about that vehicle and then the driver of that vehicle [(Ms. Buchanan)]
came up, talked to a trooper and then the trooper asked [him] to deploy [his] canine on that
vehicle.” Officer Cantora estimated that less than five minutes elapsed from when he arrived to
when he approached the vehicle to walk Ozzie around it. He also indicated that it took him
approximately between five to ten seconds to walk from the scene of the traffic stop to the
location where Ms. Buchanan’s vehicle was parked. At the time Officer Cantora approached the
car, Ms. Buchanan and a passenger she brought to the scene to keep her company were already
inside the vehicle. Officer Cantora testified that while Ms. Buchanan appeared very nervous, the
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passenger appeared very calm and relaxed. Officer Cantora was also struck by Ms. Buchanan’s
appearance. He testified that he was “very concerned for [her] wellbeing * * *.” He noted that
she “was very thin, [had] sunken cheeks[, and] marks on her face.” Officer Cantora also
described her as having the “[c]rawlies[.]” He testified that, in his training and experience those
characteristics were all indicative of “an individual who is heavily [into] methamphetamine.”
Officer Cantora walked Ozzie around the car and he alerted to three different areas. Trooper
Steppenbacker estimated that approximately ten minutes passed between the time Ms. Buchanan
first arrived on the scene and the time Ozzie alerted. Thereafter, a search was conducted of the
vehicle, and the items that resulted in Ms. Buchanan’s charges were found in the vehicle.
{¶16} All of Ms. Buchanan’s arguments center upon her assertion that officers lacked
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain her. In light of the foregoing, we cannot conclude the
trial court erred in concluding that Trooper Steppenbacker possessed reasonable suspicion such
that he was permitted to detain her while investigating her potential involvement in the criminal
activity just discovered upon stopping Mr. Roland. We note that the police involved in this case
were presented with an unusual situation: while the officers were investigating a routine traffic
stop in the early hours of the morning, a woman, Ms. Buchanan, just showed up on the scene and
essentially inserted herself into the ongoing investigation. Trooper Steppenbacker had observed
Ms. Lemon who, herself possessed drugs, talking frantically on her cell phone. Shortly
thereafter, Ms. Buchanan arrived at the scene, claimed ownership of the stopped vehicle that
contained a meth lab, and sought to retrieve the vehicle. Moreover, Trooper Steppenbacker
discovered that Ms. Buchanan was at least acquainted with Mr. Roland, the driver of the vehicle
containing the methamphetamine and related materials, as she told the trooper that she loaned the
car to Mr. Roland. Further, Mr. Roland’s comment that Ms. Buchanan “should be on the world’s
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dumbest criminals for coming on a scene where she knows there is a meth lab in the car[]” was
relayed to Trooper Steppenbacker prior to detaining Ms. Buchanan. Thus, there was evidence
suggesting that Ms. Buchanan had knowledge that the vehicle she loaned Mr. Roland had or
would have methamphetamine-related materials in it. Additionally, both officers noticed Ms.
Buchanan’s striking appearance and nervous behavior which, based upon their training and
experience, they both associated with methamphetamine use.
{¶17} Given all of the foregoing circumstances, Trooper Steppenbacker possessed
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Ms. Buchanan was engaged in criminal activity, i.e. that
she was involved in the manufacture and/or use of methamphetamines. Further, given the
unexpected nature of Ms. Buchanan’s arrival on the scene of a not-yet-completed traffic stop, her
nervous behavior, and her possible association with methamphetamine-related materials found in
her mother’s car, we cannot say that it was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case for
Trooper Steppenbacker to walk Ms. Buchanan to her car so that the integrity and security of the
scene could be maintained and so that Trooper Steppenbacker could determine the identity of the
person sitting in the vehicle. The police already had two individuals in their custody and had
called the drug task force to the scene in light of the chemicals discovered in the vehicle. From
the transcript it can be reasonably deduced that the scene was busy, and there is little doubt that
Ms. Buchanan’s unexpected appearance on the scene caused further disruption and a need to
investigate. In addition, it is evident that there were significant concerns for the safety of the
officers and of the people involved in the stop due to the presence of dangerous chemicals
associated with manufacturing methamphetamine and the inherent dangers associated with
dealing with drug-related crime. Accordingly, under the circumstances, walking Ms. Buchanan
to her car was reasonable, particularly when there was an unknown individual waiting in that
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vehicle. Thus, to the extent that Ms. Buchanan’s argument is founded upon the notion that
moving her to her vehicle was impermissible due to the absence of reasonable articulable
suspicion, we do not find merit in that argument.
{¶18} Likewise, we note that this is not a situation in which police continued to detain
an individual while awaiting the arrival of a drug dog. In the instant matter, at the point in time
when Trooper Steppenbacker first possessed reasonable suspicion the drug dog was either just
arriving at the scene or was already at the scene. Ms. Buchanan does not challenge the duration
of her detention or assert that there was any delay in walking the drug dog around the vehicle.
Nor does Ms. Buchanan assert that the investigation was completed or that the reasonable
suspicion possessed by police had been dispelled. In fact, it is clear from the record that Trooper
Steppenbacker’s investigation was ongoing when he walked Ms. Buchanan back to her car.
Instead, the foundation of her argument is that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion
present to detain her at all, for any length of time.
{¶19} Accordingly, in light of the record before us and the limited argument made on
appeal, we conclude that detention of Ms. Buchanan when the drug dog walked around the
vehicle occurred at a point in time when police investigation of Ms. Buchanan was underway
based upon reasonable suspicion that Ms. Buchanan was involved in criminal activity. Thus, we
do not find merit in the limited argument before us.
{¶20} We overrule Ms. Buchanan’s sole assignment of error.
III.
{¶21} In light of the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the Medina County Court of
Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
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There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
EVE V. BELFANCE
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, J.
CONCURS.
CARR, J.
CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
{¶22} I concur in the majority’s opinion with the exception of the discussion in
paragraph 18.
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APPEARANCES:
JOHN M. CELEBREZZE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DEAN HOLMAN, Prosecuting Attorney, and MATTHEW A. KERN, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.